35 Nebraska opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nebraska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. Zedekgreen2 sentences2000(Emphasis supplied.) The Viereggers point to recent case law holding that in a medical malpractice action, “proximate causation requires proof necessary to establish that the physician’s deviation from the standard of care caused or contributed to the injury or damage to the plaintiff.” Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963, 970 , 587 N.W.2d 885, 891 (1999). 2000(Emphasis supplied.) The Viereggers point to recent case law holding that in a medical malpractice action, “proximate causation requires proof necessary to establish that the physician’s deviation from the standard of care caused or contributed to the injury or damage to the plaintiff.” Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963, 970 , 587 N.W.2d 885, 891 (1999). | 3 | 6 |
Thone v. Regional West Medical Centergreen2 sentences2019Ctr., 275 Neb. 238, 250 , 745 N.W.2d 898, 908 (2008) (in medi- cal malpractice context, “the element of proximate causation requires proof that the physician’s deviation from the standard of care caused or contributed to the injury or damage to the plaintiff”) (emphasis supplied). 2019Ctr., 275 Neb. 238, 250 , 745 N.W.2d 898, 908 (2008) (in medi- cal malpractice context, “the element of proximate causation requires proof that the physician’s deviation from the standard of care caused or contributed to the injury or damage to the plaintiff”) (emphasis supplied). | 3 | 4 |
Microfinancial, Inc. v. Premier Holidays International, Inc.green2 sentences2019See, also, Microfinancial, Inc. v. Premier Holidays Intern., 385 F.3d 72, 80 (1st Cir. 2004) (describing that federal counterpart to § 27-702 “is not so wooden as to demand an intimate level of familiarity with every component of a transaction or device as a prerequisite to offering expert testimony” when considering qualifications of any expert as applied to specific issue in case). 2019See, also, Microfinancial, Inc. v. Premier Holidays Intern. , 385 F.3d 72 , 80 (1st Cir.2004) (describing that federal counterpart to § 27-702"is not so wooden as to demand an intimate level of familiarity with every component of a transaction or device as a prerequisite to offering expert testimony" when considering qualifications of any expert as applied to specific issue in case). | 3 | 3 |
Delgado v. Inryco, Inc.green2 sentences1992The plaintiffs’ prima facie case for breach of warranty of merchantability has been described in Delgado v. Inryco, Inc., 230 Neb. 662 , 433 N.W.2d 179 (1988): “ [T]here must be proof that there was a deviation from the standard of merchantability at the time of sale and that such deviation caused the plaintiff’s injury both proximately and in fact. 1992The plaintiffs’ prima facie case for breach of warranty of merchantability has been described in Delgado v. Inryco, Inc., 230 Neb. 662 , 433 N.W.2d 179 (1988): “ [T]here must be proof that there was a deviation from the standard of merchantability at the time of sale and that such deviation caused the plaintiff’s injury both proximately and in fact. | 2 | 3 |
Snyder Ex Rel. Snyder v. Contemporary Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C.green2 sentences2000See Snyder v. Contemporary Obstetrics & Gyn., 258 Neb. 643 , 605 N.W.2d 782 (2000). 2000See Snyder v. Contemporary Obstetrics & Gyn., 258 Neb. 643 , 605 N.W.2d 782 (2000). | 2 | 2 |
Boyle v. Welshgreen2 sentences1999See Boyle v. Welsh, 6 Neb. 1998Boyle v. Welsh, 6 Neb. | 1 | 3 |
Mennonite Deaconess Home & Hospital, Inc. v. Gates Engineering Co.green2 sentences1995Citing Mennonite Deaconess Home & Hosp. v. Gates Eng ’g Co., 219 Neb. 303 , 363 N.W.2d 155 (1985), for the proposition that there must be proof of a deviation from the standard of merchantability causing the injury, Label Concepts responds that the fact that the labels obviously passed through Westendorf’s operation without objection indicates they were not defective. 1995Citing Mennonite Deaconess Home & Hosp. v. Gates Eng ’g Co., 219 Neb. 303 , 363 N.W.2d 155 (1985), for the proposition that there must be proof of a deviation from the standard of merchantability causing the injury, Label Concepts responds that the fact that the labels obviously passed through Westendorf’s operation without objection indicates they were not defective. | 1 | 2 |
McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc.red2 sentences2000Our decision in McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 202 , 241 N.W.2d 822, 829 (1976), indicated similar reasoning: “ ‘Where there is a proper warning, a manufacturer of a prescription drug cannot be held liable either on a breach of warranty or strict liability in tort theory.’ ” We have stated that in order to recover for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, there must be proof that there was a deviation from the standard of merchantability at the time of sale and that such deviation caused the injury. 2000Our decision in McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 202 , 241 N.W.2d 822, 829 (1976), indicated similar reasoning: “ ‘Where there is a proper warning, a manufacturer of a prescription drug cannot be held liable either on a breach of warranty or strict liability in tort theory.’ ” We have stated that in order to recover for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, there must be proof that there was a deviation from the standard of merchantability at the time of sale and that such deviation caused the injury. | 1 | 1 |
Reimer v. SURGICAL SERV. OF GREAT PLAINSgreen2 sentences2000See, also, Reimer v. Surgical Servs. of the Great Plains, 258 Neb. 671 , 605 N.W.2d 777 (2000); Snyder v. Contemporary Obstetrics & Gyn., 258 Neb. 643, 651 , 605 N.W.2d 782, 791 (2000) (citing Doe for proposition that in malpractice action, burden of proof is on plaintiff to demonstrate that “the deviation [from the standard of care] was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries”). 2000See, also, Reimer v. Surgical Servs. of the Great Plains, 258 Neb. 671 , 605 N.W.2d 777 (2000); Snyder v. Contemporary Obstetrics & Gyn., 258 Neb. 643, 651 , 605 N.W.2d 782, 791 (2000) (citing Doe for proposition that in malpractice action, burden of proof is on plaintiff to demonstrate that “the deviation [from the standard of care] was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries”). | 1 | 1 |
Saporta v. Stategreen2 sentences1999Suporta v. State, 220 Neb. 142 , 368 N.W.2d 783 (1985). 1999Suporta v. State, 220 Neb. 142 , 368 N.W.2d 783 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Piller v. Kovarskygreen1 sentence1998See, also, Piller v. Kovarsky, 194 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Mooregreen2 sentences1985As expressed in Anderson v. Moore, 202 Neb. 452, 464-65, 275 N.W.2d 842, 849 (1979): In a malpractice action, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the generally recognized medical standard involved; that there was a deviation from that standard by the defendant; and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. 1985As expressed in Anderson v. Moore, 202 Neb. 452, 464-65, 275 N.W.2d 842, 849 (1979): In a malpractice action, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the generally recognized medical standard involved; that there was a deviation from that standard by the defendant; and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nebraska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cohan v. Medical Imaging Consultants
green
2 sentences2018Cohan v. Medical Imaging Consultants, 297 Neb. 111 , 900 N.W.2d 732 (2017). 2018Cohan v. Medical Imaging Consultants, 297 Neb. 111 , 900 N.W.2d 732 (2017). | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Neill v. Hemphill
green
2 sentences2004Neill v. Hemphill, 258 Neb. 949 , 607 N.W.2d 500 (2000). 2004Neill v. Hemphill, 258 Neb. 949 , 607 N.W.2d 500 (2000). | 2 | 2001–2004 |
Kortus v. Jensen
green
2 sentences1979It’s the fact that in the last few days of the hospitalization the patient was still sick.” In reviewing this case, the applicable rule is: “A motion for a directed verdict or its equivalent must be treated as an admission of the truth of all material and relevant evidence submitted on behalf of the party against whom the motion is directed, and such party is entitled to have every controverted fact resolved in his favor and to have the benefit of every inference which can reasonably be deduced from the evidence.” Kortus v. Jensen, 195 Neb. 261 , 237 N. W. 2d 845 (1976). *464 In a malpractice 1979It’s the fact that in the last few days of the hospitalization the patient was still sick.” In reviewing this case, the applicable rule is: “A motion for a directed verdict or its equivalent must be treated as an admission of the truth of all material and relevant evidence submitted on behalf of the party against whom the motion is directed, and such party is entitled to have every controverted fact resolved in his favor and to have the benefit of every inference which can reasonably be deduced from the evidence.” Kortus v. Jensen, 195 Neb. 261 , 237 N. W. 2d 845 (1976). *464 In a malpractice | 2 | 1979–1985 |
First Nat. Bank North Platte v. Cardenas
neutral
1 sentence2019Id. [11,12] In the medical malpractice context, the element of proximate causation requires proof that the physician’s deviation from the standard of care caused or contributed to the injury or damage to the plaintiff. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
O'Brien v. Cessna Aircraft Co.
green
1 sentence2018This case is similar to O’Brien v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 298 Neb. 109 , 903 N.W.2d 432 (2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In re Trust of Shire
green
1 sentence2018In that case, the court could require the beneficiary to obtain insurance or post a bond to ensure that Gronin’s interests would be adequately protected in the event of unlikely circumstances. 32 See Adair Asset Mgmt. v. Terry’s Legacy, 293 Neb. 32 , 875 N.W.2d 421 (2016). 33 See Restatement (Second), supra note 21, § 340, comment h. - 41 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 299 Nebraska R eports IN RE TRUST OF SHIRE Cite as 299 Neb. 25 Common-Law Doctrine of Deviation Was Not Presented to County Court As the parties acknowledge, the court was not presented with the issue of whether the Tr | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Adair Asset Mgmt. v. Terry's Legacy
green
2 sentences2018In that case, the court could require the beneficiary to obtain insurance or post a bond to ensure that Gronin’s interests would be adequately protected in the event of unlikely circumstances. 32 See Adair Asset Mgmt. v. Terry’s Legacy, 293 Neb. 32 , 875 N.W.2d 421 (2016). 33 See Restatement (Second), supra note 21, § 340, comment h. - 41 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 299 Nebraska R eports IN RE TRUST OF SHIRE Cite as 299 Neb. 25 Common-Law Doctrine of Deviation Was Not Presented to County Court As the parties acknowledge, the court was not presented with the issue of whether the Tr 2018In that case, the court could require the beneficiary to obtain insurance or post a bond to ensure that Gronin’s interests would be adequately protected in the event of unlikely circumstances. 32 See Adair Asset Mgmt. v. Terry’s Legacy, 293 Neb. 32 , 875 N.W.2d 421 (2016). 33 See Restatement (Second), supra note 21, § 340, comment h. - 41 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 299 Nebraska R eports IN RE TRUST OF SHIRE Cite as 299 Neb. 25 Common-Law Doctrine of Deviation Was Not Presented to County Court As the parties acknowledge, the court was not presented with the issue of whether the Tr | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Rankin v. Stetson
green
1 sentence2016Rankin v. Stetson, 275 Neb. 775 , 749 N.W.2d - 81 - Decisions of the Nebraska Court of A ppeals 24 Nebraska A ppellate R eports HILLYER v. MIDWEST GASTROINTESTINAL ASSOCS. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Karel v. Nebraska Health Systems
green
2 sentences2008Karel v. Nebraska Health Sys., 274 Neb. 175 , 738 N.W.2d 831 (2007). 2008Karel v. Nebraska Health Sys., 274 Neb. 175 , 738 N.W.2d 831 (2007). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Casey v. Levine
green
2 sentences2004In Casey v. Levine, 261 Neb. 1 , 621 N.W.2d 482 (2001), we stated that in a malpractice action involving professional negligence, the burden is on the plaintiff to show: (1) the generally recognized medical standard of care, (2) a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and (3) that the deviation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries. 2004In Casey v. Levine, 261 Neb. 1 , 621 N.W.2d 482 (2001), we stated that in a malpractice action involving professional negligence, the burden is on the plaintiff to show: (1) the generally recognized medical standard of care, (2) a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and (3) that the deviation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Sendak v. Trustees of Purdue University
green
2 sentences2003Relying in part on Sendak v. Trustees of Purdue Univ., 151 Ind. App. 372 , 279 N.E.2d 840 (1972), the Foundation argues that if cy pres does not apply, the doctrine of deviation should apply. 2003Relying in part on Sendak v. Trustees of Purdue Univ., 151 Ind. App. 372 , 279 N.E.2d 840 (1972), the Foundation argues that if cy pres does not apply, the doctrine of deviation should apply. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Fackler v. Genetzky
green
2 sentences2002Fackler v. Genetzky, 257 Neb. 130 , 595 N.W.2d 884 (1999). 2002Fackler v. Genetzky, 257 Neb. 130 , 595 N.W.2d 884 (1999). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
McLaughlin v. Hellbusch
green
2 sentences2000McLaughlin v. Hellbusch, 256 Neb. 615 , 591 N.W.2d 569 (1999); Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963 , 587 N.W.2d 885 (1999). 2000McLaughlin v. Hellbusch, 256 Neb. 615 , 591 N.W.2d 569 (1999); Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963 , 587 N.W.2d 885 (1999). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Gugliano v. Levi
neutral
2 sentences1998For example, in Gugliano v. Levi, 24 A.D.2d 591 , 262 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1965), the court held that it was error to permit one party in a malpractice case to call an opposing party’s consulting expert to testify on the issue of whether there had been a deviation from the standard of care, where there was no showing that the party could not obtain his own expert and the opinion of the opposing party’s expert was based solely upon a review of records and “was not formulated upon the basis of his physical or clinical examination of the plaintiff, so as to make his report available to the plaintiff as 1998For example, in Gugliano v. Levi, 24 A.D.2d 591 , 262 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1965), the court held that it was error to permit one party in a malpractice case to call an opposing party’s consulting expert to testify on the issue of whether there had been a deviation from the standard of care, where there was no showing that the party could not obtain his own expert and the opinion of the opposing party’s expert was based solely upon a review of records and “was not formulated upon the basis of his physical or clinical examination of the plaintiff, so as to make his report available to the plaintiff as | 1 | 1998–1998 |
O'Keefe Elevator Co. v. Second Avenue Properties, Ltd.
green
1 sentence1992The Delgado court also stated, “In proving a deviation from the standard of merchantability, some proof of noncompliance with the warranty must be presented.” Id. at 668 , 433 N.W.2d at 184 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Geiger v. Sweeney
neutral
2 sentences1984As stated in Geiger v. Sweeney, 201 Neb. 175 , 266 N.W.2d 895 (1978), to establish a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, there must be proof that there was a deviation from the standard of merchantability at the time of sale and that such deviation caused the plaintiffs injury both proximately and in fact. 1984As stated in Geiger v. Sweeney, 201 Neb. 175 , 266 N.W.2d 895 (1978), to establish a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, there must be proof that there was a deviation from the standard of merchantability at the time of sale and that such deviation caused the plaintiffs injury both proximately and in fact. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.