limitations defense in Maryland

2016We opined that the limitations defense barred an otherwise viable claim of the decedent, only due to a lapse of time, which made barring a wrongful death action under those grounds illogical since the action would be “time-barred before it can accrue.” Id. at 226-28 , 77 A.3d at 1060-61 .

2016We opined that the limitations defense barred an otherwise viable claim of the decedent, only due to a lapse of time, which made barring a wrongful death action under those grounds illogical since the action would be “time-barred before it can accrue.” Id. at 226-28 , 77 A.3d at 1060-61 .

2009The Jackson Court added: "... it is also recognized as one of the limitations of this doctrine of merger, that the original contract is not in all cases to be entirely ignored subsequent to the rendition of a judgment or decree.” 76 Md. at 571 , 25 A. 980 (citation omitted).

2009The Jackson Court added: "... it is also recognized as one of the limitations of this doctrine of merger, that the original contract is not in all cases to be entirely ignored subsequent to the rendition of a judgment or decree.” 76 Md. at 571 , 25 A. 980 (citation omitted).

2006Rule 2-322(b). *145 Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 83 Md.App. 97, 120-21 , 573 A.2d 835 (1990), rev’d on other grounds, 324 Md. 294 , 596 A.2d 1069 (1991).

2006Rule 2-322(b). *145 Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 83 Md.App. 97, 120-21 , 573 A.2d 835 (1990), rev’d on other grounds, 324 Md. 294 , 596 A.2d 1069 (1991).

2006Rule 2-322(b). *145 Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 83 Md.App. 97, 120-21 , 573 A.2d 835 (1990), rev’d on other grounds, 324 Md. 294 , 596 A.2d 1069 (1991).

2006Rule 2-322(b). *145 Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 83 Md.App. 97, 120-21 , 573 A.2d 835 (1990), rev’d on other grounds, 324 Md. 294 , 596 A.2d 1069 (1991).

2003In dispelling that concept, he wrote, “[t]he notion that all aspects of a limitations defense, including the resolution of conflicting facts and inferences, is a function of the court alone can be traced to misinterpretations in certain opinions by the Court of Special Appeals of decisions by this Court concerning the discovery rule in the era prior to Poffenberger, 290 Md. 631 , 431 A.2d 677 .” Id. at 297, 431 A.2d 677 .

2003In dispelling that concept, he wrote, “[t]he notion that all aspects of a limitations defense, including the resolution of conflicting facts and inferences, is a function of the court alone can be traced to misinterpretations in certain opinions by the Court of Special Appeals of decisions by this Court concerning the discovery rule in the era prior to Poffenberger, 290 Md. 631 , 431 A.2d 677 .” Id. at 297, 431 A.2d 677 .

1981In Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88 , 253 A.2d 904 (1969) the limitations analysis was in terms of the discovery rule where a survey crew employed by civil engineers failed to mark out subdivision lots on the ground in accordance with the record plat. *639 We also analyzed the limitations question in a claim for faulty construction under the discovery rule in Steelworkers Holding Co. v. Menefee, 255 Md. 440 , 258 A.2d 177 (1969).

1981In Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88 , 253 A.2d 904 (1969) the limitations analysis was in terms of the discovery rule where a survey crew employed by civil engineers failed to mark out subdivision lots on the ground in accordance with the record plat. *639 We also analyzed the limitations question in a claim for faulty construction under the discovery rule in Steelworkers Holding Co. v. Menefee, 255 Md. 440 , 258 A.2d 177 (1969).

1994Although we recognized the general rule that the party relying on the statute of limitations to avoid a cause of action carries the burden both to plead and prove the statute as an affirmative defense, id., we also acknowledged, citing and discussing Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Company, 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Internat'l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986), tha

1994Although we recognized the general rule that the party relying on the statute of limitations to avoid a cause of action carries the burden both to plead and prove the statute as an affirmative defense, id., we also acknowledged, citing and discussing Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Company, 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Internat'l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986), tha

1994Although we recognized the general rule that the party relying on the statute of limitations to avoid a cause of action carries the burden both to plead and prove the statute as an affirmative defense, id., we also acknowledged, citing and discussing Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Company, 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Internat'l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986), tha

1991Richards cites Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Int’l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986) for the proposition that the plaintiff should carry the burden of proof on this limitations defense.

1994Although we recognized the general rule that the party relying on the statute of limitations to avoid a cause of action carries the burden both to plead and prove the statute as an affirmative defense, id., we also acknowledged, citing and discussing Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Company, 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Internat'l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986), tha

1991Richards cites Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Int’l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986) for the proposition that the plaintiff should carry the burden of proof on this limitations defense.

1994Although we recognized the general rule that the party relying on the statute of limitations to avoid a cause of action carries the burden both to plead and prove the statute as an affirmative defense, id., we also acknowledged, citing and discussing Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Company, 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Internat'l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986), tha

1991Richards cites Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Int’l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986) for the proposition that the plaintiff should carry the burden of proof on this limitations defense.

1994Although we recognized the general rule that the party relying on the statute of limitations to avoid a cause of action carries the burden both to plead and prove the statute as an affirmative defense, id., we also acknowledged, citing and discussing Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Company, 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Internat'l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986), tha

1991Richards cites Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Int’l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986) for the proposition that the plaintiff should carry the burden of proof on this limitations defense.

1994Although we recognized the general rule that the party relying on the statute of limitations to avoid a cause of action carries the burden both to plead and prove the statute as an affirmative defense, id., we also acknowledged, citing and discussing Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Company, 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Internat'l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986), tha

1991Richards cites Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Int’l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986) for the proposition that the plaintiff should carry the burden of proof on this limitations defense.

1994Although we recognized the general rule that the party relying on the statute of limitations to avoid a cause of action carries the burden both to plead and prove the statute as an affirmative defense, id., we also acknowledged, citing and discussing Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Company, 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Internat'l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986), tha

1994Although we recognized the general rule that the party relying on the statute of limitations to avoid a cause of action carries the burden both to plead and prove the statute as an affirmative defense, id., we also acknowledged, citing and discussing Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Company, 57 Md.App. 190 , 469 A.2d 867 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 88 , 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 , 105 S.Ct. 1190 , 84 L.Ed.2d 336 , reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 , 105 S.Ct. 2043 , 85 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), and Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Internat'l, Inc., 67 Md.App. 424 , 508 A.2d 148 (1986), tha

2025Quoting United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1980), the Fourth Circuit explicitly delineated the limitations of the doctrine: The law seems to be clear that so long as the officer who orders an arrest or search has knowledge of facts establishing probable cause, it is not necessary for the officers actually making the arrest or conducting the search to be personally aware of those facts. [N.3] When a superior officer orders another officer to make an arrest, it is proper to consider the superior’s knowledge in determining whether there was probable cause.

2023Co. v. Nash, 184 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Ark. 2004) (“In ordinary contract actions, the statute of limitations begins to run upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action” and “if the right of action depends upon some contingency or a condition precedent, the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the contingency occurs or the condition precedent is complied with.”); JC Ryan EBCO/H&G, LLC v. Lipsky Enters., Inc., 78 A.D.3d 788, 789-90 , (N.Y.S. 2010) (the limitations clause in the subcontract conflicts with the pay-when-paid clause because

2023Rather, this Court flatly rejected such an interpretation by stating quite clearly that it was holding fast to the Nelson majority’s interpretation of “prosecution” and “suit” that excluded administrative proceedings from a limitations defense under CJP § 5-107. 122 Md.

2021In seeking to avoid the limitations bar, the tenant argued that her claims involved “an ongoing harm, in particular, the deteriorating condition of her apartment.” Id. at 585 .

2021We noted that this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have recognized the “continuing harm” doctrine, “which tolls the statute of limitations in cases where there are continuous violations.” Id. at 584 (citing Shell Oil, 265 Md. at 636 ; Edwards v. Demedis, 118 Md.

2021We noted that this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have recognized the “continuing harm” doctrine, “which tolls the statute of limitations in cases where there are continuous violations.” Id. at 584 (citing Shell Oil, 265 Md. at 636 ; Edwards v. Demedis, 118 Md.

2013Cline interposed a limitations defense, asserting that the amended declaration was an attempt to introduce a new cause of action which had not “accrue[d] within three years of the filing of the amended declaration.” Cline II, 214 Md. at 257 , 134 A.2d 304 .

2013Cline interposed a limitations defense, asserting that the amended declaration was an attempt to introduce a new cause of action which had not “accrue[d] within three years of the filing of the amended declaration.” Cline II, 214 Md. at 257 , 134 A.2d 304 .

2013Other issues that have been deemed suitable for preliminary determination under Rule 2-502 (or its predecessor Rule) are the res judicata effect of a prior decision, Simpkins v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 389 Md. 426, 440 , 886 A.2d 126 (2005), and Beach v. Mueller, 32 Md.App. 219 , 224 n. 3, 359 A.2d 232 (1976); demand futility in a stockholder suit, Werbowsky v. Collomb, 362 Md. 581, 621 , 766 A.2d 123 (2001), and Bender v. Schwartz, 172 Md.App. 648, 663-64 , 917 A.2d 142 (2007); a limitations defense, Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 511 , 290 A.2d 530 (1972); statutory interpretation, State v. S

2013Other issues that have been deemed suitable for preliminary determination under Rule 2-502 (or its predecessor Rule) are the res judicata effect of a prior decision, Simpkins v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 389 Md. 426, 440 , 886 A.2d 126 (2005), and Beach v. Mueller, 32 Md.App. 219 , 224 n. 3, 359 A.2d 232 (1976); demand futility in a stockholder suit, Werbowsky v. Collomb, 362 Md. 581, 621 , 766 A.2d 123 (2001), and Bender v. Schwartz, 172 Md.App. 648, 663-64 , 917 A.2d 142 (2007); a limitations defense, Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 511 , 290 A.2d 530 (1972); statutory interpretation, State v. S

2013Other issues that have been deemed suitable for preliminary determination under Rule 2-502 (or its predecessor Rule) are the res judicata effect of a prior decision, Simpkins v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 389 Md. 426, 440 , 886 A.2d 126 (2005), and Beach v. Mueller, 32 Md.App. 219 , 224 n. 3, 359 A.2d 232 (1976); demand futility in a stockholder suit, Werbowsky v. Collomb, 362 Md. 581, 621 , 766 A.2d 123 (2001), and Bender v. Schwartz, 172 Md.App. 648, 663-64 , 917 A.2d 142 (2007); a limitations defense, Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 511 , 290 A.2d 530 (1972); statutory interpretation, State v. S

2013Other issues that have been deemed suitable for preliminary determination under Rule 2-502 (or its predecessor Rule) are the res judicata effect of a prior decision, Simpkins v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 389 Md. 426, 440 , 886 A.2d 126 (2005), and Beach v. Mueller, 32 Md.App. 219 , 224 n. 3, 359 A.2d 232 (1976); demand futility in a stockholder suit, Werbowsky v. Collomb, 362 Md. 581, 621 , 766 A.2d 123 (2001), and Bender v. Schwartz, 172 Md.App. 648, 663-64 , 917 A.2d 142 (2007); a limitations defense, Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 511 , 290 A.2d 530 (1972); statutory interpretation, State v. S

2013Other issues that have been deemed suitable for preliminary determination under Rule 2-502 (or its predecessor Rule) are the res judicata effect of a prior decision, Simpkins v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 389 Md. 426, 440 , 886 A.2d 126 (2005), and Beach v. Mueller, 32 Md.App. 219 , 224 n. 3, 359 A.2d 232 (1976); demand futility in a stockholder suit, Werbowsky v. Collomb, 362 Md. 581, 621 , 766 A.2d 123 (2001), and Bender v. Schwartz, 172 Md.App. 648, 663-64 , 917 A.2d 142 (2007); a limitations defense, Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 511 , 290 A.2d 530 (1972); statutory interpretation, State v. S

2013Other issues that have been deemed suitable for preliminary determination under Rule 2-502 (or its predecessor Rule) are the res judicata effect of a prior decision, Simpkins v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 389 Md. 426, 440 , 886 A.2d 126 (2005), and Beach v. Mueller, 32 Md.App. 219 , 224 n. 3, 359 A.2d 232 (1976); demand futility in a stockholder suit, Werbowsky v. Collomb, 362 Md. 581, 621 , 766 A.2d 123 (2001), and Bender v. Schwartz, 172 Md.App. 648, 663-64 , 917 A.2d 142 (2007); a limitations defense, Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 511 , 290 A.2d 530 (1972); statutory interpretation, State v. S

2013Other issues that have been deemed suitable for preliminary determination under Rule 2-502 (or its predecessor Rule) are the res judicata effect of a prior decision, Simpkins v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 389 Md. 426, 440 , 886 A.2d 126 (2005), and Beach v. Mueller, 32 Md.App. 219 , 224 n. 3, 359 A.2d 232 (1976); demand futility in a stockholder suit, Werbowsky v. Collomb, 362 Md. 581, 621 , 766 A.2d 123 (2001), and Bender v. Schwartz, 172 Md.App. 648, 663-64 , 917 A.2d 142 (2007); a limitations defense, Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 511 , 290 A.2d 530 (1972); statutory interpretation, State v. S

2013Other issues that have been deemed suitable for preliminary determination under Rule 2-502 (or its predecessor Rule) are the res judicata effect of a prior decision, Simpkins v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 389 Md. 426, 440 , 886 A.2d 126 (2005), and Beach v. Mueller, 32 Md.App. 219 , 224 n. 3, 359 A.2d 232 (1976); demand futility in a stockholder suit, Werbowsky v. Collomb, 362 Md. 581, 621 , 766 A.2d 123 (2001), and Bender v. Schwartz, 172 Md.App. 648, 663-64 , 917 A.2d 142 (2007); a limitations defense, Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 511 , 290 A.2d 530 (1972); statutory interpretation, State v. S

2013Other issues that have been deemed suitable for preliminary determination under Rule 2-502 (or its predecessor Rule) are the res judicata effect of a prior decision, Simpkins v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 389 Md. 426, 440 , 886 A.2d 126 (2005), and Beach v. Mueller, 32 Md.App. 219 , 224 n. 3, 359 A.2d 232 (1976); demand futility in a stockholder suit, Werbowsky v. Collomb, 362 Md. 581, 621 , 766 A.2d 123 (2001), and Bender v. Schwartz, 172 Md.App. 648, 663-64 , 917 A.2d 142 (2007); a limitations defense, Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 511 , 290 A.2d 530 (1972); statutory interpretation, State v. S

2013Other issues that have been deemed suitable for preliminary determination under Rule 2-502 (or its predecessor Rule) are the res judicata effect of a prior decision, Simpkins v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 389 Md. 426, 440 , 886 A.2d 126 (2005), and Beach v. Mueller, 32 Md.App. 219 , 224 n. 3, 359 A.2d 232 (1976); demand futility in a stockholder suit, Werbowsky v. Collomb, 362 Md. 581, 621 , 766 A.2d 123 (2001), and Bender v. Schwartz, 172 Md.App. 648, 663-64 , 917 A.2d 142 (2007); a limitations defense, Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 511 , 290 A.2d 530 (1972); statutory interpretation, State v. S

2013As our discussion has already shown, GEH and FVI had Maryland taxable income for each year of the Comptroller’s assessments, and because they did not file returns as required by TG § 10-810(a), their assessments fall directly under the limitations exception in TG § 13-1101(b)(3). 15 See Classics, 189 Md.App. at 702 n. 2, 985 A.2d 593 .

2013As our discussion has already shown, GEH and FVI had Maryland taxable income for each year of the Comptroller’s assessments, and because they did not file returns as required by TG § 10-810(a), their assessments fall directly under the limitations exception in TG § 13-1101(b)(3). 15 See Classics, 189 Md.App. at 702 n. 2, 985 A.2d 593 .