power privilege in Kansas

2022It observed that "'[d]iscretion' has been defined as the power and the privilege to act unhampered by legal rule" and "as the capacity to distinguish between what is right and wrong, lawful and unlawful, wise or foolish, sufficiently to render one amenable and responsible for his acts." Hopkins v. State, 237 Kan. 601, 610 , 702 P.2d 311 (1985).

2022It observed that "'[d]iscretion' has been defined as the power and the privilege to act unhampered by legal rule" and "as the capacity to distinguish between what is right and wrong, lawful and unlawful, wise or foolish, sufficiently to render one amenable and responsible for his acts." Hopkins v. State, 237 Kan. 601, 610 , 702 P.2d 311 (1985).

2022It reasoned that "[d]iscretion implies the exercise of discriminating judgment within the bounds of reason." 237 Kan. at 610 (citing Sandford v. Smith, 11 Cal. App. 3d 991, 1000 , 90 Cal. Rptr. 256 [1970]).

2022It reasoned that "[d]iscretion implies the exercise of discriminating judgment within the bounds of reason." 237 Kan. at 610 (citing Sandford v. Smith, 11 Cal. App. 3d 991, 1000 , 90 Cal. Rptr. 256 [1970]).

2019Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub , 471 U.S. 343 , 348, 105 S. Ct. 1986 , 85 L.Ed. 2d 372 (1985) ; United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 112 F.R.D. 333 , 338 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding no waiver occurred because only the holder of the privilege related to non-testifying experts, the defendant, could waive the protections).

2019Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub , 471 U.S. 343 , 348, 105 S. Ct. 1986 , 85 L.Ed. 2d 372 (1985) ; United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 112 F.R.D. 333 , 338 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding no waiver occurred because only the holder of the privilege related to non-testifying experts, the defendant, could waive the protections).

2019Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub , 471 U.S. 343 , 348, 105 S. Ct. 1986 , 85 L.Ed. 2d 372 (1985) ; United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 112 F.R.D. 333 , 338 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding no waiver occurred because only the holder of the privilege related to non-testifying experts, the defendant, could waive the protections).

1993“How *482 ever, the district court does have the power to rule on the motion provided the party opposing it has responded or has agreed to a disposition before the expiration of the twenty-one-day period.” 11 Kan.

1975A prohibition to exercise a particular power is the exception. . . .” (pp. 263, 264.) (See also the Kentucky opinion in, Sewell and Allington v. Bennett and Levi, 187 Ky. 626 , 220 S. W. 517 [1920]; and Elrod v. Willis, Governor, 305 Ky. 225 , 203 S. W. 2d 18 [1947].) The Supreme Court of North Dakota in a landmark case, State v. Boucher, 3 N. D. 389 , 56 N. W. 142 (1893), provides an excellent history and summary of the appointment power.

1975A prohibition to exercise a particular power is the exception. . . .” (pp. 263, 264.) (See also the Kentucky opinion in, Sewell and Allington v. Bennett and Levi, 187 Ky. 626 , 220 S. W. 517 [1920]; and Elrod v. Willis, Governor, 305 Ky. 225 , 203 S. W. 2d 18 [1947].) The Supreme Court of North Dakota in a landmark case, State v. Boucher, 3 N. D. 389 , 56 N. W. 142 (1893), provides an excellent history and summary of the appointment power.

1975A prohibition to exercise a particular power is the exception. . . .” (pp. 263, 264.) (See also the Kentucky opinion in, Sewell and Allington v. Bennett and Levi, 187 Ky. 626 , 220 S. W. 517 [1920]; and Elrod v. Willis, Governor, 305 Ky. 225 , 203 S. W. 2d 18 [1947].) The Supreme Court of North Dakota in a landmark case, State v. Boucher, 3 N. D. 389 , 56 N. W. 142 (1893), provides an excellent history and summary of the appointment power.

1975A prohibition to exercise a particular power is the exception. . . .” (pp. 263, 264.) (See also the Kentucky opinion in, Sewell and Allington v. Bennett and Levi, 187 Ky. 626 , 220 S. W. 517 [1920]; and Elrod v. Willis, Governor, 305 Ky. 225 , 203 S. W. 2d 18 [1947].) The Supreme Court of North Dakota in a landmark case, State v. Boucher, 3 N. D. 389 , 56 N. W. 142 (1893), provides an excellent history and summary of the appointment power.

1975A prohibition to exercise a particular power is the exception. . . .” (pp. 263, 264.) (See also the Kentucky opinion in, Sewell and Allington v. Bennett and Levi, 187 Ky. 626 , 220 S. W. 517 [1920]; and Elrod v. Willis, Governor, 305 Ky. 225 , 203 S. W. 2d 18 [1947].) The Supreme Court of North Dakota in a landmark case, State v. Boucher, 3 N. D. 389 , 56 N. W. 142 (1893), provides an excellent history and summary of the appointment power.

1975A prohibition to exercise a particular power is the exception. . . .” (pp. 263, 264.) (See also the Kentucky opinion in, Sewell and Allington v. Bennett and Levi, 187 Ky. 626 , 220 S. W. 517 [1920]; and Elrod v. Willis, Governor, 305 Ky. 225 , 203 S. W. 2d 18 [1947].) The Supreme Court of North Dakota in a landmark case, State v. Boucher, 3 N. D. 389 , 56 N. W. 142 (1893), provides an excellent history and summary of the appointment power.

1930(In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 116 , 145 Pac. 871 .) When such a case has been appealed to the district court that court exercises the same power of inquiry that was possessed by the juvenile court before the proceeding was appealed to the district court.

1930(In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 116 , 145 Pac. 871 .) When such a case has been appealed to the district court that court exercises the same power of inquiry that was possessed by the juvenile court before the proceeding was appealed to the district court.

1929(Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 .) The public schools are for the benefit of children within school age, and efficiency ought to be the sole object of those charged with the power and privilege of managing and conducting the same, and while great care should be taken to preserve order and proper discipline, it is proper also to see that no one within school age should be denied the privilege of attending school unless it is clear that the public interest demands the expulsion of such pupil or a denial of his right to attend.

1913Thus it was held, in Rieger v. Schaible, 81 Neb. 33 , 115 N. W. 560 , that the provisions of the statutes of that state that a j ointure is a bar to dower do not ordinarily prevent an equitable bar, and further, that: “The provisions of the statute that a jointure is a bar of dower do not ordinarily deprive the intended wife of the power to bar her dower by any other form of antenuptial contract.” (Syl. ¶ 3.) Another decision in that state, upon facts quite similar to the facts of this case, should be referred to.

1913Thus it was held, in Rieger v. Schaible, 81 Neb. 33 , 115 N. W. 560 , that the provisions of the statutes of that state that a j ointure is a bar to dower do not ordinarily prevent an equitable bar, and further, that: “The provisions of the statute that a jointure is a bar of dower do not ordinarily deprive the intended wife of the power to bar her dower by any other form of antenuptial contract.” (Syl. ¶ 3.) Another decision in that state, upon facts quite similar to the facts of this case, should be referred to.

1912Co., 98 Minn. 380 , 108 N. W. 261 .) “The right to exercise the police power is a continuing one that can not be limited or contracted away by the State or its municipality, nor can it be destroyed by compromise as it is immaterial upon what consideration the attempted contract is based.” (Northern Pacific Railway v. Duluth, 208 U. S. 583 , syl.) In that case it was said in the opinion: “There can be no question as to the attitude of this. court upon this question, as it has been uniformly held that the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one; that it can not be contracted away,

1912Co., 98 Minn. 380 , 108 N. W. 261 .) “The right to exercise the police power is a continuing one that can not be limited or contracted away by the State or its municipality, nor can it be destroyed by compromise as it is immaterial upon what consideration the attempted contract is based.” (Northern Pacific Railway v. Duluth, 208 U. S. 583 , syl.) In that case it was said in the opinion: “There can be no question as to the attitude of this. court upon this question, as it has been uniformly held that the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one; that it can not be contracted away,

1912Railroad Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556 : “It is likewise thoroughly established in this court that the inhibitions of the Constitution of the United States upon the impairment of the obligation of contracts, or the deprivation of property without due process, or of the equal protection of the laws, by the States, are not violated by the legitimate exercise of legislative power in securing the public safety, health and morals.

1912Co., 98 Minn. 380 , 108 N. W. 261 .) “The right to exercise the police power is a continuing one that can not be limited or contracted away by the State or its municipality, nor can it be destroyed by compromise as it is immaterial upon what consideration the attempted contract is based.” (Northern Pacific Railway v. Duluth, 208 U. S. 583 , syl.) In that case it was said in the opinion: “There can be no question as to the attitude of this. court upon this question, as it has been uniformly held that the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one; that it can not be contracted away,