deviation standard in North Dakota

2006However, Harrie served an answer and amended answer on behalf of Ellen Welch, and at least by the time of the amended answer, Harrie had actual knowledge that Welch had died. [¶ 11] In Muhammed, 2004 ND 46, ¶ 26 , 675 N.W.2d 402 , we quoted Yoh v. Hoffman, 29 Kan.App.2d 312 , 27 P.3d 927, 931 (2001) for the proposition that “ ‘[k]nowingly filing a pleading on behalf of a dead person as though he or she is still alive is fraud.’ ” In Yoh, 27 P.3d at 929 , the plaintiff was injured in a car accident.

2006However, Harrie served an answer and amended answer on behalf of Ellen Welch, and at least by the time of the amended answer, Harrie had actual knowledge that Welch had died. [¶ 11] In Muhammed, 2004 ND 46, ¶ 26 , 675 N.W.2d 402 , we quoted Yoh v. Hoffman, 29 Kan.App.2d 312 , 27 P.3d 927, 931 (2001) for the proposition that “ ‘[k]nowingly filing a pleading on behalf of a dead person as though he or she is still alive is fraud.’ ” In Yoh, 27 P.3d at 929 , the plaintiff was injured in a car accident.

2006"Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation. [¶25] We reject the hearing panel's finding that Bullis's conduct was the product of mere "negligen[ce]" and "poor judgment." "A knowing or willful act for purposes of a professional disciplinary proceeding does not require evil intent or bad purpose; rather, the terms mean the act was done in the exercise of the performer's free will and was not done under coerc

2006“Negligence” is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation. [¶ 25] We reject the hearing panel’s finding that Bullis’s conduct was the product of mere “negligen[ce]” and “poor judgment.” “A knowing or willful act for purposes of a professional disciplinary proceeding does not require evil intent or bad purpose; rather, the terms mean the act was done in the exercise of the performer’s free will and was not done under coer

1989As this court said in State v. Hanson, supra, 256 N.W.2d at 367 “[t]he process by which a judge or a jury determines whether there has been a gross *822 deviation from acceptable standards of conduct ... is analogous to the process by which one determines whether there has been a deviation from the standard of reasonable care, a much-used legal test.

1977We hold that the reckless-endangerment statute meets the constitutional requirements set forth in State v. Hagge, supra. When the culpability of “recklessly” is implied, the definition of that culpability combined with the statutory requirement that the created risk be of serious bodily injury or death provides an ascertainable standard of guilt and satisfies the requirements of due process of law.