contractual clause in Colorado

2017Thus, recognizing the necessity of privity of contract for breach of implied warranty claims is consistent with the boundary between tort and contract claims. 6 See Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Colo.2000) (adopting the economic loss rule, which provides that a party who suffers only economic harm may recover damages for that harm based only upon a contractual claim and not on a tort theory, such as negligence or strict liability, in order to “maintain the boundary between tort law and contract law”).

2012In Robinson v. Colorado State Lottery, the court expressly acknowledged its seminal economic loss rule case, Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256 (Colo.2000), and nonetheless held that in areas where there is overlap, "claims that could arise in both tort and contract are barred by the CGIA." 179 P.3d at 1004 ("In deed, certain common law tort claims that are expressly intended to remedy economic loss such as fraud or negligent misrepresentation can exist independent of or in conjunction with a contractual claim.

2008Co. v. Stein, 940 P.2d 384, 387 (Colo.1997) (when a contractual clause is clear and unambiguous, courts should neither rewrite it nor limit its effect by a strained construction).

2001State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Stein, 940 P.2d 384 (Colo.1997).

2017Noble v. Ogborn, 43 Wash.App. 387 , 717 P.2d 285, 286 (1986); 5 see also, Sampson v. McAdoo, 47 Md.App. 602 , 425 A.2d 1, 3 (Md.

2017Noble v. Ogborn, 43 Wash.App. 387 , 717 P.2d 285, 286 (1986); 5 see also, Sampson v. McAdoo, 47 Md.App. 602 , 425 A.2d 1, 3 (Md.

2017Noble v. Ogborn, 43 Wash.App. 387 , 717 P.2d 285, 286 (1986); 5 see also, Sampson v. McAdoo, 47 Md.App. 602 , 425 A.2d 1, 3 (Md.

2017Noble v. Ogborn, 43 Wash.App. 387 , 717 P.2d 285, 286 (1986); 5 see also, Sampson v. McAdoo, 47 Md.App. 602 , 425 A.2d 1, 3 (Md.

2012See id. at 1179 (failure to exhaust remedies provided by contract does not result in lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Vaca, 386 U.S. at 184 , 87 S.Ct. 903 . 145 Because a court is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction when an employee fails to exhaust contractual remedies, a summary judgment motion is the appropriate method to decide a dispute as to exhaustion, and not a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion, which concerns subject matter jurisdiction.

2012See id. at 1179 (failure to exhaust remedies provided by contract does not result in lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Vaca, 386 U.S. at 184 , 87 S.Ct. 903 . 145 Because a court is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction when an employee fails to exhaust contractual remedies, a summary judgment motion is the appropriate method to decide a dispute as to exhaustion, and not a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion, which concerns subject matter jurisdiction.

2012In Robinson v. Colorado State Lottery, the court expressly acknowledged its seminal economic loss rule case, Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256 (Colo.2000), and nonetheless held that in areas where there is overlap, "claims that could arise in both tort and contract are barred by the CGIA." 179 P.3d at 1004 ("In deed, certain common law tort claims that are expressly intended to remedy economic loss such as fraud or negligent misrepresentation can exist independent of or in conjunction with a contractual claim.

2012See id. at 1179 (failure to exhaust remedies provided by contract does not result in lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Vaca, 386 U.S. at 184 , 87 S.Ct. 903 . 145 Because a court is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction when an employee fails to exhaust contractual remedies, a summary judgment motion is the appropriate method to decide a dispute as to exhaustion, and not a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion, which concerns subject matter jurisdiction.

2008See § 18-21-102.5(6)(a)(I), C.R.S.2008 (no recovery of noneconomic losses in a claim for breach of contract unless conditions not present here are met); Decker v. Browning, Ferris Indus. of Colo., Inc., 931 P.2d 436, 446 (Colo.1997) (exemplary damages not allowed when only claim is for breach of contract).

2000See People v. Smith, 754 P.2d 1168 (Colo.1988) (pendency of civil suit between criminal and victim does not affect court's duty to order restitution; statutory language is not discretionary); People v. Phillips, 732 P.2d 1226 (Colo.App.1986) (an insurer's contractual waiver of its right to recover pursuant to policy in no way affects restitution decision).

1990See Johnson v. Eagle, 355 P.2d 868 (Okla.1960); Imperial Assurance Co. v. Joseph Supornick & Son, 184 F.2d 930 (8th Cir.1950).

1990See Johnson v. Eagle, 355 P.2d 868 (Okla.1960); Imperial Assurance Co. v. Joseph Supornick & Son, 184 F.2d 930 (8th Cir.1950).

1981Stolz v. Wells, 43 S.W.2d 163 (Tex.Civ.App.1931); Derry v. Board of Education, 102 Mich. 631 , 61 N.W. 61 (1894); See Raynor v. Burroughs Corp., supra. We adopt these rules as applicable to the factual circumstances of this case.

1980In Samuelson v. Chutich, 187 Colo. 155, 159 , 529 P.2d 631, 633-34 (1974), we adopted Justice Traynor’s statement in Gagne v. Bertram, 43 Cal.2d 481 , 275 P.2d 15 (1954), on a contractor’s duty to its customer in the performance of a service contract: “ ‘The services of experts are sought because of their special skill.

1980In Samuelson v. Chutich, 187 Colo. 155, 159 , 529 P.2d 631, 633-34 (1974), we adopted Justice Traynor’s statement in Gagne v. Bertram, 43 Cal.2d 481 , 275 P.2d 15 (1954), on a contractor’s duty to its customer in the performance of a service contract: “ ‘The services of experts are sought because of their special skill.