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7 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. BENNY E.green2 sentences1997See State v. Fairweather, 116 N.M. 456, 463 , 863 P.2d 1077, 1084 (1993) (“The reason that a trial judge is required to make individualized findings justifying a deviation from the standard trial procedure of face-to-face confrontation in front of the jury is so that an appellate court may review those findings in determining whether the trial court properly balanced the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right and the special need for protection of the child witness.”); see also State v. Benny E., 110 N.M. 237, 240-42 , 794 P.2d 380, 383-85 (Ct.App.1990) (use of video monitor and testimony in judge’ 1997See State v. Fairweather, 116 N.M. 456, 463 , 863 P.2d 1077, 1084 (1993) (“The reason that a trial judge is required to make individualized findings justifying a deviation from the standard trial procedure of face-to-face confrontation in front of the jury is so that an appellate court may review those findings in determining whether the trial court properly balanced the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right and the special need for protection of the child witness.”); see also State v. Benny E., 110 N.M. 237, 240-42 , 794 P.2d 380, 383-85 (Ct.App.1990) (use of video monitor and testimony in judge’ | 2 | 2 |
Harold Summers v. Baptist Medical Center Arkadelphiagreen1 sentence2016“The question is not whether a plaintiff has insurance, or whether he was refused screening because of lack of insurance, but, rather, whether he was afforded an appropriate medical screening examination.” Summers, 91 F.3d at 1137 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp.green1 sentence2001We do not think it required that, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff with a medical condition for which a standard screening procedure is in place must actually show that he was treated differently than other patients having the same or similar conditions. {59} In reducing the cases to their common denominator, we conclude that a plaintiffs proof of the existence of a standard screening procedure for a person presenting a medical condition, and of a deviation from that standard screening procedure with respect to that person, is a prima facie showing of inappropriat | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fairweathergreen2 sentences1997See State v. Fairweather, 116 N.M. 456, 463 , 863 P.2d 1077, 1084 (1993) (“The reason that a trial judge is required to make individualized findings justifying a deviation from the standard trial procedure of face-to-face confrontation in front of the jury is so that an appellate court may review those findings in determining whether the trial court properly balanced the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right and the special need for protection of the child witness.”); see also State v. Benny E., 110 N.M. 237, 240-42 , 794 P.2d 380, 383-85 (Ct.App.1990) (use of video monitor and testimony in judge’ 1997See State v. Fairweather, 116 N.M. 456, 463 , 863 P.2d 1077, 1084 (1993) (“The reason that a trial judge is required to make individualized findings justifying a deviation from the standard trial procedure of face-to-face confrontation in front of the jury is so that an appellate court may review those findings in determining whether the trial court properly balanced the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right and the special need for protection of the child witness.”); see also State v. Benny E., 110 N.M. 237, 240-42 , 794 P.2d 380, 383-85 (Ct.App.1990) (use of video monitor and testimony in judge’ | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Faden v. Robbins
green
2 sentences2018Partners, Lp , 933 A.2d 800 , 816 (D.C. 2007) (equating equitable indemnity claim to malpractice claim and providing that, to recover, indemnitee "would have the burden of proving the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard and a causal relationship between the deviation and the injury"); Faden v. Robbins , 88 A.D.2d 631 , 450 N.Y.S.2d 238 , 239 (1982) ("To be entitled to contribution from the third-party defendants, [the doctor] will have to establish that what the third-party defendants did or failed to do in their treatment of [the] plaintiff constituted a departure from 2018Partners, Lp , 933 A.2d 800 , 816 (D.C. 2007) (equating equitable indemnity claim to malpractice claim and providing that, to recover, indemnitee "would have the burden of proving the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard and a causal relationship between the deviation and the injury"); Faden v. Robbins , 88 A.D.2d 631 , 450 N.Y.S.2d 238 , 239 (1982) ("To be entitled to contribution from the third-party defendants, [the doctor] will have to establish that what the third-party defendants did or failed to do in their treatment of [the] plaintiff constituted a departure from | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Caglioti v. District Hospital Partners, LP
green
1 sentence2018Partners, Lp , 933 A.2d 800 , 816 (D.C. 2007) (equating equitable indemnity claim to malpractice claim and providing that, to recover, indemnitee "would have the burden of proving the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard and a causal relationship between the deviation and the injury"); Faden v. Robbins , 88 A.D.2d 631 , 450 N.Y.S.2d 238 , 239 (1982) ("To be entitled to contribution from the third-party defendants, [the doctor] will have to establish that what the third-party defendants did or failed to do in their treatment of [the] plaintiff constituted a departure from | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Godwin v. Memorial Medical Center
green
1 sentence2016In other words, not to judge it differently because people have insurance or don’t have insurance.” As noted earlier, Bronston then commented, “[i]n this case, the patient had insurance anyway}].” {22} As previously discussed, in order to make a prima facie showing of inappropriate screening, the plaintiff must show “the existence of a standard screening procedure for a person presenting a medical condition, and of a deviation from that standard screening procedirre with respect to that person.” Godwin, 2001-NMCA-033 ¶ 59 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Clark Ex Rel. Clark v. Electronic City
green
2 sentences1982Carter was distinguished in Clark v. Electronic City, 90 N.M. 477 , 565 P.2d 348 (Ct. App. 1977), but it was followed in Calloway v. State Workmen's Compensation, 268 S.E.2d 132 (W. 1982Carter was distinguished in Clark v. Electronic City, 90 N.M. 477 , 565 P.2d 348 (Ct. App. 1977), but it was followed in Calloway v. State Workmen's Compensation, 268 S.E.2d 132 (W. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Calloway v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner & Sheppards Auto Supply Co.
green
2 sentences1982Carter was distinguished in Clark v. Electronic City, 90 N.M. 477 , 565 P.2d 348 (Ct. App. 1977), but it was followed in Calloway v. State Workmen's Compensation, 268 S.E.2d 132 (W. 1982Carter was distinguished in Clark v. Electronic City, 90 N.M. 477 , 565 P.2d 348 (Ct.App.1977), but it was followed in Calloway v. State Workmen’s Compensation, 268 S.E.2d 132 (W.Va.1980). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Carter v. Burn Construction Company, Inc.
green
2 sentences1982Then, regardless if he returns to the route of the business trip, this does not in and of itself return him to the scope of employment and an injury occurring after this does not arise out of or in the course of his employment. [Emphasis added.] [Id. 30, 508 P.2d 1324 .] No distinction is intended between an employee who is "on a trip in the course of *855 his employment" and an employee who is "in the course of a business trip." The deviation rule is applicable in every case where an employee, while in the course of employment deviates for personal reasons and then returns to the scope of his 1982Then, regardless if he returns to the route of the business trip, this does not in and of itself return him to the scope of employment and an injury occurring after this does not arise out of or in the course of his employment. [Emphasis added.] [Id. 30, 508 P.2d 1324 .] No distinction is intended between an employee who is “on a trip in the course of his employment” and an employee who is “in the course of a business trip.” The deviation rule is applicable in every case where an employee, while in the course of employment deviates for personal reasons and then returns to the scope of his empl | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Missouri Utilities Co. v. City of California
green
1 sentence1964Appellees lastly rely on Missouri Utilities Co. v. City of California (C.D.Mo.1934), 8 F.Supp. 454 . | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.