contractual claim in North Dakota

2021The district court’s order applied the same findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its decision that both were applicable: that the annexation of the property by the City and the use of the modules for housing becoming illegal was unforeseeable, and it was a basic assumption of the parties that these events would not occur. [¶18] “This Court has recognized the doctrine of frustration of purpose may be used to avoid all or part of a contractual claim.” City of Harwood v. City of Reiles Acres, 2015 ND 33, ¶ 18 , 859 N.W.2d 13 (citing Silbernagel v. Silbernagel, 2011 ND 140, ¶ 13 , 80

2015Silbernagel v. Silbernagel, 2011 ND 140, ¶ 13 , 800 N.W.2d 320 ; WFND, LLC v. Fargo Marc, LLC, 2007 ND 67, ¶ 18 , 730 N.W.2d 841 .

2021The district court’s order applied the same findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its decision that both were applicable: that the annexation of the property by the City and the use of the modules for housing becoming illegal was unforeseeable, and it was a basic assumption of the parties that these events would not occur. [¶18] “This Court has recognized the doctrine of frustration of purpose may be used to avoid all or part of a contractual claim.” City of Harwood v. City of Reiles Acres, 2015 ND 33, ¶ 18 , 859 N.W.2d 13 (citing Silbernagel v. Silbernagel, 2011 ND 140, ¶ 13 , 80

2015Silbernagel v. Silbernagel, 2011 ND 140, ¶ 13 , 800 N.W.2d 320 ; WFND, LLC v. Fargo Marc, LLC, 2007 ND 67, ¶ 18 , 730 N.W.2d 841 .

2007Circle B Enterprises, Inc. v. Steinke, 1998 ND 164, ¶ 11 , 584 N.W.2d 97 ; Fisher v. Schmeling, 520 N.W.2d 820, 822 (N.D.1994).

2007Circle B Enterprises, Inc. v. Steinke, 1998 ND 164, ¶ 11 , 584 N.W.2d 97 ; Fisher v. Schmeling, 520 N.W.2d 820, 822 (N.D.1994).

2021The doctrine of frustration of purpose is applicable when “after a contract is made, a party’s principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.” WFND, LLC, 2007 ND 67, ¶ 18 (quoting Tallackson Potato Co., Inc. v. MTK Potato Co., 278 N.W.2d 417 , 424 n.6 (N.D. 1979)); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 265 (1981) (adopted version). [¶19] Our cases cite favorably to the three requirements for frustration of purpose described in the Restatement.

2021The district court’s order applied the same findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its decision that both were applicable: that the annexation of the property by the City and the use of the modules for housing becoming illegal was unforeseeable, and it was a basic assumption of the parties that these events would not occur. [¶18] “This Court has recognized the doctrine of frustration of purpose may be used to avoid all or part of a contractual claim.” City of Harwood v. City of Reiles Acres, 2015 ND 33, ¶ 18 , 859 N.W.2d 13 (citing Silbernagel v. Silbernagel, 2011 ND 140, ¶ 13 , 80

2021The district court’s order applied the same findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its decision that both were applicable: that the annexation of the property by the City and the use of the modules for housing becoming illegal was unforeseeable, and it was a basic assumption of the parties that these events would not occur. [¶18] “This Court has recognized the doctrine of frustration of purpose may be used to avoid all or part of a contractual claim.” City of Harwood v. City of Reiles Acres, 2015 ND 33, ¶ 18 , 859 N.W.2d 13 (citing Silbernagel v. Silbernagel, 2011 ND 140, ¶ 13 , 80

2014The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals predicted this Court “would adopt the doctrine.” Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc. , 552 F.2d 1285 , 1290 n.5 (8th Cir. 1977).

2014The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals predicted this Court “would adopt the doctrine.” Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 552 F.2d 1285 , 1290 n. 5 (8th Cir.1977).

1991Considering the strong public policy against deficiency judgments and the view that the anti-deficiency judgment statutes are debtor-protection legislation to be construed "strictly in favor of mortgagors" [ Anderson, supra ], we conclude that a debtor's contractual waiver of procedural *169 rights under these statutes must be clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous.

1991Considering the strong public policy against deficiency judgments and the view that the anti-deficiency judgment statutes are debtor-protection legislation to be construed “strictly in favor of mortgagors” [ Anderson, supra], we conclude that a debtor’s contractual waiver of procedural rights under these statutes must be clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous.

1989Union State Bank v. Woell, supra, ruled that a 54(b) certification, of a Bank’s judgment on a contractual claim was improvidently granted where the defendant’s counterclaim for torts of fraud, duress and coercion was still pending because the “claims ... and counterclaim arose from the same series of transactions and occurrences, are logically related legally and factually, and are closely intertwined." That mechanistic treatment of Rule 54(b) is surely questionable.

1989Co., 446 U.S., at 8 , 100 S.Ct., at 1465 . [2] Union State Bank v. Woell, supra , ruled that a 54(b) certification, of a Bank's judgment on a contractual claim was improvidently granted where the defendant's counterclaim for torts of fraud, duress and coercion was still pending because the "claims ... and counterclaim arose from the same series of transactions and occurrences, are logically related legally and factually, and are closely intertwined." That mechanistic treatment of Rule 54(b) is surely questionable.

1989Co., 446 U.S., at 8 , 100 S.Ct., at 1465 . [2] Union State Bank v. Woell, supra , ruled that a 54(b) certification, of a Bank's judgment on a contractual claim was improvidently granted where the defendant's counterclaim for torts of fraud, duress and coercion was still pending because the "claims ... and counterclaim arose from the same series of transactions and occurrences, are logically related legally and factually, and are closely intertwined." That mechanistic treatment of Rule 54(b) is surely questionable.

1989Co., 446 U.S., at 8 , 100 S.Ct., at 1465 . [2] Union State Bank v. Woell, supra , ruled that a 54(b) certification, of a Bank's judgment on a contractual claim was improvidently granted where the defendant's counterclaim for torts of fraud, duress and coercion was still pending because the "claims ... and counterclaim arose from the same series of transactions and occurrences, are logically related legally and factually, and are closely intertwined." That mechanistic treatment of Rule 54(b) is surely questionable.