power exception in Maryland

2000We find that the reservation of the power to rule on the marital property issues is strong evidence that the court intended to grant Mr. Davis an absolute divorce on February 28. 335 Md. at 712 , 646 A.2d 365 (emphasis supplied).

2000We find that the reservation of the power to rule on the marital property issues is strong evidence that the court intended to grant Mr. Davis an absolute divorce on February 28. 335 Md. at 712 , 646 A.2d 365 (emphasis supplied).

1940In Leonard v. Earle, 155 Md. 252 , 141 A. 714 , it is said: “The powers of the Legislature are not derived from grants in the Constitution of the state, or, indeed, from any classifications made use of in discussions of exercises of power; plenary power in the Legislature for all purposes of civil government is the rule, a prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception, and can be founded only on some constitutional clause plainly giving rise to it.” See Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466 , 87 A. 413 ; Kenneweg v. Allegany County, 102 Md. 119 , 62 A. 249 ; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio S

1940In Leonard v. Earle, 155 Md. 252 , 141 A. 714 , it is said: “The powers of the Legislature are not derived from grants in the Constitution of the state, or, indeed, from any classifications made use of in discussions of exercises of power; plenary power in the Legislature for all purposes of civil government is the rule, a prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception, and can be founded only on some constitutional clause plainly giving rise to it.” See Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466 , 87 A. 413 ; Kenneweg v. Allegany County, 102 Md. 119 , 62 A. 249 ; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio S

1940In Leonard v. Earle, 155 Md. 252 , 141 A. 714 , it is said: “The powers of the Legislature are not derived from grants in the Constitution of the state, or, indeed, from any classifications made use of in discussions of exercises of power; plenary power in the Legislature for all purposes of civil government is the rule, a prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception, and can be founded only on some constitutional clause plainly giving rise to it.” See Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466 , 87 A. 413 ; Kenneweg v. Allegany County, 102 Md. 119 , 62 A. 249 ; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio S

1940In Leonard v. Earle, 155 Md. 252 , 141 A. 714 , it is said: “The powers of the Legislature are not derived from grants in the Constitution of the state, or, indeed, from any classifications made use of in discussions of exercises of power; plenary power in the Legislature for all purposes of civil government is the rule, a prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception, and can be founded only on some constitutional clause plainly giving rise to it.” See Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466 , 87 A. 413 ; Kenneweg v. Allegany County, 102 Md. 119 , 62 A. 249 ; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio S

1978Code (1974), § 2-102 (a) of the Estates and Trusts Article), and recognized by this Court, e.g., Hayman, Adm’r v. Messick, 252 Md. 384, 388 , 249 A. 2d 695, 697 (1969); Crandall, Exec. v. Crandall; 218 Md. 598, 600 , 147 A. 2d 754, 755 (1959); Scott v. Burch, 6 H. & J. 67, 79 (1823), the orphans’ courts of this State are tribunals of special, limited jurisdiction that can exercise only such authority and power as is expressly provided them by law. 2 Although neither of the parties nor the orphans’ court questioned whether that judicial body had been given the power to rule on the validity of a

1967The Court in Heaps at page 378 quoted the language of the Supreme Court in the Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 265 , 68 L.Ed. 667, 674 , that: "To refuse to consider evidence introduced, or to make an essential finding without supporting evidence, is arbitrary action," and added: "Administrative boards in general may be said to act in a quasi judicial capacity insofar as they have the duty to hear and determine facts and, based on them, to make decisions. [1] When the legislature seemingly has conferred upon a state court a too intense right of review in an appeal from an administrative o

1967Ed. 667, 674 , that: “To refuse to consider evidence introduced, or to make an essential finding without supporting evidence, is arbitrary action,” and added: “Administrative boards in general may be said to act in a quasi judicial capacity insofar as they have the duty to hear and determine facts and, based on them, to make decisions. 1 When the legislature seemingly has conferred upon a state court a too intense right of review in an appeal from an administrative order legislative in nature — that is, a power or requirement to decide the matter de novo by making its own independent findings

1967The Court in Heaps at page 378 quoted the language of the Supreme Court in the Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 265 , 68 L.Ed. 667, 674 , that: "To refuse to consider evidence introduced, or to make an essential finding without supporting evidence, is arbitrary action," and added: "Administrative boards in general may be said to act in a quasi judicial capacity insofar as they have the duty to hear and determine facts and, based on them, to make decisions. [1] When the legislature seemingly has conferred upon a state court a too intense right of review in an appeal from an administrative o

1967The Court in Heaps at page 378 quoted the language of the Supreme Court in the Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 265 , 68 L.Ed. 667, 674 , that: "To refuse to consider evidence introduced, or to make an essential finding without supporting evidence, is arbitrary action," and added: "Administrative boards in general may be said to act in a quasi judicial capacity insofar as they have the duty to hear and determine facts and, based on them, to make decisions. [1] When the legislature seemingly has conferred upon a state court a too intense right of review in an appeal from an administrative o

1967The courts will if possible construe the appeal statute in a way that makes the review granted constitutional. 4 Davis, op. cit. § 29.01, p. 115 ("So strong is the judicial tendency towards the substantial-evidence rule that that rule is often followed even when the statute prescribes a narrower or broader scope of review"); § 29.07, p. 153 ("When the administrative action is deemed nonjudicial, interpretations that provisions for de novo review mean review in accordance with the substantial-evidence rule or something like it are especially common. * * * A test which is between the substantial

1940In Leonard v. Earle, 155 Md. 252 , 141 A. 714 , it is said: “The powers of the Legislature are not derived from grants in the Constitution of the state, or, indeed, from any classifications made use of in discussions of exercises of power; plenary power in the Legislature for all purposes of civil government is the rule, a prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception, and can be founded only on some constitutional clause plainly giving rise to it.” See Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466 , 87 A. 413 ; Kenneweg v. Allegany County, 102 Md. 119 , 62 A. 249 ; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio S

1940In Leonard v. Earle, 155 Md. 252 , 141 A. 714 , it is said: “The powers of the Legislature are not derived from grants in the Constitution of the state, or, indeed, from any classifications made use of in discussions of exercises of power; plenary power in the Legislature for all purposes of civil government is the rule, a prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception, and can be founded only on some constitutional clause plainly giving rise to it.” See Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466 , 87 A. 413 ; Kenneweg v. Allegany County, 102 Md. 119 , 62 A. 249 ; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio S

1940In Leonard v. Earle, 155 Md. 252 , 141 A. 714 , it is said: “The powers of the Legislature are not derived from grants in the Constitution of the state, or, indeed, from any classifications made use of in discussions of exercises of power; plenary power in the Legislature for all purposes of civil government is the rule, a prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception, and can be founded only on some constitutional clause plainly giving rise to it.” See Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466 , 87 A. 413 ; Kenneweg v. Allegany County, 102 Md. 119 , 62 A. 249 ; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio S

1940What, therefore, were the constitutional limitations upon the Legislature of this State which enacted chapter 277? *483 First of all, it may be observed that the Federal Constitution has not undertaken to lay down any hard and fast rule with respect to due process of law, the equal protection of the laws, or as to privileges and immunities; and as tersely summarized in Board of Commnrs. etc. v. Johnson County, 173 Ind. 76 , 89 N. E. 590, 593 ; “ * * * Nor does the equal protection clause prevent the states from adjusting their systems of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. * * * If all

1940What, therefore, were the constitutional limitations upon the Legislature of this State which enacted chapter 277? *483 First of all, it may be observed that the Federal Constitution has not undertaken to lay down any hard and fast rule with respect to due process of law, the equal protection of the laws, or as to privileges and immunities; and as tersely summarized in Board of Commnrs. etc. v. Johnson County, 173 Ind. 76 , 89 N. E. 590, 593 ; “ * * * Nor does the equal protection clause prevent the states from adjusting their systems of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. * * * If all