65 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Toy v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2009In order to prevail on a negligence cause of action, the plaintiff must prove “the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiffs injury.” Evans-Reid, supra, 930 A.2d at 937 n. 6 (citing on p. -Etheredge, supra, 635 A.2d at 917 (quoting Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C.1988) (quoting Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C.1984)))). 2007In order to prevail in a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove "the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury.” Etheredge, 635 A.2d at 917 (quoting Toy, 549 A.2d at 6 (quoting Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C.1984))). | 14 | 16 |
Meek v. Shepardgreen2 sentences2023“The plaintiff in a negligence action bears the burden of proving ‘the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injury.’” District of Columbia v. Hampton, 666 A.2d 30, 35 (D.C. 1995) (quoting Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C. 1984)). 2009In order to prevail on a negligence cause of action, the plaintiff must prove “the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiffs injury.” Evans-Reid, supra, 930 A.2d at 937 n. 6 (citing on p. -Etheredge, supra, 635 A.2d at 917 (quoting Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C.1988) (quoting Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C.1984)))). | 12 | 12 |
Derzavis v. Bepkogreen2 sentences2009The Claim of Negligence “In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiffs injury.” Derzavis v. Bepko, 766 A.2d 514, 519 (D.C.2000). 7 “Due to the ‘great variety of infections and complications which, despite all precautions and skill, sometimes follow accepted and standard medical treatment,’ an inference of negligence in a malpractice suit cannot be based solely on the fact that an adverse result follows treatment.” Quin v. 2005"In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury.” Derzavis v. Bepko, 766 A.2d 514, 519 (D.C.2000). | 4 | 4 |
District of Columbia v. Watkinsgreen2 sentences2007“In an action for negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between the deviation and the plaintiffs injury.” District of Columbia v. Wilson, 721 A.2d 591, 597 (D.C.1998) (citing District of Columbia v. Watkins, 684 A.2d 395, 401 (D.C.1996)). 2007"In an action for negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the applicable *167 standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between the deviation and the plaintiff's injury." District of Columbia v. Wilson, 721 A.2d 591, 597 (D.C.1998 ) (citing District of Columbia v. Watkins, 684 A.2d 395, 401 (D.C.1996)). | 4 | 4 |
Talley v. Varmagreen2 sentences2010Standard of Care “It is fundamental in tort law that one can be held liable for negligence only if there was a duty.... ” Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C.1990) (en banc); see also N.O.L. v. District of Columbia, 674 A.2d 498 , 499 n. 2 (D.C.1995) (“The foundation of modern negligence law is the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.”)- Once duty is established, it is well settled that “[i]n a medical malpractice action, there are three elements a plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case: ‘(1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from that 2010Once duty is established, it is well settled that "[i]n a medical malpractice action, there are three elements a plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case: `(1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from that standard of care by the defendant; and (3) a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury.'" Burke v. Scaggs, 867 A.2d 213, 217 (D.C.2005) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Talley v. Varma, 689 A.2d 547, 552 (D.C.1997)). | 3 | 3 |
District of Columbia v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2007“In an action for negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between the deviation and the plaintiffs injury.” District of Columbia v. Wilson, 721 A.2d 591, 597 (D.C.1998) (citing District of Columbia v. Watkins, 684 A.2d 395, 401 (D.C.1996)). 2007"In an action for negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the applicable *167 standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between the deviation and the plaintiff's injury." District of Columbia v. Wilson, 721 A.2d 591, 597 (D.C.1998 ) (citing District of Columbia v. Watkins, 684 A.2d 395, 401 (D.C.1996)). | 3 | 3 |
Allen v. Hillgreen2 sentences2006Moreover, "the use of expert testimony is required since the subject is `not likely to be within the common knowledge of the average layman.'" Allen v. Hill, 626 A.2d 875, 877 (D.C.1993) (quoting District of Columbia v. Barriteau, 399 A.2d 563, 569 (D.C.1979)). 1997“The plaintiff in a medical malpractice case bears the burden of proof on three issues: the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiffs injury.” Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C.1984) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Allen v. Hill, 626 A.2d 875, 877 (D.C.1993); Psychiatric Institute of Washington v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 623-624 (D.C.1986). | 3 | 3 |
Washington v. Washington Hospital Centergreen2 sentences2000“Expert testimony is usually required to establish each of [these] elements, except where proof is so obvious as to lie within the ken of the average lay juror.” Washington v. Washington Hospital Center, 579 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C.1990) (citations omitted); see Lasley v. Georgetown University, 688 A.2d 1381, 1383 (D.C.1997) (rule requiring expert testimony applies to proof of causation), ce rt. denied, 522 U.S. 1060 , 118 S.Ct. 719 , 139 L.Ed.2d 659 (1998). 2000Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C.1990). | 3 | 3 |
Psychiatric Institute of Washington v. Allengreen2 sentences1997“The plaintiff in a medical malpractice case bears the burden of proof on three issues: the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiffs injury.” Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C.1984) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Allen v. Hill, 626 A.2d 875, 877 (D.C.1993); Psychiatric Institute of Washington v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 623-624 (D.C.1986). 1997Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C.1990); Psychiatric Inst. of Washington v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 623-24 (D.C.1986); Kosberg v. Washington Hosp. | 3 | 3 |
Travers v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Travers v. District of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566, 568 (D.C.1996). 2005Given that the burden is on the plaintiff to show a deviation from the standard of care in a medical malpractice case, see Travers, 672 A.2d at 568-70 , the disagreement between the plaintiffs experts will necessarily show that there is a wide range of medical opinion as to the proper course of action, and defense counsel will alert the jury that the plaintiff recognizes there is not only one acceptable course, but a range of opinion and more than one option or means of treatment. | 2 | 3 |
Varner v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2024“In an action for negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between the deviation and the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. at 265 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2024“In an action for negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between the deviation and the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. at 265 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2 |
District of Columbia v. Petersgreen2 sentences2022After he demonstrates the existence of a duty, a plaintiff must 13 establish “the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard of care by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injury.” Scales v. District of Columbia, 973 A.2d 722, 730 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia, 930 A.2d 930 , 937 n.6 (D.C. 2007)). 5 “A plaintiff must put on expert testimony to establish what that standard of care is if the subject in question is so distinctly related to some science, profession, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of t 1995While expert testimony regarding the appropriate standard of care is not necessary for acts “within the realm of common knowledge and everyday experience,” District of Columbia v. White, 442 A.2d 159, 164 (D.C.1982), “[a] plaintiff must put on expert testimony to establish what that standard of care is if the subject in question is so distinctly related to some science, profession or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layperson.” District of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1273 (D.C.1987) (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Clark v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2022“The standard of care is to be found in ‘the practices in fact generally followed by other comparable governmental facilities’ or some nationally-recognized standard.” See, e.g., Evans- Reid, 930 A.2d at 936 (quoting Clark v. District of Columbia, 708 A.2d 632, 635 (D.C. 1997)). 1998As we recently stated in Clark v. District of Columbia, 708 A.2d 632, 634 (D.C. 1997), a case involving a suicide by ag'uvenile resident of the District’s Receiving Home for Children, “[t]he plaintiff in a negligence action bears the burden of proof on three issues: the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiffs injury.” (Citations omitted.) In general, the standard of care owed by the District to persons in its custody is a matter beyond the ken of the average juror. | 2 | 2 |
Burke v. Scaggsgreen2 sentences2010Standard of Care “It is fundamental in tort law that one can be held liable for negligence only if there was a duty.... ” Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C.1990) (en banc); see also N.O.L. v. District of Columbia, 674 A.2d 498 , 499 n. 2 (D.C.1995) (“The foundation of modern negligence law is the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.”)- Once duty is established, it is well settled that “[i]n a medical malpractice action, there are three elements a plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case: ‘(1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from that 2010Once duty is established, it is well settled that "[i]n a medical malpractice action, there are three elements a plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case: `(1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from that standard of care by the defendant; and (3) a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury.'" Burke v. Scaggs, 867 A.2d 213, 217 (D.C.2005) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Talley v. Varma, 689 A.2d 547, 552 (D.C.1997)). | 2 | 2 |
Morrison v. MacNamaragreen2 sentences2006Standard of Review "In a medical malpractice action, there are three elements a plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case: `(1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from that standard of care by the defendant; and (3) a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury.'" Burke v. Scaggs, 867 A.2d 213, 217 (D.C.2005) (emphasis in original) (quoting Talley v. Varma, 689 A.2d 547, 552 (D.C.1997)). "[I]n view of the uniform standards of proficiency established by national board certification," the standard of care for board-certified physicians "is to be 2006Burke v. Scaggs, 867 A.2d 213, 217 (D.C.2005) (emphasis in original) (quoting Talley v. Varma, 689 A.2d 547, 552 (D.C.1997)). “[I]n view of the uniform standards of proficiency established by national board certification,” the standard of care for board-certified physicians “is to be measured by the national standard.” Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 565 (D.C.1979). | 2 | 2 |
District of Columbia v. Andersongreen2 sentences1997She must establish “(1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from that standard of care by the defendant; and (3) a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiffs injury.” District of Columbia v. Anderson, 597 A.2d 1295, 1297 (D.C.1991) (emphasis added); see also Bunn v. Urban Shelters & Health Care Systems, Inc., 672 A.2d 1056, 1059 (D.C.1996); Washington v. Washington Hosp. 1993District of Columbia v. Anderson, 597 A.2d 1295, 1297 (D.C.1991) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences1992The ophthalmologist who supported this effort was Dr. William Cooper, an ophthalmologist and orbital surgeon associated with Cornell Medical Center. [7] The motion stated that it was "too late to resort" to these databases so close to trial. [8] The trial judge appears to have derived this standard from Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital, 185 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 92 , 566 F.2d 749, 757 (1977), which held that a plaintiff alleging medical mismanagement of an already potentially fatal condition must present evidence sufficient for the finder of fact to conclude that the defendant's deviation from t 1992The trial judge appears to have derived this standard from Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital, 185 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 92 , 566 F.2d 749, 757 (1977), which held that a plaintiff alleging medical mismanagement of an already potentially fatal condition must present evidence sufficient for the finder of fact to conclude that the defendant’s deviation from the standard of care was a “substantial factor” in causing the harm complained of. . | 2 | 2 |
District of Columbia v. Carmichaelgreen2 sentences1998Id. at 634-35 ; see also Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 7 (D.C.1988); District of Columbia v. Carmichael, 577 A.2d 312, 314 (D.C.1990). 1995“If the standard itself is not proven, then a deviation from that standard is incapable of proof.” District of Columbia v. Carmichael, supra, 577 A.2d at 314 . | 1 | 3 |
District of Columbia v. Hamptongreen2 sentences2023“The plaintiff in a negligence action bears the burden of proving ‘the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injury.’” District of Columbia v. Hampton, 666 A.2d 30, 35 (D.C. 1995) (quoting Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C. 1984)). 2000In a negligence case, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing “‘the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between the deviation and the plaintiffs injury.’ ” District of Columbia v. Hampton, supra, 666 A.2d at 35 (quoting Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C.1984)). | 1 | 2 |
Gubbins v. Hursongreen1 sentence2026Gubbins v. Hurson, 885 A.2d 269, 282 (D.C. 2005) (explaining that “[r]es ipsa loquitur is not to be invoked lightly in any case, and particularly not where medical malpractice is claimed” (emphasis in original)). | 1 | 1 |
Giordano v. Sherwoodgreen1 sentence2026Given that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, when it applies, may relieve a plaintiff of the burden of proving the traditional components of a medical malpractice claim—“standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injury,” Giordano v. Sherwood, 968 A.2d 494, 498 (D.C. 2009)—this court has indicated that trial courts should be cautious in allowing plaintiffs to pursue this theory of liability. | 1 | 1 |
Scales v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2022After he demonstrates the existence of a duty, a plaintiff must 13 establish “the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard of care by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injury.” Scales v. District of Columbia, 973 A.2d 722, 730 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia, 930 A.2d 930 , 937 n.6 (D.C. 2007)). 5 “A plaintiff must put on expert testimony to establish what that standard of care is if the subject in question is so distinctly related to some science, profession, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of t | 1 | 1 |
Tolu v. Ayodejigreen1 sentence2021See Tolu, 945 A.2d at 601 (when the applicable standard of care is not known by the average juror, then expert testimony is required for a plaintiff to meet his burden); Sullivan v. AboveNet Commc’ns, Inc., 112 A.3d 347, 358 (D.C. 2015) (“[I]f the standard itself is not proven, then a deviation from that standard is incapable of proof.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 17 The final piece of evidence to which Mr. Jones points is his own testimony that his employer experienced “significant vibrations in their building office during exterior renovation work and experienced a number of falling | 1 | 1 |
Stephen M. Sullivan v. AboveNet Communications, Inc.green1 sentence2021See Tolu, 945 A.2d at 601 (when the applicable standard of care is not known by the average juror, then expert testimony is required for a plaintiff to meet his burden); Sullivan v. AboveNet Commc’ns, Inc., 112 A.3d 347, 358 (D.C. 2015) (“[I]f the standard itself is not proven, then a deviation from that standard is incapable of proof.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 17 The final piece of evidence to which Mr. Jones points is his own testimony that his employer experienced “significant vibrations in their building office during exterior renovation work and experienced a number of falling | 1 | 1 |
| Word v. Potomac Electric Power Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hill v. Metropolitan African Methodist Episcopal Churchgreen | 1 | 1 |
Payne v. Soft Sheen Products, Inc.green1 sentence2013Power Co., 742 A.2d 452, 459-460 (D.C.1999) ("To prevail on a claim for strict liability in tort under § 402A [of Restatement (Second) of Torts], the plaintiff must prove the [product] defect was a direct and proximate cause of the plaintiffs [sic] injuries.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Payne v. Soft Sheen Products, Inc. 486 A.2d 712, 720 (D.C.1985) (explaining that under the doctrine of implied warranty, as under strict liability in tort, liability is imposed for "injury caused” by a defective product (internal quotation marks omitted)). . | 1 | 1 |
| N.O.L. v. District of Columbiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Bakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| District of Columbia v. Chinngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Creola Quick, Administratrix, Estate of Lawrence Quick, Deceased v. Roger G. Thurstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Quin v. George Washington Universitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Woldeamanuel v. Georgetown University Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Twyman v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reaves-Bey v. Karrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| District of Columbia v. Barriteaugreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mills v. Cootergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pannell v. District of Columbiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holder v. District of Columbiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences2022After he demonstrates the existence of a duty, a plaintiff must 13 establish “the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard of care by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injury.” Scales v. District of Columbia, 973 A.2d 722, 730 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia, 930 A.2d 930 , 937 n.6 (D.C. 2007)). 5 “A plaintiff must put on expert testimony to establish what that standard of care is if the subject in question is so distinctly related to some science, profession, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of t 2009Foreseeability of the Criminal Assault To prevail in a negligence cause of action, a plaintiff must prove “ ‘the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiffs injury.’ ” Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia, 930 A.2d 930 , 937 n. 6 (D.C.2007) (internal citation omitted). | 4 | 2009–2022 |
Etheredge v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences2009In order to prevail on a negligence cause of action, the plaintiff must prove “the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiffs injury.” Evans-Reid, supra, 930 A.2d at 937 n. 6 (citing on p. -Etheredge, supra, 635 A.2d at 917 (quoting Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C.1988) (quoting Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C.1984)))). 2007In order to prevail in a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove "the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury.” Etheredge, 635 A.2d at 917 (quoting Toy, 549 A.2d at 6 (quoting Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C.1984))). | 4 | 1997–2009 |
Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
green
2 sentences2024“Where negligent conduct is alleged in a context which is within the realm of common knowledge and everyday experience, the plaintiff is not required to adduce expert testimony either 10 to establish the applicable standard of care or to prove that the defendant failed to adhere to it.” Id. (quoting Beard, 587 A.2d at 200 ). 2024“Where negligent conduct is alleged in a context which is within the realm of common knowledge and everyday experience, the plaintiff is not required to adduce expert testimony either 10 to establish the applicable standard of care or to prove that the defendant failed to adhere to it.” Id. (quoting Beard, 587 A.2d at 200 ). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital
green
2 sentences1992The ophthalmologist who supported this effort was Dr. William Cooper, an ophthalmologist and orbital surgeon associated with Cornell Medical Center. [7] The motion stated that it was "too late to resort" to these databases so close to trial. [8] The trial judge appears to have derived this standard from Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital, 185 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 92 , 566 F.2d 749, 757 (1977), which held that a plaintiff alleging medical mismanagement of an already potentially fatal condition must present evidence sufficient for the finder of fact to conclude that the defendant's deviation from t 1992The trial judge appears to have derived this standard from Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital, 185 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 92 , 566 F.2d 749, 757 (1977), which held that a plaintiff alleging medical mismanagement of an already potentially fatal condition must present evidence sufficient for the finder of fact to conclude that the defendant’s deviation from the standard of care was a “substantial factor” in causing the harm complained of. . | 2 | 1992–1992 |
Curtis v. United States
green
1 sentence2021The government cites to one of our cases suggesting, in dicta, a deviation from this principle: Curtis v. United States, 886 A.2d 92 (D.C. 2005). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Hawes v. Chua green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Jeanty green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| District of Columbia v. Walker green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Stevens v. Hall green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| City of Louisville v. Yeager green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Martin v. Yeoham green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.