power waiver in Washington

1963The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (Italics ours.) The rule of the Johnson case was adopted by this court in In re Gensburg v. Smith, 35 Wn. (2d) 849, 215 P. (2d) 880 (1950), where we said, at page 856: “An accused person may waive his constitutional right to counsel, but this power of waiver, to be effective, must be exercised ‘competently and intelligently.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 30

1963The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (Italics ours.) The rule of the Johnson case was adopted by this court in In re Gensburg v. Smith, 35 Wn. (2d) 849, 215 P. (2d) 880 (1950), where we said, at page 856: “An accused person may waive his constitutional right to counsel, but this power of waiver, to be effective, must be exercised ‘competently and intelligently.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 30

1957In the case of In re Gensburg v. Smith, 35 Wn. (2d) 849, 215 P. (2d) 880 , the court quoted from Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 780 , 93 L.Ed. 1686 , 69 S.Ct. 1247 , as follows: "`Our decisions have been that where the ignorance, youth, or other incapacity of the defendant made a trial without counsel unfair, the defendant is deprived of his liberty contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote: Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 , and cases there cited.] Counsel necessary for his adequate defense would be lacking.'" In the Gensburg case, the court further said: "An accused person may

1951"An accused person may waive his constitutional right to counsel, but this power of waiver, to be effective, must be exercised `competently and intelligently.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ; Voight v. Webb, 47 F. Supp. 743 .

1963The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (Italics ours.) The rule of the Johnson case was adopted by this court in In re Gensburg v. Smith, 35 Wn. (2d) 849, 215 P. (2d) 880 (1950), where we said, at page 856: “An accused person may waive his constitutional right to counsel, but this power of waiver, to be effective, must be exercised ‘competently and intelligently.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 30

1957In the case of In re Gensburg v. Smith, 35 Wn. (2d) 849, 215 P. (2d) 880 , the court quoted from Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 780 , 93 L.Ed. 1686 , 69 S.Ct. 1247 , as follows: "`Our decisions have been that where the ignorance, youth, or other incapacity of the defendant made a trial without counsel unfair, the defendant is deprived of his liberty contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote: Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 , and cases there cited.] Counsel necessary for his adequate defense would be lacking.'" In the Gensburg case, the court further said: "An accused person may

2014To the contrary, "the determination of the validity of an initiative is 'exclusively a judicial function.'" Evman v. McGehee. 173 Wn.

2014To the contrary, “the determination of the validity of an initiative is ‘exclusively a judicial function.’ ” Eyman v. McGehee, 173 Wn.

2007A prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception.'" Fair, 35 Wash. at 132-33 , 76 P. 731 (quoting People ex rel.

2007A prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception.’ ” Fair, 35 Wash. at 132 -33 (quoting People ex rel.

2023Id.

2022Here, Humphrey, relying on State v. Allen, 182 Wn.2d 364 , 341 P.3d 268 (2015), merely makes the conclusory argument that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s argument overwhelms the power of the instruction to cure.

2022Here, Humphrey, relying on State v. Allen, 182 Wn.2d 364 , 341 P.3d 268 (2015), merely makes the conclusory argument that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s argument overwhelms the power of the instruction to cure.

2022“Repetitive misconduct can have a ‘cumulative 4 Although the challenged statements were not clear and unmistakable expressions of personal opinion, the better practice would be to argue what “the evidence shows” rather than what “the State believes.” 16 No. 54114-9-II effect.’” Allen, 182 Wn.2d at 376 (quoting Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d at 707 ).

1982The state's power to challenge for cause capital punishment opponents was elaborated upon in a footnote. [Njothing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision a

1982The state's power to challenge for cause capital punishment opponents was elaborated upon in a footnote. [N]othing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision a

1977App. 290 , 567 P.2d 264 (1977), recognizes the distinction between procedural and substantive guaranties of a speedy trial right, discussing the dichotomy in the context of the accused's attorney's power of waiver.

1957In the Johnson case it was further held that one who asserts that the right to counsel was not competently and intelligently waived, has the burden of proof to establish that claim." See, also, Thorne v. Callahan, 39 Wn. (2d) 43, 234 P. (2d) 517 .

1957In the case of In re Gensburg v. Smith, 35 Wn. (2d) 849, 215 P. (2d) 880 , the court quoted from Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 780 , 93 L.Ed. 1686 , 69 S.Ct. 1247 , as follows: "`Our decisions have been that where the ignorance, youth, or other incapacity of the defendant made a trial without counsel unfair, the defendant is deprived of his liberty contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote: Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 , and cases there cited.] Counsel necessary for his adequate defense would be lacking.'" In the Gensburg case, the court further said: "An accused person may

1957In the case of In re Gensburg v. Smith, 35 Wn. (2d) 849, 215 P. (2d) 880 , the court quoted from Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 780 , 93 L.Ed. 1686 , 69 S.Ct. 1247 , as follows: "`Our decisions have been that where the ignorance, youth, or other incapacity of the defendant made a trial without counsel unfair, the defendant is deprived of his liberty contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote: Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 , and cases there cited.] Counsel necessary for his adequate defense would be lacking.'" In the Gensburg case, the court further said: "An accused person may

1957Ed. 1686 , 69 S. Ct. 1247 , as follows: “ ‘Our decisions have been that where the ignorance, youth, or other incapacity of the defendant made a trial without counsel unfair, the defendant is deprived of his liberty contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote: Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437, 441 , and cases there cited.] Counsel necessary for his adequate defense would be lacking.’ ” In the Gensburg case, the court further said: “An accused person may waive his constitutional right to counsel, but this power of waiver, to be effective, must be exercised ‘competently and intelligently

1957In the case of In re Gensburg v. Smith, 35 Wn. (2d) 849, 215 P. (2d) 880 , the court quoted from Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 780 , 93 L.Ed. 1686 , 69 S.Ct. 1247 , as follows: "`Our decisions have been that where the ignorance, youth, or other incapacity of the defendant made a trial without counsel unfair, the defendant is deprived of his liberty contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote: Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 , and cases there cited.] Counsel necessary for his adequate defense would be lacking.'" In the Gensburg case, the court further said: "An accused person may

1957Ed. 1367 , 65 S. Ct. 989 , and Thorne v. Callahan, supra. In the latter case, we held that “ . . . the fourteenth amendment requires counsel for all persons charged with serious crimes where the assistance of counsel is necessary to their adequate defense, whether or not they request counsel and whether they plead guilty or stand trial.” In In re Gensburg v. Smith, 35 Wn. (2d) 849, 215 P. (2d) 880 , we held that an accused person may waive his constitutional right to counsel, but this power of waiver, to be effective, must be exercised “competently and intelligently,” citing Johnson v. Zerbst,

1952If so, the House of Representatives had no power or authority in the matter more than any other equal number of gentlemen interested for the government of their country." (pp. 194, 195) Under this case, the scope of legislative investigatory power appears to have been narrowed for a period of years until the advent of the decision in McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 , 71 L.Ed. 580 , 47 S.Ct. 319 , 50 A.L.R. 1 , wherein Justice Van Devanter, in an unanimous opinion, said: "We are of opinion that the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary

1952If so, the House of Representatives had no power or authority in the matter more than any other equal number of gentlemen interested for the government of their country." (pp. 194, 195) Under this case, the scope of legislative investigatory power appears to have been narrowed for a period of years until the advent of the decision in McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 , 71 L.Ed. 580 , 47 S.Ct. 319 , 50 A.L.R. 1 , wherein Justice Van Devanter, in an unanimous opinion, said: "We are of opinion that the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary