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26 Virginia opinions name it 8 courts 1976–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Raines v. Lutzgreen2 sentences2025Consequently, “expert testimony is ordinarily necessary to establish the appropriate standard of care, to establish a deviation from the standard, and to establish that such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages.” Webb v. Smith, 276 Va. 305, 308 (2008) (quoting Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110, 113 (1986)). 2023In Raines, the Supreme Court held, “expert testimony is ordinarily necessary to establish the appropriate standard of care, to establish a deviation from the standard, and to establish that such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages.” Id. at 113 (citations omitted). | 9 | 13 |
Beverly Enterprises-Virginia, Inc. v. Nicholsgreen2 sentences2024A plaintiff in a medical-malpractice action generally must present expert testimony to establish “the appropriate standard of care, a deviation from that standard, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of damages.” Mayr v. Osborne, 293 Va. 74, 82 (2017) (quoting Beverly Enters.-Va., Inc. v. Nichols, 247 Va. 264, 267 (1994)). 2024Rule 5A:8(a). -6- Generally, in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must present expert testimony to establish “the appropriate standard of care, a deviation from that standard, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of damages.” Mayr v. Osborne, 293 Va. 74, 82 (2017) (quoting Beverly Enters.-Va., Inc. v. Nichols, 247 Va. 264, 267 (1994)). | 5 | 6 |
Bly v. Rhoadsgreen2 sentences2008IV We have said that, in medical malpractice cases, "expert testimony is ordinarily necessary to establish the appropriate standard of care, to establish a deviation from the standard, and to establish that such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages." Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110 , 113, 341 S.E.2d 194 , 196 (1986); accord Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645 , 653, 222 S.E.2d 783 , 789 (1976). 2008IV We have said that, in medical malpractice cases, "expert testimony is ordinarily necessary to establish the appropriate standard of care, to establish a deviation from the standard, and to establish that such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages." Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110 , 113, 341 S.E.2d 194 , 196 (1986); accord Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645 , 653, 222 S.E.2d 783 , 789 (1976). | 4 | 7 |
Rogers v. Marrow by Marrowgreen2 sentences2024Affirmed. 5 In medical negligence cases, the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff and to meet that burden, Black was required to prove, through expert testimony, “the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard, proximate causation, and damages.” Rogers v. Marrow, 243 Va. 162, 167 (1992) (citation omitted). - 13 - 2008"In order to recover for medical negligence, the plaintiff ordinarily must prove through the use of expert testimony the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard, proximate causation, and damages." Rogers v. Marrow, 243 Va. 162 , 167, 413 S.E.2d 344 , 346 (1992) (emphasis added) (citing Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110 , 115, 341 S.E.2d 194 , 197 (1986)). | 4 | 5 |
Bitar v. Rahmangreen2 sentences2026Bitar v. Rahman, 272 Va. 130, 137-38 (2006). “[E]xpert testimony is ordinarily necessary to establish the appropriate standard of care, to establish a deviation from the standard, and to establish that such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages.” Perdieu v. Blackstone Fam. 2008Expert testimony is generally required to establish not only the appropriate standard of care and a deviation from the standard, but also "`that such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages.' " Perdieu v. Blackstone Family Practice Ctr., Inc., 264 Va. 408 , 420, 568 S.E.2d 703 , 710 (2002) (quoting Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110 , 113, 341 S.E.2d 194 , 196 (1986)); accord Bitar, 272 Va. at 138 , 630 S.E.2d at 323 . | 2 | 2 |
Mayr v. Osbornegreen2 sentences2024A plaintiff in a medical-malpractice action generally must present expert testimony to establish “the appropriate standard of care, a deviation from that standard, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of damages.” Mayr v. Osborne, 293 Va. 74, 82 (2017) (quoting Beverly Enters.-Va., Inc. v. Nichols, 247 Va. 264, 267 (1994)). 2024Rule 5A:8(a). -6- Generally, in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must present expert testimony to establish “the appropriate standard of care, a deviation from that standard, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of damages.” Mayr v. Osborne, 293 Va. 74, 82 (2017) (quoting Beverly Enters.-Va., Inc. v. Nichols, 247 Va. 264, 267 (1994)). | 2 | 2 |
Perdieu v. Blackstone Family Practice Center, Inc.green2 sentences2008Expert testimony is generally required to establish not only the appropriate standard of care and a deviation from the standard, but also "`that such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages.' " Perdieu v. Blackstone Family Practice Ctr., Inc., 264 Va. 408 , 420, 568 S.E.2d 703 , 710 (2002) (quoting Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110 , 113, 341 S.E.2d 194 , 196 (1986)); accord Bitar, 272 Va. at 138 , 630 S.E.2d at 323 . 2008Expert testimony is generally required to establish not only the appropriate standard of care and a deviation from the standard, but also "`that such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages.' " Perdieu v. Blackstone Family Practice Ctr., Inc., 264 Va. 408 , 420, 568 S.E.2d 703 , 710 (2002) (quoting Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110 , 113, 341 S.E.2d 194 , 196 (1986)); accord Bitar, 272 Va. at 138 , 630 S.E.2d at 323 . | 1 | 2 |
Little v. Crossgreen2 sentences1987Dr. Fulcher's motions are based upon the contention that the Plaintiff has failed to prove by expert testimony (1) the standard of care to be observed by the Defendant physician; (2) a deviation from that standard; (3) that such deviation was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries; and (4) the claimed injuries and/or damages as dictated by Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645 (1976); Little v. Cross, 217 Va. 71 (1976); and Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110 (1986). 1986Health care providers are required by law to possess and exercise only that degree of skill and diligence practiced by a reasonably prudent practitioner in the same field of practice or speciality in Virginia. 1 We have held that expert testimony is ordinarily necessary to establish the appropriate standard of care, to establish a deviation from the standard, and to establish that such a deviation, was the proximate cause of the claimed damages. 2 Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 653 , 222 S.E.2d 783, 789 (1976); see also Little v. Cross, 217 Va. 71, 75 , 225 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1976). | 1 | 2 |
Webb v. Smithgreen1 sentence2025Consequently, “expert testimony is ordinarily necessary to establish the appropriate standard of care, to establish a deviation from the standard, and to establish that such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages.” Webb v. Smith, 276 Va. 305, 308 (2008) (quoting Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110, 113 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Coston v. BIO-MEDICAL APPLICATIONS, INC.green2 sentences2008Exceptions to this rule exist only in "those rare cases in which a health care provider's act or omission is clearly negligent within the common knowledge of laymen." Raines, 231 Va. at 113 , n. 2 , 341 S.E.2d at 196 , n. 2 ; see, e.g., Coston v. Bio-Medical Applications of Va., Inc., 275 Va. 1 , 5, 654 S.E.2d 560 , 562 (2008) (plaintiff placed in defective chair by health care provider); Easterling v. Walton, 208 Va. 214 , 218, 156 S.E.2d 787 , 790-91 (1967) (foreign object left in patient's body by surgeon). 2008Exceptions to this rule exist only in "those rare cases in which a health care provider's act or omission is clearly negligent within the common knowledge of laymen." Raines, 231 Va. at 113 , n. 2 , 341 S.E.2d at 196 , n. 2 ; see, e.g., Coston v. Bio-Medical Applications of Va., Inc., 275 Va. 1 , 5, 654 S.E.2d 560 , 562 (2008) (plaintiff placed in defective chair by health care provider); Easterling v. Walton, 208 Va. 214 , 218, 156 S.E.2d 787 , 790-91 (1967) (foreign object left in patient's body by surgeon). | 1 | 1 |
Spruill v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2006To be admissible, such medical expert testimony must be rendered to a "reasonable degree of medical probability." Pettus v. Gottfried, 269 Va. 69 , 78, 606 S.E.2d 819 , 825 (2005); see also Spruill v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 475 , 479, 271 S.E.2d 419 , 421 (1980) ("[a] medical opinion based on a `possibility' is irrelevant, purely speculative and, hence inadmissible"). 2006To be admissible, such medical expert testimony must be rendered to a "reasonable degree of medical probability." Pettus v. Gottfried, 269 Va. 69 , 78, 606 S.E.2d 819 , 825 (2005); see also Spruill v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 475 , 479, 271 S.E.2d 419 , 421 (1980) ("[a] medical opinion based on a `possibility' is irrelevant, purely speculative and, hence inadmissible"). | 1 | 1 |
King v. Sowersgreen2 sentences2006In a medical malpractice action, "a plaintiff must establish not only that a defendant violated the applicable standard of care, and therefore was negligent, the plaintiff must also sustain the burden of showing that the negligent acts constituted a proximate cause of the injury or death." Bryan v. Burt, 254 Va. 28 , 34, 486 S.E.2d 536 , 539-40 (1997); see also King v. Sowers, 252 Va. 71 , 76, 471 S.E.2d 481 , 484 (1996) ("[t]he relevant issue ... is whether the treatment rendered violated the applicable standard of care and whether any such breach of the standard of care was a proximate cause 2006In a medical malpractice action, "a plaintiff must establish not only that a defendant violated the applicable standard of care, and therefore was negligent, the plaintiff must also sustain the burden of showing that the negligent acts constituted a proximate cause of the injury or death." Bryan v. Burt, 254 Va. 28 , 34, 486 S.E.2d 536 , 539-40 (1997); see also King v. Sowers, 252 Va. 71 , 76, 471 S.E.2d 481 , 484 (1996) ("[t]he relevant issue ... is whether the treatment rendered violated the applicable standard of care and whether any such breach of the standard of care was a proximate cause | 1 | 1 |
Nichols v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc.green2 sentences2004Health Plan, 257 Va. 491, 498 , 514 S.E.2d 608, 612 (1999). (noting expert testimony may not be necessarywhere act or omission was clearly negligent within common knowledge of layman). 2004Health Plan, 257 Va. 491, 498 , 514 S.E.2d 608, 612 (1999). (noting expert testimony may not be necessarywhere act or omission was clearly negligent within common knowledge of layman). | 1 | 1 |
Spainhour v. B. Aubrey Huffman & Associates., Ltd.green2 sentences1990Aubrey Huffman & Assoc., 237 Va. 340, 346 , 377 S.E.2d 615, 619 (1989) (surveyor’s duty to follow rule that monuments prevail over acreage measurements), expert testimony is required to establish the appropriate professional standard, to establish a deviation from that standard, and to establish that such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages. 1990Aubrey Huffman & Assoc., 237 Va. 340, 346 , 377 S.E.2d 615, 619 (1989) (surveyor’s duty to follow rule that monuments prevail over acreage measurements), expert testimony is required to establish the appropriate professional standard, to establish a deviation from that standard, and to establish that such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages. | 1 | 1 |
Virginia Railway & Power Co. v. Godseygreen2 sentences1976While arguably the trial court’s ruling is supported by precedent (see Virginia Railway and Power Co. v. Godsey, 117 Va. 167, 168-69 , 83 S.E. 1072, 1072-73 (1915)), we do not decide this issue. 1976While arguably the trial court’s ruling is supported by precedent (see Virginia Railway and Power Co. v. Godsey, 117 Va. 167, 168-69 , 83 S.E. 1072, 1072-73 (1915)), we do not decide this issue. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Seaward International, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse
green
2 sentences2016This expert testimony must "establish the appropriate professional standard, ... establish a deviation from that standard, and ... establish that such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages." Seaward Int'l, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 239 Va. 585 , 592, 391 S.E.2d 283 , 287 (1990). 2016This expert testimony must "establish the appropriate professional standard, ... establish a deviation from that standard, and ... establish that such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages." Seaward Int'l, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 239 Va. 585 , 592, 391 S.E.2d 283 , 287 (1990). | 2 | 2002–2016 |
Farmington Country Club, Inc. v. Marshall
green
1 sentence2024In a workers’ compensation case, by contrast, “[a] finding of causation need not be based exclusively on medical evidence, and [Miller was] not required to produce a physician’s medical opinion in order to establish causation.” Farmington Country Club, 47 Va. App. at 26 (citing Dollar Gen. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Allison v. Brown
green
1 sentence2022And as in any negligence case, the plaintiff “must prove not only that the physician was negligent but also ‘that the negligent act was a proximate cause of her injury.’” Allison, 293 Va. at 629 (quoting Tashman, 263 Va. at 76 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Tashman v. Gibbs
green
2 sentences2022Then, “once a plaintiff has met the burden of establishing the standard of care and a deviation from that standard, she may establish by lay testimony that her physician did not disclose certain information regarding risks, and that she had no knowledge of those risks.” Id. 2022And as in any negligence case, the plaintiff “must prove not only that the physician was negligent but also ‘that the negligent act was a proximate cause of her injury.’” Allison, 293 Va. at 629 (quoting Tashman, 263 Va. at 76 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Easterling v. Walton
green
2 sentences2008Exceptions to this rule exist only in "those rare cases in which a health care provider's act or omission is clearly negligent within the common knowledge of laymen." Raines, 231 Va. at 113 , n. 2 , 341 S.E.2d at 196 , n. 2 ; see, e.g., Coston v. Bio-Medical Applications of Va., Inc., 275 Va. 1 , 5, 654 S.E.2d 560 , 562 (2008) (plaintiff placed in defective chair by health care provider); Easterling v. Walton, 208 Va. 214 , 218, 156 S.E.2d 787 , 790-91 (1967) (foreign object left in patient's body by surgeon). 2008Exceptions to this rule exist only in "those rare cases in which a health care provider's act or omission is clearly negligent within the common knowledge of laymen." Raines, 231 Va. at 113 , n. 2 , 341 S.E.2d at 196 , n. 2 ; see, e.g., Coston v. Bio-Medical Applications of Va., Inc., 275 Va. 1 , 5, 654 S.E.2d 560 , 562 (2008) (plaintiff placed in defective chair by health care provider); Easterling v. Walton, 208 Va. 214 , 218, 156 S.E.2d 787 , 790-91 (1967) (foreign object left in patient's body by surgeon). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Pettus v. Gottfried
green
2 sentences2006To be admissible, such medical expert testimony must be rendered to a "reasonable degree of medical probability." Pettus v. Gottfried, 269 Va. 69 , 78, 606 S.E.2d 819 , 825 (2005); see also Spruill v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 475 , 479, 271 S.E.2d 419 , 421 (1980) ("[a] medical opinion based on a `possibility' is irrelevant, purely speculative and, hence inadmissible"). 2006To be admissible, such medical expert testimony must be rendered to a "reasonable degree of medical probability." Pettus v. Gottfried, 269 Va. 69 , 78, 606 S.E.2d 819 , 825 (2005); see also Spruill v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 475 , 479, 271 S.E.2d 419 , 421 (1980) ("[a] medical opinion based on a `possibility' is irrelevant, purely speculative and, hence inadmissible"). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Bryan v. Burt
green
2 sentences2006In a medical malpractice action, "a plaintiff must establish not only that a defendant violated the applicable standard of care, and therefore was negligent, the plaintiff must also sustain the burden of showing that the negligent acts constituted a proximate cause of the injury or death." Bryan v. Burt, 254 Va. 28 , 34, 486 S.E.2d 536 , 539-40 (1997); see also King v. Sowers, 252 Va. 71 , 76, 471 S.E.2d 481 , 484 (1996) ("[t]he relevant issue ... is whether the treatment rendered violated the applicable standard of care and whether any such breach of the standard of care was a proximate cause 2006In a medical malpractice action, "a plaintiff must establish not only that a defendant violated the applicable standard of care, and therefore was negligent, the plaintiff must also sustain the burden of showing that the negligent acts constituted a proximate cause of the injury or death." Bryan v. Burt, 254 Va. 28 , 34, 486 S.E.2d 536 , 539-40 (1997); see also King v. Sowers, 252 Va. 71 , 76, 471 S.E.2d 481 , 484 (1996) ("[t]he relevant issue ... is whether the treatment rendered violated the applicable standard of care and whether any such breach of the standard of care was a proximate cause | 1 | 2006–2006 |
MacK v. State
green
1 sentence2002Dickerson v. Fatehi, 253 Va. 324 , 484 S.E.2d 880 (1997), citing Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110 , 641 S.E.2d 194 (1986); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645 , 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Dickerson v. Fatehi
green
2 sentences2002Dickerson v. Fatehi, 253 Va. 324 , 484 S.E.2d 880 (1997), citing Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110 , 641 S.E.2d 194 (1986); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645 , 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976). 2002Dickerson v. Fatehi, 253 Va. 324 , 484 S.E.2d 880 (1997), citing Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110 , 641 S.E.2d 194 (1986); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645 , 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.