power inquiry in Florida

2014“If any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify the law, the court’s power of inquiry ends.” State v. Bales, 343 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla.1977) (citing United States v. Carolene Prods.

2010“If any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify the law, the court’s power of inquiry ends.” State v. Bales, 343 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla.1977).

2026See Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1st DCCA 2004) (explaining that a facial constitutional challenge “must fail unless no set of circumstances exists in which the statute can be constitutionally applied”); see also Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010) (“If any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify the law, the court’s power of inquiry ends.” (citation omitted)); Smalley v. Duke Energy Fla., Inc., 154 So. 3d 439, 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (“A facial challenge fails when a statute has a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” (quoting Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 )).

2005If any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify the law, the court's power of inquiry ends.") (citation omitted); Cashatt, 873 So.2d at 434 ("A facial challenge to a statute is more difficult than an `as applied' challenge, because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.") We conclude that in a situation in which municipal telecommunications services do not promote any of the goals set forth above from section 364.01, Florida Statutes, for the benefit of the municipal population, property used to provide those services do

2005For, “if any state of fact, known or to be assumed, justifies the law, the court’s power of inquiry ends; questions as to the wisdom, need or appropriateness are for the legislature.” Fulford v. Graham, 418 So.2d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

1991Fulford v. Graham, 418 So.2d 1204, 05 [1205] (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

1978See Point East Management Corporation v. Point East One Condominium Corporation, Inc., 258 So.2d 322, 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).

1978See Point East Management Corporation v. Point East One Condominium Corporation, Inc., 258 So.2d 322, 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).

2008The Court expressly adopted the Second District's reasoning that "[t]his statutory prohibition of constitutional challenges by property appraisers is in accord with the general common law principle denying ministerial officers the power to challenge the constitutionality of statutes." Fuchs, 818 So.2d at 464 (quoting Turner v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 739 So.2d 175, 179-80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citing Atlantic Coast Line; Barr )).

2002Indeed, it specifically provides, in pertinent part, that "nothing herein shall authorize the property appraiser to institute any suit to challenge the validity of any portion of the constitution or of any duly enacted legislative act of this state." As aptly observed by the Second District in Turner , "[t]his statutory prohibition of constitutional challenges by property appraisers is in accord with the general common law principle denying ministerial officers the power to challenge the constitutionality of statutes." 739 So.2d at 179 -80 (citing State ex rel.

2026See Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1st DCCA 2004) (explaining that a facial constitutional challenge “must fail unless no set of circumstances exists in which the statute can be constitutionally applied”); see also Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010) (“If any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify the law, the court’s power of inquiry ends.” (citation omitted)); Smalley v. Duke Energy Fla., Inc., 154 So. 3d 439, 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (“A facial challenge fails when a statute has a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” (quoting Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 )).

2026See Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1st DCCA 2004) (explaining that a facial constitutional challenge “must fail unless no set of circumstances exists in which the statute can be constitutionally applied”); see also Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010) (“If any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify the law, the court’s power of inquiry ends.” (citation omitted)); Smalley v. Duke Energy Fla., Inc., 154 So. 3d 439, 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (“A facial challenge fails when a statute has a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” (quoting Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 )).

2017See, e.g., Allred v. State, 186 So. 3d 530, 542-43 (Fla. 2016) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was constitutionally entitled to know the identity of his execution team and explaining that identity of executioners was not ascertainable because Governor had not signed death warrant); Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176, 205 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that “section 945.10(g), Florida Statutes (2013), makes the identity of the executioner and any persons preparing, dispensing or administering lethal injection confidential”); Power v. State, 886 So. 2d 952, 958 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting Power’s claim

2017See, e.g., Allred v. State, 186 So.3d 530, 542-43 (Fla. 2016) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was constitutionally entitled to know the identity of his execution team and explaining that identity of executioners was not ascer-tamable because Governor had not signed death warrant); Muhammad v. State, 132 So.3d 176, 205 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that “section 945.10(g), Florida Statutes (2013), makes the identity of the executioner and any persons preparing, dispensing or administer ing lethal injection confidential”); Power v. State, 886 So.2d 952, 958 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting Power’s claim th

2017See, e.g., Allred v. State, 186 So. 3d 530, 542-43 (Fla. 2016) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was constitutionally entitled to know the identity of his execution team and explaining that identity of executioners was not ascertainable because Governor had not signed death warrant); Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176, 205 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that “section 945.10(g), Florida Statutes (2013), makes the identity of the executioner and any persons preparing, dispensing or administering lethal injection confidential”); Power v. State, 886 So. 2d 952, 958 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting Power’s claim

2017See, e.g., Allred v. State, 186 So.3d 530, 542-43 (Fla. 2016) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was constitutionally entitled to know the identity of his execution team and explaining that identity of executioners was not ascer-tamable because Governor had not signed death warrant); Muhammad v. State, 132 So.3d 176, 205 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that “section 945.10(g), Florida Statutes (2013), makes the identity of the executioner and any persons preparing, dispensing or administer ing lethal injection confidential”); Power v. State, 886 So.2d 952, 958 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting Power’s claim th

2017See, e.g., Allred v. State, 186 So. 3d 530, 542-43 (Fla. 2016) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was constitutionally entitled to know the identity of his execution team and explaining that identity of executioners was not ascertainable because Governor had not signed death warrant); Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176, 205 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that “section 945.10(g), Florida Statutes (2013), makes the identity of the executioner and any persons preparing, dispensing or administering lethal injection confidential”); Power v. State, 886 So. 2d 952, 958 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting Power’s claim

2017See, e.g., Allred v. State, 186 So.3d 530, 542-43 (Fla. 2016) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was constitutionally entitled to know the identity of his execution team and explaining that identity of executioners was not ascer-tamable because Governor had not signed death warrant); Muhammad v. State, 132 So.3d 176, 205 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that “section 945.10(g), Florida Statutes (2013), makes the identity of the executioner and any persons preparing, dispensing or administer ing lethal injection confidential”); Power v. State, 886 So.2d 952, 958 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting Power’s claim th

2012Although we do not reach the merits of the denial of the motion to dismiss, we vacate the order to the extent it denies the motion to dismiss because the motion “should be considered after the change of venue has been accomplished.” Straughn v. Grootemaat, 291 So.2d 669, 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); see also Davis v. Fla. Power Corp., 486 So.2d 34, 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (“Upon a change of venue the transferor court generally loses the power to rule upon other matters pending in the case.”).

2012Although we do not reach the merits of the denial of the motion to dismiss, we vacate the order to the extent it denies the motion to dismiss because the motion “should be considered after the change of venue has been accomplished.” Straughn v. Grootemaat, 291 So.2d 669, 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); see also Davis v. Fla. Power Corp., 486 So.2d 34, 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (“Upon a change of venue the transferor court generally loses the power to rule upon other matters pending in the case.”).