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6 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1945–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Waltz v. Wysegreen2 sentences2026MCL 600.5805(8) states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, the period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging malpractice.” (Emphasis added.) The introductory clause of this provision suggests that there are multiple “period[s] of limitations” in the medical malpractice context located within Chapter 58 of the Revised Judicature Act, the chapter in which MCL 600.5852 is housed. 13 the saving provision is a limitation period” because, like the six-month discovery rule, MCL 600.5852 also “requires a plaintiff to bring suit within a specified time.” Waltz, 469 Mich at 2026MCL 600.5805(8) states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, the period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging malpractice.” (Emphasis added.) The introductory clause of this provision suggests that there are multiple “period[s] of limitations” in the medical malpractice context located within Chapter 58 of the Revised Judicature Act, the chapter in which MCL 600.5852 is housed. 13 the saving provision is a limitation period” because, like the six-month discovery rule, MCL 600.5852 also “requires a plaintiff to bring suit within a specified time.” Waltz, 469 Mich at | 2 | 2 |
Brenner v. Kolkgreen1 sentence2023And, this inherent power does not depend on statutes or court rules: “This power is not governed so much by rule or statute, but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id.; see also Banta v Serban, 370 Mich 367, 368 ; 121 NW2d 854 (1963) (“We have recognized the inherent power of a court to control the movement of cases on its docket by a variety of sanctions including dismissal, discontinuance or involuntary nonsuit even when requests for continuances are timely made and, lacking persuasive me | 1 | 1 |
Banta v. Serbangreen2 sentences2023And, this inherent power does not depend on statutes or court rules: “This power is not governed so much by rule or statute, but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id.; see also Banta v Serban, 370 Mich 367, 368 ; 121 NW2d 854 (1963) (“We have recognized the inherent power of a court to control the movement of cases on its docket by a variety of sanctions including dismissal, discontinuance or involuntary nonsuit even when requests for continuances are timely made and, lacking persuasive me 2023And, this inherent power does not depend on statutes or court rules: “This power is not governed so much by rule or statute, but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id.; see also Banta v Serban, 370 Mich 367, 368 ; 121 NW2d 854 (1963) (“We have recognized the inherent power of a court to control the movement of cases on its docket by a variety of sanctions including dismissal, discontinuance or involuntary nonsuit even when requests for continuances are timely made and, lacking persuasive me | 1 | 1 |
Mouradian v. Goldbergred1 sentence2005Compare Mouradian, supra at 571 , quoting the same sentence from Scarsella, but omitting the introductory clause (“[Plaintiffs’ complaint, filed without the affidavit of merit required by MCL 600.2912d, did not toll the limitations period because ‘in a medical malpractice case, the mere tendering of a complaint without the required affidavit of merit is insufficient to commence the lawsuit.’ ” [Punctuation and citation deleted.]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2023That reading, however, negates the introductory clause under MCR 2.313(B)(2), which specifically provides that trial courts are not limited to the enumerated sanctions, but instead may order “such sanctions as are just.” The Supreme Court preserved the inherent authority of courts to manage their dockets and sanction misconduct by explicitly stating that the sanctions were not limited to those provided in the court rule. -10- Co, 476 Mich 372, 376 ; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). 2023That reading, however, negates the introductory clause under MCR 2.313(B)(2), which specifically provides that trial courts are not limited to the enumerated sanctions, but instead may order “such sanctions as are just.” The Supreme Court preserved the inherent authority of courts to manage their dockets and sanction misconduct by explicitly stating that the sanctions were not limited to those provided in the court rule. -10- Co, 476 Mich 372, 376 ; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
green
1 sentence2003The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania described another basis for the theory in Zenith Radio Corp v Matsushita Electric Industrial Co, Ltd, 505 F Supp 1190 (ED Penn, 1980): The [near-miss theory] is also supported by a basic principle of statutory construction, which we find equally applicable to the Federal Rules of Evidence: that the specific controls the general. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Fries v. Kracklauer
green
2 sentences1945Tbe court said (p. 45): “This court, in common with tbe courts of New York and Illinois, has held that the use of the word ‘jointly’ is not by itself a sufficient declaration of an intent to create an estate in joint tenancy to overcome the statutory presumption (Fries v. Kracklauer, 198 Wis. 547 [ 224 N. W. 717 ]), although there is very respectable authority to the contrary. 1945Tbe court said (p. 45): “This court, in common with tbe courts of New York and Illinois, has held that the use of the word ‘jointly’ is not by itself a sufficient declaration of an intent to create an estate in joint tenancy to overcome the statutory presumption (Fries v. Kracklauer, 198 Wis. 547 [ 224 N. W. 717 ]), although there is very respectable authority to the contrary. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.