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32 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1902–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burd v. New Jersey Telephone Companygreen2 sentences1989In this he is supported by Burd v. New Jersey Telephone Company, 76 N.J. 284, 291 , 386 A. 2d *392 1310 (1978) which holds that the discovery principle modifies the conventional limitations rule only to the extent of postponing accrual of the cause of action until plaintiff learns, or reasonably should learn, the existence of that state of facts which may equate in law with a cause of action. 1981The discovery principle modifies the conventional limitations rule only to the extent of postponing the commencement of accrual of the cause of action until plaintiff learns, or reasonably should learn, the existence of that state of facts which may equate in law with a cause of action. [ 76 N.J. at 291 (emphasis in original).] The key elements are knowledge of injury and knowledge of its cause. | 1 | 4 |
Zaccardi v. Beckergreen2 sentences2022Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, courts can reject "a limitations defense where [the] defendant has contributed to the delay." Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 (1982); see also Williams, 132 N.J. at 119-20 ; White, 354 N.J. 1997Courts “[have] often rejected a limitations defense where defendant has contributed to the delay.” Zaccardi, supra, 88 N.J. at 256 , 440 A.2d 1329 . | 1 | 2 |
Williams v. Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.green1 sentence2022Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, courts can reject "a limitations defense where [the] defendant has contributed to the delay." Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 (1982); see also Williams, 132 N.J. at 119-20 ; White, 354 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc.green1 sentence2019Under Ohio law, "[a] party seeking to avoid a limitations clause on grounds of unconscionability must show that the clause is commercially unreasonable and that he had no meaningful choice but to accept its inclusion in the contract." Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 962, 970 (N.D. | 1 | 1 |
Farrell v. Votator Division of Chemetron Corp.green1 sentence2013Where, however, the plaintiff does not know or have reason to know that he has a cause of action against an identifiable defendant until after the normal period of limitations has expired, the considerations of individual justice and the considerations of repose are in conflict and other factors may fairly be brought into play. [Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 115 (1973) (citations omitted).] Plaintiff argues the limitations bar of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2a does not affect its action against Gilbane, because it falls within the statute's exception. | 1 | 1 |
Bank of Commerce v. Markakosgreen2 sentences2001In no case shall the fee allowance exceed the limitations of this rule." [5] Chief Justice Vanderbilt stated in Markakos that "[t]he Court of Chancery, like all other courts, has always had the inherent power to control the allowance of counsel fees, and no court has been more vigorous in asserting such power than the Court of Chancery." 22 N.J. at 431 , 126 A. 2d 346 . 2001In no case shall the fee allowance exceed the limitations of this rule." [5] Chief Justice Vanderbilt stated in Markakos that "[t]he Court of Chancery, like all other courts, has always had the inherent power to control the allowance of counsel fees, and no court has been more vigorous in asserting such power than the Court of Chancery." 22 N.J. at 431 , 126 A. 2d 346 . | 1 | 1 |
Bank of Commerce v. Markakosgreen2 sentences2001See also, the lower court decision in Markakos written by then Judge (later Justice) Sullivan. 40 N.J.Super. 31, 33 , 122 A. 2d 13 (Ch.Div.1956). [6] "By the ninety-first section of the Chancery act (P.L.1902 pp. 510, 540), it is provided that the counsel fee in foreclosure suits to be included in the complainants' taxed costs shall be such percentage, not exceeding five per cent. of the amount decreed, as the chancellor may by general rule, from time to time, prescribe." [7] For example, the version of the rule considered in Markakos, supra, 22 N.J. at 429-430 , 126 A. 2d 346 , set the rates 2001See also, the lower court decision in Markakos written by then Judge (later Justice) Sullivan. 40 N.J.Super. 31, 33 , 122 A. 2d 13 (Ch.Div.1956). [6] "By the ninety-first section of the Chancery act (P.L.1902 pp. 510, 540), it is provided that the counsel fee in foreclosure suits to be included in the complainants' taxed costs shall be such percentage, not exceeding five per cent. of the amount decreed, as the chancellor may by general rule, from time to time, prescribe." [7] For example, the version of the rule considered in Markakos, supra, 22 N.J. at 429-430 , 126 A. 2d 346 , set the rates | 1 | 1 |
Aruta v. Kellergreen2 sentences1999See also Aruta v. Keller, 134 N.J.Super. 522, 529 , 342 A. 2d 231 (App.Div.1975) (relaxing the limitations bar in the interest of justice because plaintiff did not become aware of the identity of the party responsible for his injuries until after the limitations period had expired). 1999See also Aruta v. Keller, 134 N.J.Super. 522, 529 , 342 A. 2d 231 (App.Div.1975) (relaxing the limitations bar in the interest of justice because plaintiff did not become aware of the identity of the party responsible for his injuries until after the limitations period had expired). | 1 | 1 |
Dale R. Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corporationgreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., Kichline, supra, 800 F. 2d at 358 (recognizing jury's role in resolving factual disputes concerning accrual of FELA cause of action); Curry v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 766 F. Supp. 380, 384 (W.D.Pa. 1991) (reversing summary judgment on limitations grounds and remanding issues of fact for resolution by jury). 1996See, e.g., Kichline, supra, 800 F. 2d at 358 (recognizing jury's role in resolving factual disputes concerning accrual of FELA cause of action); Curry v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 766 F. Supp. 380, 384 (W.D.Pa. 1991) (reversing summary judgment on limitations grounds and remanding issues of fact for resolution by jury). | 1 | 1 |
Curry v. Consolidated Rail Corp.green1 sentence1996See, e.g., Kichline, supra, 800 F. 2d at 358 (recognizing jury's role in resolving factual disputes concerning accrual of FELA cause of action); Curry v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 766 F. Supp. 380, 384 (W.D.Pa. 1991) (reversing summary judgment on limitations grounds and remanding issues of fact for resolution by jury). | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. Jeremiasengreen1 sentence1993See Barker v. Jeremiasen, 676 P.2d 1259, 1261-62 (Colo.Ct.App.1984) (statute of limitations ran anew with each violation of lease’s restrictive covenant); Singer Co. v. Baltimore Gas & Elect. | 1 | 1 |
Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co.green2 sentences1992We are, however, satisfied that there is an alternate theoretical underpinning for excepting the transactionally-related counterclaim from the limitations bar consistent with the policy rationale of Lawlor and consistent as well with the underlying policy of recoupment as a procedural mechanism for permitting "a transaction which is made the subject of suit by a plaintiff to be examined in all its respects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the one transaction as a whole." Rothensies v. Electric Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299 , 67 S.Ct. 271, 272 , 91 L.Ed. 296, 299 (1946 1992We are, however, satisfied that there is an alternate theoretical underpinning for excepting the transactionally-related counterclaim from the limitations bar consistent with the policy rationale of Lawlor and consistent as well with the underlying policy of recoupment as a procedural mechanism for permitting "a transaction which is made the subject of suit by a plaintiff to be examined in all its respects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the one transaction as a whole." Rothensies v. Electric Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299 , 67 S.Ct. 271, 272 , 91 L.Ed. 296, 299 (1946 | 1 | 1 |
Holifield v. Cities Service Tanker Corp.green1 sentence1984As stated in Holifield v. Cities Service Tanker Corp., 421 F. Supp. 131, 136 (E.D.La. 1976), aff'd 552 F. 2d 367 (5th Cir.1977), "it is only genuine issues of fact and not simply issues created by self-contradictions of an opposing party that are intended to preclude resort to the device of summary judgment." [Emphasis in original.] We also hold, contrary to plaintiff's claim, that INA is not equitably estopped from raising the limitations defense in this case. | 1 | 1 |
| Schack v. Trimblegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State Ex Rel. Wm. Eckelmann, Inc. v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State Ex Rel. Wm. Eckelmann, Inc. v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
White v. Karlsson
green
2 sentences2022Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, courts can reject "a limitations defense where [the] defendant has contributed to the delay." Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 (1982); see also Williams, 132 N.J. at 119-20 ; White, 354 N.J. 2006Moreover, this is not a case such as White v. Karlsson, 354 N.J.Super. 284 , 806 A. 2d 843 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 175 N.J. 170 , 814 A. 2d 635 (2002), in which plaintiff's entire complaint was susceptible to dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, or Williams , in which all the plaintiff's defamation claims would have been barred by the statute. | 2 | 2006–2022 |
Molnar v. Hedden
green
2 sentences1994Having concluded that plaintiffs action was still pending when defendant sought leave to file his counterclaim, the court below held that under the circumstances defendant’s counterclaim was “a litigation component embraced by the entire controversy doctrine” and was therefore “eligible for the relation-back principle of [Rule 4:9-3] and consequently for protection from the limitations bar.” 260 N.J.Super. 133, 140 , 615 A.2d 647 (1992). 1994Having concluded that plaintiffs action was still pending when defendant sought leave to file his counterclaim, the court below held that under the circumstances defendant’s counterclaim was “a litigation component embraced by the entire controversy doctrine” and was therefore “eligible for the relation-back principle of [Rule 4:9-3] and consequently for protection from the limitations bar.” 260 N.J.Super. 133, 140 , 615 A.2d 647 (1992). | 2 | 1994–2017 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024The defendant in Hill, appealing a conviction of several offenses related to robbery, argued that the expert testimony about historical cell-site analysis did not meet the requirements for reliability outlined in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Wayne Hill
green
1 sentence2024In Hill, the Seventh Circuit held that testimony on historical cell-site analysis was admissible, where the expert disclaimed the ability to pinpoint a defendant's phone's exact location and described the limitations of the analysis. 818 F.3d at 299 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Molnar v. Hedden
green
1 sentence2022Molnar, 138 N.J. at 105 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Stenson
green
1 sentence2011In that regard, juries have been informed that the phenolphthalein test can, in addition to manifesting a reaction to blood, give a positive reaction to potatoes, rust, bleach, and nickel, Taylor, supra, 298 S.W. 3d at 500 ; that the presence of a vegetable substance, such as red beets can create a false positive, Hetzel, supra, 822 A. 2d at 761 ; and that "a host of environmental materials having nothing to do with blood can trigger a positive reaction." Stenson, supra, 940 P. 2d at 1264 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Commonwealth v. Hetzel
green
2 sentences2011In that regard, juries have been informed that the phenolphthalein test can, in addition to manifesting a reaction to blood, give a positive reaction to potatoes, rust, bleach, and nickel, Taylor, supra, 298 S.W. 3d at 500 ; that the presence of a vegetable substance, such as red beets can create a false positive, Hetzel, supra, 822 A. 2d at 761 ; and that "a host of environmental materials having nothing to do with blood can trigger a positive reaction." Stenson, supra, 940 P. 2d at 1264 . 2011In that regard, juries have been informed that the phenolphthalein test can, in addition to manifesting a reaction to blood, give a positive reaction to potatoes, rust, bleach, and nickel, Taylor, supra, 298 S.W. 3d at 500 ; that the presence of a vegetable substance, such as red beets can create a false positive, Hetzel, supra, 822 A. 2d at 761 ; and that "a host of environmental materials having nothing to do with blood can trigger a positive reaction." Stenson, supra, 940 P. 2d at 1264 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2011In that regard, juries have been informed that the phenolphthalein test can, in addition to manifesting a reaction to blood, give a positive reaction to potatoes, rust, bleach, and nickel, Taylor, supra, 298 S.W. 3d at 500 ; that the presence of a vegetable substance, such as red beets can create a false positive, Hetzel, supra, 822 A. 2d at 761 ; and that "a host of environmental materials having nothing to do with blood can trigger a positive reaction." Stenson, supra, 940 P. 2d at 1264 . 2011In that regard, juries have been informed that the phenolphthalein test can, in addition to manifesting a reaction to blood, give a positive reaction to potatoes, rust, bleach, and nickel, Taylor, supra, 298 S.W. 3d at 500 ; that the presence of a vegetable substance, such as red beets can create a false positive, Hetzel, supra, 822 A. 2d at 761 ; and that "a host of environmental materials having nothing to do with blood can trigger a positive reaction." Stenson, supra, 940 P. 2d at 1264 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Galik v. Clara Maass Medical Center a Hospital Corp.
green
2 sentences2005Ctr., 167 N.J. 341 , 353, 771 A. 2d 1141 (2001). 2005Ctr., 167 N.J. 341 , 353, 771 A. 2d 1141 (2001). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002A limitations defense should not be permitted when its "`mechanistic' application ... would ... inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing [the] legislative purposes." Galligan, supra, 82 N.J. at 192 , 412 A. 2d 122 . 2002A limitations defense should not be permitted when its "`mechanistic' application ... would ... inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing [the] legislative purposes." Galligan, supra, 82 N.J. at 192 , 412 A. 2d 122 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
INS. UNDERWRITING ASSO. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2000In New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Ass'n v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 270 N.J.Super. 49, 53 , 636 A. 2d 550 (App.Div.1994), we held that "a formal demand for arbitration must be filed within two years of the filing of the PIP claim in order to satisfy N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1." There is no question that Allstate did not formally make such a demand within the two-year period. 2000In New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Ass'n v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 270 N.J.Super. 49, 53 , 636 A. 2d 550 (App.Div.1994), we held that "a formal demand for arbitration must be filed within two years of the filing of the PIP claim in order to satisfy N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1." There is no question that Allstate did not formally make such a demand within the two-year period. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
W v. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences1998Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Transportation, 116 N.J. 543 , 562 A.2d 222 (1989), the Court did not invoke equitable estoppel to preclude the State from asserting a limitations defense although it did consider that certain of its actions created confusion and were a breach of its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. 1998Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Transportation, 116 N.J. 543 , 562 A.2d 222 (1989), the Court did not invoke equitable estoppel to preclude the State from asserting a limitations defense although it did consider that certain of its actions created confusion and were a breach of its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co.
green
2 sentences1993For the latter proposition the Appellate Division relied on Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539 , 569 A. 2d 793 (1990), decided after the trial of this case. 1993For the latter proposition the Appellate Division relied on Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539 , 569 A. 2d 793 (1990), decided after the trial of this case. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Holifield v. Cities Service Tanker Corp.
green
1 sentence1984As stated in Holifield v. Cities Service Tanker Corp., 421 F. Supp. 131, 136 (E.D.La. 1976), aff'd 552 F. 2d 367 (5th Cir.1977), "it is only genuine issues of fact and not simply issues created by self-contradictions of an opposing party that are intended to preclude resort to the device of summary judgment." [Emphasis in original.] We also hold, contrary to plaintiff's claim, that INA is not equitably estopped from raising the limitations defense in this case. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Paul v. Virginia
red
1 sentence1981It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; .... [ 8 Wall. at 180 ] The leading modern exposition of the limitations the clause places on a state's power to weight employment opportunities in favor of its own residents is Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Toomer v. Witsell
green
2 sentences1981It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; .... [ 8 Wall. at 180 ] The leading modern exposition of the limitations the clause places on a state's power to weight employment opportunities in favor of its own residents is Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 1981It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; .... [ 8 Wall. at 180 ] The leading modern exposition of the limitations the clause places on a state's power to weight employment opportunities in favor of its own residents is Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Roviaro v. United States
green
2 sentences1966While recognizing the general privilege of non-disclosure in the furtherance of the public's interest in effective law-enforcement the court listed as one of the limitations of the principle that which "arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness" ( 353 U.S., at p. 60 , 77 S.Ct., at p. 628 ). 1966While recognizing the general privilege of non-disclosure in the furtherance of the public's interest in effective law-enforcement the court listed as one of the limitations of the principle that which "arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness" ( 353 U.S., at p. 60 , 77 S.Ct., at p. 628 ). | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Swede v. Passaic Daily News green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| MacKenzie v. Trustees of the Presbytery green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Williams v. . B.E.R.R. Co. green | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.