power rule in Massachusetts

2022The arbitration provision here requires that disputes be submitted "to binding arbitration in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in accordance with the commercial rules of the American Arbitration Association." Rule 7(a) of those rules gives "[t]he arbitrator . . . the power to rule on . . . the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim." [Note 9] The First Circuit, in addressing similar language, concluded that (1) "'[a]rbitrability' itself encompasses a variety of possible meanings, but the most obvious meaning focuses on certain substantive issues, and particularly the question of whether

2019"In *746 considering whether to allow a motion to revise or revoke, 'we have repeatedly and unequivocally held that a judge may not take into account conduct of the defendant that occurs subsequent to the original sentencing.' " DeJesus , supra , quoting Commonwealth v. Barclay , 424 Mass. 377 , 380, 676 N.E.2d 1127 (1997).

2019"In *746 considering whether to allow a motion to revise or revoke, 'we have repeatedly and unequivocally held that a judge may not take into account conduct of the defendant that occurs subsequent to the original sentencing.' " DeJesus , supra , quoting Commonwealth v. Barclay , 424 Mass. 377 , 380, 676 N.E.2d 1127 (1997).

2019Rule 29 (a) (2) provides that "[t]he trial judge, upon the judge's own motion, or the written motion of a defendant, filed within sixty days after the imposition of a sentence or within sixty days after issuance of a rescript by an appellate court **796 on direct review, may, upon such terms and conditions as the judge shall order, revise or revoke such sentence if it appears that justice may not have been done." Although a trial judge's power under rule 29 (a)"to revise or revoke a criminal disposition is severely limited," Commonwealth v. Goodwin , 458 Mass. 11 , 16, 933 N.E.2d 925 (2010), t

2019Rule 29 (a) (2) provides that "[t]he trial judge, upon the judge's own motion, or the written motion of a defendant, filed within sixty days after the imposition of a sentence or within sixty days after issuance of a rescript by an appellate court **796 on direct review, may, upon such terms and conditions as the judge shall order, revise or revoke such sentence if it appears that justice may not have been done." Although a trial judge's power under rule 29 (a)"to revise or revoke a criminal disposition is severely limited," Commonwealth v. Goodwin , 458 Mass. 11 , 16, 933 N.E.2d 925 (2010), t

2019Rule 29 (a) (2) provides that "[t]he trial judge, upon the judge's own motion, or the written motion of a defendant, filed within sixty days after the imposition of a sentence or within sixty days after issuance of a rescript by an appellate court **796 on direct review, may, upon such terms and conditions as the judge shall order, revise or revoke such sentence if it appears that justice may not have been done." Although a trial judge's power under rule 29 (a)"to revise or revoke a criminal disposition is severely limited," Commonwealth v. Goodwin , 458 Mass. 11 , 16, 933 N.E.2d 925 (2010), t

2019Rule 29 (a) (2) provides that "[t]he trial judge, upon the judge's own motion, or the written motion of a defendant, filed within sixty days after the imposition of a sentence or within sixty days after issuance of a rescript by an appellate court **796 on direct review, may, upon such terms and conditions as the judge shall order, revise or revoke such sentence if it appears that justice may not have been done." Although a trial judge's power under rule 29 (a)"to revise or revoke a criminal disposition is severely limited," Commonwealth v. Goodwin , 458 Mass. 11 , 16, 933 N.E.2d 925 (2010), t

2019Rule 29 (a) (2) provides that "[t]he trial judge, upon the judge's own motion, or the written motion of a defendant, filed within sixty days after the imposition of a sentence or within sixty days after issuance of a rescript by an appellate court **796 on direct review, may, upon such terms and conditions as the judge shall order, revise or revoke such sentence if it appears that justice may not have been done." Although a trial judge's power under rule 29 (a)"to revise or revoke a criminal disposition is severely limited," Commonwealth v. Goodwin , 458 Mass. 11 , 16, 933 N.E.2d 925 (2010), t

2019Rule 29 (a) (2) provides that "[t]he trial judge, upon the judge's own motion, or the written motion of a defendant, filed within sixty days after the imposition of a sentence or within sixty days after issuance of a rescript by an appellate court **796 on direct review, may, upon such terms and conditions as the judge shall order, revise or revoke such sentence if it appears that justice may not have been done." Although a trial judge's power under rule 29 (a)"to revise or revoke a criminal disposition is severely limited," Commonwealth v. Goodwin , 458 Mass. 11 , 16, 933 N.E.2d 925 (2010), t

2016Further, its application is permissive, not mandatory, Sudduth 49 Mass.App.Ct. at 413 n.19, and it is beyond dispute that the second judge to hear the case or issue retains “the power to rule differently from the first judge ... in order to reach a just result.” Goulet v. Whitin Mach.

2000Wenton v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 78, 80 (1956). 5 As to the guardrails, Jersey barriers, and Cape Cod berms, those partial obstructions do not have the physical barrier effect described in Poulos v. Planning Bd. of Braintree, 413 Mass. 359 (1992).

1987Furthermore, cases subsequent to Barringer, supra, have adopted the rule that a second judge does have the power to rule differently from the first judge on a “case, an issue, or a question of fact or law once decided” in order to reach a just result.

1986Chavoor v. Lewis, 383 Mass. 801 (1981).

1976On the contrary, counsel appears to have affirmed the power of the hearing officer to bring in such recommendations. (d) In Springfield I, 362 Mass. at 435 , we held under G.

1956Gleason v. Metropolitan District Commission, 270 Mass. 377, 381 .

1945The trial judge “acts to the end that a just result be reached.” Field v. Hamm, 254 Mass. 268, 271 .

1893Williams v. Bradley, 3 Allen, 270 , 281.

1851As to the mode of trial contemplated by this act, it is described by Mr. Justice McLean, in his opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Peters, 539, 667 , in these terms: “ Both the constitution and the act of .1793 require the fugitive from labor to be delivered up on claim being made by the party, or his agent, to whom the service is due.