15 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Meda v. Browngreen2 sentences2022Id. at 427 . 28 In affirming, we took note of the long-held principle that negligence “can be established by the proof of circumstances from which its existence may be inferred.” Id. at 427-28 (citation omitted). 1994The plaintiffs second expert, Dr. John Rybock, similarly concluded that “there was a deviation from the standard of care in that Dr. Meda failed to adequately protect the ulnar nerve during the procedure.” Id. | 2 | 4 |
Hardware Mutual Casualty v. Samegreen2 sentences2015However, Melvin supports by implication the minor deviation rule. 3) ‘Actual’ use with the permission of the named insured is ‘the particular use contemplated when permission is granted and relied on.’ 4) Such use and the operation of the car at the time of accident are not ‘synonymous,’ for using a car by a borrower includes riding in it while another drives, at least where the former remains ‘the custodian of the 2 In Mitnick, 180 Md. at 605-07 , 26 A.2d at 393-94 , the first permittee was a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the accident, and the omnibus clause extended coverage to any 2015However, Melvin supports by implication the minor deviation rule. 3) ‘Actual’ use with the permission of the named insured is ‘the particular use contemplated when permission is granted and relied on.’ 4) Such use and the operation of the car at the time of accident are not ‘synonymous,’ for using a car by a borrower includes riding in it while another drives, at least where the former remains ‘the custodian of the 2 In Mitnick, 180 Md. at 605-07 , 26 A.2d at 393-94 , the first permittee was a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the accident, and the omnibus clause extended coverage to any | 1 | 1 |
Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A.green2 sentences2013See Schultz v. Bank of America, 413 Md. 15, 29 , 990 A.2d 1078 (2010) (“sometimes the alleged negligence, if proven, would be so obviously shown that the trier of fact could recognize it without expert testimony”); see also Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222, 224 , 285 A.2d 612 (1972). 2013See Schultz v. Bank of America, 413 Md. 15, 29 , 990 A.2d 1078 (2010) (“sometimes the alleged negligence, if proven, would be so obviously shown that the trier of fact could recognize it without expert testimony”); see also Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222, 224 , 285 A.2d 612 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Crockett v. Crothersgreen2 sentences2013See Schultz v. Bank of America, 413 Md. 15, 29 , 990 A.2d 1078 (2010) (“sometimes the alleged negligence, if proven, would be so obviously shown that the trier of fact could recognize it without expert testimony”); see also Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222, 224 , 285 A.2d 612 (1972). 2013See Schultz v. Bank of America, 413 Md. 15, 29 , 990 A.2d 1078 (2010) (“sometimes the alleged negligence, if proven, would be so obviously shown that the trier of fact could recognize it without expert testimony”); see also Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222, 224 , 285 A.2d 612 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Rostkergreen1 sentence2012We quoted with approval the observations of the court in Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 161 (N.D.Cal.1981), in which the court analyzed for “classifiable characteristics” many cases in which requests by parties to proceed anonymously had been granted: “[T]he most common instances are cases involving abortion, mental illness, personal safety, homosexuality, transsexuality and illegitimate or abandoned children in welfare cases. | 1 | 1 |
Watts v. Kinggreen1 sentence2004In Watts , a certificate was filed with the HCAO, but the certificate did not “attest to a deviation from the standard of care” by one the defendants, Dr. Richard Watts, or Dr. Watts’s co-defendant, Watts Dental Associates, P.C., nor did the certificate show “that any deviation was the proximate cause of the alleged injury.” 143 Md.App. at 295, 309 , 794 *649 A.2d 728. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Noonangreen2 sentences1996“Knowing misappropriation” was defined in Matter of Roth, 140 N.J. 430 , 658 A.2d 1264 (1995), as the taking by a lawyer of “a client’s money entrusted to him, knowing that it is the client’s money and knowing that the client has not authorized the taking.” Id. 658 A.2d at 1272 (quoting In re Noonan, 102 N.J. 157 , 506 A.2d 722, 723 (1986)). 1996“Knowing misappropriation” was defined in Matter of Roth, 140 N.J. 430 , 658 A.2d 1264 (1995), as the taking by a lawyer of “a client’s money entrusted to him, knowing that it is the client’s money and knowing that the client has not authorized the taking.” Id. 658 A.2d at 1272 (quoting In re Noonan, 102 N.J. 157 , 506 A.2d 722, 723 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Davison v. Duke Universitygreen2 sentences1973See Davison v. Duke University, 282 N. C. 676 , 194 S.E.2d 761 (1973), where modification of the administrative provisions of the trust instrument which created the Duke Endowment to conform to the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was permitted, possibly under the doctrine of deviation, only to an extent not at variance with the expressed intention of the settlor. 1973See Davison v. Duke University, 282 N. C. 676 , 194 S.E.2d 761 (1973), where modification of the administrative provisions of the trust instrument which created the Duke Endowment to conform to the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was permitted, possibly under the doctrine of deviation, only to an extent not at variance with the expressed intention of the settlor. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lomax v. Warden
green
2 sentences2015Co., 232 Md. 476 , 194 A.2d 269 (1963), “neither of which ... involved the question of coverage vel non of a second permittee.” Kornke, 21 Md.App. at 184 , 319 A.2d at 607 . 2 After reviewing Mitnick, Melvin, and other relevant authorities, the Court of Special Appeals reached the following six conclusions concerning construction of omnibus clauses: 1) Where coverage is extended by the omnibus clause only to persons using the vehicle with the permission of the named insured (or other designated person) coverage depends upon the scope of the permission granted. 2) In determining whether the sco 1974This latter construction of permitted use under an omnibus *193 clause is in accord with the large majority of cases cited by the Court of Appeals in Mitnick and Melvin, supra, in support of the rule that “use” and “operation” of the car are “not synonymous.” Moreover it is in accord with the majority of cases in general deciding the issue of permitted use. | 2 | 1974–2015 |
Maryland Indemnity Insurance v. Kornke
green
2 sentences2015Co., 232 Md. 476 , 194 A.2d 269 (1963), “neither of which ... involved the question of coverage vel non of a second permittee.” Kornke, 21 Md.App. at 184 , 319 A.2d at 607 . 2 After reviewing Mitnick, Melvin, and other relevant authorities, the Court of Special Appeals reached the following six conclusions concerning construction of omnibus clauses: 1) Where coverage is extended by the omnibus clause only to persons using the vehicle with the permission of the named insured (or other designated person) coverage depends upon the scope of the permission granted. 2) In determining whether the sco 2015Co., 232 Md. 476 , 194 A.2d 269 (1963), “neither of which ... involved the question of coverage vel non of a second permittee.” Kornke, 21 Md.App. at 184 , 319 A.2d at 607 . 2 After reviewing Mitnick, Melvin, and other relevant authorities, the Court of Special Appeals reached the following six conclusions concerning construction of omnibus clauses: 1) Where coverage is extended by the omnibus clause only to persons using the vehicle with the permission of the named insured (or other designated person) coverage depends upon the scope of the permission granted. 2) In determining whether the sco | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Melvin v. American Automobile Insurance
green
1 sentence2015Co., 232 Md. 476 , 194 A.2d 269 (1963), “neither of which ... involved the question of coverage vel non of a second permittee.” Kornke, 21 Md.App. at 184 , 319 A.2d at 607 . 2 After reviewing Mitnick, Melvin, and other relevant authorities, the Court of Special Appeals reached the following six conclusions concerning construction of omnibus clauses: 1) Where coverage is extended by the omnibus clause only to persons using the vehicle with the permission of the named insured (or other designated person) coverage depends upon the scope of the permission granted. 2) In determining whether the sco | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Dooley v. Luzerne County Board of Assessment Appeals
green
1 sentence2004In Watts , a certificate was filed with the HCAO, but the certificate did not “attest to a deviation from the standard of care” by one the defendants, Dr. Richard Watts, or Dr. Watts’s co-defendant, Watts Dental Associates, P.C., nor did the certificate show “that any deviation was the proximate cause of the alleged injury.” 143 Md.App. at 295, 309 , 794 *649 A.2d 728. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Karl v. Davis
green
2 sentences2002If it does not, dismissal is required and the arbitration panel does not hear the merits of the claim. § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(i); Robinson, supra; and see Karl v. Davis, 100 Md.App. 42, 56 , 639 A.2d 214 , cert. denied, 336 Md. 224 , 647 A.2d 444 (1994). 2002If it does not, dismissal is required and the arbitration panel does not hear the merits of the claim. § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(i); Robinson, supra; and see Karl v. Davis, 100 Md.App. 42, 56 , 639 A.2d 214 , cert. denied, 336 Md. 224 , 647 A.2d 444 (1994). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Perna v. Pirozzi
green
2 sentences2000It then addressed the proper form of action: *375 Id., 92 N.J. 446 , 457 A.2d at 441 . 2000It then addressed the proper form of action: *375 Id., 92 N.J. 446 , 457 A.2d at 441 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Glenn
green
2 sentences1999Intent is defined as “the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.” Knowledge is defined as “the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.” Negligence is defined as “the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.” 341 Md. at 485 , 671 A.2d at 481 . 1999Intent is defined as “the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.” Knowledge is defined as “the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.” Negligence is defined as “the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.” 341 Md. at 485 , 671 A.2d at 481 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Matter of Roth
green
2 sentences1996“Knowing misappropriation” was defined in Matter of Roth, 140 N.J. 430 , 658 A.2d 1264 (1995), as the taking by a lawyer of “a client’s money entrusted to him, knowing that it is the client’s money and knowing that the client has not authorized the taking.” Id. 658 A.2d at 1272 (quoting In re Noonan, 102 N.J. 157 , 506 A.2d 722, 723 (1986)). 1996“Knowing misappropriation” was defined in Matter of Roth, 140 N.J. 430 , 658 A.2d 1264 (1995), as the taking by a lawyer of “a client’s money entrusted to him, knowing that it is the client’s money and knowing that the client has not authorized the taking.” Id. 658 A.2d at 1272 (quoting In re Noonan, 102 N.J. 157 , 506 A.2d 722, 723 (1986)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Carolina Coach Co. v. Bradley
green
1 sentence1973Carolina Coach Co. v. Bradley, 17 Md. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.