limitations defense in Alabama

2014Our holding in Pearson serves to emphasize the limitations of the doctrine of “prejudice as a matter of law.” “ ‘Generally, a presumption of prejudice applies only in a ease in which the jury’s consideration of the extraneous material was “ ‘crucial in resolving a key material issue in the case.” ’ Dawson v. State, 710 So.2d 472, 475 (Ala.1997) (citing Hallmark v. Allison , 451 So.2d 270, 271 (Ala.1984), and Ex parte Thomas, 666 So.2d 855 (Ala.1995)).’ ” Taite, 48 So.3d at 9 .

2012Our holding in Pearson serves to emphasize the limitations of the doctrine of ‘prejudice as a matter of law.’ “Generally, a presumption of prejudice applies only in a case in which the jury’s consideration of the extraneous material was ‘ “crucial in resolving a key material issue in the case.” ’ Dawson v. State, 710 So.2d 472, 475 (Ala.1997) (citing Hallmark v. Allison, 451 So.2d 270, 271 (Ala.1984), and Ex parte Thomas, 666 So.2d 855 (Ala.1995)).

2014Our holding in Pearson serves to emphasize the limitations of the doctrine of “prejudice as a matter of law.” “ ‘Generally, a presumption of prejudice applies only in a ease in which the jury’s consideration of the extraneous material was “ ‘crucial in resolving a key material issue in the case.” ’ Dawson v. State, 710 So.2d 472, 475 (Ala.1997) (citing Hallmark v. Allison , 451 So.2d 270, 271 (Ala.1984), and Ex parte Thomas, 666 So.2d 855 (Ala.1995)).’ ” Taite, 48 So.3d at 9 .

2012Our holding in Pearson serves to emphasize the limitations of the doctrine of ‘prejudice as a matter of law.’ “Generally, a presumption of prejudice applies only in a case in which the jury’s consideration of the extraneous material was ‘ “crucial in resolving a key material issue in the case.” ’ Dawson v. State, 710 So.2d 472, 475 (Ala.1997) (citing Hallmark v. Allison, 451 So.2d 270, 271 (Ala.1984), and Ex parte Thomas, 666 So.2d 855 (Ala.1995)).

2009In determining whether the discovery statute applied retroactively, this Court concluded: “Once an action is barred by a statute of limitations in existence at the time of commencement of the action, rights vest in the limitations defense which cannot be destroyed by subsequent legislative act because § 95 of the [Alabama] Constitution restricts the legislative power to do so.” 399 So.2d at 270 .

2009In determining whether the discovery statute applied retroactively, this Court concluded: "Once an action is barred by a statute of limitations in existence at the time of commencement of the action, rights vest in the limitations defense which cannot be destroyed by subsequent legislative act because § 95 of the [Alabama] Constitution restricts the legislative power to do so." 399 So.2d at 270 .

2014In-Tyson, speaking’of the addition of a party under Rule 17(a) after the expiration of the limitations period, we stated; “ ‘ “As long as defendant is fully apprised of the claim arising from specified conduct and has fully prepared to defend the action against him, his ability to protect himself will not be prejudicially affected if a new plaintiff is added, and he should not be permitted to invoke a limitations defense.” ’ ” 146 So.3d at 1045 (quoting Board of Water & Sewer Comm’rs of the City of Mobile v. McDonald, 56 Ala.App. 426, 430 , 322 So.2d 717, 721 (Civ.App.1975), quoting in turn 6

2014In-Tyson, speaking’of the addition of a party under Rule 17(a) after the expiration of the limitations period, we stated; “ ‘ “As long as defendant is fully apprised of the claim arising from specified conduct and has fully prepared to defend the action against him, his ability to protect himself will not be prejudicially affected if a new plaintiff is added, and he should not be permitted to invoke a limitations defense.” ’ ” 146 So.3d at 1045 (quoting Board of Water & Sewer Comm’rs of the City of Mobile v. McDonald, 56 Ala.App. 426, 430 , 322 So.2d 717, 721 (Civ.App.1975), quoting in turn 6

2024Third, Daugherty's claim for recovery based on quantum meruit ignores the limitations on such a claim. " 'The rule in Alabama is that an attorney discharged without cause, or otherwise prevented from full performance, is entitled to be reasonably compensated only for services rendered before such discharge. ' " Gaines, Gaines & Gaines, P.C. v. Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, 554 So. 2d 445, 448 (Ala. Civ.

2024App. 1989) (quoting Owens v. Bolt, 218 Ala. 344, 348 , 118 So. 590, 594 (1928)) (emphasis added).

2024App. 1989) (quoting Owens v. Bolt, 218 Ala. 344, 348 , 118 So. 590, 594 (1928)) (emphasis added).

2014Because Ralph, the real party in interest, has cured the defect and because that cure, as explained above, relates back to the time of Mary’s death, he is entitled to “proceed to a determination of the merits.” See Tyson, 146 So.3d at 1046 (noting that “the goal of relation-back principles is ‘to prevent parties against whom claims are made from taking unjust advantage of otherwise inconsequential pleading errors to sustain a limitations defense’” (quoting Advisory Committee Note to Rule 15, Fed.

2014In-Tyson, speaking’of the addition of a party under Rule 17(a) after the expiration of the limitations period, we stated; “ ‘ “As long as defendant is fully apprised of the claim arising from specified conduct and has fully prepared to defend the action against him, his ability to protect himself will not be prejudicially affected if a new plaintiff is added, and he should not be permitted to invoke a limitations defense.” ’ ” 146 So.3d at 1045 (quoting Board of Water & Sewer Comm’rs of the City of Mobile v. McDonald, 56 Ala.App. 426, 430 , 322 So.2d 717, 721 (Civ.App.1975), quoting in turn 6

2013Limitations of Actions § 176 (1987).) Also, citing Singer Asset Finance Co. v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 975 So.2d 375, 382 (Ala.Civ.App.2007), it asserted that, although Shuler Brothers attempted to avoid the limitations bar by alleging that it did not discover the Utilities Board’s negligence until it was served with the complaint, “there is no ‘discovery rule’ for negligence claims that would toll the running of the statute of limitations from the time the cause of action was ‘discovered’ by the plaintiff.” Regarding the breach-of-contract claim, the Utilities Board argued tha

2007See Howard v. State, 616 So.2d 398 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (holding that the State had waived the limitations defense found in Rule 32.2(c) by failing to raise it), overruled by Williams v. State, 783 So.2d 135 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Jackson v. State, 612 So.2d 1356, 1357 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (“Generally, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be affirmatively pleaded or it is waived.”).

2007However, the Court of Criminal Appeals later held in Williams that “the failure to file a Rule 32 petition within the two-year limitations period is a jurisdictional defect that can be noticed at any time and is not waived by the failure of the State to assert it.” 783 So.2d at 137 .

2007See Howard v. State, 616 So.2d 398 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (holding that the State had waived the limitations defense found in Rule 32.2(c) by failing to raise it), overruled by Williams v. State, 783 So.2d 135 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Jackson v. State, 612 So.2d 1356, 1357 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (“Generally, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be affirmatively pleaded or it is waived.”).

2005Although the cases applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel in the area of municipal zoning do not expressly espouse a reasonableness standard with respect to reliance upon "words, conduct or silence," the Alabama Supreme Court has said, in the context of analyzing whether one may be equitably estopped to assert a limitations defense to an action, that "application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel must be tempered by applying `a standard of reasonable reliance.'" McCormack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 759 So.2d 538, 543 (Ala.1999) (quoting City of Birmingham v. Cochrane Roofing & Metal Co.,

2005Although the cases applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel in the area of municipal zoning do not expressly espouse a reasonableness standard with respect to reliance upon "words, conduct or silence," the Alabama Supreme Court has said, in the context of analyzing whether one may be equitably estopped to assert a limitations defense to an action, that "application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel must be tempered by applying `a standard of reasonable reliance.'" McCormack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A. , 759 So.2d 538 , 543 (Ala. 1999) (quoting City of Birmingham v. Cochrane Roofing Metal Co.

2005Although the cases applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel in the area of municipal zoning do not expressly espouse a reasonableness standard with respect to reliance upon "words, conduct or silence," the Alabama Supreme Court has said, in the context of analyzing whether one may be equitably estopped to assert a limitations defense to an action, that "application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel must be tempered by applying `a standard of reasonable reliance.'" McCormack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 759 So.2d 538, 543 (Ala.1999) (quoting City of Birmingham v. Cochrane Roofing & Metal Co.,

2005Although the cases applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel in the area of municipal zoning do not expressly espouse a reasonableness standard with respect to reliance upon "words, conduct or silence," the Alabama Supreme Court has said, in the context of analyzing whether one may be equitably estopped to assert a limitations defense to an action, that "application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel must be tempered by applying `a standard of reasonable reliance.'" McCormack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A. , 759 So.2d 538 , 543 (Ala. 1999) (quoting City of Birmingham v. Cochrane Roofing Metal Co.

2005Indeed, a party asserting estoppel must "`"in good faith been ignorant of the true facts."'" BSI Rentals, Inc. v. Wendt, 893 So.2d 1184, 1188 (Ala.Civ.App.2004), (quoting Lambert v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 682 So.2d 61, 64 (Ala.1996), quoting in turn Ivey v. Dixon Inv.

2005Indeed, a party asserting estoppel must have "`"in good faith been ignorant of the true facts."'" BSI Rentals, Inc. v. Wendt , 893 So.2d 1184 , 1188 (Ala.Civ.App. 2004), (quoting Lambert v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan , 682 So.2d 61 , 64 (Ala. 1996), quoting in turn Ivey v. Dixon Inv.

2005Indeed, a party asserting estoppel must "`"in good faith been ignorant of the true facts."'" BSI Rentals, Inc. v. Wendt, 893 So.2d 1184, 1188 (Ala.Civ.App.2004), (quoting Lambert v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 682 So.2d 61, 64 (Ala.1996), quoting in turn Ivey v. Dixon Inv.

2005Indeed, a party asserting estoppel must have "`"in good faith been ignorant of the true facts."'" BSI Rentals, Inc. v. Wendt , 893 So.2d 1184 , 1188 (Ala.Civ.App. 2004), (quoting Lambert v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan , 682 So.2d 61 , 64 (Ala. 1996), quoting in turn Ivey v. Dixon Inv.

2004The Gilmores make an alternative argument, in an attempt to avoid the limitations bar to the maintenance of their negligence and wantonness claims, citing Becton v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. , 706 So.2d 1134 , 1135-36 (Ala. 1997), for the proposition that "a plaintiff's ignorance of the fact of the injury through a fraudulent concealment by defendant postpones the running of the limitations period." Becton simply states that proposition conversely, stating "[a] plaintiff's ignorance of the fact of injury, if there is no fraudulent concealment by the defendant, does not postpone the running of the li

2004The Gilmores make an alternative argument, in an attempt to avoid the limitations bar to the maintenance of their negligence and wantonness claims, citing Becton v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. , 706 So.2d 1134 , 1135-36 (Ala. 1997), for the proposition that "a plaintiff's ignorance of the fact of the injury through a fraudulent concealment by defendant postpones the running of the limitations period." Becton simply states that proposition conversely, stating "[a] plaintiff's ignorance of the fact of injury, if there is no fraudulent concealment by the defendant, does not postpone the running of the li

1985Nevertheless, the Bank maintains that a directed verdict should have been granted based on the limitations defense because "there is no disputed issue of fact upon which reasonable men could differ." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford, 406 So.2d 854, 856 (Ala. 1981).

1985Nevertheless, the Bank maintains that a directed verdict should have been granted based on the limitations defense because "there is no disputed issue of fact upon which reasonable men could differ." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford , 406 So.2d 854 , 856 (Ala. 1981).