power rule in Pennsylvania

2006“Pre-enforcement review, however, is clearly not within the authority of the Environmental Hearing Board and any suggestion to the contrary can only be founded upon a strained and unrealistic construction of the language of the Code.” Id. at 208-209 , 477 A.2d at 1339 .

2006“Pre-enforcement review, however, is clearly not within the authority of the Environmental Hearing Board and any suggestion to the contrary can only be founded upon a strained and unrealistic construction of the language of the Code.” Id. at 208-209 , 477 A.2d at 1339 .

1974In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927), the Court stated that the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function and therefore, the Legislature could obtain information needed to exercise its legislative function by compelling a private individual to appear before it or one of its committees.

1974McGinley v. Scott, 401 Pa. 310 , 164 A.2d 424 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-112 , 79 S.Ct. 1081, 1085 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1115, 1120-1121 (1959) ; McGrain v. Dougherty, 273 U.S. 135 , 47 S.Ct. 319 , 71 L.Ed. 580 (1927).

2022The intent and applicability of Rule 233.1 was addressed by the Superior Court in Gray v. Buonopane, 53 A.3d 829 (Pa. Super. 2012), as follows: Rule 233.1 was promulgated by our Supreme Court in 2010 to stem a noted increase in serial lawsuits of dubious merit filed by pro se litigants disaffected by prior failures to secure relief for injuries they perceived but could not substantiate.

2009Finally, Appellees argue that the County Referendum Question, which purports to increase property taxes in addition to abolishing the Drink Tax, improperly gives the voters authority to set the rates of taxation on residents, a power they claim is reserved to County Council under § 2962(b), pursuant to Musewicz, 925 A.2d 172 .

1998The Court had to decide whether a principal “wishing to grant one of the powers referred to in section 5602(a) must explicitly identify the power using specific language either identical or similar to the statutory language.” Id., 531 Pa. at 24 , 610 A.2d at 961 .

1998The Court had to decide whether a principal “wishing to grant one of the powers referred to in section 5602(a) must explicitly identify the power using specific language either identical or similar to the statutory language.” Id., 531 Pa. at 24 , 610 A.2d at 961 .

1997Thus, where the marital family was intact, the power of the presumption remained unquestioned, but in others, such as the Jones case, where no marriage remained, the Court adopted an approach that looked to the "actual relationship of the presumptive father and natural mother." [18] Id., citing Christianson, supra at 409 , 568 A.2d at 966 .

1997Thus, where the marital family was intact, the power of the presumption remained unquestioned, but in others, such as the Jones case, where no marriage remained, the Court adopted an approach that looked to the “actual relationship of the presumptive father and natural mother.” 18 Id., citing Chris-tianson, supra at 409, 568 A.2d at 966 .

1997Thus, where the marital family was intact, the power of the presumption remained unquestioned, but in others, such as the Jones case, where no marriage remained, the Court adopted an approach that looked to the "actual relationship of the presumptive father and natural mother." [18] Id., citing Christianson, supra at 409 , 568 A.2d at 966 .

1997Thus, where the marital family was intact, the power of the presumption remained unquestioned, but in others, such as the Jones case, where no marriage remained, the Court adopted an approach that looked to the “actual relationship of the presumptive father and natural mother.” 18 Id., citing Chris-tianson, supra at 409, 568 A.2d at 966 .

1986It is well settled in this jurisdiction that “the Commonwealth has no right to appeal from an adverse ruling in the trial court, unless a pure question of law is involved, and that the Commonwealth may not appeal if the action complained of is based on an admixture of law and fact.” Commonwealth v. Marks, 442 Pa. 208 , 275 A.2d 81 (1971), Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201 , 275 A.2d 78 (1971).

1986It is well settled in this jurisdiction that “the Commonwealth has no right to appeal from an adverse ruling in the trial court, unless a pure question of law is involved, and that the Commonwealth may not appeal if the action complained of is based on an admixture of law and fact.” Commonwealth v. Marks, 442 Pa. 208 , 275 A.2d 81 (1971), Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201 , 275 A.2d 78 (1971).

1986It is well settled in this jurisdiction that “the Commonwealth has no right to appeal from an adverse ruling in the trial court, unless a pure question of law is involved, and that the Commonwealth may not appeal if the action complained of is based on an admixture of law and fact.” Commonwealth v. Marks, 442 Pa. 208 , 275 A.2d 81 (1971), Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201 , 275 A.2d 78 (1971).

1986It is well settled in this jurisdiction that “the Commonwealth has no right to appeal from an adverse ruling in the trial court, unless a pure question of law is involved, and that the Commonwealth may not appeal if the action complained of is based on an admixture of law and fact.” Commonwealth v. Marks, 442 Pa. 208 , 275 A.2d 81 (1971), Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201 , 275 A.2d 78 (1971).

1983We believe that the correct rule of law, which is articulated in City of Pittsburgh v. Brunwasser, 40 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 197 , 396 A.2d 907 (1979), aff'd sub nom., Brunwasser v. Fields, 487 Pa. 283 , 409 A.2d 352 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979) , could allow us to rule affirmatively in such a proceeding.

1983We believe that the correct rule of law, which is articulated in City of Pittsburgh v. Brunwasser, 40 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 197 , 396 A.2d 907 (1979), aff'd sub nom., Brunwasser v. Fields, 487 Pa. 283 , 409 A.2d 352 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979) , could allow us to rule affirmatively in such a proceeding.

1983We believe that the correct rule of law, which is articulated in City of Pittsburgh v. Brunwasser, 40 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 197 , 396 A.2d 907 (1979), aff'd sub nom., Brunwasser v. Fields, 487 Pa. 283 , 409 A.2d 352 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979) , could allow us to rule affirmatively in such a proceeding.

1983We believe that the correct rule of law, which is articulated in City of Pittsburgh v. Brunwasser, 40 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 197 , 396 A.2d 907 (1979), aff'd sub nom., Brunwasser v. Fields, 487 Pa. 283 , 409 A.2d 352 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979) , could allow us to rule affirmatively in such a proceeding.

1983Keeping in mind the principle that the trial judge’s characterization of his own action cannot control the classification of the action, Commonwealth v. Wimberly, supra, quoting U.S. v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 549 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (Opinion of Harlan, J.), we find that the lower court’s not guilty verdict entered erroneously and without the power to so rule, does not preclude a review of the proceedings.

1983Keeping in mind the principle that the trial judge’s characterization of his own action cannot control the classification of the action, Commonwealth v. Wimberly, supra, quoting U.S. v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 549 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (Opinion of Harlan, J.), we find that the lower court’s not guilty verdict entered erroneously and without the power to so rule, does not preclude a review of the proceedings.

1983No. 1515 or Jackson v. Hendricks, 457 Pa 405, 321 A2d 603 (1974) requires the court to appoint a master in this ease and, therefore, dismiss this claim as well We reject, however, respondents’ argument that the court lacked the power to rule on the contempt proceedings because exceptions have been filed.

1983We believe that the correct rule of law, which is articulated in City of Pittsburgh v. Brunwasser, 40 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 197 , 396 A.2d 907 (1979), aff'd sub nom., Brunwasser v. Fields, 487 Pa. 283 , 409 A.2d 352 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979) , could allow us to rule affirmatively in such a proceeding.

1983Keeping in mind the principle that the trial judge’s characterization of his own action cannot control the classification of the action, Commonwealth v. Wimberly, supra, quoting U.S. v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 549 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (Opinion of Harlan, J.), we find that the lower court’s not guilty verdict entered erroneously and without the power to so rule, does not preclude a review of the proceedings.

1983Keeping in mind the principle that the trial judge's characterization of his own action cannot control the classification of the action, Commonwealth v. Wimberly, supra , quoting U.S. v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 549 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (Opinion of Harlan, J.), we find that the lower court's not guilty verdict entered erroneously and without the power to so rule, does not preclude a review of the proceedings.

1977If a defendant is an- officer, we may then rule on the question of his immunity; if he is not, we lack the power to so rule, Schroeck v. Pennsylvania State Police, 26 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 41 , 362 A.2d 486 (1976), and must transfer the question to the court of competent jurisdiction.

1977If a defendant is an- officer, we may then rule on the question of his immunity; if he is not, we lack the power to so rule, Schroeck v. Pennsylvania State Police, 26 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 41 , 362 A.2d 486 (1976), and must transfer the question to the court of competent jurisdiction.

1977In Opie, supra, 30 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 559 , 375 A.2d at 398 , we defined “officer” as follows: ‘ [Ojfficers,’ for jurisdictional purposes, should encompass only those persons who perform state-wide policymaking functions and who are charged with the responsibility for independent initiation of administrative policy regarding some sovereign function of state government.

1977In Opie, supra, 30 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 559 , 375 A.2d at 398 , we defined “officer” as follows: ‘ [Ojfficers,’ for jurisdictional purposes, should encompass only those persons who perform state-wide policymaking functions and who are charged with the responsibility for independent initiation of administrative policy regarding some sovereign function of state government.

1974In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929), the Court, while recognizing that Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the sole purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits, stated that the Legislature can require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional powers even if the information sought may be of use in a pending suit.

1949The case is therefore not like cases that have been referred to in argument, in which attachment for contempt was denied for disregard of orders which the court had no power to make; see for example, Com. v. Sage , 160 Pa. 399 , 28 A. 863 (1894); Com. v. Perkins , 124 Pa. 36 , 48 , 16 A. 525 (1889); Rose Child Dependency Case , 161 Pa. Super. 204 , *Page 209 54 A.2d 297 (1947); In Matter of Rossiter , 84 Pa. Super. 193 (1924).

1949The case is therefore not like cases that have been referred to in argument, in which attachment for contempt was denied for disregard of orders which the court had no power to make; see for example, Com. v. Sage , 160 Pa. 399 , 28 A. 863 (1894); Com. v. Perkins , 124 Pa. 36 , 48 , 16 A. 525 (1889); Rose Child Dependency Case , 161 Pa. Super. 204 , *Page 209 54 A.2d 297 (1947); In Matter of Rossiter , 84 Pa. Super. 193 (1924).