limitations defense (New Jersey) · Go Syfert
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limitations defense in New Jersey

32 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1902–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (16)

CaseFollowedCited
Burd v. New Jersey Telephone Companygreen
nj · 1978 · cited in 4 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1981–1997
2 sentences

1989In this he is supported by Burd v. New Jersey Telephone Company, 76 N.J. 284, 291 , 386 A. 2d *392 1310 (1978) which holds that the discovery principle modifies the conventional limitations rule only to the extent of postponing accrual of the cause of action until plaintiff learns, or reasonably should learn, the existence of that state of facts which may equate in law with a cause of action.

1981The discovery principle modifies the conventional limitations rule only to the extent of postponing the commencement of accrual of the cause of action until plaintiff learns, or reasonably should learn, the existence of that state of facts which may equate in law with a cause of action. [ 76 N.J. at 291 (emphasis in original).] The key elements are knowledge of injury and knowledge of its cause.

14
Zaccardi v. Beckergreen
nj · 1982 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1997–2022
2 sentences

2022Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, courts can reject "a limitations defense where [the] defendant has contributed to the delay." Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 (1982); see also Williams, 132 N.J. at 119-20 ; White, 354 N.J.

1997Courts “[have] often rejected a limitations defense where defendant has contributed to the delay.” Zaccardi, supra, 88 N.J. at 256 , 440 A.2d 1329 .

12
Williams v. Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.green
nj · 1993 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, courts can reject "a limitations defense where [the] defendant has contributed to the delay." Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 (1982); see also Williams, 132 N.J. at 119-20 ; White, 354 N.J.

11
Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc.green
ohnd · 1995 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Under Ohio law, "[a] party seeking to avoid a limitations clause on grounds of unconscionability must show that the clause is commercially unreasonable and that he had no meaningful choice but to accept its inclusion in the contract." Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 962, 970 (N.D.

11
Farrell v. Votator Division of Chemetron Corp.green
nj · 1973 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013Where, however, the plaintiff does not know or have reason to know that he has a cause of action against an identifiable defendant until after the normal period of limitations has expired, the considerations of individual justice and the considerations of repose are in conflict and other factors may fairly be brought into play. [Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 115 (1973) (citations omitted).] Plaintiff argues the limitations bar of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2a does not affect its action against Gilbane, because it falls within the statute's exception.

11
Bank of Commerce v. Markakosgreen
nj · 1956 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001In no case shall the fee allowance exceed the limitations of this rule." [5] Chief Justice Vanderbilt stated in Markakos that "[t]he Court of Chancery, like all other courts, has always had the inherent power to control the allowance of counsel fees, and no court has been more vigorous in asserting such power than the Court of Chancery." 22 N.J. at 431 , 126 A. 2d 346 .

2001In no case shall the fee allowance exceed the limitations of this rule." [5] Chief Justice Vanderbilt stated in Markakos that "[t]he Court of Chancery, like all other courts, has always had the inherent power to control the allowance of counsel fees, and no court has been more vigorous in asserting such power than the Court of Chancery." 22 N.J. at 431 , 126 A. 2d 346 .

11
Bank of Commerce v. Markakosgreen
njsuperctappdiv · 1956 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001See also, the lower court decision in Markakos written by then Judge (later Justice) Sullivan. 40 N.J.Super. 31, 33 , 122 A. 2d 13 (Ch.Div.1956). [6] "By the ninety-first section of the Chancery act (P.L.1902 pp. 510, 540), it is provided that the counsel fee in foreclosure suits to be included in the complainants' taxed costs shall be such percentage, not exceeding five per cent. of the amount decreed, as the chancellor may by general rule, from time to time, prescribe." [7] For example, the version of the rule considered in Markakos, supra, 22 N.J. at 429-430 , 126 A. 2d 346 , set the rates

2001See also, the lower court decision in Markakos written by then Judge (later Justice) Sullivan. 40 N.J.Super. 31, 33 , 122 A. 2d 13 (Ch.Div.1956). [6] "By the ninety-first section of the Chancery act (P.L.1902 pp. 510, 540), it is provided that the counsel fee in foreclosure suits to be included in the complainants' taxed costs shall be such percentage, not exceeding five per cent. of the amount decreed, as the chancellor may by general rule, from time to time, prescribe." [7] For example, the version of the rule considered in Markakos, supra, 22 N.J. at 429-430 , 126 A. 2d 346 , set the rates

11
Aruta v. Kellergreen
njsuperctappdiv · 1975 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999See also Aruta v. Keller, 134 N.J.Super. 522, 529 , 342 A. 2d 231 (App.Div.1975) (relaxing the limitations bar in the interest of justice because plaintiff did not become aware of the identity of the party responsible for his injuries until after the limitations period had expired).

1999See also Aruta v. Keller, 134 N.J.Super. 522, 529 , 342 A. 2d 231 (App.Div.1975) (relaxing the limitations bar in the interest of justice because plaintiff did not become aware of the identity of the party responsible for his injuries until after the limitations period had expired).

11
Dale R. Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corporationgreen
ca3 · 1986 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996See, e.g., Kichline, supra, 800 F. 2d at 358 (recognizing jury's role in resolving factual disputes concerning accrual of FELA cause of action); Curry v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 766 F. Supp. 380, 384 (W.D.Pa. 1991) (reversing summary judgment on limitations grounds and remanding issues of fact for resolution by jury).

1996See, e.g., Kichline, supra, 800 F. 2d at 358 (recognizing jury's role in resolving factual disputes concerning accrual of FELA cause of action); Curry v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 766 F. Supp. 380, 384 (W.D.Pa. 1991) (reversing summary judgment on limitations grounds and remanding issues of fact for resolution by jury).

11
Curry v. Consolidated Rail Corp.green
pawd · 1991 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
1 sentence

1996See, e.g., Kichline, supra, 800 F. 2d at 358 (recognizing jury's role in resolving factual disputes concerning accrual of FELA cause of action); Curry v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 766 F. Supp. 380, 384 (W.D.Pa. 1991) (reversing summary judgment on limitations grounds and remanding issues of fact for resolution by jury).

11
Barker v. Jeremiasengreen
coloctapp · 1984 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
1 sentence

1993See Barker v. Jeremiasen, 676 P.2d 1259, 1261-62 (Colo.Ct.App.1984) (statute of limitations ran anew with each violation of lease’s restrictive covenant); Singer Co. v. Baltimore Gas & Elect.

11
Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co.green
scotus · 1946 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
2 sentences

1992We are, however, satisfied that there is an alternate theoretical underpinning for excepting the transactionally-related counterclaim from the limitations bar consistent with the policy rationale of Lawlor and consistent as well with the underlying policy of recoupment as a procedural mechanism for permitting "a transaction which is made the subject of suit by a plaintiff to be examined in all its respects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the one transaction as a whole." Rothensies v. Electric Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299 , 67 S.Ct. 271, 272 , 91 L.Ed. 296, 299 (1946

1992We are, however, satisfied that there is an alternate theoretical underpinning for excepting the transactionally-related counterclaim from the limitations bar consistent with the policy rationale of Lawlor and consistent as well with the underlying policy of recoupment as a procedural mechanism for permitting "a transaction which is made the subject of suit by a plaintiff to be examined in all its respects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the one transaction as a whole." Rothensies v. Electric Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299 , 67 S.Ct. 271, 272 , 91 L.Ed. 296, 299 (1946

11
Holifield v. Cities Service Tanker Corp.green
laed · 1976 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
1 sentence

1984As stated in Holifield v. Cities Service Tanker Corp., 421 F. Supp. 131, 136 (E.D.La. 1976), aff'd 552 F. 2d 367 (5th Cir.1977), "it is only genuine issues of fact and not simply issues created by self-contradictions of an opposing party that are intended to preclude resort to the device of summary judgment." [Emphasis in original.] We also hold, contrary to plaintiff's claim, that INA is not equitably estopped from raising the limitations defense in this case.

11
Schack v. Trimblegreen
nj · 1958 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1964–1964
11
State Ex Rel. Wm. Eckelmann, Inc. v. Jonesgreen
nj · 1950 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1950–1950
11
State Ex Rel. Wm. Eckelmann, Inc. v. Jonesgreen
nj · 1950 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1950–1950
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (20)

CaseCitedYears
White v. Karlsson green
njsuperctappdiv · 2002
2 sentences

2022Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, courts can reject "a limitations defense where [the] defendant has contributed to the delay." Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 (1982); see also Williams, 132 N.J. at 119-20 ; White, 354 N.J.

2006Moreover, this is not a case such as White v. Karlsson, 354 N.J.Super. 284 , 806 A. 2d 843 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 175 N.J. 170 , 814 A. 2d 635 (2002), in which plaintiff's entire complaint was susceptible to dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, or Williams , in which all the plaintiff's defamation claims would have been barred by the statute.

22006–2022
Molnar v. Hedden green
njsuperctappdiv · 1992
2 sentences

1994Having concluded that plaintiffs action was still pending when defendant sought leave to file his counterclaim, the court below held that under the circumstances defendant’s counterclaim was “a litigation component embraced by the entire controversy doctrine” and was therefore “eligible for the relation-back principle of [Rule 4:9-3] and consequently for protection from the limitations bar.” 260 N.J.Super. 133, 140 , 615 A.2d 647 (1992).

1994Having concluded that plaintiffs action was still pending when defendant sought leave to file his counterclaim, the court below held that under the circumstances defendant’s counterclaim was “a litigation component embraced by the entire controversy doctrine” and was therefore “eligible for the relation-back principle of [Rule 4:9-3] and consequently for protection from the limitations bar.” 260 N.J.Super. 133, 140 , 615 A.2d 647 (1992).

21994–2017
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. green
scotus · 1993
1 sentence

2024The defendant in Hill, appealing a conviction of several offenses related to robbery, argued that the expert testimony about historical cell-site analysis did not meet the requirements for reliability outlined in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 .

12024–2024
United States v. Wayne Hill green
ca7 · 2016
1 sentence

2024In Hill, the Seventh Circuit held that testimony on historical cell-site analysis was admissible, where the expert disclaimed the ability to pinpoint a defendant's phone's exact location and described the limitations of the analysis. 818 F.3d at 299 .

12024–2024
Molnar v. Hedden green
nj · 1994
1 sentence

2022Molnar, 138 N.J. at 105 .

12022–2022
State v. Stenson green
wash · 1997
1 sentence

2011In that regard, juries have been informed that the phenolphthalein test can, in addition to manifesting a reaction to blood, give a positive reaction to potatoes, rust, bleach, and nickel, Taylor, supra, 298 S.W. 3d at 500 ; that the presence of a vegetable substance, such as red beets can create a false positive, Hetzel, supra, 822 A. 2d at 761 ; and that "a host of environmental materials having nothing to do with blood can trigger a positive reaction." Stenson, supra, 940 P. 2d at 1264 .

12011–2011
Commonwealth v. Hetzel green
pasuperct · 2003
2 sentences

2011In that regard, juries have been informed that the phenolphthalein test can, in addition to manifesting a reaction to blood, give a positive reaction to potatoes, rust, bleach, and nickel, Taylor, supra, 298 S.W. 3d at 500 ; that the presence of a vegetable substance, such as red beets can create a false positive, Hetzel, supra, 822 A. 2d at 761 ; and that "a host of environmental materials having nothing to do with blood can trigger a positive reaction." Stenson, supra, 940 P. 2d at 1264 .

2011In that regard, juries have been informed that the phenolphthalein test can, in addition to manifesting a reaction to blood, give a positive reaction to potatoes, rust, bleach, and nickel, Taylor, supra, 298 S.W. 3d at 500 ; that the presence of a vegetable substance, such as red beets can create a false positive, Hetzel, supra, 822 A. 2d at 761 ; and that "a host of environmental materials having nothing to do with blood can trigger a positive reaction." Stenson, supra, 940 P. 2d at 1264 .

12011–2011
State v. Taylor green
mo · 2009
2 sentences

2011In that regard, juries have been informed that the phenolphthalein test can, in addition to manifesting a reaction to blood, give a positive reaction to potatoes, rust, bleach, and nickel, Taylor, supra, 298 S.W. 3d at 500 ; that the presence of a vegetable substance, such as red beets can create a false positive, Hetzel, supra, 822 A. 2d at 761 ; and that "a host of environmental materials having nothing to do with blood can trigger a positive reaction." Stenson, supra, 940 P. 2d at 1264 .

2011In that regard, juries have been informed that the phenolphthalein test can, in addition to manifesting a reaction to blood, give a positive reaction to potatoes, rust, bleach, and nickel, Taylor, supra, 298 S.W. 3d at 500 ; that the presence of a vegetable substance, such as red beets can create a false positive, Hetzel, supra, 822 A. 2d at 761 ; and that "a host of environmental materials having nothing to do with blood can trigger a positive reaction." Stenson, supra, 940 P. 2d at 1264 .

12011–2011
Galik v. Clara Maass Medical Center a Hospital Corp. green
nj · 2001
2 sentences

2005Ctr., 167 N.J. 341 , 353, 771 A. 2d 1141 (2001).

2005Ctr., 167 N.J. 341 , 353, 771 A. 2d 1141 (2001).

12005–2005
Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc. green
nj · 1980
2 sentences

2002A limitations defense should not be permitted when its "`mechanistic' application ... would ... inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing [the] legislative purposes." Galligan, supra, 82 N.J. at 192 , 412 A. 2d 122 .

2002A limitations defense should not be permitted when its "`mechanistic' application ... would ... inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing [the] legislative purposes." Galligan, supra, 82 N.J. at 192 , 412 A. 2d 122 .

12002–2002
INS. UNDERWRITING ASSO. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. green
njsuperctappdiv · 1994
2 sentences

2000In New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Ass'n v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 270 N.J.Super. 49, 53 , 636 A. 2d 550 (App.Div.1994), we held that "a formal demand for arbitration must be filed within two years of the filing of the PIP claim in order to satisfy N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1." There is no question that Allstate did not formally make such a demand within the two-year period.

2000In New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Ass'n v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 270 N.J.Super. 49, 53 , 636 A. 2d 550 (App.Div.1994), we held that "a formal demand for arbitration must be filed within two years of the filing of the PIP claim in order to satisfy N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1." There is no question that Allstate did not formally make such a demand within the two-year period.

12000–2000
W v. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Department of Transportation green
nj · 1989
2 sentences

1998Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Transportation, 116 N.J. 543 , 562 A.2d 222 (1989), the Court did not invoke equitable estoppel to preclude the State from asserting a limitations defense although it did consider that certain of its actions created confusion and were a breach of its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

1998Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Transportation, 116 N.J. 543 , 562 A.2d 222 (1989), the Court did not invoke equitable estoppel to preclude the State from asserting a limitations defense although it did consider that certain of its actions created confusion and were a breach of its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

11998–1998
Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co. green
nj · 1990
2 sentences

1993For the latter proposition the Appellate Division relied on Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539 , 569 A. 2d 793 (1990), decided after the trial of this case.

1993For the latter proposition the Appellate Division relied on Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539 , 569 A. 2d 793 (1990), decided after the trial of this case.

11993–1993
Holifield v. Cities Service Tanker Corp. green
ca5 · 1977
1 sentence

1984As stated in Holifield v. Cities Service Tanker Corp., 421 F. Supp. 131, 136 (E.D.La. 1976), aff'd 552 F. 2d 367 (5th Cir.1977), "it is only genuine issues of fact and not simply issues created by self-contradictions of an opposing party that are intended to preclude resort to the device of summary judgment." [Emphasis in original.] We also hold, contrary to plaintiff's claim, that INA is not equitably estopped from raising the limitations defense in this case.

11984–1984
Paul v. Virginia red
scotus · 1869
1 sentence

1981It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; .... [ 8 Wall. at 180 ] The leading modern exposition of the limitations the clause places on a state's power to weight employment opportunities in favor of its own residents is Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385

11981–1981
Toomer v. Witsell green
scotus · 1948
2 sentences

1981It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; .... [ 8 Wall. at 180 ] The leading modern exposition of the limitations the clause places on a state's power to weight employment opportunities in favor of its own residents is Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385

1981It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; .... [ 8 Wall. at 180 ] The leading modern exposition of the limitations the clause places on a state's power to weight employment opportunities in favor of its own residents is Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385

11981–1981
Roviaro v. United States green
scotus · 1957
2 sentences

1966While recognizing the general privilege of non-disclosure in the furtherance of the public's interest in effective law-enforcement the court listed as one of the limitations of the principle that which "arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness" ( 353 U.S., at p. 60 , 77 S.Ct., at p. 628 ).

1966While recognizing the general privilege of non-disclosure in the furtherance of the public's interest in effective law-enforcement the court listed as one of the limitations of the principle that which "arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness" ( 353 U.S., at p. 60 , 77 S.Ct., at p. 628 ).

11966–1966
Swede v. Passaic Daily News green
nj · 1959
11965–1965
MacKenzie v. Trustees of the Presbytery green
nj · 1905
11960–1960
Williams v. . B.E.R.R. Co. green
ny · 1891
11902–1902

Statutes the citing opinions construe

NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2A:14-2 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 459 (1935–2026) NY 234 (1866–2026) CA 116 (1897–2026) IL 90 (1923–2024) MD 49 (1969–2026) FL 42 (1879–2026) OH 39 (1926–2026) IA 38 (1904–2026) AL 32 (1928–2024) NJ 32 (1902–2024) PA 31 (1893–2024) AZ 25 (1971–2026) CT 23 (1913–2000) KY 21 (1929–2026) MA 19 (1979–2026) OR 17 (1898–2026) MI 16 (1925–2025) UT 15 (1913–2026) KS 15 (1917–2019) IN 14 (1956–2018) DE 13 (1989–2026) DC 13 (1973–2011) MO 12 (1932–2007) CO 11 (1981–2026) OK 11 (1923–2017) WA 10 (1929–2021) AR 10 (1923–2023) MS 9 (1949–2013) VT 9 (1978–2018) TN 8 (1988–2024) VA 6 (1932–2021) WY 6 (1971–2025) MN 6 (1911–1995) SC 6 (1972–2019) NM 6 (1981–2003) NC 5 (1965–2025) MT 5 (1914–2008) NE 5 (1927–2017) HI 4 (1998–2017) LA 4 (1959–2024) NH 3 (1983–2025) ND 3 (2008–2020) ME 3 (1939–2025) GA 3 (1933–2024) WI 3 (1981–2020) VI 3 (2015–2023) ID 2 (1980–1999) WV 2 (1990–1995) AK 2 (1985–1988)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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