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7 Alaska opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodardgreen2 sentences2020We therefore follow Lewis’s determination that some limited due process protects a person’s interest in applying for executive clemency. 39 Id. at 1267, 1269 . 40 Id. at 1267 . -14- 7492 is eligible for parole except upon a ‘substantial showing of innocence’ or other ‘exceptional circumstance arising since trial.’ ”41 When she began preparing another clemency application in 2003, her attorney requested that she be examined by a doctor of her choice.42 The Department denied the request because it saw nothing extraordinary about her medical condition warranting a deviation from its standard prac 2020Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 345 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The furthest our cases have gone in imposing due process requirements upon analogous exercises of Executive discretion is . . . . requir[ing] ‘minimal procedural safeguards’ for death-penalty clemency proceedings, to prevent them from becoming so capricious as to involve ‘a state official flipp[ing] a coin to determine whether to grant clemency.’ ” (quoting Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (emphasis and second alteration in original))); then citing Noel v. Norris, 336 F.3d 648, 649 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding inmate’s due process rights not violate | 1 | 1 |
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. St. Cyrred1 sentence2020Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 345 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The furthest our cases have gone in imposing due process requirements upon analogous exercises of Executive discretion is . . . . requir[ing] ‘minimal procedural safeguards’ for death-penalty clemency proceedings, to prevent them from becoming so capricious as to involve ‘a state official flipp[ing] a coin to determine whether to grant clemency.’ ” (quoting Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (emphasis and second alteration in original))); then citing Noel v. Norris, 336 F.3d 648, 649 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding inmate’s due process rights not violate | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. State, Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2020We therefore follow Lewis’s determination that some limited due process protects a person’s interest in applying for executive clemency. 39 Id. at 1267, 1269 . 40 Id. at 1267 . -14- 7492 is eligible for parole except upon a ‘substantial showing of innocence’ or other ‘exceptional circumstance arising since trial.’ ”41 When she began preparing another clemency application in 2003, her attorney requested that she be examined by a doctor of her choice.42 The Department denied the request because it saw nothing extraordinary about her medical condition warranting a deviation from its standard prac 2020We therefore follow Lewis’s determination that some limited due process protects a person’s interest in applying for executive clemency. 39 Id. at 1267, 1269 . 40 Id. at 1267 . -14- 7492 is eligible for parole except upon a ‘substantial showing of innocence’ or other ‘exceptional circumstance arising since trial.’ ”41 When she began preparing another clemency application in 2003, her attorney requested that she be examined by a doctor of her choice.42 The Department denied the request because it saw nothing extraordinary about her medical condition warranting a deviation from its standard prac | 1 | 1 |
Mose Young v. Dee Joyce Hayes, Circuit Attorney for the City of St. Louis, and Alfred D. Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Centergreen1 sentence2020Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 345 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The furthest our cases have gone in imposing due process requirements upon analogous exercises of Executive discretion is . . . . requir[ing] ‘minimal procedural safeguards’ for death-penalty clemency proceedings, to prevent them from becoming so capricious as to involve ‘a state official flipp[ing] a coin to determine whether to grant clemency.’ ” (quoting Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (emphasis and second alteration in original))); then citing Noel v. Norris, 336 F.3d 648, 649 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding inmate’s due process rights not violate | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen1 sentence2020Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 345 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The furthest our cases have gone in imposing due process requirements upon analogous exercises of Executive discretion is . . . . requir[ing] ‘minimal procedural safeguards’ for death-penalty clemency proceedings, to prevent them from becoming so capricious as to involve ‘a state official flipp[ing] a coin to determine whether to grant clemency.’ ” (quoting Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (emphasis and second alteration in original))); then citing Noel v. Norris, 336 F.3d 648, 649 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding inmate’s due process rights not violate | 1 | 1 |
Noel v. Norrisgreen1 sentence2020Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 345 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The furthest our cases have gone in imposing due process requirements upon analogous exercises of Executive discretion is . . . . requir[ing] ‘minimal procedural safeguards’ for death-penalty clemency proceedings, to prevent them from becoming so capricious as to involve ‘a state official flipp[ing] a coin to determine whether to grant clemency.’ ” (quoting Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (emphasis and second alteration in original))); then citing Noel v. Norris, 336 F.3d 648, 649 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding inmate’s due process rights not violate | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Proceeding Under AS 22.30.070(c) in Relation to Johnstonegreen1 sentence2020BAR ASS’N (1992) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS], www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_res ponsibility/sanction_standards.pdf; see also In re Johnstone, 2 P.3d 1226, 1238 (Alaska 2000) (noting judge was negligent because “surrounding circumstances should reasonably have alerted the judge that his actions would be perceived as improper”). -7- ORD 0110 them. | 1 | 1 |
Gilreath v. State Board of Pardons & Parolesgreen1 sentence2020Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 345 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The furthest our cases have gone in imposing due process requirements upon analogous exercises of Executive discretion is . . . . requir[ing] ‘minimal procedural safeguards’ for death-penalty clemency proceedings, to prevent them from becoming so capricious as to involve ‘a state official flipp[ing] a coin to determine whether to grant clemency.’ ” (quoting Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (emphasis and second alteration in original))); then citing Noel v. Norris, 336 F.3d 648, 649 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding inmate’s due process rights not violate | 1 | 1 |
In Re Kirschkegreen2 sentences1991See In re Kirschke, 16 Cal.3d 902 , 129 Cal. Rptr. 780 , 549 P.2d 548, 549 (1976). 1991See In re Kirschke, 16 Cal.3d 902 , 129 Cal. Rptr. 780 , 549 P.2d 548, 549 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
In the Disciplinary Matter Involving Buckalewgreen1 sentence1991Accord AS 11.81.900(a)(4) (defining criminal negligence as "fail[ing] to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists.") [11] We have found an attorney's actions to be knowing and intentional "[w]hen he prepared [a] forged `settlement agreement'... with the conscious objective to deceive Whittier Fuel into believing its case had been settled." Buckalew, 731 P.2d at 53 . [12] The ABA Model Standards provide definitions for "injury" and "potential injury": "Injury" is harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession whi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Faulkner v. Goldfuss
green
1 sentence2023P. 90.3(c)(1). 52 Id. 53 Boone v. Boone, No. S-18412, 2023 WL 4921561 , at *8 (Alaska Aug. 2, 2023) (“An order of equally shared educational and extracurricular expenses, in addition to payment of child support calculated under Civil Rule 90.3, constitutes a deviation from the standard child support award . . . .”). 54 Alaska R. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hazelwood v. State
green
2 sentences1997Under ordinary negligence, “the risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Id. at 1278 . 1997Under ordinary negligence, "the risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation." Id. at 1278 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
In Re Inquiry Concerning a Judge
green
2 sentences1991Negligence is a failure "to be aware of a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation." Id. (quoting ABA Standards, Definitions, ABA/BNA 1:807). 1991Negligence is a failure “to be aware of a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.” Id. (quoting ABA Standards, Definitions, ABA/BNA 1:807). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.