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10 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Waara v. Kanegreen1 sentence2025See Waara v. Kane, 269 N.W.2d 395, 397 (S.D. 1978) (“The contractual defense of duress requires that there has been such constraint upon the complainant that the complainant was forced to act against his own free will.” (citation omitted)). [¶32.] Regardless of which test is used here, the plaintiffs are unable to sustain their claim of economic duress, and the circuit court correctly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2022Our conclusion is also consistent with Minnesota law that “[a] contractual forum selection clause is not governed by the rules relating to venue and jurisdiction, but rather by the rules of contractual defenses.” OT Indus., Inc., 346 N.W.2d at 168 ; see also Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1982) (finding that the rules for waiver of a contractual defense, not the rules of venue and jurisdiction, govern a case involving a forum selection clause). | 1 | 1 |
Subsurfco, Inc. v. B-Y Water Districtgreen1 sentence2022To support the defense of waiver, there must be a showing of a clear, unequivocal and decisive act or acts showing an intention to relinquish the existing right.” Norwest Bank S.D., N.A. v. Venners, 440 N.W.2d 774, 775 (S.D. 1989) (quoting Subsurfco, Inc. v. B–Y Water Dist., 337 N.W.2d 448, 456 (S.D. 1983)). 2 Robinson’s letter put Northland on notice that he objected to the lawsuit being filed in Spink County and requested the action be moved to Stearns County. | 1 | 1 |
Norwest Bank South Dakota, N.A. v. Vennersgreen1 sentence2022To support the defense of waiver, there must be a showing of a clear, unequivocal and decisive act or acts showing an intention to relinquish the existing right.” Norwest Bank S.D., N.A. v. Venners, 440 N.W.2d 774, 775 (S.D. 1989) (quoting Subsurfco, Inc. v. B–Y Water Dist., 337 N.W.2d 448, 456 (S.D. 1983)). 2 Robinson’s letter put Northland on notice that he objected to the lawsuit being filed in Spink County and requested the action be moved to Stearns County. | 1 | 1 |
Hicks v. Brookings Mall, Inc.green1 sentence2007For purposes of this contractual analysis, we must assume that reasonable suspicion did not exist. [¶ 13.] Pursley cites Ziegler Furniture and Funeral Home, Inc. v. Cicmanec, 2006 SD 6, ¶ 25 , 709 N.W.2d 350, 357 ; Campion v. Parkview Apartments, 1999 SD 10, ¶ 34 , 588 N.W.2d 897, 903 ; and, Hicks v. Brookings Mall, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 54, 56 (S.D.1984), for the contract principle that ambiguities should be construed against the drafter. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Isaac v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2013Consequently, “the portion of attorney’s fees related to the bad faith -16- #26442 claim, as opposed to the contractual claim, should [be] excluded.” Isaac, 522 N.W.2d at 763 . [¶32.] In this case, Bertelsen initially submitted a request for $534,230 in attorney’s fees. 2013Consequently, “the portion of attorney’s fees related to the bad faith claim, as opposed to the contractual claim, should [be] excluded.” Isaac, 522 N.W.2d at 763 . [¶ 32.] In this case, Bertelsen initially submitted a request for $534,230 in attorney’s fees. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
OT Industries, Inc. v. OT-tehdas Oy Santasalo-Sohlberg AB
green
1 sentence2022Our conclusion is also consistent with Minnesota law that “[a] contractual forum selection clause is not governed by the rules relating to venue and jurisdiction, but rather by the rules of contractual defenses.” OT Indus., Inc., 346 N.W.2d at 168 ; see also Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1982) (finding that the rules for waiver of a contractual defense, not the rules of venue and jurisdiction, govern a case involving a forum selection clause). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Campion v. Parkview Apartments
green
2 sentences2007For purposes of this contractual analysis, we must assume that reasonable suspicion did not exist. [¶ 13.] Pursley cites Ziegler Furniture and Funeral Home, Inc. v. Cicmanec, 2006 SD 6, ¶ 25 , 709 N.W.2d 350, 357 ; Campion v. Parkview Apartments, 1999 SD 10, ¶ 34 , 588 N.W.2d 897, 903 ; and, Hicks v. Brookings Mall, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 54, 56 (S.D.1984), for the contract principle that ambiguities should be construed against the drafter. 2007For purposes of this contractual analysis, we must assume that reasonable suspicion did not exist. [¶ 13.] Pursley cites Ziegler Furniture and Funeral Home, Inc. v. Cicmanec, 2006 SD 6, ¶ 25 , 709 N.W.2d 350, 357 ; Campion v. Parkview Apartments, 1999 SD 10, ¶ 34 , 588 N.W.2d 897, 903 ; and, Hicks v. Brookings Mall, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 54, 56 (S.D.1984), for the contract principle that ambiguities should be construed against the drafter. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Ziegler Furniture & Funeral Home, Inc. v. Cicmanec
green
2 sentences2007For purposes of this contractual analysis, we must assume that reasonable suspicion did not exist. [¶ 13.] Pursley cites Ziegler Furniture and Funeral Home, Inc. v. Cicmanec, 2006 SD 6, ¶ 25 , 709 N.W.2d 350, 357 ; Campion v. Parkview Apartments, 1999 SD 10, ¶ 34 , 588 N.W.2d 897, 903 ; and, Hicks v. Brookings Mall, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 54, 56 (S.D.1984), for the contract principle that ambiguities should be construed against the drafter. 2007For purposes of this contractual analysis, we must assume that reasonable suspicion did not exist. [¶ 13.] Pursley cites Ziegler Furniture and Funeral Home, Inc. v. Cicmanec, 2006 SD 6, ¶ 25 , 709 N.W.2d 350, 357 ; Campion v. Parkview Apartments, 1999 SD 10, ¶ 34 , 588 N.W.2d 897, 903 ; and, Hicks v. Brookings Mall, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 54, 56 (S.D.1984), for the contract principle that ambiguities should be construed against the drafter. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Richard E. Shaw v. Republic Drill Corporation
green
2 sentences2000Its sole "authority" is Shaw v. Republic Drill Corp., 810 F.2d 149 (7th Cir.1987) wherein the federal court in a two paragraph opinion refused to uphold an employee's contractual claim because the employee failed to cite any Illinois cases which supported his position and the federal court felt it improper to speculate how the Illinois courts would decide the issue. 2000Its sole "authority” is Shaw v. Republic Drill Corp., 810 F.2d 149 (7th Cir.1987) wherein the federal court in a two paragraph opinion refused to uphold an employee’s contractual claim because the employee failed to cite any Illinois cases which supported his position and the federal court felt it improper to speculate how the Illinois courts would decide the issue. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Crabb v. National Indemnity Company
green
2 sentences1994Crabb, 205 N.W.2d at 639 . 1994Crabb, 205 N.W.2d at 639 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States
green
2 sentences1988"General statements of policy [in a personnel handbook] do not meet the contractual requirement of an offer [sufficient to create an employment contract]." Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn.1986), citing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); see Hunt v. I.B.M. 1988“General statements of policy [in a personnel handbook] do not meet the contractual requirement of an offer [sufficient to create an employment contract].” Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn.1986), citing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn.1983); see Hunt v. I.B.M. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille
green
2 sentences1988"General statements of policy [in a personnel handbook] do not meet the contractual requirement of an offer [sufficient to create an employment contract]." Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn.1986), citing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); see Hunt v. I.B.M. 1988“General statements of policy [in a personnel handbook] do not meet the contractual requirement of an offer [sufficient to create an employment contract].” Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn.1986), citing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn.1983); see Hunt v. I.B.M. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Hunt v. IBM Mid America Employees Federal Credit Union
green
2 sentences1988Mid American Employee's Federal Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853 , 857 fn. 8 (Minn.1986); see also L. 1988Mid American Employee’s Federal Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853 , 857 fn. 8 (Minn.1986); see also L. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Joshua Stonecipher v. William E. Bray
green
1 sentence1982Indeed, a contractual clause providing otherwise might very well be invalid as contrary to public policy. 653 F.2d at 403 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Buhrman v. International Harvester Company
green
2 sentences1978Buhrman v. International Harvester Company, 181 Neb. 633 , 150 N.W.2d 220 (1967). 1978Buhrman v. International Harvester Company, 181 Neb. 633 , 150 N.W.2d 220 (1967). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.