contractual defense in Utah

2011See Robinson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 , cert. denied, 241 P.3d 771 (Utah 2010); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 38 (Utah Ct.App.1993); Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 . "'Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.'" Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 ); see

2011See Robinson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 , cert. denied, 241 P.3d 771 (Utah 2010); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 38 (Utah Ct.App.1993); Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 . "'Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.'" Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 ); see

2024Stated another way, HCQIA “does not create a private cause of action,” Hancock v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 21 F.3d 373, 374 (10th Cir. 1994), much less a private cause of action that overrides a hospital’s contractual immunity from suit. ¶17 The additional extent of Cottam’s argument in his principal brief against enforcement of the Bylaws’ immunity provisions consists solely of the following recycled text from his memorandum below: that the Hospital’s credentialing and peer review procedures will comply with HCQIA.

2024Stated another way, HCQIA “does not create a private cause of action,” Hancock v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 21 F.3d 373, 374 (10th Cir. 1994), much less a private cause of action that overrides a hospital’s contractual immunity from suit. ¶17 The additional extent of Cottam’s argument in his principal brief against enforcement of the Bylaws’ immunity provisions consists solely of the following recycled text from his memorandum below: that the Hospital’s credentialing and peer review procedures will comply with HCQIA.

2024See generally Jacob v. Cross, 2012 UT App 190, ¶ 3 , 283 P.3d 539 (per curiam) (“[The appellant] fails to provide any factual or legal basis to support these conclusory statements.

2024See generally Jacob v. Cross, 2012 UT App 190, ¶ 3 , 283 P.3d 539 (per curiam) (“[The appellant] fails to provide any factual or legal basis to support these conclusory statements.

2023See In re EBC I, Inc., 356 B.R. 631, 640 (Bankr.

2015Id. (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Trinity Universal, 75 S.W.3d at 12 (explaining that courts using the "source of coverage" approach interpret the waiver as precluding recovery of all damages covered by a policy if "the owner's policy was broad enough to cover both Work and Non-Work property and ... the policy paid for damages" (emphasis added)) 7 And in jurisdictions applying the "type of damages" approach, the waiver is necessarily limited to Work damage because that approach interprets the contractual waiver as being limited to the seope of the obl

2015Trinity Universal, 75 S.W.3d at 11 (explaining that in "type of damages" cases, the waiver "bars subrogation only for those damages covered by insurance provided to meet the requirement of protecting the contractor's limited interest in the building-ie., damages to the Work itself").

2011See Robinson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 , cert. denied, 241 P.3d 771 (Utah 2010); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 38 (Utah Ct.App.1993); Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 . "'Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.'" Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 ); see

2011See Robinson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 , cert. denied, 241 P.3d 771 (Utah 2010); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 38 (Utah Ct.App.1993); Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 . "'Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.'" Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 ); see

2011See Robinson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 , cert. denied, 241 P.3d 771 (Utah 2010); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 38 (Utah Ct.App.1993); Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 . "'Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.'" Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 ); see

2011See Robinson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 , cert. denied, 241 P.3d 771 (Utah 2010); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 38 (Utah Ct.App.1993); Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 . "'Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.'" Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 ); see

2011In support of such a liberal application of the impossibility defense, Kilgore cites, without any discussion or analysis, to Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1982), and section 74.15 of Corbin on Contracts, see 14 James P. Nehf, Corbin on Contracts, § 74.15, at 90 (2001).

2011See Robinson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 , cert. denied, 241 P.3d 771 (Utah 2010); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 38 (Utah Ct.App.1993); Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 . "'Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.'" Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 ); see

2011See Robinson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 , cert. denied, 241 P.3d 771 (Utah 2010); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 38 (Utah Ct.App.1993); Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 . "'Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.'" Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 12 , 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 ); see

2010If the parties harbor only mistaken expectations as to the course of future events and their assumptions as to facts existing at the time of the contract are correct, rescission is not proper.” Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 3, ¶ 17 , 178 P.3d 886 (quoting Mooney v. GR & Assocs., 746 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah Ct.App.1987)).

2007Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 1978); Quealy v. Amderson, 714 P.2d 667, 668-69 (Utah 1986). {12 Because Bilanzich cannot establish a contractual claim to attorney fees, we next consider whether Utah Code section 78-27-56.5 grants authority to the district court to award attorney fees and costs to Bilanzich.

2007Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 1978); Quealy v. Anderson, 714 P.2d 667, 668-69 (Utah 1986). ¶ 12 Because Bilanzich cannot establish a contractual claim to attorney fees, we next consider whether Utah Code section 78-27-56.5 grants authority to the district court to award attorney fees and costs to Bilanzich.

2007Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 1978); Quealy v. Amderson, 714 P.2d 667, 668-69 (Utah 1986). {12 Because Bilanzich cannot establish a contractual claim to attorney fees, we next consider whether Utah Code section 78-27-56.5 grants authority to the district court to award attorney fees and costs to Bilanzich.

2007Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 1978); Quealy v. Anderson, 714 P.2d 667, 668-69 (Utah 1986). ¶ 12 Because Bilanzich cannot establish a contractual claim to attorney fees, we next consider whether Utah Code section 78-27-56.5 grants authority to the district court to award attorney fees and costs to Bilanzich.

2002See, Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107-08 (Utah 1991). 139 An assignment is interpreted as is any other contract.

1993Western Properties v. Southern Utah Aviation, 776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah App.1989) (footnotes omitted); see also Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1978) (“a party may be relieved of performing an obligation under a contract where supervening events, unforeseeable at the time the contract is made, render performance of the contract impossible”).

1987See Strevell-Paterson, 646 P.2d at 744 .