deviation standard in Georgia

2012(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Olde South Custom Landscaping v. Mathis, 229 Ga. App. 316, 318 ( 494 SE2d 14 ) (1997).

2012(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Olde South Custom Landscaping v. Mathis, 229 Ga. App. 316, 318 ( 494 SE2d 14 ) (1997).

2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (

2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (

2014In other words, a plaintiff must prove that the defendants’ negligence was both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of his injury.6 6 (Punctuation omitted.) Knight v. Roberts, 316 Ga. App. 599, 603 (1) ( 730 SE2d 78 ) (2012), quoting Walker v. Giles, 276 Ga. App. 632, 638 ( 624 SE2d 191 ) 8 In some instances where the question of causation is outside the ken of the normal juror, this showing must be based on expert testimony that is sufficient to support a finding that the deviation from the standard of care to a reasonable degree of medical certainty caused the injury.7 “Causation may b

2014In other words, a plaintiff must prove that the defendants’ negligence was both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of his injury.6 6 (Punctuation omitted.) Knight v. Roberts, 316 Ga. App. 599, 603 (1) ( 730 SE2d 78 ) (2012), quoting Walker v. Giles, 276 Ga. App. 632, 638 ( 624 SE2d 191 ) 8 In some instances where the question of causation is outside the ken of the normal juror, this showing must be based on expert testimony that is sufficient to support a finding that the deviation from the standard of care to a reasonable degree of medical certainty caused the injury.7 “Causation may b

2014In other words, a plaintiff must prove that the defendants’ negligence was both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of his injury.6 6 (Punctuation omitted.) Knight v. Roberts, 316 Ga. App. 599, 603 (1) ( 730 SE2d 78 ) (2012), quoting Walker v. Giles, 276 Ga. App. 632, 638 ( 624 SE2d 191 ) 8 In some instances where the question of causation is outside the ken of the normal juror, this showing must be based on expert testimony that is sufficient to support a finding that the deviation from the standard of care to a reasonable degree of medical certainty caused the injury.7 “Causation may b

2014In other words, a plaintiff must prove that the defendants’ negligence was both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of his injury.6 6 (Punctuation omitted.) Knight v. Roberts, 316 Ga. App. 599, 603 (1) ( 730 SE2d 78 ) (2012), quoting Walker v. Giles, 276 Ga. App. 632, 638 ( 624 SE2d 191 ) 8 In some instances where the question of causation is outside the ken of the normal juror, this showing must be based on expert testimony that is sufficient to support a finding that the deviation from the standard of care to a reasonable degree of medical certainty caused the injury.7 “Causation may b

2014Credit Ass’n v. Cheek, 248 Ga. 745, 746 (4) ( 285 SE2d 689 ) (1982) (“[W]hen the defendant produces an expert’s opinion in his favor on motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff fails to produce a contrary expert opinion in opposition to that motion, then there is no genuine issue to be tried by the jury and it is not error to grant summary judgment to the defendant.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 In its order, the trial court invited Appellants to identify any evidence that Dr. Mahathre’s care of Reeves proximately caused her death, noting, “Should the Court have missed seeing any evidence o

2014Credit Ass’n v. Cheek, 248 Ga. 745, 746 (4) ( 285 SE2d 689 ) (1982) (“[W]hen the defendant produces an expert’s opinion in his favor on motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff fails to produce a contrary expert opinion in opposition to that motion, then there is no genuine issue to be tried by the jury and it is not error to grant summary judgment to the defendant.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 In its order, the trial court invited Appellants to identify any evidence that Dr. Mahathre’s care of Reeves proximately caused her death, noting, “Should the Court have missed seeing any evidence o

2014Credit Ass’n v. Cheek, 248 Ga. 745, 746 (4) ( 285 SE2d 689 ) (1982) (“[W]hen the defendant produces an expert’s opinion in his favor on motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff fails to produce a contrary expert opinion in opposition to that motion, then there is no genuine issue to be tried by the jury and it is not error to grant summary judgment to the defendant.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 In its order, the trial court invited Appellants to identify any evidence that Dr. Mahathre’s care of Reeves proximately caused her death, noting, “Should the Court have missed seeing any evidence o

2014A mere possibility of such causation is not enough . . . .”10 Based on the combined expert testimony, we conclude that Moore presented evidence creating a jury issue as to whether Dr. Singh would have discovered the fracture if she had properly complied with the standard of care during the examination (2005). 7 See Knight, 316 Ga. App. at 604 (1) (a); Ladner v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 314 Ga. App. 136, 136-137 ( 723 SE2d 450 ) (2012); Walker, 276 Ga. App. at 638 (1). 8 Knight, 316 Ga. App. at 607 (1) (a). 9 Id. at 604 (1) (a). 10 (Punctuation omitted.) Ladner, 314 Ga. App. at 140 , quoting Grin

2014A mere possibility of such causation is not enough . . . .”10 Based on the combined expert testimony, we conclude that Moore presented evidence creating a jury issue as to whether Dr. Singh would have discovered the fracture if she had properly complied with the standard of care during the examination (2005). 7 See Knight, 316 Ga. App. at 604 (1) (a); Ladner v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 314 Ga. App. 136, 136-137 ( 723 SE2d 450 ) (2012); Walker, 276 Ga. App. at 638 (1). 8 Knight, 316 Ga. App. at 607 (1) (a). 9 Id. at 604 (1) (a). 10 (Punctuation omitted.) Ladner, 314 Ga. App. at 140 , quoting Grin

2014Auth., 233 Ga. App. 706, 709 (2) ( 505 SE2d 232 ) (1998) (“[When] . . . the defendant hospital makes a motion for summary judgment and the attending physician gives a medical affidavit that states a medical opinion that the alleged deviation from the standard of care has no causal connection with the injury or aggravated a pre-existing condition, such motion has pierced the plaintiff’s pleadings, refuted causation, and shifted the burden to the plaintiff of coming forward with some evidence to create a material issue of fact, because the defendant hospital has disproved the essential element o

2014Auth., 233 Ga. App. 706, 709 (2) ( 505 SE2d 232 ) (1998) (“[When] . . . the defendant hospital makes a motion for summary judgment and the attending physician gives a medical affidavit that states a medical opinion that the alleged deviation from the standard of care has no causal connection with the injury or aggravated a pre-existing condition, such motion has pierced the plaintiff’s pleadings, refuted causation, and shifted the burden to the plaintiff of coming forward with some evidence to create a material issue of fact, because the defendant hospital has disproved the essential element o

2014A mere possibility of such causation is not enough . . . .”10 Based on the combined expert testimony, we conclude that Moore presented evidence creating a jury issue as to whether Dr. Singh would have discovered the fracture if she had properly complied with the standard of care during the examination (2005). 7 See Knight, 316 Ga. App. at 604 (1) (a); Ladner v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 314 Ga. App. 136, 136-137 ( 723 SE2d 450 ) (2012); Walker, 276 Ga. App. at 638 (1). 8 Knight, 316 Ga. App. at 607 (1) (a). 9 Id. at 604 (1) (a). 10 (Punctuation omitted.) Ladner, 314 Ga. App. at 140 , quoting Grin

2014A mere possibility of such causation is not enough . . . .”10 Based on the combined expert testimony, we conclude that Moore presented evidence creating a jury issue as to whether Dr. Singh would have discovered the fracture if she had properly complied with the standard of care during the examination (2005). 7 See Knight, 316 Ga. App. at 604 (1) (a); Ladner v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 314 Ga. App. 136, 136-137 ( 723 SE2d 450 ) (2012); Walker, 276 Ga. App. at 638 (1). 8 Knight, 316 Ga. App. at 607 (1) (a). 9 Id. at 604 (1) (a). 10 (Punctuation omitted.) Ladner, 314 Ga. App. at 140 , quoting Grin

2014Auth., 233 Ga. App. 706, 709 (2) ( 505 SE2d 232 ) (1998) (“[When] . . . the defendant hospital makes a motion for summary judgment and the attending physician gives a medical affidavit that states a medical opinion that the alleged deviation from the standard of care has no causal connection with the injury or aggravated a pre-existing condition, such motion has pierced the plaintiff’s pleadings, refuted causation, and shifted the burden to the plaintiff of coming forward with some evidence to create a material issue of fact, because the defendant hospital has disproved the essential element o

2014Auth., 233 Ga. App. 706, 709 (2) ( 505 SE2d 232 ) (1998) (“[When] . . . the defendant hospital makes a motion for summary judgment and the attending physician gives a medical affidavit that states a medical opinion that the alleged deviation from the standard of care has no causal connection with the injury or aggravated a pre-existing condition, such motion has pierced the plaintiff’s pleadings, refuted causation, and shifted the burden to the plaintiff of coming forward with some evidence to create a material issue of fact, because the defendant hospital has disproved the essential element o

2014Credit Ass’n v. Cheek, 248 Ga. 745, 746 (4) ( 285 SE2d 689 ) (1982) (“[W]hen the defendant produces an expert’s opinion in his favor on motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff fails to produce a contrary expert opinion in opposition to that motion, then there is no genuine issue to be tried by the jury and it is not error to grant summary judgment to the defendant.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 In its order, the trial court invited Appellants to identify any evidence that Dr. Mahathre’s care of Reeves proximately caused her death, noting, “Should the Court have missed seeing any evidence o

2014Credit Ass’n v. Cheek, 248 Ga. 745, 746 (4) ( 285 SE2d 689 ) (1982) (“[W]hen the defendant produces an expert’s opinion in his favor on motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff fails to produce a contrary expert opinion in opposition to that motion, then there is no genuine issue to be tried by the jury and it is not error to grant summary judgment to the defendant.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 In its order, the trial court invited Appellants to identify any evidence that Dr. Mahathre’s care of Reeves proximately caused her death, noting, “Should the Court have missed seeing any evidence o

2012“An injury to an employee occurring during working hours and on the employer’s premises ordinarily and presumptively will be considered as arising out of and in the course of employment[.]” (Citations omitted.) Miles v. Brown Transport Corp., 163 Ga. App. 563, 564 ( 294 SE2d 734 ) (1982). 4 Under the deviation rule, “[w]here [an] employee breaks the continuity of [her] employment for purposes of [her] own and is *509 injured before [she] brings [herself] back into the line of employment, [her] injury does not arise out of or in the course of [her] employment^]” (Citation omitted.) Gen.

2012“An injury to an employee occurring during working hours and on the employer’s premises ordinarily and presumptively will be considered as arising out of and in the course of employment[.]” (Citations omitted.) Miles v. Brown Transport Corp., 163 Ga. App. 563, 564 ( 294 SE2d 734 ) (1982). 4 Under the deviation rule, “[w]here [an] employee breaks the continuity of [her] employment for purposes of [her] own and is *509 injured before [she] brings [herself] back into the line of employment, [her] injury does not arise out of or in the course of [her] employment^]” (Citation omitted.) Gen.

2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (

2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (

2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (

2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (

2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (

2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (

2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (

2011Cf. Norris v. Emanuel County, 254 Ga. App. 114, 116 (1) ( 561 SE2d 240 ) (2002) (“Because the defendants did not raise the issue of sovereign immunity in their motion for summary judgment, I the plaintiff] was not required to rebut this issue.” (footnote omitted)).

2011Cf. Norris v. Emanuel County, 254 Ga. App. 114, 116 (1) ( 561 SE2d 240 ) (2002) (“Because the defendants did not raise the issue of sovereign immunity in their motion for summary judgment, I the plaintiff] was not required to rebut this issue.” (footnote omitted)).

2005See id.; Kenney v. Piedmont Hosp., 136 Ga. App. 660, 664 (3) ( 222 SE2d 162 ) (1975). 13 See also Jenkins v. Payne, 465 SE2d 795, 797-799 (Va. 1996) (noting that plaintiff presented expert testimony that gynecologist and family practice physician had the same duty of care under circumstances of the case, precluding determination by trial court that, as a matter of law, either physician’s negligence constituted the sole proximate cause of the patient’s injuries).

2005See id.; Kenney v. Piedmont Hosp., 136 Ga. App. 660, 664 (3) ( 222 SE2d 162 ) (1975). 13 See also Jenkins v. Payne, 465 SE2d 795, 797-799 (Va. 1996) (noting that plaintiff presented expert testimony that gynecologist and family practice physician had the same duty of care under circumstances of the case, precluding determination by trial court that, as a matter of law, either physician’s negligence constituted the sole proximate cause of the patient’s injuries).

2005See id.; Kenney v. Piedmont Hosp., 136 Ga. App. 660, 664 (3) ( 222 SE2d 162 ) (1975). 13 See also Jenkins v. Payne, 465 SE2d 795, 797-799 (Va. 1996) (noting that plaintiff presented expert testimony that gynecologist and family practice physician had the same duty of care under circumstances of the case, precluding determination by trial court that, as a matter of law, either physician’s negligence constituted the sole proximate cause of the patient’s injuries).

2001See generally Freeman v. Pittman, 220 Ga. App. 672 ( 469 SE2d 543 ) (1996); Huntington v. Fishman, 212 Ga. App. 27 ( 441 SE2d 444 ) (1994); Little v. Middleton, 198 Ga. App. 393 ( 401 SE2d 751 ) (1991).

2001See generally Freeman v. Pittman, 220 Ga. App. 672 ( 469 SE2d 543 ) (1996); Huntington v. Fishman, 212 Ga. App. 27 ( 441 SE2d 444 ) (1994); Little v. Middleton, 198 Ga. App. 393 ( 401 SE2d 751 ) (1991).

1998"Whether the acts upon which liability is predicated are ministerial or discretionary is determined by the facts of the particular *807 case." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kordares v. Gwinnett County, 220 Ga.App. 848, 851 , 470 S.E.2d 479 (1996).

1998"Whether the acts upon which liability is predicated are ministerial or discretionary is determined by the facts of the particular *807 case." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kordares v. Gwinnett County, 220 Ga.App. 848, 851 , 470 S.E.2d 479 (1996).