42 Florida opinions name it 4 courts 1879–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jaszay v. HB CORPORATIONgreen2 sentences2010Coi~p., 598 So.2d 112 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (stating that a nursing home that stipulated to a 60-day extension of the pre-suit screening period was estopped from later asserting a limitations defense in a malpractice action). 2005Corp., 598 So.2d 112, 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) ("The appellee is estopped from asserting the limitations defense because it stipulated to the sixty-day extension of the pre-suit screening period."); Glantzis v. State Auto. | 4 | 5 |
Bryan v. Stategreen2 sentences2003As we stated in Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla. 1988): The only limitations to the rule of relevancy are that the state should not be permitted to make the evidence of other crimes the feature of the trial or to introduce the evidence solely for the purpose of showing bad character or propensity, in which event it would not be relevant, and such evidence, even if relevant, should not be admitted if its probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. 1992This does not bar the introduction of evidence of other crimes which are factually dissimilar to the charged crime if the evidence of other crimes is relevant. * * * * * * The only limitations to the rule of relevancy are that the state should not be permitted to make the evidence of other crimes the feature of the trial or to introduce the evidence solely for the purpose of showing bad character or propensity *919 in which event it would not be relevant, and such evidence, even if relevant, should not be admitted if its probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. 533 So.2d | 3 | 3 |
Angrand v. Foxgreen2 sentences2000See Pezzi v. Brown, 697 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)("statutes restricting access to the courts must be narrowly construed in a manner favoring access."); Angrand v. Fox, 552 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)("it is well established that a limitations defense is not favored, ... and that therefore any substantial doubt on the question should be resolved by choosing the longer rather than the shorter possible statutory period."). 1999Section 718.124 must be read to toll all limitations periods, including those characterized as statutes of repose. *801 First, "[i]t is well established that a limitations defense is not favored[,] and that therefore, any substantial doubt on the question should be resolved by choosing the longer rather than the shorter possible statutory period." Angrand v. Fox, 552 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (citations omitted). | 3 | 3 |
Wishnatzki v. Coffman Const., Inc.green2 sentences2026Wishnatzki v. Coffman Const., Inc., 884 So. 2d 282, 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). 2016“If the alleged circumstances suggest the possibility that the plaintiff ‘could plead matters in avoidance of the limitations defense,’ dismissal is inappropriate.” Wishnatzki v. Coffman Constr., Inc., 884 So.2d 282, 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing Levine, Zweihach, Davis, P.A. v. Levine, 734 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)). | 2 | 2 |
Foster Wheeler Energy Group v. Fairhurstgreen2 sentences1991See Howanitz v. Biscayne Electric Inc., 139 So.2d 678 (Fla.1962); Boyd v. Fla. Memorial College, 475 So.2d 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); see also, Foster Wheeler Energy Group v. Fairhurst, 405 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). 1983See Foster Wheeler Energy Group v. Fairhurst, 405 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). | 2 | 2 |
Levine v. Levinegreen2 sentences2016“If the alleged circumstances suggest the possibility that the plaintiff ‘could plead matters in avoidance of the limitations defense,’ dismissal is inappropriate.” Wishnatzki v. Coffman Constr., Inc., 884 So.2d 282, 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing Levine, Zweihach, Davis, P.A. v. Levine, 734 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)). 2004"With the issues thus framed by the pleadings, the parties could then develop evidence that would permit disposition of the limitations defense[] on motion for summary judgment or at trial." Levine, 734 So.2d at 1195 . | 1 | 2 |
Wiley v. Roofgreen1 sentence2016This is so because by the time the 2009 amendment to section 732.108(2)(b) took effect to eliminate the limitations bar previously imposed by section 95.11(3)(b), Rose’s claim had long since expired, and as noted in Smith, “[o]nce a claim has been extinguished by the applicable statute of limitations, the claim cannot be revived because a constitutionally protected property right to be free from the claim has vested in the defendant.” Id. at 1210; see also Wiley v. Roof, 641 So.2d 66, 68 (Fla. 1994) (“Once the defense of the statute of limitations has accrued, it is protected as a property int | 1 | 1 |
Streeter v. Stategreen1 sentence2007But, even though the record does not reveal when Mr. Trattmann initially refused to convey the property (or otherwise acted inconsistently with his putative fiduciary obligations), the trial court ruled that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, finding four years to be the limitations period applicable to an action to enforce *346 a resulting trust. [4] Applying a statute of limitations to a resulting trust, [5] the Fifth District held that the "beneficiary of a resulting trust is not bound to act until the trustee repudiates the trust or begins to hold the property adversely w | 1 | 1 |
Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Cartergreen1 sentence2005See Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 562-63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (finding a triable issue as to the estate’s estoppel to claim the limitations defense where the decedent’s surviv- or actively misled a hospital into believing that the decedent left no estate from which to collect outstanding bills), abrogated by May v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Alachua County v. Cheshiregreen1 sentence2005Co., 771 So.2d 1143 (Fla.2000); Alachua County v. Cheshire, 603 So.2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (applying equitable estoppel where the federal government, by continual assurances of payment, induced the plaintiff not to sue on a lien against government-seized property within the limitations period); Jaszay v. H.B. | 1 | 1 |
Koehler v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.green1 sentence2004See Koehler v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 706 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); S.A.P. v. Dept. of Health & Reh. | 1 | 1 |
Olenek v. Bennettgreen1 sentence2001Co., 573 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) ("[W]e believe the evidence is such that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies preventing State Auto from resorting to the statute of limitations as a defense."); Olenek v. Bennett, 537 So.2d 160, 161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) ("Fairness and equity dictate that the estate is estopped from raising the statute [of limitations] as a defense."); Martin v. Monroe County, 518 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987) ("We hold that when the [Department] acknowledges that within the statute of limitations, an accident report of a claim was filed ... it is thereaf | 1 | 1 |
City of Brooksville v. HERNANDO CTY.green1 sentence2001Co., 573 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) ("[W]e believe the evidence is such that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies preventing State Auto from resorting to the statute of limitations as a defense."); Olenek v. Bennett, 537 So.2d 160, 161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) ("Fairness and equity dictate that the estate is estopped from raising the statute [of limitations] as a defense."); Martin v. Monroe County, 518 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987) ("We hold that when the [Department] acknowledges that within the statute of limitations, an accident report of a claim was filed ... it is thereaf | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Monroe Countygreen1 sentence2001Co., 573 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) ("[W]e believe the evidence is such that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies preventing State Auto from resorting to the statute of limitations as a defense."); Olenek v. Bennett, 537 So.2d 160, 161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) ("Fairness and equity dictate that the estate is estopped from raising the statute [of limitations] as a defense."); Martin v. Monroe County, 518 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987) ("We hold that when the [Department] acknowledges that within the statute of limitations, an accident report of a claim was filed ... it is thereaf | 1 | 1 |
Glantzis v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.green1 sentence2001Co., 573 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) ("[W]e believe the evidence is such that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies preventing State Auto from resorting to the statute of limitations as a defense."); Olenek v. Bennett, 537 So.2d 160, 161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) ("Fairness and equity dictate that the estate is estopped from raising the statute [of limitations] as a defense."); Martin v. Monroe County, 518 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987) ("We hold that when the [Department] acknowledges that within the statute of limitations, an accident report of a claim was filed ... it is thereaf | 1 | 1 |
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Soffergreen1 sentence2000This Court has historically emphasized that "Florida policy dictates a strong preference that cases be decided on their merits." City of Miami v. Rivas, 723 So.2d 393, 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Venero v. Balbuena, 652 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Cinkat Transp., Inc. v. Maryland Cas. | 1 | 1 |
Heredia v. Safeway Trails, Inc.green1 sentence1996See § 95.051, Fla. Stat (1989). [2] The bus ticket was designated "Contract." 369 So.2d at 419 . | 1 | 1 |
| Burch v. Burgessgreen | 1 | 1 |
| FSC Securities Corp. v. Freelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Baskerville-Donovan Eng's, Inc. v. Pensacola Exec. House Condominium Ass'n, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Howanitz v. Biscayne Electric, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Bagley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Combs v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Trammel v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pezzi v. Browngreen1 sentence2000See Pezzi v. Brown, 697 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)("statutes restricting access to the courts must be narrowly construed in a manner favoring access."); Angrand v. Fox, 552 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)("it is well established that a limitations defense is not favored, ... and that therefore any substantial doubt on the question should be resolved by choosing the longer rather than the shorter possible statutory period."). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Osbourne v. United States
green
2 sentences2002Mann argues that the Government may be prevented from taking advantage of this defense in "a proper case." He points to Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767 (2d Cir.1947), wherein the Government was not allowed the limitations defense because the plaintiff, a seaman proceeding under the Jones Act, had been denied access to the courts by reason of his imprisonment by the enemy during time of war. 2002Mann argues that the Government may be prevented from taking advantage of this defense in “a proper case.” He points to Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767 (2d Cir.1947), wherein the Government was not allowed the limitations defense because the plaintiff, a seaman proceeding under the Jones Act, had been denied access to the courts by reason of his imprisonment by the enemy during time of war. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Application of Conticommodity Services Inc., for an Order Restraining Arbitration Attempted to Be Had by Philipp & Lion
green
2 sentences1995In Wylie , in accord with, and adopting, the conclusions of Conticommodity, we held that any contrary conclusion — permitting the judge to decide the “rightfulness” of the party’s refusal to arbitrate because of a limitations defense — “would be at odds with the limited scope of judicial inquiry authorized by [USAA] section 4.” Conticommodity, 613 F.2d at 1227 . 1993The contrary conclusion permitting *901 the judge to decide the "rightfulness" of the party's refusal to arbitrate because of a limitations defense "would be at odds with the limited scope of judicial inquiry authorized by [USAA] section 4." 613 F.2d at 1227 . | 2 | 1993–1995 |
Wilson v. Scruggs
green
1 sentence2018As Rose provides, This is so because by the time the 2009 amendment to section 732.108(2)(b) took effect to eliminate the limitations bar previously imposed by section 95.11(3)(b), Rose's claim had long since expired, and as noted in Smith, “[o]nce a claim has been extinguished by the applicable statute of limitations, the claim cannot be revived because a constitutionally protected property right to be free from the claim has vested in the defendant.” Id. at 1210 ; see also Wiley v. Roof, 641 So. 3 2d 66, 68 (Fla. 1994) (“Once the defense of the statute of limitations has accrued, it is prote | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Cook
green
2 sentences2016Cf. United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. 168 , 179–80, 17 Wall. 168 , 21 L.Ed. 538 (1872) (explaining that the rationale for requiring the statute of limitations defense to be raised at trial is to allow the prosecutor to present evidence in order to rebut the defense). 2016Cf. United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. 168 , 179–80, 17 Wall. 168 , 21 L.Ed. 538 (1872) (explaining that the rationale for requiring the statute of limitations defense to be raised at trial is to allow the prosecutor to present evidence in order to rebut the defense). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Louis A. Arky
green
2 sentences2016Although the facts surrounding Lewis's statute of limitations defense are not in dispute, this does not change our conclusion that a rule requiring all defendants to “affirmatively assert a limitations defense at trial to preserve it for appeal,” Arky, 938 F.2d at 582 , is preferable to a case-by-case determination. 2016Although the facts surrounding Lewis’s statute of limitations defense are not in dispute, this does not change our conclusion that a rule requiring all defendants to “affirmatively assert a limitations defense at trial to preserve it for appeal,” Arky, 938 F.2d at 582 , is preferable to a case-by-case determination. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Earth Trades, Inc. v. T & G Corp.
green
2 sentences2016In support of this argument, Appellants rely on Earth Trades, Inc. v. T&G Corp., 108 So. 3d 580 (Fla. 2013). 2016In support of this argument, Appellants rely on Earth Trades, Inc. v. T&G Corp., 108 So.3d 580 (Fla.2013). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Major League Baseball v. Morsani
green
1 sentence2005In Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071 (Fla.2001), the specific question raised was whether Florida statutes of limitations preclude an equitable estoppel to assert a limitations defense. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
May v. Illinois Nat. Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2005Co., 771 So.2d 1143 (Fla.2000); Alachua County v. Cheshire, 603 So.2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (applying equitable estoppel where the federal government, by continual assurances of payment, induced the plaintiff not to sue on a lien against government-seized property within the limitations period); Jaszay v. H.B. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Williams v. State
green
1 sentence2003We have consistently adhered to this principle in other cases where evidence is being introduced pursuant to Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Jackie Evans v. Leo Meyer, Warden, Logan Correctional Center
green
1 sentence2001After identifying the many limitations of the defense of voluntary intoxication, the court concluded its decision by saying that "no lawyer in his right mind would have advised [the defendant] to go to trial with a defense of intoxication." 742 F.2d at 374 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Venero v. Balbuena
green
1 sentence2000This Court has historically emphasized that "Florida policy dictates a strong preference that cases be decided on their merits." City of Miami v. Rivas, 723 So.2d 393, 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Venero v. Balbuena, 652 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Cinkat Transp., Inc. v. Maryland Cas. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| McCrory Stores Corporation v. Lee neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Adams v. the Hackensack Trust Company
green
2 sentences1995It is well settled, both as a general rule, see McCrory Stores Corp. v. Lee, 157 Fla. 274 , 25 So.2d 567 (1946), and with respect to the alleged filing of untimely claims in probate proceedings, Adams v. Hackensack Trust Co., 156 Fla. 20 , 22 So.2d 392 (1945), that fraud or misrepresentation which misleads a claimant into a justified failure to assert his rights bars reliance on a statute of limitations. 1995See Burch v. Burgess, 521 So.2d 921 (Ala. 1988); Adams v. Hackensack Trust Co., 156 Fla. at 20 , 22 So.2d at 392; Van Dusen v. Southeast First Nat'l Bank, 478 So.2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Karpo v. Deitsch, 196 So.2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Metcalf v. Johnson, 113 So.2d 864 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959); Fort v. White, 54 Ind. App. 210 , 101 N.E. 27 (1913); In re West's Estate, 169 Kan. 447 , 219 P.2d 418 (1950); Pellegrino v. Maloof, 56 Md. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| West v. West neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Van Dusen v. Southeast First Nat. Bank green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Pellegrino v. Maloof green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Fort v. White green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Metcalf v. Johnson green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Karpo v. Deitsch green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH, ETC. v. West green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Isaacs v. Deutsch green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Maguire v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Boyd v. Florida Memorial College neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Salcedo v. Asociacion Cubana, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Southern Pacific Railroad Co. of Mexico v. Gonzalez green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| O'Malley v. Sims green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Flesche v. Interstate Warehouse green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Meehan v. Celotex Corp. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Rolle v. State neutral | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Enright green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Brooks-Fisher Insulating Co. neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Florida State Turnpike Authority v. O'Loughlin & Hansen, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Nielsen v. Food Fair Stores, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Burch v. Mayor of Savannah green | 1 | 1879–1879 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.