Mother motion in Texas

2026“To affirm a termination judgment on appeal, a court need uphold only one termination ground—in addition to upholding a challenged best interest finding—even if the trial court based the termination on more than one ground.” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019); see also In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (stating one predicate finding under Section 161.001(b)(1) “is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest”).

2022Because a finding of only one of the grounds alleged under Section 161.001(b)(1) is sufficient to support termination, A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362 , we need not reach Mother’s issue regarding termination under Subsection (O).

2026See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 , 237 & n.1 (Tex. 2019); TEX.

2026“To affirm a termination judgment on appeal, a court need uphold only one termination ground—in addition to upholding a challenged best interest finding—even if the trial court based the termination on more than one ground.” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019); see also In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (stating one predicate finding under Section 161.001(b)(1) “is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest”).

2024See In re D.N.C., 252 S.W.3d 317, 318-19 (Tex. 2008).

2019See In re D.N.C., 252 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tex. 2008).

2024Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018).

2022Best-Interest Factors Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018).

2024See, e.g., In re P.W., 579 S.W.3d at 728 . 4 We overrule Mother’s first two issues.

2023See, e.g., In re P.W., 579 S.W.3d 713, 728 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).

2021The court of appeals here should have considered the merits of Mother’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington.6 See M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545 (adopting the well-established Strickland standard from the criminal law).

2020As to the Status Hearing Order, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion by admitting that order. 15 A comment on the weight of the evidence may take many forms, but the Supreme Court of Texas specifically prohibits “judicial comments that indicate the opinion of the trial judge as to the verity or accuracy of the facts in inquiry.” M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 538 (emphasis added) (quoting McDonald Transit, Inc. v. Moore, 565 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex. 1978)); see also In re Commitment of Shelton, No. 02-19- 15 Mother’s motion for mistrial was based solely on the caseworker’s testimony be

2018See Fletcher v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Services, 277 S.W.3d 58, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (when an appellant does not challenge an independent ground that may support the judgment that appellant seeks to reverse, this court must overrule the challenges that the appellant has chosen to assert).

2018See Fletcher v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Services, 277 S.W.3d 58, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (when an appellant does not challenge an independent ground that may support the judgment that appellant seeks to reverse, this court must overrule the challenges that the appellant has chosen to assert).

2025We similarly conclude that the disputed evidence, namely, Mother’s claim that M.N.R. was coached into accusing V.G. of physical abuse, is not so significant that the trial court could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest. - 15 - 04-24-00880-CV See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 .

2023Therefore, we only address Mother’s issue under section 161.001(2). –7– of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.” Id.

2022Given the relatively short duration of Mother’s claim of sobriety when compared to Mother’s history of drug abuse, her admitted addiction, and the lack of evidence that Mother successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program, the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that 25 Mother’s use of illegal substances was a condition that endangered Sara and that it justified granting the Department’s request to terminate Mother’s parental rights. 27 We conclude the evidence allowed the trial court, acting reasonably, to form a firm conviction or belief that Mother’s

2021When viewed as a whole, the evidence shows the trial court, acting reasonably, could form a firm belief or conviction that Mother has an ongoing and severe substance abuse problem connected to meth. 30 The trial court also could 29 See Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 253-54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (upholding termination based on parent’s continued use of drugs). 30 See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346 . 11 reasonably reject Mother’s claim that she had acquired the skills she needed to control her desire to use the drug. 31 We

2025Id.

2024Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018).

2013We conclude that these facts provided the trial court with a reasonable basis for denying Mother’s motion and that the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying the 14 motion.14 Z.C., 280 S.W.3d at 478 .

2013We conclude that these facts provided the trial court with a reasonable basis for denying Mother’s motion and that the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. [14] Z.C. , 280 S.W.3d at 478 .

2026Once we overrule a parent’s challenge to an order terminating her parental rights, the trial court’s appointment of the Department or another person as the child’s sole managing conservator may be considered a 60 “consequence of the termination.” In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 92 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); see also In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at 856 . 8 Because we have overruled Mother’s challenge to the portion of the trial court’s decree terminating her parental rights to Jack, John, and Mark, the decree divested Mother of her legal rights and duties to these children.

2026Once we overrule a parent’s challenge to an order terminating her parental rights, the trial court’s appointment of the Department or another person as the child’s sole managing conservator may be considered a 60 “consequence of the termination.” In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 92 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); see also In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at 856 .8 Because we have overruled Mother’s challenge to the portion of the trial court’s decree terminating her parental rights to Jack, John, and Mark, the decree divested Mother of her legal rights and duties to these children.

2026Once we overrule a parent’s challenge to an order terminating her parental rights, the trial court’s appointment of the Department or another person as the child’s sole managing conservator may be considered a 60 “consequence of the termination.” In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 92 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); see also In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at 856 . 8 Because we have overruled Mother’s challenge to the portion of the trial court’s decree terminating her parental rights to Jack, John, and Mark, the decree divested Mother of her legal rights and duties to these children.

2026Once we overrule a parent’s challenge to an order terminating her parental rights, the trial court’s appointment of the Department or another person as the child’s sole managing conservator may be considered a 60 “consequence of the termination.” In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 92 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); see also In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at 856 .8 Because we have overruled Mother’s challenge to the portion of the trial court’s decree terminating her parental rights to Jack, John, and Mark, the decree divested Mother of her legal rights and duties to these children.

2025See In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Tex. 2014) (“[C]lear and convincing proof of any one ground will support a judgment terminating parental rights, if similar proof also exists that termination is in the child’s best interest.”); see In re J.M.H., No. 01-15-00734-CV, 2015 WL 8929569 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 15, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (declining to review challenged predicate finding when parent did not challenge all predicate findings on appeal); Toliver v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 217 S.W.3d 85, 102 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (same

2015See Toliver v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 217 S.W.3d 85, 102 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding that court did not need to address sufficiency argument regarding one ground for termination when appellant failed to challenge three other section 161.001(1) grounds).

2025BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002).

2020See BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002).

2025See In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Tex. 2014) (“[C]lear and convincing proof of any one ground will support a judgment terminating parental rights, if similar proof also exists that termination is in the child’s best interest.”); see In re J.M.H., No. 01-15-00734-CV, 2015 WL 8929569 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 15, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (declining to review challenged predicate finding when parent did not challenge all predicate findings on appeal); Toliver v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 217 S.W.3d 85, 102 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (same

2015The trial court found that both statutory grounds supported termination of the mother’s parental rights. “[C]lear and convincing proof of any one ground will support a judgment terminating parental rights, if similar proof also exists that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Tex. 2014); see TEX.

2024See First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214 , 221–22 (Tex. 2017) (providing that appellate courts are to construe briefing “reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appellate review is not lost by waiver”) (quoting Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008)). 18 producing an environment that threatens the child’s well-being.

2018See id.; see also Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (“Simply stated, appellate courts should reach the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably possible.”). 5 On other issues within Mother’s brief that we do not reach, she cites no authority to support her arguments. 11 Second, the Grandparents contend that Mother’s argument asserts a defense of “condition precedent” and that she waived the defense by failing to request a finding on it.

2024Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982).

2013See, e.g ., Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982) (recognizing that trial court’s order modifying conservatorship is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard); In re M.N.G ., 113 S.W.3d 27, 32 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (same). [6] Mother’s motion for continuance is titled “Motion for Continuance of 12/17/10 Nonjury Trial Setting,” showing that Mother understood the case was to be tried without a jury. [7] Moreover, the trial court stated on the record its reasons for determining that the 2009 judgment was the final judgment.

2024However, as this Court has previously explained, because we have overruled Mother’s challenge to the termination of her parental rights, “the trial court’s appointment of the Department as sole managing conservator may be considered a –14– ‘consequence of the termination pursuant to Family Code section 161.207.’” In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 481 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.) (citations omitted); see also TEX.

2023As we have explained previously, In the case before us, “we have overruled appellant’s challenge to the termination, and the trial court’s appointment of the Department as sole managing conservator may be considered a ‘consequence of the termination pursuant to Family Code section 161.207.’” Further, Mother “provides no authority for the proposition that she is a ‘suitable, competent adult’ as contemplated by section 161.207(a) or that the presumption in section 153.131(a) applies to a parent whose parental rights have been terminated under Chapter 161.” Accordingly, Mother’s challenge to the

2023See In re B.R., 456 S.W.3d 612, 618 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.) (declining to modify conservatorship finding when reversing termination of parental rights); see also In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex. 2007) (explaining procedure to be followed by a parent, the - 19 - 04-23-00519-CV Department, and the trial court when a judgment terminating parental rights is reversed by the court of appeals but the Department’s conservatorship is affirmed).

2017See id.

2023See id.; see also In re A.K.M., No. 02-12-00469-CV, 2013 WL 6564267 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 12, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (court of appeals declined to dismiss appeal that was filed after signing of temporary orders, before final order was signed, because subject matter of temporary and final orders was virtually identical, noting that supreme court “has cautioned on several occasions that appellate courts should not dismiss an appeal for a procedural defect when any arguable interpretation of the rules of appellate procedure would preserve the appeal”). 4 Parental rights are “essen

2020Sufficient Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Best-Interest Determination A. Standard of Review “The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions.” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985).

2023The trial court overruled Mother’s objection to the instruction and denied Mother’s request to insert the additional language into the instruction. 16 On appeal, Mother cites Texas Department of Human Services v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987), as support for her position that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her requested instruction.

2021As the factfinder, the trial court could have rejected Mother’s claim she was scared of what Terry would do to her and her evidence claiming she 26 See Texas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). 27 See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). 28 In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). 12 did not know that Terry engaged in the various acts of abuse the Department proved when it presented its evidence in the trial.

2023See In re A.L.H., 515 S.W.3d at 81 n.5 (noting that judicial 3 See also In re J.C.P., No. 14-21-00415-CV, 2022 WL 10227942 , at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Father’s allegation of a change of circumstances in his petition to modify constitutes a judicial admission of that same essential element in Mother’s claim for modification of the parent-child relationship even though the parties did not request the same relief.”); In re L.C.L., 396 S.W.3d 712 , 718–19 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (holding that mother’s allegation of material and substantia

2023See In re A.L.H., 515 S.W.3d at 81 n.5 (noting that judicial 3 See also In re J.C.P., No. 14-21-00415-CV, 2022 WL 10227942 , at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Father’s allegation of a change of circumstances in his petition to modify constitutes a judicial admission of that same essential element in Mother’s claim for modification of the parent-child relationship even though the parties did not request the same relief.”); In re L.C.L., 396 S.W.3d 712 , 718–19 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (holding that mother’s allegation of material and substantia

2021See J.R., 171 S.W.3d at 569 .

2007See In re J.A.J., 2006 WL 2291175 , at *1; In re J.R., 171 S.W.3d at 579 .

2024See 386 U.S. at 744 ; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regul.

2020Code Ann. § 161.001 (b)(1)(O), (b)(2), (d) (Supp.). 2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). 1 We conclude Mother’s brief complies with the requirements applicable to Anders briefs.

2024The Court held that despite the lack of proper service, the mother could not challenge the termination judgment if she had actual notice of the judgment, showed an intention to treat the judgment as valid, and “granting relief would impair another person’s substantial interest of reliance on the judgment.” Id. at 567 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 30 JUDGMENTS § 66 (1982)).

2018See In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 563, 566 (Tex. 2012) (noting that “if service was invalid, a party is entitled to a new trial without showing good cause” and that “[a] complete failure of service deprives a litigant of due process and a trial court of personal jurisdiction; the resulting judgment is void and may be challenged at any time”). /s/ Wade Birdwell WADE BIRDWELL JUSTICE MEIER and GABRIEL, JJ., join.

2023See O’Neal v. Dale, No. 02- 20-00173-CV, 2021 WL 210848 , at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)).

2015Mother attempts to distinguish the facts of this case from the case cited by Aunt and Uncle in their response to her petition for writ of mandamus, (Garza v. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs., 757 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App.—San Anto- nio 1988, writ denied)) and the case referred to by Respondent during the hearing on Mother’s motion to transfer (Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)) to support her claim that the evidence did not support a manipulation finding.