limitations defense in Illinois

2019App. 3d 281, 285-86 (2003), which stands for the general proposition that “[a]n insurer will be estopped from raising a limitations defense where its actions during negotiations are such as to lull the insured into a false sense of security, thereby causing him to delay the assertion of his rights.” (citing Hermanson v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 267 Ill.

2003“An insurer will be estopped from raising a limitations defense where its actions during negotiations are such as to lull the insured into a false sense of security, thereby causing him to delay the assertion of his rights.” Hermanson v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 267 Ill.

2005See, e.g., Pape, 145 Ill. 2d at 27 (section 13 — 207 applied to avoid the limitations bar of section 302(a)(1) of the IIlinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill.

2005See, e.g., Pape, 145 Ill.2d at 27 , 163 Ill.Dec. 898 , 582 N.E.2d 164 (section 13-207 applied to avoid the limitations bar of section 302(a)(1) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 40, par. 302(a)(1))); Westbank v. Maurer, 276 Ill.App.3d 553, 564 , 213 Ill.Dec. 360 , 658 N.E.2d 1381 (1995) (section 13-207 applied to save a counterclaim despite a federal statute of limitations providing that the right to rescission "shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or sale of the property"); Bethlehem Steel Corp., 863 F.2d at

1994Leydig is "estopped from asserting the limitations bar if the plaintiff's failure to act within the statutory period results from reasonable reliance on the defendant's conduct or representations." ( Witherell v. Weimer (1987), 118 Ill.2d 321, 330 , 113 Ill.Dec. 259 , 515 N.E.2d 68 ; see Dill v. Widman (1952), 413 Ill. 448, 455-56 , 109 N.E.2d 765 .) The conduct and representations cited by Jackson in support of this contention are Leydig's statements regarding the strength of Plasser's claim of infringement and possible defenses to that claim.

1994Leydig is "estopped from asserting the limitations bar if the plaintiff’s failure to act within the statutory period results from reasonable reliance on the defendant’s conduct or representations.” (Witherell v. Weimer (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 321, 330 ; see Dill v. Widman (1952), 413 Ill. 448, 455-56 .) The conduct and representations cited by Jackson in support of this contention are Leydig’s statements regarding the strength of Plasser’s claim of infringement and possible defenses to that claim.

2023Liberty Mutual did not waive the provision’s applicability. ¶ 33 We further find nothing in the record to support the plaintiffs’ claim that Liberty Mutual engaged in actions requiring it to be estopped from asserting the two-year time-limitation provision. “ ‘An insurer will be estopped from raising a limitations defense where its actions during negotiations are such as to lull the insured into a false sense of security, thereby causing him to delay the assertion of his rights.’ ” Mitchell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 343 Ill.

2018Equitable estoppel may be defined as the effect of A’s conduct whereby A is barred from asserting rights that might otherwise have existed against B who, in good faith, relied upon such conduct and has been thereby led to change his or her position for the worse.” In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D., 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 24 . “ ‘An insurer will be estopped from raising a limitations defense where its actions during negotiations are such as to lull the insured into a false sense of security, thereby causing him to delay the assertion of his rights.’ ” Mitchell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 343

2003Board of Education of City of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428 , 546 N.E.2d 580 (1989) (Board of Education); City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc., 96 Ill. 2d 457 , 451 N.E.2d 874 (1983) (Shelbyville).

1985As such, this court upheld “the common law rule that the statute of limitations may not be asserted against the State or its county or municipal subdivisions as plaintiffs in actions involving ‘public rights.’ ” ( 96 Ill. 2d 457, 459 .) At the same time, it is well established that where a statute of limitations does “expressly include the State, county, municipality, or other governmental agencies,” common law governmental limitations immunity will not bar a limitations defense predicated on that statute.

2003Board of Education of City of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428 , 546 N.E.2d 580 (1989) (Board of Education); City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc., 96 Ill. 2d 457 , 451 N.E.2d 874 (1983) (Shelbyville).

2003Board of Education of City of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428 , 546 N.E.2d 580 (1989) (Board of Education); City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc., 96 Ill. 2d 457 , 451 N.E.2d 874 (1983) (Shelbyville).

2014McKinnon v. City of Chicago, 243 Ill.

2014McKinnon v. City of Chicago, 243 Ill.

2017See Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 23 (“if a nolle prosequi is entered before jeopardy attaches, the State may reprosecute the defendant subject to other relevant statutory or constitutional defenses” (emphasis added)). ¶ 25 Based on the foregoing, we need not consider defendant’s remaining arguments. ¶ 26 CONCLUSION 10 No. 1-15-2758 ¶ 27 Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.

2017See Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 23 (“if a nolle prosequi is entered before jeopardy attaches, the State may reprosecute the defendant subject to other relevant statutory or constitutional defenses” (emphasis added)). ¶ 25 Based on the foregoing, we need not consider defendant’s remaining arguments. ¶ 26 CONCLUSION ¶ 27 Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.

2012See People v. Ligon, 365 Ill.App.3d 109, 122 , 301 Ill.Dec. 753 , 847 N.E.2d 763 (2006) ("Where the disposition of a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires consideration of matters beyond the record on direct appeal, it is more appropriate that the defendant's contentions be addressed in a proceeding for postconviction relief, and the appellate court may properly decline to adjudicate the defendant's claim in his direct appeal from his criminal conviction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also In re Ch.

2012See People v. Ligon, 365 Ill.App.3d 109, 122 , 301 Ill.Dec. 753 , 847 N.E.2d 763 (2006) ("Where the disposition of a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires consideration of matters beyond the record on direct appeal, it is more appropriate that the defendant's contentions be addressed in a proceeding for postconviction relief, and the appellate court may properly decline to adjudicate the defendant's claim in his direct appeal from his criminal conviction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also In re Ch.

2001App.3d 860, 868 , 186 Ill.Dec. 807 , 617 N.E.2d 46 (1993); Partipilo v. Hallman, 156 Ill.App.3d 806, 811 , 109 Ill.Dec. 387 , 510 N.E.2d 8 (1987); see Burns Philp Food, Inc. v. Cavalea Continental Freight, Inc., 135 F.3d 526, 527-28 (7th Cir.1998) (applying Illinois law)).

2001App. 3d 860, 868 (1993); Partipilo v. Hallman, 156 Ill.

2001Specifically, courts have applied the limitations bar of section 13-205 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its predecessor provisions to constructive trust cases sounding in equity (see, e.g., Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill.2d 458, 462 , 168 Ill.Dec. 829 , 590 N.E.2d 466 (1992), citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill.2d 555, 560-61 , 37 Ill.Dec. 291 , 402 N.E.2d 181 (1980)), as well as to implied contract or assumpsit actions at law (see, e.g., Rohter v. Passarella, 246 Ill.

2001Specifically, courts have applied the limitations bar of section 13 — 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its predecessor provisions to constructive trust cases sounding in equity (see, e.g., Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill. 2d 458, 462 (1992), citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 555, 560-61 (1980)), as well as to implied contract or assumpsit actions at law (see, e.g., Rohter v. Passarella, 246 Ill.

2001Specifically, courts have applied the limitations bar of section 13-205 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its predecessor provisions to constructive trust cases sounding in equity (see, e.g., Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill.2d 458, 462 , 168 Ill.Dec. 829 , 590 N.E.2d 466 (1992), citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill.2d 555, 560-61 , 37 Ill.Dec. 291 , 402 N.E.2d 181 (1980)), as well as to implied contract or assumpsit actions at law (see, e.g., Rohter v. Passarella, 246 Ill.

2001Specifically, courts have applied the limitations bar of section 13 — 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its predecessor provisions to constructive trust cases sounding in equity (see, e.g., Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill. 2d 458, 462 (1992), citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 555, 560-61 (1980)), as well as to implied contract or assumpsit actions at law (see, e.g., Rohter v. Passarella, 246 Ill.

2001Specifically, courts have applied the limitations bar of section 13-205 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its predecessor provisions to constructive trust cases sounding in equity (see, e.g., Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill.2d 458, 462 , 168 Ill.Dec. 829 , 590 N.E.2d 466 (1992), citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill.2d 555, 560-61 , 37 Ill.Dec. 291 , 402 N.E.2d 181 (1980)), as well as to implied contract or assumpsit actions at law (see, e.g., Rohter v. Passarella, 246 Ill.

2001Specifically, courts have applied the limitations bar of section 13 — 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its predecessor provisions to constructive trust cases sounding in equity (see, e.g., Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill. 2d 458, 462 (1992), citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 555, 560-61 (1980)), as well as to implied contract or assumpsit actions at law (see, e.g., Rohter v. Passarella, 246 Ill.

1999App. 428, 439 , 64 N.E.2d 773, 779 (1945), argues Devonshire’s repeated misrepresentations regarding the building’s air quality create a question of fact for the jury as to whether the such fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations or, in the alternative, whether defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting a limitations defense.

1999App. 428, 439 , 64 N.E.2d 773, 779 (1945), argues Devonshire’s repeated misrepresentations regarding the building's air quality create a question of fact for the jury as to whether the such fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations or, in the alternative, whether defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting a limitations defense.

2023Cf. Witherell, 85 Ill. 2d at 158-60 (where one of the plaintiff’s doctors constantly reassured her that her injuries stemmed from a muscle condition, not birth control pills, and convinced her to resume taking the pills after she voluntarily quit, the court held that the defendant doctors were estopped from asserting a limitations defense). ¶ 50 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that plaintiff did not meet her burden of presenting a sufficient factual basis that would arguably entitle her to recovery at trial because she fell manifestly short of establishing the estoppel elements.

2006In our opinion, generally accepted principles of equitable estoppel prevent the defendant doctors from urging the limitations bar.” Witherell, 85 Ill. 2d at 158 .

2024Ordinarily, a limitations defense would be raised in a section 2-619 motion for involuntary dismissal, which expressly authorizes dismissal on the defendant’s motion when “the action was not commenced within the time limited by law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2022); see Cangemi v. Advocate South Suburban Hospital, 364 Ill.

2023It is well settled that defendants are equitably estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense when the defendants “undertook affirmative acts that lulled the plaintiff into a false sense of security that the limitations defense would not be raised.” Pack v. Santa Fe Park Enterprises, Inc., 209 Ill.

2023It is well settled that defendants are equitably estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense when the defendants “undertook affirmative acts that lulled the plaintiff into a false sense of security that the limitations defense would not be raised.” Pack v. Santa Fe Park Enterprises, Inc., 209 Ill.