deviation standard in Florida

1998Our supreme court has often emphasized that their approval of standard jury instructions does not relieve the trial judge of his or her responsibility to "properly and correctly ... charge the jury in each case." Matter of Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So.2d 594 , 598 (Fla.), modified, 431 So.2d 599 (Fla.1981); Vazquez v. State, 700 So.2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), rev. granted, 705 So.2d 902 (Fla.1998), cause dismissed, 718 So.2d 755 , (Fla. 1998) (citing State v. Bryan, 287 So.2d 73 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 912 , 94 S.Ct. 2611 , 41 L.Ed.2d 216

1976If a person kills another in trying to do or commit any (arson) (involuntary sexual battery) (robbery) (burglary) (kidnapping) (aircraft piracy) (unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb), or while escaping from the immediate scene of such crime, the killing is in perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate such crime.” Commenting upon a deviation from the standard jury instructions, our Supreme Court in State v. Bryan, 287 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1973), said: “By this Court’s approval of the jury instructions for publication, it was not intended that they be iron c

1999A somewhat similar situation arose in Young v. State, 711 So.2d 1379 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), where the court held that the judge's deviation from the standard jury instruction by one sentence was error.

1998Our supreme court has often emphasized that their approval of standard jury instructions does not relieve the trial judge of his or her responsibility to "properly and correctly ... charge the jury in each case." Matter of Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So.2d 594 , 598 (Fla.), modified, 431 So.2d 599 (Fla.1981); Vazquez v. State, 700 So.2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), rev. granted, 705 So.2d 902 (Fla.1998), cause dismissed, 718 So.2d 755 , (Fla. 1998) (citing State v. Bryan, 287 So.2d 73 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 912 , 94 S.Ct. 2611 , 41 L.Ed.2d 216

1998Our supreme court has often emphasized that their approval of standard jury instructions does not relieve the trial judge of his or her responsibility to "properly and correctly ... charge the jury in each case." Matter of Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So.2d 594 , 598 (Fla.), modified, 431 So.2d 599 (Fla.1981); Vazquez v. State, 700 So.2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), rev. granted, 705 So.2d 902 (Fla.1998), cause dismissed, 718 So.2d 755 , (Fla. 1998) (citing State v. Bryan, 287 So.2d 73 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 912 , 94 S.Ct. 2611 , 41 L.Ed.2d 216

1998Our supreme court has often emphasized that their approval of standard jury instructions does not relieve the trial judge of his or her responsibility to "properly and correctly ... charge the jury in each case." Matter of Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So.2d 594 , 598 (Fla.), modified, 431 So.2d 599 (Fla.1981); Vazquez v. State, 700 So.2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), rev. granted, 705 So.2d 902 (Fla.1998), cause dismissed, 718 So.2d 755 , (Fla. 1998) (citing State v. Bryan, 287 So.2d 73 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 912 , 94 S.Ct. 2611 , 41 L.Ed.2d 216

1998Our supreme court has often emphasized that their approval of standard jury instructions does not relieve the trial judge of his or her responsibility to "properly and correctly ... charge the jury in each case." Matter of Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So.2d 594 , 598 (Fla.), modified, 431 So.2d 599 (Fla.1981); Vazquez v. State, 700 So.2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), rev. granted, 705 So.2d 902 (Fla.1998), cause dismissed, 718 So.2d 755 , (Fla. 1998) (citing State v. Bryan, 287 So.2d 73 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 912 , 94 S.Ct. 2611 , 41 L.Ed.2d 216

1998Our supreme court has often emphasized that their approval of standard jury instructions does not relieve the trial judge of his or her responsibility to "properly and correctly ... charge the jury in each case." Matter of Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So.2d 594 , 598 (Fla.), modified, 431 So.2d 599 (Fla.1981); Vazquez v. State, 700 So.2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), rev. granted, 705 So.2d 902 (Fla.1998), cause dismissed, 718 So.2d 755 , (Fla. 1998) (citing State v. Bryan, 287 So.2d 73 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 912 , 94 S.Ct. 2611 , 41 L.Ed.2d 216

1998Our supreme court has often emphasized that their approval of standard jury instructions does not relieve the trial judge of his or her responsibility to "properly and correctly ... charge the jury in each case." Matter of Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So.2d 594 , 598 (Fla.), modified, 431 So.2d 599 (Fla.1981); Vazquez v. State, 700 So.2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), rev. granted, 705 So.2d 902 (Fla.1998), cause dismissed, 718 So.2d 755 , (Fla. 1998) (citing State v. Bryan, 287 So.2d 73 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 912 , 94 S.Ct. 2611 , 41 L.Ed.2d 216

1993Warren v. State, 498 So.2d 472 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).

1990As the Florida Supreme Court has said, “The courts may not fix rates but will determine, on behalf of any aggrieved party, whether there has been a deviation from the standard of just and reasonable in fixing rates.” Cooksey v. Utilities Comm’n, 261 So.2d 129, 130 (Fla.1972) (footnote omitted); see City of Pompano Beach v. Oltman, 389 So.2d 283, 285-86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (class action), review denied, 399 So.2d 1144 (Fla.1981); Orlando Utilities Comm’n v. Rosalind Holding Co., 330 So.2d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); cf. Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So.2d 463 (Fla.1976) (challenge of water ra

1990As the Florida Supreme Court has said, “The courts may not fix rates but will determine, on behalf of any aggrieved party, whether there has been a deviation from the standard of just and reasonable in fixing rates.” Cooksey v. Utilities Comm’n, 261 So.2d 129, 130 (Fla.1972) (footnote omitted); see City of Pompano Beach v. Oltman, 389 So.2d 283, 285-86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (class action), review denied, 399 So.2d 1144 (Fla.1981); Orlando Utilities Comm’n v. Rosalind Holding Co., 330 So.2d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); cf. Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So.2d 463 (Fla.1976) (challenge of water ra

1989Testing, however, by the applicable abuse of discretion standard, see Rety v. Greene, 546 So.2d 410 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), the trial judge's conclusion that a deviation from this rule was in order and that a new trial was required, we cannot agree with that ruling.

1987Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701 (Fla.1978); De La Cova v. State, 355 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 361 So.2d 831 (Fla.1978); Page v. State, 412 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); 3 Fla.Jur.2d Appellate Review §§ 293, 300-301 (1978).

1987Because the number of examiners is merely a non-fundamental procedural matter — unlike, for example a total failure to determine competence by failing to secure any expert opinion whatever, Scott v. State, 420 So.2d 595 (Fla.1982)— we hold that the failure to bring the deviation from the rule to the trial court’s attention effected a waiver of the contention.

1987Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701 (Fla.1978); De La Cova v. State, 355 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 361 So.2d 831 (Fla.1978); Page v. State, 412 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); 3 Fla.Jur.2d Appellate Review §§ 293, 300-301 (1978).

1987Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701 (Fla.1978); De La Cova v. State, 355 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 361 So.2d 831 (Fla.1978); Page v. State, 412 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); 3 Fla.Jur.2d Appellate Review §§ 293, 300-301 (1978).

1984Appellant contends that notwithstanding the unenforceability of his agreement with Economic Research, Talisman could still be liable for tortious interference, because an agreement does not have to be enforceable in order for the party interfered with to have a cause of action against one who willfully or maliciously interferes with it, relying on cases such as Allen v. Leybourne, 190 So.2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), and Franklin v. Brown, 159 So.2d 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964).

1984Appellant contends that notwithstanding the unenforceability of his agreement with Economic Research, Talisman could still be liable for tortious interference, because an agreement does not have to be enforceable in order for the party interfered with to have a cause of action against one who willfully or maliciously interferes with it, relying on cases such as Allen v. Leybourne, 190 So.2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), and Franklin v. Brown, 159 So.2d 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964).