limitations rule in Connecticut

2000The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and "the burden [is] on the defendant to prove the elements of that defense by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443 , 451 , 521 A.2d 1034 .

2000The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and "the burden [is] on the defendant to prove the elements of that defense by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443 , 451 , 521 A.2d 1034 .

1944Meriden, 109 Conn. 324 .... illustrate the limitations of the rule we are considering and the distinction between those nuisances to which governmental immunity does not apply and conditions to which it is applicable.

1931Such cases as Hewison v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475 ; Dyer v. Danbury, 85 Conn. 128 , 81 Atl. 958 ; Riccio v. Plainville, 106 Conn. 61 , 136 Atl. 872 , and Rogers v. Meriden, 109 Conn. 324 , 146 Atl. 735 , illustrate the limitations of the rule we are considering and the distinction between those nuisances to which governmental immunity does not apply and conditions to which it is applicable.

1999The case of Groton v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 169 Conn. 89 , 362 A.2d 1359 (1975), did not resolve the issue of whether § 46a-82 (e) was jurisdictional, although the trial court had determined that the commission lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was not timely filed.

1999The case of Groton v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 169 Conn. 89 , 362 A.2d 1359 (1975), did not resolve the issue of whether § 46a-82 (e) was jurisdictional, although the trial court had determined that the commission lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was not timely filed.

1999That is the very point of Ross Realty Co. v. Surkis, 163 Conn. 388 , 392 (1972) which i indicates that § 52-592 (a) need not be referenced in the complaint, can be referred to in the reply to a special defense — in fact either of these steps would be the preferable practice — but the statute need not be referred to in either pleading.

1996Our Supreme Court stated in Fichera v. Mine Hill Corporation, 207 Conn. 204 , 212 , 541 A.2d 472 (1988): In construing our general tort statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-577 , which allows for an action to be brought within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, we have concluded that the history of that legislative choice of language precludes any construction thereof delaying the start of the limitation period until the cause of action has accrued or the injury has occurred . . . . " (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) S.M.S.

1996Our Supreme Court stated in Fichera v. Mine Hill Corporation, 207 Conn. 204 , 212 , 541 A.2d 472 (1988): In construing our general tort statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-577 , which allows for an action to be brought within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, we have concluded that the history of that legislative choice of language precludes any construction thereof delaying the start of the limitation period until the cause of action has accrued or the injury has occurred . . . . " (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) S.M.S.

1996The statute of limitations for CUSA causes of action, General Statutes § 36-498 (f), reads in relevant in part: "No person may bring an action under this section . . . with respect to actions arising out of intentional misrepresentations or fraud in the purchase or sale of any interest in any limited partnership not required to be registered under the Securities Act of 1933, no person may bring an action more than one year from the date when the misrepresentation or fraud is discovered, except that no such action may be brought more than five years from the date of such misrepresentation or fr

1996The statute of limitations for CUSA causes of action, General Statutes § 36-498 (f), reads in relevant in part: "No person may bring an action under this section . . . with respect to actions arising out of intentional misrepresentations or fraud in the purchase or sale of any interest in any limited partnership not required to be registered under the Securities Act of 1933, no person may bring an action more than one year from the date when the misrepresentation or fraud is discovered, except that no such action may be brought more than five years from the date of such misrepresentation or fr

1996It is also true as the plaintiffs note that Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114 (CA 2, 1991), Conticommunity Services v. Philipp Lion, 613 F.2d 1222 (CA 2, 1980), and Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner Smith v. Shaddock, 822 F. Sup. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) were extensively referred to by this court in Levine I and they all unequivocally state that a statute of limitations defense is for the arbitrators to decide.

1996CT Page 858 Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a right that is known, Cutlip v. Conn. Motor Vehicles Comm'r., 168 Conn. 94 , 96 (1975).

1996It is also true as the plaintiffs note that Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114 (CA 2, 1991), Conticommunity Services v. Philipp Lion, 613 F.2d 1222 (CA 2, 1980), and Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner Smith v. Shaddock, 822 F. Sup. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) were extensively referred to by this court in Levine I and they all unequivocally state that a statute of limitations defense is for the arbitrators to decide.

1996In fact, the court expressly stated that “[o]ur holding in this case does not preclude the possibility that, in an appropriate case, an insurer may be estopped from asserting the limitations clause as a defense.” Id., 243 n.7.

1993Assuming the agreement alleged by the defendant, Philips, was an oral agreement indemnifying against "liability", then the Statute of Limitations defense may lie since "liability" occurred at the date of the alleged injury. "[I]f facts provable under the allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the demurrer [motion to strike] must fail." Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Co., 179 Conn. 541 , 543 (1980).

1993Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724 (1982).

1992STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE It is true that breach of trust (count one in plaintiff's complaint) is an equitable claim against which the limitations defense is ordinarily ineffective, MacDonald v. Hartford Trust Company, 104 Conn. 169 , 187-89 (1926); Dunham v. Dunham, 204 Conn. 303 , 326-27 (1987); Restatement (Second) of Trusts 197 (1959); III Scott on Trusts 198 and 198.1 (4th ed. 1988).

1992STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE It is true that breach of trust (count one in plaintiff's complaint) is an equitable claim against which the limitations defense is ordinarily ineffective, MacDonald v. Hartford Trust Company, 104 Conn. 169 , 187-89 (1926); Dunham v. Dunham, 204 Conn. 303 , 326-27 (1987); Restatement (Second) of Trusts 197 (1959); III Scott on Trusts 198 and 198.1 (4th ed. 1988).

1976No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.” 4 See footnote 1, supra. 5 “As regards the commencement of the period of limitations against a tort action, the general rule is that the cause of action accrues when, but only when, the force wrongfully put into motion produces injury, and this rule has often been applied to products liability cases grounded on negligence. . . .

1976Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253 .

1958The defendant quite properly makes no claim that the plea of guilty would not have been admissible against Erikson himself, had he been a party defendant, within the limitations of our rule as set forth in eases such as Zenuk v. Johnson, 114 Conn. 383, 388 , 158 A. 910 , and Fitzhugh v. Bushnell, 118 Conn. 677, 680 , 174 A. 80 .

1958The defendant quite properly makes no claim that the plea of guilty would not have been admissible against Erikson himself, had he been a party defendant, within the limitations of our rule as set forth in eases such as Zenuk v. Johnson, 114 Conn. 383, 388 , 158 A. 910 , and Fitzhugh v. Bushnell, 118 Conn. 677, 680 , 174 A. 80 .

1958The defendant quite properly makes no claim that the plea of guilty would not have been admissible against Erikson himself, had he been a party defendant, within the limitations of our rule as set forth in eases such as Zenuk v. Johnson, 114 Conn. 383, 388 , 158 A. 910 , and Fitzhugh v. Bushnell, 118 Conn. 677, 680 , 174 A. 80 .

1958The defendant quite properly makes no claim that the plea of guilty would not have been admissible against Erikson himself, had he been a party defendant, within the limitations of our rule as set forth in eases such as Zenuk v. Johnson, 114 Conn. 383, 388 , 158 A. 910 , and Fitzhugh v. Bushnell, 118 Conn. 677, 680 , 174 A. 80 .

1945The court, however, exceeded the limitations of the rule stated in Heslin v. Malone, supra. In Hinckley v. Danbury, 81 Conn. 241, 244 , 70 Atl. 590 , we said that, when the proof relied on in support of a claim is so weak that, if a verdict were rendered in favor of the claimant, it would be properly set aside by the court, it is within the discretion of the trial judge to instruct the jury to give the evidence no consideration.

1945The court, however, exceeded the limitations of the rule stated in Heslin v. Malone, supra. In Hinckley v. Danbury, 81 Conn. 241, 244 , 70 Atl. 590 , we said that, when the proof relied on in support of a claim is so weak that, if a verdict were rendered in favor of the claimant, it would be properly set aside by the court, it is within the discretion of the trial judge to instruct the jury to give the evidence no consideration.

1941She is still accomplishing her original purpose, and still managing her own affair through another.” In Chouinard v. Woolridge, 102 Conn. 66, 74 , 127 Atl. 908 , the facts were that the defendant lived in the same household with her two sons and her brother-in-law; that she maintained several trucks for their use and that they had general authority to drive them in their business of transporting mail under contracts with the United States government, the proceeds being applied to the common use and support of the family group; and we held, under the principles of the Wolf and Epstein cases tha

1941She is still accomplishing her original purpose, and still managing her own affair through another.” In Chouinard v. Woolridge, 102 Conn. 66, 74 , 127 Atl. 908 , the facts were that the defendant lived in the same household with her two sons and her brother-in-law; that she maintained several trucks for their use and that they had general authority to drive them in their business of transporting mail under contracts with the United States government, the proceeds being applied to the common use and support of the family group; and we held, under the principles of the Wolf and Epstein cases tha

1931Such cases as Hewison v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475 ; Dyer v. Danbury, 85 Conn. 128 , 81 Atl. 958 ; Riccio v. Plainville, 106 Conn. 61 , 136 Atl. 872 , and Rogers v. Meriden, 109 Conn. 324 , 146 Atl. 735 , illustrate the limitations of the rule we are considering and the distinction between those nuisances to which governmental immunity does not apply and conditions to which it is applicable.

1931Such cases as Hewison v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475 ; Dyer v. Danbury, 85 Conn. 128 , 81 Atl. 958 ; Riccio v. Plainville, 106 Conn. 61 , 136 Atl. 872 , and Rogers v. Meriden, 109 Conn. 324 , 146 Atl. 735 , illustrate the limitations of the rule we are considering and the distinction between those nuisances to which governmental immunity does not apply and conditions to which it is applicable.

1931Such cases as Hewison v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475 ; Dyer v. Danbury, 85 Conn. 128 , 81 Atl. 958 ; Riccio v. Plainville, 106 Conn. 61 , 136 Atl. 872 , and Rogers v. Meriden, 109 Conn. 324 , 146 Atl. 735 , illustrate the limitations of the rule we are considering and the distinction between those nuisances to which governmental immunity does not apply and conditions to which it is applicable.

1931Such cases as Hewison v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475 ; Dyer v. Danbury, 85 Conn. 128 , 81 Atl. 958 ; Riccio v. Plainville, 106 Conn. 61 , 136 Atl. 872 , and Rogers v. Meriden, 109 Conn. 324 , 146 Atl. 735 , illustrate the limitations of the rule we are considering and the distinction between those nuisances to which governmental immunity does not apply and conditions to which it is applicable.

1931Such cases as Hewison v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475 ; Dyer v. Danbury, 85 Conn. 128 , 81 Atl. 958 ; Riccio v. Plainville, 106 Conn. 61 , 136 Atl. 872 , and Rogers v. Meriden, 109 Conn. 324 , 146 Atl. 735 , illustrate the limitations of the rule we are considering and the distinction between those nuisances to which governmental immunity does not apply and conditions to which it is applicable.

1917Thus in Haight v. Hoyt, 50 Conn. 583, 586 , it is stated: "Malice is a principal ingredient in the action of slander, and damages to a great extent depend upon its existence in fact.” And in Arnott v. Standard Association, 57 Conn. 86, 93 , 17 Atl. 361 , it is said: “Damages are to be graduated by the degree to which the motive is unjustifiable and improper.” In the first instance the court was treating of punitive damages, and what was said in this connection shows that the court had a clear conception of the distinction between compensatory and punitive damages.

1917Thus in Haight v. Hoyt, 50 Conn. 583, 586 , it is stated: "Malice is a principal ingredient in the action of slander, and damages to a great extent depend upon its existence in fact.” And in Arnott v. Standard Association, 57 Conn. 86, 93 , 17 Atl. 361 , it is said: “Damages are to be graduated by the degree to which the motive is unjustifiable and improper.” In the first instance the court was treating of punitive damages, and what was said in this connection shows that the court had a clear conception of the distinction between compensatory and punitive damages.

1917Thus in Haight v. Hoyt, 50 Conn. 583, 586 , it is stated: "Malice is a principal ingredient in the action of slander, and damages to a great extent depend upon its existence in fact.” And in Arnott v. Standard Association, 57 Conn. 86, 93 , 17 Atl. 361 , it is said: “Damages are to be graduated by the degree to which the motive is unjustifiable and improper.” In the first instance the court was treating of punitive damages, and what was said in this connection shows that the court had a clear conception of the distinction between compensatory and punitive damages.

1913The damages in such cases are “on the same grounds, and measured by the same rule, as if the action had been brought by her intestate in his lifetime.” Wilmot v. McPadden, 79 Conn. 367, 378 , 65 Atl. 157 .

1913The damages in such cases are “on the same grounds, and measured by the same rule, as if the action had been brought by her intestate in his lifetime.” Wilmot v. McPadden, 79 Conn. 367, 378 , 65 Atl. 157 .