21 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1929–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Newberg v. Hudsongreen2 sentences2004As we explained in Newberg v. Hudson, Ky., 838 S.W.2d 384, 389 (1992), estoppel is generally reserved for situations where there is evidence of misconduct on the employer’s part, such as attempting to manufacture a limitations defense. 1998In addition, the court distinguished Newberg v. Hudson, supra, and expressly rejected the employer’s argument that it was not barred from asserting a limitations defense since there was no proof that it acted in bad faith. | 1 | 3 |
Akers v. Pike County Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2024Akers v Pike County Board of Education, 171 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2005). 2008Thus, the courts have turned to equitable principles when the circumstances warranted and estopped employers who failed to comply strictly with KRS 342.040(1) from asserting a limitations defense, even in the absence of bad faith or misconduct. 2 The court explained in Akers v. Pike County Board of Education, 171 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Ky.2005), that estoppel is an equitable remedy that courts often invoke to prevent a party from benefiting from its misconduct. | 1 | 2 |
Billy Baker Painting v. Barrygreen2 sentences2021Billy Baker Painting v. Barry, 179 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Ky. 2005). 2008Thus, the courts have turned to equitable principles when the circumstances *796 warranted and estopped employers who failed to comply strictly with KRS 342.040(1) from asserting a limitations defense, even in the absence of bad faith or misconduct. 2 Contrary to the employer’s assertion, Billy Baker Painting v. Barry, supra, stands for the principle that an employer must bear the burden of its failure to comply strictly with KRS 342.040(1) and 803 KAR 25:170, § 2(2). | 1 | 2 |
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjornogreen1 sentence2024See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 857 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Hitachi Automotive Products USA, Inc. v. Craiggreen2 sentences2021It is well-established Kentucky courts have “‘turned to equitable principles when the circumstances warranted and estopped employers who failed to comply strictly with KRS 342.040(1) from asserting a limitations defense, even in the absence of bad faith or misconduct.” Id. at 532 (quoting Hitachi Automotive Products USA, Inc. v. Craig, 279 S.W.3d 123, 125 (Ky. 2008). 2021However, the Court cautioned that “estoppel is an equitable remedy and that the appropriateness of its application depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Carroll County Memorial Hospital v. Yocumgreen1 sentence2021Mem’l Hosp. v. Yocum, 489 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Ky. 1972) (explaining Kentucky courts have “emphasized . . . that the real inquiry should be whether the party against whom the statute was asserted was justified in relying upon the representations and activities of the insurance adjuster in delaying filing suit until time had run out[,]” and finding estoppel appropriate where the insurer had unequivocally agreed, prior to the expiration of the statutory period, to waive the statute of limitations for a reasonable time); see also Miller v. Thacker, 481 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. 1972) (holding that insurer was e | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Thackergreen1 sentence2021Mem’l Hosp. v. Yocum, 489 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Ky. 1972) (explaining Kentucky courts have “emphasized . . . that the real inquiry should be whether the party against whom the statute was asserted was justified in relying upon the representations and activities of the insurance adjuster in delaying filing suit until time had run out[,]” and finding estoppel appropriate where the insurer had unequivocally agreed, prior to the expiration of the statutory period, to waive the statute of limitations for a reasonable time); see also Miller v. Thacker, 481 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. 1972) (holding that insurer was e | 1 | 1 |
McCarthy v. Louisville Cartage Co., Inc.green1 sentence2021Mem’l Hosp. v. Yocum, 489 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Ky. 1972) (explaining Kentucky courts have “emphasized . . . that the real inquiry should be whether the party against whom the statute was asserted was justified in relying upon the representations and activities of the insurance adjuster in delaying filing suit until time had run out[,]” and finding estoppel appropriate where the insurer had unequivocally agreed, prior to the expiration of the statutory period, to waive the statute of limitations for a reasonable time); see also Miller v. Thacker, 481 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. 1972) (holding that insurer was e | 1 | 1 |
State v. Timoteogreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., State v. Timoteo, supra , and State v. Boyd, 209 W.Va. 90 , 543 S.E.2d 647 (2000). 2008Timoteo, supra ; Boyd, supra . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boydgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., State v. Timoteo, supra, and State v. Boyd, 209 W.Va. 90 , 543 S.E.2d 647 (2000). 2008See, e.g., State v. Timoteo, supra, and State v. Boyd, 209 W.Va. 90 , 543 S.E.2d 647 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Burke v. Blairgreen2 sentences2006Burke v. Blair, 349 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Ky.1961), Hazel v. General Motors Corporation, 863 F.Supp. 435, 439 (WD.Ky.1994), or toll the running of the statute of limitations during the period of the conduct. 2006Burke v. Blair, 349 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Ky.1961), Hazel v. General Motors Corporation, 863 F.Supp. 435, 439 (W.D.Ky.1994), or toll the running of the statute of limitations during the period of the conduct. | 1 | 1 |
Hazel v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2006Burke v. Blair, 349 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Ky.1961), Hazel v. General Motors Corporation, 863 F.Supp. 435, 439 (WD.Ky.1994), or toll the running of the statute of limitations during the period of the conduct. 2006Burke v. Blair, 349 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Ky.1961), Hazel v. General Motors Corporation, 863 F.Supp. 435, 439 (W.D.Ky.1994), or toll the running of the statute of limitations during the period of the conduct. | 1 | 1 |
Harris Bros. Construction Co. v. Cridergreen1 sentence2002As we observed in Harris Brothers Construction Co. v. Crider, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 731, 733 (1973): [A] waiver exists only where one with full knowledge of a material fact does or forbears to do something inconsistent with the existence of the right or of his intention to rely upon the right.... | 1 | 1 |
Peoples State Bank v. Ohio Casualty Insurancegreen2 sentences1989One of the cases Edmondson has cited is Peoples State Bank v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 96 N.M. 751 , 635 P.2d 306, 307-08 (1981), stating: "The acts and conduct generally held to constitute a waiver [sic, estoppel] of a time-to-sue provision are those acts which would lull the insured into reasonably believing that its claim would be settled without suit [case cited], or which would render enforcement of a limitations defense unjust, inequitable or unconscionable." We agree with this premise, taking note that it does not apply here because it refers to "acts which would lull the insure 1989One of the cases Edmondson has cited is Peoples State Bank v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 96 N.M. 751 , 635 P.2d 306, 307-08 (1981), stating: "The acts and conduct generally held to constitute a waiver [sic, estoppel] of a time-to-sue provision are those acts which would lull the insured into reasonably believing that its claim would be settled without suit [case cited], or which would render enforcement of a limitations defense unjust, inequitable or unconscionable." We agree with this premise, taking note that it does not apply here because it refers to "acts which would lull the insure | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Frankfort v. Rogers
green
2 sentences2008Neumann Co. v. Lee, 975 S.W.2d 917 (Ky.1998) (employer’s failure to pay TTD or notify the Department tolled the statute of limitations without regard to bad faith); Colt Management Co. v. Carter, 907 S.W.2d 169 (Ky.App.1995) (lack of misconduct is immaterial where the employer failed to notify the Department that it terminated TTD); and Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Whittaker, 883 S.W.2d 514 (Ky.App.1994) (failure to notify the Department precluded a limitations defense regardless of who was responsible); City of Frankfort v. Rogers, 765 S.W.2d 579 (Ky.App.1988) (an employer may not manufacture a limi 2008The claimant argued that the employer should be estopped from raising a limitations defense such as occurred in City of Frankfort v. Rogers, 765 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. App.1988), because its insurance carrier failed to comply with KRS 342.267 and 803 KAR 25:240. | 7 | 1992–2020 |
H.E. Neumann Co. v. Lee
green
2 sentences2008Neumann Co. v. Lee, 975 S.W.2d 917 (Ky.1998) (employer’s failure to pay TTD or notify the Department tolled the statute of limitations without regard to bad faith); Colt Management Co. v. Carter, 907 S.W.2d 169 (Ky.App.1995) (lack of misconduct is immaterial where the employer failed to notify the Department that it terminated TTD); and Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Whittaker, 883 S.W.2d 514 (Ky.App.1994) (failure to notify the Department precluded a limitations defense regardless of who was responsible); City of Frankfort v. Rogers, 765 S.W.2d 579 (Ky.App.1988) (an employer may not manufacture a limi 2004Neumann Co. v. Lee, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 917 (1998), we determined that the employer was estopped from asserting a limitations defense because, despite knowledge of Mr. Lee’s injury and alleged disability, it failed to notify the Department within two years after the injury that it was refusing to pay voluntary TTD benefits. | 2 | 2004–2008 |
Storm v. Mullins
green
1 sentence2026Id. at 162 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
J & v. COAL CO. v. Hall
green
1 sentence2008J & V Coal Co. v. Hall, 62 S.W.3d 392 (Ky.2001), is inapplicable in the present circumstances. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Whittaker
green
1 sentence2008Neumann Co. v. Lee, 975 S.W.2d 917 (Ky.1998) (employer’s failure to pay TTD or notify the Department tolled the statute of limitations without regard to bad faith); Colt Management Co. v. Carter, 907 S.W.2d 169 (Ky.App.1995) (lack of misconduct is immaterial where the employer failed to notify the Department that it terminated TTD); and Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Whittaker, 883 S.W.2d 514 (Ky.App.1994) (failure to notify the Department precluded a limitations defense regardless of who was responsible); City of Frankfort v. Rogers, 765 S.W.2d 579 (Ky.App.1988) (an employer may not manufacture a limi | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Clark v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2008Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90 (Ky. 2007). 2008Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90 (Ky.2007). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Colt Management Co. v. Carter
green
1 sentence2008Neumann Co. v. Lee, 975 S.W.2d 917 (Ky.1998) (employer’s failure to pay TTD or notify the Department tolled the statute of limitations without regard to bad faith); Colt Management Co. v. Carter, 907 S.W.2d 169 (Ky.App.1995) (lack of misconduct is immaterial where the employer failed to notify the Department that it terminated TTD); and Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Whittaker, 883 S.W.2d 514 (Ky.App.1994) (failure to notify the Department precluded a limitations defense regardless of who was responsible); City of Frankfort v. Rogers, 765 S.W.2d 579 (Ky.App.1988) (an employer may not manufacture a limi | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Stanfield
green
2 sentences1999Although the distinction between insureds of the first and second classes determined the outcome of the claim in Ohio Casualty, 581 S.W.2d at 557-559 , the distinction does not affect the result of the case sub judice. 1999Although the distinction between insureds of the first and second classes determined the outcome of the claim in Ohio Casualty, 581 S.W.2d at 557-559 , the distinction does not affect the result of the case sub judice. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Wilcox v. Sams
green
2 sentences1991While these acts might signify ownership to third parties, the Court held they were not sufficiently hostile to oust the joint tenant. 5 Once an ouster has occurred sufficient to put an owner on notice that his possessory rights to real estate have been challenged, such as a sale by the other joint tenants to a third party who then takes possession, Rose et al. v. Ware, et al., 115 Ky. 420 , 74 S.W. 188 (1903), that owner has a maximum of fifteen years within which to file suit for the recovery of his real estate interest, see Wilcox, et al. v. Sams, et al., 213 Ky. 696 , 281 S.W. 832 (1926). 1991While these acts might signify ownership to third parties, the Court held they were not sufficiently hostile to oust the joint tenant. 5 Once an ouster has occurred sufficient to put an owner on notice that his possessory rights to real estate have been challenged, such as a sale by the other joint tenants to a third party who then takes possession, Rose et al. v. Ware, et al., 115 Ky. 420 , 74 S.W. 188 (1903), that owner has a maximum of fifteen years within which to file suit for the recovery of his real estate interest, see Wilcox, et al. v. Sams, et al., 213 Ky. 696 , 281 S.W. 832 (1926). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Rose v. Ware
green
2 sentences1991While these acts might signify ownership to third parties, the Court held they were not sufficiently hostile to oust the joint tenant. 5 Once an ouster has occurred sufficient to put an owner on notice that his possessory rights to real estate have been challenged, such as a sale by the other joint tenants to a third party who then takes possession, Rose et al. v. Ware, et al., 115 Ky. 420 , 74 S.W. 188 (1903), that owner has a maximum of fifteen years within which to file suit for the recovery of his real estate interest, see Wilcox, et al. v. Sams, et al., 213 Ky. 696 , 281 S.W. 832 (1926). 1991While these acts might signify ownership to third parties, the Court held they were not sufficiently hostile to oust the joint tenant. 5 Once an ouster has occurred sufficient to put an owner on notice that his possessory rights to real estate have been challenged, such as a sale by the other joint tenants to a third party who then takes possession, Rose et al. v. Ware, et al., 115 Ky. 420 , 74 S.W. 188 (1903), that owner has a maximum of fifteen years within which to file suit for the recovery of his real estate interest, see Wilcox, et al. v. Sams, et al., 213 Ky. 696 , 281 S.W. 832 (1926). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Alexander v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1973It is sometimes intimated that such evidence is received under the rule with respect to the acts and declarations of coconspirators and codefendants, but as such evidence is frequently received when the circumstances are such that the limitations of the rule mentioned would preclude its reception, it is apparent that the real reason for the admission of the evidence is that such acts or declarations constitute a part of the res gestae.’ ” Cf. Maddox v. Commonwealth, Ky., 349 S.W.2d 686 (1961) and Alexander v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 376 , 287 S.W. 933 (1926). 1973It is sometimes intimated that such evidence is received under the rule with respect to the acts and declarations of coconspirators and codefendants, but as such evidence is frequently received when the circumstances are such that the limitations of the rule mentioned would preclude its reception, it is apparent that the real reason for the admission of the evidence is that such acts or declarations constitute a part of the res gestae.’ ” Cf. Maddox v. Commonwealth, Ky., 349 S.W.2d 686 (1961) and Alexander v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 376 , 287 S.W. 933 (1926). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Maddox v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1973It is sometimes intimated that such evidence is received under the rule with respect to the acts and declarations of coconspirators and codefendants, but as such evidence is frequently received when the circumstances are such that the limitations of the rule mentioned would preclude its reception, it is apparent that the real reason for the admission of the evidence is that such acts or declarations constitute a part of the res gestae.’ ” Cf. Maddox v. Commonwealth, Ky., 349 S.W.2d 686 (1961) and Alexander v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 376 , 287 S.W. 933 (1926). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Brummett v. Knuckles
green
1 sentence1972CR 12.08 provides in part: “A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) * * * (Exceptions set out not applicable here.) In Thompson v. Ward, Ky., 409 S.W.2d 807 (1966), the rule is stated as follows: “ * * * The matter of limitations is a personal one and in order for it to become an issue in the case it must be pled affirmatively. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Frasure v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1929In Frasure v. Commonwealth, 169 Ky. 620 , 185 S. W. 146 , the limitations of this principle were set out with full discussion and elaboration. 1929In Frasure v. Commonwealth, 169 Ky. 620 , 185 S. W. 146 , the limitations of this principle were set out with full discussion and elaboration. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.