limitations defense in Iowa

2023See Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 143 (“We explicitly and ‘specifically reject[ed] any requirement that an applicant must show the ground of fact would likely or probable have changed the outcome of the underlying criminal case in order to avoid a limitations defense.’” (quoting Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 521 ) (alteration in original)).

2021And the ground-of-fact exception does not require a showing that “the ground of fact would likely or probably have changed the outcome of the underlying criminal case in order to avoid a limitations defense.” Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 143 (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003)); see also Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 799 (Iowa 2018).

2023See, e.g., Porter v. Good Eavespouting, 505 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Iowa 1993) (“Because the limitations defense was not raised, the defendant waived it.”).

2016See Porter v. Good Eavespouting, 505 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Iowa 1993) (“[T]he defendant did not raise the limitations defense in its pleadings.

2021And the ground-of-fact exception does not require a showing that “the ground of fact would likely or probably have changed the outcome of the underlying criminal case in order to avoid a limitations defense.” Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 143 (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003)); see also Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 799 (Iowa 2018).

2020See Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 799 (stating an applicant need not show a ground of fact under section 822.3 “would likely or probably have changed the outcome of the underlying criminal case in order to avoid the limitations defense” (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003))).

2026See id. at 862.

2017See Osmic, 841 N.W.2d at 862 .

2015Porter, 505 N.W.2d at 182 (“Because the limitations defense was not raised, the defendant waived it.”); Conklin v. Towne, 216 N.W. 264, 266 (Iowa 1927) (“The statute of limitations was not set up as a defense until appellant had rested his case.

2015Porter, 505 N.W.2d at 182 (“Because the limitations defense was not raised, the defendant waived it.”); Conklin v. Towne, 216 N.W. 264, 266 (Iowa 1927) (“The statute of limitations was not set up as a defense until appellant had rested his case.

2015If not taken advantage of by demurrer or answer, it will be deemed waived.”); see generally Bond v. Cedar Rapids Television Co., 518 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 1994) (“We have defined an affirmative defense as ‘one resting on facts not necessary to support plaintiff’s case.’ Under Iowa rule of civil procedure 101 these matters must be specially pleaded, and a motion for directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict do not qualify as special pleadings.

2015If not taken advantage of by demurrer or answer, it will be deemed waived.”); see generally Bond v. Cedar Rapids Television Co., 518 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 1994) (“We have defined an affirmative defense as ‘one resting on facts not necessary to support plaintiff’s case.’ Under Iowa rule of civil procedure 101 these matters must be specially pleaded, and a motion for directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict do not qualify as special pleadings.

2014But, the State failed to timely assert the statute of limitations defense and therefore waived it. 3 Discussing the limitations defense in a postconviction-relief proceeding, our supreme court has restated the general rule that the “defense must be affirmatively asserted by a responsive pleading.” Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 708 (Iowa 1989) (citing Pride v. Peterson, 173 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Iowa 1970)).

2014The limitations defense “is primarily an affirmative defense to be specially asserted in a separate division of the responsive pleading to the claim for relief.” Pride, 173 N.W.2d at 554 .

2006Peppmeier v. Murphy, 708 N.W.2d 57, 63-64 (Iowa 2005); Brosamle, 427 N.W.2d at 475 .

2006Peppmeier v. Murphy, 708 N.W.2d 57, 63-64 (Iowa 2005); Brosamle, 427 N.W.2d at 475 .

2023See Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 143 (“We explicitly and ‘specifically reject[ed] any requirement that an applicant must show the ground of fact would likely or probable have changed the outcome of the underlying criminal case in order to avoid a limitations defense.’” (quoting Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 521 ) (alteration in original)).

2021And the ground-of-fact exception does not require a showing that “the ground of fact would likely or probably have changed the outcome of the underlying criminal case in order to avoid a limitations defense.” Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 143 (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003)); see also Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 799 (Iowa 2018).

2020See id. at 809 (noting “[a] defendant may raise the statute of limitations by a motion to dismiss if it is obvious from the uncontroverted facts contained in the petition that the applicable statute of limitations bars the plaintiff’s claim for relief,” and finding the record inadequate “to evaluate the limitations defense” (citation omitted)).

2016Because the limitations defense was not raised, the defendant waived it.”); see generally Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”). 1.

2016Because the limitations defense was not raised, the defendant waived it.”); see generally Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”). 1.

2014See Iowa Code § 232.96 (6) ("The circumstances of the making of the report, study, record or other writing or an audiotape or videotape recording, including the maker’s lack of personal knowledge, may be proved to affect its weight.”); In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012) (noting that in absence of objection to exhibit it was still "fair for the court of appeals to comment on the limitations of the test report”). 3 .

2014But, the State failed to timely assert the statute of limitations defense and therefore waived it. 3 Discussing the limitations defense in a postconviction-relief proceeding, our supreme court has restated the general rule that the “defense must be affirmatively asserted by a responsive pleading.” Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 708 (Iowa 1989) (citing Pride v. Peterson, 173 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Iowa 1970)).

2014See, e.g., Crandall v. City of Birmingham, 442 So. 2d 77, 79 (Ala. 1983) (per curiam) (finding no rational basis for a ninety-day limitations period for claims against state’s largest city when claims against all other municipalities were subject to a 180-day limitations period); Silva v. City & County of Honolulu, 165 P.3d 247 , 258–59 (Haw. 2007) (distinguishing Farnum and finding no rational basis for a six-month limitations period for claims against a county as opposed to a two-year limitations period for claims against the state given that the legislature had recently eliminated the dispa

2014See, e.g., Crandall v. City of Birmingham, 442 So.2d 77, 79 (Ala.1983) (per curiam) (finding no rational basis for a ninety-day limitations period for claims against state’s largest city when claims against all other municipalities were subject to a 180-day limitations period); Silva v. City & County of Honolulu, 115 Hawai'i 1 , 165 P.3d 247, 258-59 (2007) (distinguishing Famum and finding no rational basis for a six-month limitations period for claims against a county as opposed to a two-year limitations period for claims against the state given that the legislature had recently eliminated th

2014See, e.g., Crandall v. City of Birmingham, 442 So. 2d 77, 79 (Ala. 1983) (per curiam) (finding no rational basis for a ninety-day limitations period for claims against state’s largest city when claims against all other municipalities were subject to a 180-day limitations period); Silva v. City & County of Honolulu, 165 P.3d 247 , 258–59 (Haw. 2007) (distinguishing Farnum and finding no rational basis for a six-month limitations period for claims against a county as opposed to a two-year limitations period for claims against the state given that the legislature had recently eliminated the dispa

2014See, e.g., Crandall v. City of Birmingham, 442 So.2d 77, 79 (Ala.1983) (per curiam) (finding no rational basis for a ninety-day limitations period for claims against state’s largest city when claims against all other municipalities were subject to a 180-day limitations period); Silva v. City & County of Honolulu, 115 Hawai'i 1 , 165 P.3d 247, 258-59 (2007) (distinguishing Famum and finding no rational basis for a six-month limitations period for claims against a county as opposed to a two-year limitations period for claims against the state given that the legislature had recently eliminated th

1987There is no suggestion in any of the leading cases in this area that accrual of the cause of action is postponed until plaintiff learns or should learn the state of the law positing a right of recovery upon the facts already known to or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff_ When the reported decisions speak in terms of the “discovery of the existence of the cause of action” the intended meaning is ... [that] the cause of action accrues when “the injured party discovers ... that he may have a basis for an actionable claim.” Id. at 291-92 , 386 A.2d at 1314-15 (citations omitted).

1987There is no suggestion in any of the leading cases in this area that accrual of the cause of action is postponed until plaintiff learns or should learn the state of the law positing a right of recovery upon the facts already known to or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff_ When the reported decisions speak in terms of the “discovery of the existence of the cause of action” the intended meaning is ... [that] the cause of action accrues when “the injured party discovers ... that he may have a basis for an actionable claim.” Id. at 291-92 , 386 A.2d at 1314-15 (citations omitted).

1986Iowa R.Civ.P. 222; see Lamantia v. Sojka, 298 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Iowa 1980).

1986Iowa R.Civ.P. 222; see Lamantia v. Sojka, 298 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Iowa 1980).