Mother motion in New Mexico

2025See Johnny S., Sr., 2009-NMCA-032, ¶ 10 (affirming the termination of parental rights based on a parent’s failure to preserve an ADA argument, and stating the parent’s failure to preserve the argument created shortcomings in the record such that the appellate court could not “undertake any analysis of the factual showing which might be required to demonstrate eligibility for ADA protection”); see also State v. Moore, 1989-NMCA-073 , ¶ 42, 109 N.M. 119 , 782 P.2d 91 (stating that this Court will deny motions to amend that raise issues that are not viable). {6} Mother also argues more generally

2009See State v. Moore, 109 13 N.M. 119 , 129, 782 P.2d 91, 101 (Ct. App. 1989), superceded by rule on other 14 grounds as recognized in State v. Salgado, 112 N.M. 537 , 817 P.2d 730 (Ct. App. 15 1991). 16 Therefore, for the reasons stated in this opinion and in the notice of proposed 17 summary disposition, we deny Mother’s motion to amend the docketing statement and 18 her motion to modify child support, and we affirm the district court’s order denying 19 her Rule 1-060(B) motion for relief from judgment. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 1 2 MICHAEL D.

2009See State v. Moore, 109 13 N.M. 119 , 129, 782 P.2d 91, 101 (Ct. App. 1989), superceded by rule on other 14 grounds as recognized in State v. Salgado, 112 N.M. 537 , 817 P.2d 730 (Ct. App. 15 1991). 16 Therefore, for the reasons stated in this opinion and in the notice of proposed 17 summary disposition, we deny Mother’s motion to amend the docketing statement and 18 her motion to modify child support, and we affirm the district court’s order denying 19 her Rule 1-060(B) motion for relief from judgment. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 1 2 MICHAEL D.

2009See State v. Moore, 109 13 N.M. 119 , 129, 782 P.2d 91, 101 (Ct. App. 1989), superceded by rule on other 14 grounds as recognized in State v. Salgado, 112 N.M. 537 , 817 P.2d 730 (Ct. App. 15 1991). 16 Therefore, for the reasons stated in this opinion and in the notice of proposed 17 summary disposition, we deny Mother’s motion to amend the docketing statement and 18 her motion to modify child support, and we affirm the district court’s order denying 19 her Rule 1-060(B) motion for relief from judgment. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 1 2 MICHAEL D.

2022See State v. Munoz, 1990-NMCA-109 , ¶ 19, 111 N.M. 118 , 802 P.2d 23 (denying a motion to amend a docketing statement where the issue sought to be raised was not viable). {3} Mother’s docketing statement asserted error in the inclusion of findings and conclusions regarding matters not related to the grounds for termination ultimately pursued by the Department. [DS PDF 8] Our notice of proposed disposition suggested that the inclusion of such findings and conclusions did not amount to reversible error, and Mother’s memorandum opposing that disposition does not address that proposal. [CN 2] Acco

2022See State v. Munoz, 1990-NMCA-109 , ¶ 19, 111 N.M. 118 , 802 P.2d 23 (denying a motion to amend a docketing statement where the issue sought to be raised was not viable). {3} Mother’s docketing statement asserted error in the inclusion of findings and conclusions regarding matters not related to the grounds for termination ultimately pursued by the Department. [DS PDF 8] Our notice of proposed disposition suggested that the inclusion of such findings and conclusions did not amount to reversible error, and Mother’s memorandum opposing that disposition does not address that proposal. [CN 2] Acco

2016See Lorena R., 1999-NMCA-035, ¶ 25 (stating that parents have a due process right to participate meaningfully in termination of parental rights cases, including the right to review and challenge the evidence presented against them).

2016See Lorena R., 1999-NMCA-035, ¶ 25 (stating that parents have a due process right to participate meaningfully in termination of parental rights cases, including the right to review and challenge the evidence presented against them).

2023Mother’s memorandum “questions whether CYFD met its burden of investigating the suitability of family members for placement/guardianship/adoption” [MIO 15], but fails to respond to the specific concerns identified in our calendar notice regarding this issue, including the absence of relevant facts and the failure to explain Mother’s claim of error given the circumstances of this case, where some Children were placed in relative foster care. [CN 9] See Hennessy, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24 ; Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10; see also Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100 , ¶ 8, 1

2022See Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24 , 124 N.M. 754 , 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”); State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that a party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact, and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013

2025See Johnny S., Sr., 2009-NMCA-032, ¶ 10 (affirming the termination of parental rights based on a parent’s failure to preserve an ADA argument, and stating the parent’s failure to preserve the argument created shortcomings in the record such that the appellate court could not “undertake any analysis of the factual showing which might be required to demonstrate eligibility for ADA protection”); see also State v. Moore, 1989-NMCA-073 , ¶ 42, 109 N.M. 119 , 782 P.2d 91 (stating that this Court will deny motions to amend that raise issues that are not viable). {6} Mother also argues more generally

2025See State v. Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003, ¶ 5 , 149 N.M. 185 , 246 P.3d 1057 (observing that New Mexico appellate courts will not invade the province of the fact-finder’s decision concerning the credibility of witnesses). {27} We conclude the district court’s findings were not based on speculation and the evidence was sufficient to show Mother failed to obtain safe and stable housing for Child and obtain employment sufficient to provide for herself and Child.

2025See State v. Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003, ¶ 5 , 149 N.M. 185 , 246 P.3d 1057 (observing that New Mexico appellate courts will not invade the province of the fact-finder’s decision concerning the credibility of witnesses). {27} We conclude the district court’s findings were not based on speculation and the evidence was sufficient to show Mother failed to obtain safe and stable housing for Child and obtain employment sufficient to provide for herself and Child.

2025See generally State v. Vigil-Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, ¶ 60 , 327 P.3d 1129 (recognizing that where a party does not cite to authority to support a proposition, appellate courts assume no such authority exists). {9} Defendant also asserts that “the misdemeanor bargain offered to [Mother] indicated that the State viewed the evidence as insufficient to prove reckless child abuse by either party.” [BIC 9] We disagree.

2023Mother’s memorandum “questions whether CYFD met its burden of investigating the suitability of family members for placement/guardianship/adoption” [MIO 15], but fails to respond to the specific concerns identified in our calendar notice regarding this issue, including the absence of relevant facts and the failure to explain Mother’s claim of error given the circumstances of this case, where some Children were placed in relative foster care. [CN 9] See Hennessy, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24 ; Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10; see also Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100 , ¶ 8, 1

2023Mother’s memorandum “questions whether CYFD met its burden of investigating the suitability of family members for placement/guardianship/adoption” [MIO 15], but fails to respond to the specific concerns identified in our calendar notice regarding this issue, including the absence of relevant facts and the failure to explain Mother’s claim of error given the circumstances of this case, where some Children were placed in relative foster care. [CN 9] See Hennessy, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24 ; Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10; see also Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100 , ¶ 8, 1

2021See Browind C., 2007-NMCA-023, ¶ 31 (requiring a respondent parent to “show that there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome might have been different” had additional procedural safeguards been provided (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). {28} Because our own review of the record demonstrates that the eighteen-month period of time that allegedly violated statutory deadlines benefitted Mother’s defense in certain ways—creating additional time for her to fully comply with her treatment plan and allowing time for further attempts to reestablish visitation with Child

2021See State v. Anthony L., 2019-NMCA-003, ¶ 17 , 433 P.3d 347 (noting that the state’s concession is not binding on appeal).

2021See State v. Anthony L., 2019-NMCA-003, ¶ 17 , 433 P.3d 347 (noting that the state’s concession is not binding on appeal).

2019Patricia H., 2002-NMCA-061, ¶ 28 (noting that “our job is not to determine whether CYFD did everything possible; our task is limited by our statutory scope of review to whether CYFD complied with the minimum required under law”). 3.

2019In Patricia H., this Court noted that “states are not required to make reunification efforts for an indefinite period of time” and concluded that “[t]he fifteen-month period described in [the Adoption and Safe Families Act] for time-limited reunification services provides us some guidance in how we assess the duration of reasonable efforts under state law.” 2002-NMCA-061, ¶ 26 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2016See In re Estate of Heeter, 1992-NMCA-032 , ¶ 23, 113 N.M. 691 , 831 13 P.2d 990 (“On appeal, error will not be corrected if it will not change the result.”); 14 Hartman v. Texaco Inc., 1997-NMCA-032 , ¶ 25 n. 4, 123 N.M. 220 , 937 P.2d 979 15 (holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice, and that in the 16 absence of prejudice, there is no reversible error); State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-027 , 17 ¶ 30, 284 P.3d 1076 (recognizing that in the absence of demonstrating harm done by 18 alleged errors, there is no due process violation). 19 {6} For the reasons set forth above

2016See In re Estate of Heeter, 1992-NMCA-032 , ¶ 23, 113 N.M. 691 , 831 13 P.2d 990 (“On appeal, error will not be corrected if it will not change the result.”); 14 Hartman v. Texaco Inc., 1997-NMCA-032 , ¶ 25 n. 4, 123 N.M. 220 , 937 P.2d 979 15 (holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice, and that in the 16 absence of prejudice, there is no reversible error); State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-027 , 17 ¶ 30, 284 P.3d 1076 (recognizing that in the absence of demonstrating harm done by 18 alleged errors, there is no due process violation). 19 {6} For the reasons set forth above

2016See In re Estate of Heeter, 1992-NMCA-032 , ¶ 23, 113 N.M. 691 , 831 13 P.2d 990 (“On appeal, error will not be corrected if it will not change the result.”); 14 Hartman v. Texaco Inc., 1997-NMCA-032 , ¶ 25 n. 4, 123 N.M. 220 , 937 P.2d 979 15 (holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice, and that in the 16 absence of prejudice, there is no reversible error); State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-027 , 17 ¶ 30, 284 P.3d 1076 (recognizing that in the absence of demonstrating harm done by 18 alleged errors, there is no due process violation). 19 {6} For the reasons set forth above

2013See State v. Trujillo, 2009- 2 1 NMCA-128, ¶¶ 9, 11, 147 N.M. 334 , 222 P.3d 1040 (stating that “[w]e review a 2 denial of a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion” and that “[r]ecusal is only 3 required when a judge has become so embroiled in the controversy that he or she 4 cannot fairly and objectively hear the case” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and 5 citation omitted)). 6 {3} In her memorandum in opposition, Mother argues that Judge McElroy was 7 required to recuse himself because his ex parte communications “were neither 8 administrative or inadvertent.” [MIO 1] Mother reli

2013See State v. Trujillo, 2009- 2 1 NMCA-128, ¶¶ 9, 11, 147 N.M. 334 , 222 P.3d 1040 (stating that “[w]e review a 2 denial of a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion” and that “[r]ecusal is only 3 required when a judge has become so embroiled in the controversy that he or she 4 cannot fairly and objectively hear the case” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and 5 citation omitted)). 6 {3} In her memorandum in opposition, Mother argues that Judge McElroy was 7 required to recuse himself because his ex parte communications “were neither 8 administrative or inadvertent.” [MIO 1] Mother reli

2013See State v. Trujillo, 2009- 2 1 NMCA-128, ¶¶ 9, 11, 147 N.M. 334 , 222 P.3d 1040 (stating that “[w]e review a 2 denial of a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion” and that “[r]ecusal is only 3 required when a judge has become so embroiled in the controversy that he or she 4 cannot fairly and objectively hear the case” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and 5 citation omitted)). 6 {3} In her memorandum in opposition, Mother argues that Judge McElroy was 7 required to recuse himself because his ex parte communications “were neither 8 administrative or inadvertent.” [MIO 1] Mother reli

2013See State v. Trujillo, 2009- 2 1 NMCA-128, ¶¶ 9, 11, 147 N.M. 334 , 222 P.3d 1040 (stating that “[w]e review a 2 denial of a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion” and that “[r]ecusal is only 3 required when a judge has become so embroiled in the controversy that he or she 4 cannot fairly and objectively hear the case” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and 5 citation omitted)). 6 {3} In her memorandum in opposition, Mother argues that Judge McElroy was 7 required to recuse himself because his ex parte communications “were neither 8 administrative or inadvertent.” [MIO 1] Mother reli