61 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1958–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Leodori v. Cigna Corp.green2 sentences2019Whenever a consumer waives constitutional or statutory rights through a contractual waiver-of-rights provision, our courts have required a showing that the party " 'has agreed clearly and unambiguously' to its terms." Id. at 443, 99 A.3d 306 (quoting *940 Leodori v. CIGNA Corp. , 175 N.J. 293 , 302, 814 A.2d 1098 (2003) ). "[B]ecause arbitration involves a waiver of the right to pursue a case in a judicial forum, 'courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent.' " Id. at 442-43 , 99 A 2019Whenever a consumer waives constitutional or statutory rights through a contractual waiver-of-rights provision, our courts have required a showing that the party " 'has agreed clearly and unambiguously' to its terms." Id. at 443, 99 A.3d 306 (quoting *940 Leodori v. CIGNA Corp. , 175 N.J. 293 , 302, 814 A.2d 1098 (2003) ). "[B]ecause arbitration involves a waiver of the right to pursue a case in a judicial forum, 'courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent.' " Id. at 442-43 , 99 A | 4 | 5 |
In the Matter of the Estate of Solomon Z. Balkgreen2 sentences2026A-3502-23 8 N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 sets a six-year statute of limitations "for replevin of goods or chattel" and "for and recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied." N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1(a); see also O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 489 (1980) (applying a six-year statute of limitations to a replevin action); In re Est. of Balk, 445 N.J. 2026A-3502-23 8 N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 sets a six-year statute of limitations "for replevin of goods or chattel" and "for and recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied." N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1(a); see also O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 489 (1980) (applying a six-year statute of limitations to a replevin action); In re Est. of Balk, 445 N.J. | 4 | 4 |
Fox v. Millmangreen2 sentences2024Laches, A-2620-21 24 on the other hand, remains an equitable doctrine, utilized to achieve fairness." Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 422 (2012). 2019N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 imposes a six-year statute of limitations for "recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied . . . ." The primary purpose of the statute of limitations is to "compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend." Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 415 (2012) (quoting Hous. | 3 | 3 |
Patricia Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P. (072314)green2 sentences2019Whenever a consumer waives constitutional or statutory rights through a contractual waiver-of-rights provision, our courts have required a showing that the party " 'has agreed clearly and unambiguously' to its terms." Id. at 443, 99 A.3d 306 (quoting *940 Leodori v. CIGNA Corp. , 175 N.J. 293 , 302, 814 A.2d 1098 (2003) ). "[B]ecause arbitration involves a waiver of the right to pursue a case in a judicial forum, 'courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent.' " Id. at 442-43 , 99 A 2019Whenever a consumer waives constitutional or statutory rights through a contractual waiver-of-rights provision, our courts have required a showing that the party " 'has agreed clearly and unambiguously' to its terms." Id. at 443, 99 A.3d 306 (quoting *940 Leodori v. CIGNA Corp. , 175 N.J. 293 , 302, 814 A.2d 1098 (2003) ). "[B]ecause arbitration involves a waiver of the right to pursue a case in a judicial forum, 'courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent.' " Id. at 442-43 , 99 A | 2 | 3 |
Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A.green2 sentences2019A contractual waiver of the right to pursue a claim in court must be "clearly and unmistakably established." Id. at 444 (quoting Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001)). 2019In particular, a contractual waiver of the right to pursue a claim in court must be "clearly and unmistakably established." Id. at 444 (quoting Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001)). | 2 | 3 |
Metromedia Co. v. Hartz Mountain Associatesgreen2 sentences2026Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, "Every action at law for . . . recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied, . . . shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued." "[F]or purposes of determining when a cause of action accrues so that the A-3336-24 9 applicable period of limitation commences to run, the relevant question is when did the party seeking to bring the action have an enforceable right." Metromedia Co. v. Hartz Mountain Assocs., 139 N.J. 532, 535 (1995) (quoting Andreaggi v. Relis, 171 N.J. 2025The statute of limitations begins when "the party seeking to bring the action ha[s] an enforceable right." Metromedia Co. v. Hartz Mountain Assocs., 139 N.J. 532, 535 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Desiderio v. D'AMBROSIOgreen2 sentences2020In pertinent part, by its plain terms N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applies only to "action[s] at law . . . for recovery upon a contractual claim or liability." See Desiderio v. D'Ambrosio, 190 N.J. 2020In pertinent part, by its plain terms N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applies only to "action[s] at law . . . for recovery upon a contractual claim or liability." See Desiderio v. D'Ambrosio, 190 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Grunwald v. Bronkeshgreen2 sentences2019The applicable period of limitations runs when a plaintiff "knows or should know the facts underlying" the elements of a cause of action, rather than "when a plaintiff learns the legal effect of those facts." Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 493 (1993) (citing Burd v. N.J. 2019The applicable period of limitations runs when a plaintiff "knows or should know the facts underlying" the elements of a cause of action, rather than "when a plaintiff learns the legal effect of those facts." Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 493 (1993) (citing Burd v. N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Knorr v. Smealgreen2 sentences2019Whenever a consumer waives constitutional or statutory rights through a contractual waiver -of-rights provision, our courts have required a showing that the party "'has agreed clearly and unambiguously' to its terms." Id. at 443 (quoting Leodori v. Cigna Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 302 (2003)). "[B]ecause arbitration involves a waiver of the right A-2378-17T4 12 to pursue a case in a judicial forum, 'courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent.'" Id. at 442-43 (quoting Foulke, 421 N.J. 2017Because "[w]aiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right," Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003), there cannot be a clear and unambiguous agreement to waive without a "mutual understanding" of the terms of the waiver. | 1 | 2 |
Newark Publishers' Ass'n v. Newark Typographical Union No. 103green1 sentence2026See Newark Publishers' Ass'n v. Newark Typographical Union, No. 103, 22 N.J. 419, 427 (1956) ("Evidence of the circumstances [regarding a contractual clause] is always admissible in aid of the interpretation of an integrated agreement . . ." A-0608-24 6 but courts "are not at liberty to introduce and effectuate some supposed unrevealed intention. | 1 | 1 |
Andreaggi v. Relisgreen1 sentence2026Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, "Every action at law for . . . recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied, . . . shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued." "[F]or purposes of determining when a cause of action accrues so that the A-3336-24 9 applicable period of limitation commences to run, the relevant question is when did the party seeking to bring the action have an enforceable right." Metromedia Co. v. Hartz Mountain Assocs., 139 N.J. 532, 535 (1995) (quoting Andreaggi v. Relis, 171 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Richard Catena v. Raytheon Companygreen1 sentence2026Thus, a claim must be filed within six years of when a plaintiff knows "or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he [or she] may have a basis for an actionable claim." Catena v. Raytheon Co., 447 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
O'KEEFFE v. Snydergreen2 sentences2026A-3502-23 8 N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 sets a six-year statute of limitations "for replevin of goods or chattel" and "for and recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied." N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1(a); see also O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 489 (1980) (applying a six-year statute of limitations to a replevin action); In re Est. of Balk, 445 N.J. 2026A-3502-23 8 N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 sets a six-year statute of limitations "for replevin of goods or chattel" and "for and recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied." N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1(a); see also O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 489 (1980) (applying a six-year statute of limitations to a replevin action); In re Est. of Balk, 445 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.green1 sentence2025N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1(a) states in relevant part: Every action at law . . . for recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied, not under seal, or upon an account other than one which concerns the trade or merchandise between merchant and merchant, their factors, agents and servants, shall be commenced A-1182-24 8 within six years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued. [(Emphasis added).] "[T]he determination of when a cause of action accrues is a question of law for the court." Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 209 N.J. 173, 206 (2012) (Wefing, J., dissent | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ercolanogreen1 sentence2024Linden, 251 N.J. at 428 (quoting State v. Ercolano, 335 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Kopin v. Orange Products, Inc.green1 sentence2024Kopin v. Orange Prods., Inc., 297 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
In re Deighangreen1 sentence2023Ass'n, Inc. v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, 230 N.J. 427, 443 (2017). | 1 | 1 |
Serico v. Rothberggreen1 sentence2020"A high-low agreement, like the one at issue in this case, is '[a] settlement in which a defendant agrees to pay the plaintiff a minimum recovery in return for the plaintiff's agreement to accept a maximum amount regardless of the outcome at trial.'" Serico v. Rothberg, 234 N.J. 168, 177 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 797 (9th ed. 2009)). | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co.green1 sentence2020Although the CFA's original purpose was to "combat 'sharp practices and dealings' that victimized consumers by luring them into purchases through fraudulent or deceptive means," Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 16 (1994) (quoting D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 206 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp.green1 sentence2020Although the CFA's original purpose was to "combat 'sharp practices and dealings' that victimized consumers by luring them into purchases through fraudulent or deceptive means," Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 16 (1994) (quoting D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 206 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc.green1 sentence2019Whether there is mutual assent to arbitrate depends on "the intent expressed or apparent in the writing," Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 300 (2003), considering "the contractual terms, the surrounding circumstances, and the purpose of the contract." Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 282 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Verdicchio v. Riccagreen1 sentence2019See Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004) (regarding the similar standards for directed verdict and a new trial accord ing the non-moving party the benefit of all legitimate inferences from the evidence). | 1 | 1 |
Union City Housing Authority v. Commonwealth Trust Co.green1 sentence2019Auth. of Union City v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 25 N.J. 330, 335 (1957)). | 1 | 1 |
Pope v. Kingsleygreen1 sentence2014Id. at 96-97, 367 A.2d 878 (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Madanes v. Madanesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lavin v. Hackensack Bd. of Ed.green | 1 | 1 |
| State Ex Rel. Bingaman v. Valley Savings & Loan Associationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nathan Agar and Christina Edith Agar v. Commissioner of Internal Revenuegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mason K. Knuckles and Bernice A. Knuckles v. Commissioner of Internal Revenuegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Villaume v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schenkel v. Schenkelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
NAACP of Camden County East v. Foulke Management Corp.
green
2 sentences2019Whenever a consumer waives constitutional or statutory rights through a contractual waiver-of-rights provision, our courts have required a showing that the party " 'has agreed clearly and unambiguously' to its terms." Id. at 443, 99 A.3d 306 (quoting *940 Leodori v. CIGNA Corp. , 175 N.J. 293 , 302, 814 A.2d 1098 (2003) ). "[B]ecause arbitration involves a waiver of the right to pursue a case in a judicial forum, 'courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent.' " Id. at 442-43 , 99 A 2019Whenever a consumer waives constitutional or statutory rights through a contractual waiver -of-rights provision, our courts have required a showing that the party "'has agreed clearly and unambiguously' to its terms." Id. at 443 (quoting Leodori v. Cigna Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 302 (2003)). "[B]ecause arbitration involves a waiver of the right A-2378-17T4 12 to pursue a case in a judicial forum, 'courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent.'" Id. at 442-43 (quoting Foulke, 421 N.J. | 4 | 2019–2019 |
Red Bk. Reg. Ed. Assn. v. RED BK. REG. HIGH SCH. BD.
green
2 sentences2010Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 122, 140 , 393 A. 2d 267 (1978) (observing that the "propriety of a contractual waiver of statutory rights is well-established"). 2010Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 122, 140 , 393 A. 2d 267 (1978) (observing that the "propriety of a contractual waiver of statutory rights is well-established"). | 3 | 2001–2010 |
In Re Poly-America, L.P.
green
1 sentence2025Plaintiffs note "[t]here is no question that Texas does not require a clear and explicit waiver requirement with regard to [c]onstitutional and statutory rights," citing Poly-America L.P., 262 S.W.3d at 349 .7 On the contrary, plaintiffs assert New Jersey's "clear and express waiver principle is a general contract principle" applicable to all "New Jersey contracts that purport to waive a statutory or [c]onstitutional right," citing Atalese. 7 During oral argument in the trial court, defendants' counsel acknowledged "[t]here[ i]s a conflict between New Jersey and Texas law." A-3741-23 14 We con | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In the Matter of Del Tufo
green
1 sentence2019Super. at 425 , 24 A.3d 777 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Globe Motor Company v. Ilya Igdalev(074996)
green
1 sentence2019That statute provides, in relevant part, "[e]very action at law . . . for recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied, not under seal . . . shall be commenced within [six] years next after the cause of action shall have accrued." Ibid. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Recognizing that the Illinois claim “might well involve attention to the same factual considerations as the contractual determination of whether [the employee] was fired for just cause,” the Court “disagree[d] with the [Seventh Circuit’s] conclusion that such parallelism renders the state-law analysis dependent upon the contractual analysis.” Id. at 408 , 108 S.Ct. at 1883 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 420 . 2016Recognizing that the Illinois claim “might well involve attention to the same factual considerations as the contractual determination of whether [the employee] was fired for just cause,” the Court “disagree[d] with the [Seventh Circuit’s] conclusion that such parallelism renders the state-law analysis dependent upon the contractual analysis.” Id. at 408 , 108 S.Ct. at 1883 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 420 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In Re the Estate of Lingle green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Olkusz v. Brown green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Alamo Rent a Car, Inc. v. Galarza green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Epix v. MARSH & McLENNAN COMPANIES green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Exxon Corp. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Pinto v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Dunn v. Praiss green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| LaFage v. Jani green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| HIGHLAND LAKES COUNTY CLUB & COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION v. Franzino neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Shea v. Global Travel Marketing, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Alloway v. General Marine Industries, L.P. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Couri v. Gardner green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Rickenbach v. Noecker Shipbuilding Co. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Eskofot A/S v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Ribeira & Lourenco v. Jackson Health green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| AGS Computers, Inc. v. Bear, Stearns Co. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Wright-Moore Corporation, Cross-Appellee v. Ricoh Corporation, Cross-Appellant green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| NJ HIGHER ED. ASSISTANCE v. Carlock green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Kalman Floor Co., Inc. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| In Re Local 195, IFPTE green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Large v. Township Committee neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| County of Warren v. Harden green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| First National Bank of Brownsville v. Fleitmann green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| First National Bank of Brownsville v. Fleitmann green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Miller v. ZURICH GEN. ACCIDENT AND LIABILITY INS. green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Reese v. Laymon green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.