Mother challenge in Georgia

2015Notwithstanding, we are persuaded that the evidence showed that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child, considering the child’s physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and “need for a secure and stable home.”57 55 In the Interest of A. E., 314 Ga. App. 206, 209 (2) (c) ( 723 SE2d 499 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). 56 In the Interest of D.

2015Notwithstanding, we are persuaded that the evidence showed that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child, considering the child’s physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and “need for a secure and stable home.”57 55 In the Interest of A. E., 314 Ga. App. 206, 209 (2) (c) ( 723 SE2d 499 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). 56 In the Interest of D.

2026“Failure to 1 See Froehlich v. Froehlich, 297 Ga. 551, 554 (2) ( 775 SE2d 534 ) (2015) (acknowledging that for purposes of appellate procedure, visitation is treated as an aspect of child custody). file an application when one is necessary requires that the appeal be dismissed.” Evans v. Jackson, 368 Ga. App. 170 , 173(1) ( 889 SE2d 343 ) (2023) (quotation marks omitted).

2026“Failure to 1 See Froehlich v. Froehlich, 297 Ga. 551, 554 (2) ( 775 SE2d 534 ) (2015) (acknowledging that for purposes of appellate procedure, visitation is treated as an aspect of child custody). file an application when one is necessary requires that the appeal be dismissed.” Evans v. Jackson, 368 Ga. App. 170 , 173(1) ( 889 SE2d 343 ) (2023) (quotation marks omitted).

2024Pretermitting whether the evaluation was protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the mother failed to raise this argument in the juvenile court. “[B]ecause [the mother] did not assert privilege as a ground for [her] 11 objection below . . . we cannot consider this argument for the first time on appeal.” Thomas v. State, 224 Ga. App. 816, 818-819 (6) ( 482 SE2d 472 ) (1997) (attorney-client privilege).

2024Pretermitting whether the evaluation was protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the mother failed to raise this argument in the juvenile court. “[B]ecause [the mother] did not assert privilege as a ground for [her] 11 objection below . . . we cannot consider this argument for the first time on appeal.” Thomas v. State, 224 Ga. App. 816, 818-819 (6) ( 482 SE2d 472 ) (1997) (attorney-client privilege).

2019(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Viskup, 291 Ga. at 105 (2) (“[t]he evidence sufficient to warrant a modification of custody can consist of a change in material conditions which have a positive effect on the child’s welfare as well as changes which adversely affect the child”); Weickert v. Weickert, 268 Ga. App. 624, 627 (1) ( 602 SE2d 337 ) (2004) (a trial court is not required to find a material change for the worse to modify custody). (b) Although we find the evidence supports the award of primary physical custody of F. W. to the father, we find it necessary to vacate and remand the cust

2019(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Viskup, 291 Ga. at 105 (2) (“[t]he evidence sufficient to warrant a modification of custody can consist of a change in material conditions which have a positive effect on the child’s welfare as well as changes which adversely affect the child”); Weickert v. Weickert, 268 Ga. App. 624, 627 (1) ( 602 SE2d 337 ) (2004) (a trial court is not required to find a material change for the worse to modify custody). (b) Although we find the evidence supports the award of primary physical custody of F. W. to the father, we find it necessary to vacate and remand the cust

2019(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Viskup, 291 Ga. at 105 (2) (“[t]he evidence sufficient to warrant a modification of custody can consist of a change in material conditions which have a positive effect on the child’s welfare as well as changes which adversely affect the child”); Weickert v. Weickert, 268 Ga. App. 624, 627 (1) ( 602 SE2d 337 ) (2004) (a trial court is not required to find a material change for the worse to modify custody). (b) Although we find the evidence supports the award of primary physical custody of F. W. to the father, we find it necessary to vacate and remand the cust

2014See Triola, 292 Ga. at 808-809 (reversal and remand required where the trial court denied a motion for new trial without holding the mandatory hearing and did not issue an order excepting the motion from the procedural requirement); Kuriatnyk, 286 Ga. at 592 (2) (same).

2014See Triola, 292 Ga. at 808-809 (reversal and remand required where the trial court denied a motion for new trial without holding the mandatory hearing and did not issue an order excepting the motion from the procedural requirement); Kuriatnyk, 286 Ga. at 592 (2) (same).

1986Nevertheless, “[t]he fact that a divorce decree has been entered placing custody of minor children in the mother will not bar a prosecution for abandonment on the theory the defendant cannot ‘abandon’ children whose custody has been taken from him by process of law.” Dyer v. State, 87 Ga. App. 440 (2) ( 74 SE2d 129 ) (1953); Barrow v. State, 87 Ga. App. 572, 573 ( 74 SE2d 467 ) (1953).

1986Nevertheless, “[t]he fact that a divorce decree has been entered placing custody of minor children in the mother will not bar a prosecution for abandonment on the theory the defendant cannot ‘abandon’ children whose custody has been taken from him by process of law.” Dyer v. State, 87 Ga. App. 440 (2) ( 74 SE2d 129 ) (1953); Barrow v. State, 87 Ga. App. 572, 573 ( 74 SE2d 467 ) (1953).