Mother brief in Pennsylvania

2022“Where the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ____________________________________________ 2In this disposition, we identify Mother’s brief relating to C.M.M. as “Mother's Brief I” and A.S.C. as “Mother’s Brief II.” - 11 - ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580 , 591 (Pa. 2021). “[A]n abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion” or “the facts could support an opposite result.”

2020Mother’s brief at 3.7 In matters involving the involuntary termination of parental rights, our standard of review is as follows: The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012).

2026See M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465 ; see also In re A.C., 991 A.2d at 897 ; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). -7- Even if Mother’s claim was not waived, we conclude that she is not entitled to relief.

2018In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. - 19 - J-S75013-17 Super. 2017); Mother’s brief does neither.

2026See P.Z., supra; T.S.M., supra. Mother’s challenge to Section 2511(a)(2) merits no relief.

2025See T.S.M., supra. Mother’s challenge to Section 2511(b) merits no relief. - 22 - Mother addresses her final two issues together in her brief.

2023See In the Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (holding that an appeal from a goal change order is moot when this Court affirms a decree involuntarily terminating parental rights). ____________________________________________ 5 Even if Mother had preserved a challenge to the adequacy of second counsel’s representation, we would conclude that Mother’s issue merits no relief.

2021See In the Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citing In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa.Super. 2002)) (“[E]ven if Father had not waived his goal change claim, it would be moot in light of our decision to affirm the court’s termination decrees.”). - 23 - Nevertheless, even if not moot, upon independent analysis, Mother’s claim as to the goal change would likewise be frivolous and without merit.

2018See In re Z.P., supra; In re N.C., supra. Thus, Mother’s claim of error in this regard fails.

2018We further agree with the trial court that Mother’s request that Child be evaluated by a professional to analyze the bond between her and Mother is unwarranted, especially in light of the fact that “the lack of contact between Mother and Child has resulted in the dissolution of any bond that might have ever existed.” (Trial court opinion, 12/5/17 at 6; see also Mother’s brief at 21-22.) This court has continually recognized that “Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted). “[I]n cases - 13 - J.

2025See Int. of M.E., 283 A.3d at 830. - 14 - 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

2025See Int. of M.E., 283 A.3d at 830. - 18 - n]eutral observers confirmed that [Children] benefit from their bond with [Mother].” Id. at 19.

2020See Krebs v. United Refining Co., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa.Super. 2006) (stating that a failure to preserve issues by raising them both in the concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved portion of the brief on appeal results in a waiver of those issues). -5- abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id.

2020See Krebs v. United Refining Co., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa.Super. 2006) (stating that a failure to preserve issues by raising them both in the concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved portion of the brief on appeal results in a waiver of those issues). -5- abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id.

2005We may not interfere with the trial court’s factual conclusions unless they are unreasonable in light of the factual findings, and thus represent a “gross abuse of discretion.” 1 Robinson v. Robinson, 538 Pa. 52, 56 , 645 A.2d 836, 837-38 (1994); Jackson, supra at 1252 (quoting Luminella v. Marcocci, 814 A.2d 711, 716 (Pa.Super., 2002)); Graham v. Graham, 794 A.2d 912 , 914—15 (Pa.Super.2002) (quoting Vineski v. Vineski, 675 A.2d 722, 723 (Pa.Super.1996)); S.M. v. J.M., 811 A.2d 621, 623 (Pa.Super.2002.) Johns v. Cioci, 865 A.2d 931, 936 (Pa.Super.2004). ¶ 7 We find merit in Mother’s claim tha

2005We may not interfere with the trial court’s factual conclusions unless they are unreasonable in light of the factual findings, and thus represent a “gross abuse of discretion.” 1 Robinson v. Robinson, 538 Pa. 52, 56 , 645 A.2d 836, 837-38 (1994); Jackson, supra at 1252 (quoting Luminella v. Marcocci, 814 A.2d 711, 716 (Pa.Super., 2002)); Graham v. Graham, 794 A.2d 912 , 914—15 (Pa.Super.2002) (quoting Vineski v. Vineski, 675 A.2d 722, 723 (Pa.Super.1996)); S.M. v. J.M., 811 A.2d 621, 623 (Pa.Super.2002.) Johns v. Cioci, 865 A.2d 931, 936 (Pa.Super.2004). ¶ 7 We find merit in Mother’s claim tha

2026Further, Mother does not direct any argument to that portion of the analysis regarding her own conduct as the parent; instead, Mother’s challenge is based on an analysis regarding Child’s needs and welfare and the alleged bond she shares with -7- Child.4 See R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 508 .

2022Moreover, despite Mother’s plea that she has changed, “[t]his Court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

2026See A.H., 247 A.3d at 446 (citation omitted).

2026Overall, “[p]arents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d at 443 . - 12 - Mother contends that the “record does not establish, by clear and convincing evidence, . . . that incapacity would not be remedied[.]” Mother’s brief at 4.

2024To satisfy Section 2511(a)(1), the petitioner “must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental duties.” See In re Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d 700, 706-07 (Pa. Super. -9- 2021) (citation omitted); see also In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998) (“Section 2511[(a)(1)] does not require that the parent demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim t

2019Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P 2116, this Court may disregard issues that are not identified in the statement of questions presented.3 However, in an abundance of caution, and mindful of the three-step review outlined in In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., supra, we address Mother’s claim insofar as it implicates D.M.L.’s bests interests. ____________________________________________ 3 Rule 2116 provides, “[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). -9- In deciding In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super.

2025See Int. of A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1272-73 (Pa.Super. 2021) (finding issues regarding goal change moot in light of termination of parental rights).

2024See Interest of A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1272-73 (Pa. Super. 2021) (finding issues regarding goal change are moot once parental rights are terminated).

2024To satisfy Section 2511(a)(1), the petitioner “must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental duties.” See In re Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d 700, 706-07 (Pa. Super. -9- 2021) (citation omitted); see also In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998) (“Section 2511[(a)(1)] does not require that the parent demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim t

2024To satisfy Section 2511(a)(1), the petitioner “must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental duties.” See In re Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d 700, 706-07 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted); see also In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998) (“Section 2511[(a)(1)] does not require that the parent demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a

2022See Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc) (noting that an appellate court may only consider that which is in the certified record).

2018See Commonwealth v. Preston , 904 A.2d 1 , 6 (Pa.Super. 2006) ( en banc ) (noting that an appellate court may only consider that which is in the certified record). *1125 Turning now to Father's issues on appeal, with his first issue, Father argues that the trial court erred in not interviewing Child with regard to flying as an unaccompanied minor.

2020See Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908 , 912 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2002) (“[A]n issue identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant’s brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived.”); see also Mother’s brief at 4, 5. -2- informed D.N.G.’s school counselor that D.N.G. had been truant due to transportation issues from the shelter where the family was residing.

2020See Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908 , 912 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2002) (“[A]n issue identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant’s brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived.”); see also Mother’s brief at 4, 5. -2- informed D.N.G.’s school counselor that D.N.G. had been truant due to transportation issues from the shelter where the family was residing.

2025See A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1170-71; see also Sanders, 312 A.2d at 417.

2025See A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1166-67; see G.W., 342 A.3d at 94 n.21.

2025See S.P., 313 A.3d 156 (unpublished memorandum at 7) (holding Judge Menges “properly imposed non-punitive sanctions against Mother… due to Mother’s intentional, obstructionist actions.” (emphasis added)); Gross, supra; Luminella, supra; see also Godfrey v. Godfrey, 894 A.2d 776, 783 (Pa. Super. 2006) (concluding the evidence of record supported the trial court’s holding father/appellant in civil contempt, where father willfully violated a child support order by never complying with the order and accumulating substantial arrearages).

2025When determining whether a party acted with wrongful intent to support a finding of contempt, the trial court “should use common sense and consider context[;] wrongful intent can be imputed to a defendant by virtue of the substantial certainty that his actions will violate the court order.” Gross v. Mitz, 284 A.3d 479, 493 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). -7- Here, Mother’s claim that she did not willfully violate the court order because she acted in the best interests of her children has already been rejected by this Court.

2008“Finally, we note that ‘[o]n issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, appellate courts must defer to the findings of the trial judge who has had the opportunity to observe the proceedings and the demeanor of the witnesses.’ ” Dranko v. Dranko, 824 A.2d 1215, 1219 (Pa.Super.2003). ¶ 5 The central issue in this case concerns Mother’s objection to Father’s pervasive use of pornography, which the parties concede precipitated the demise of their marriage.

2008“Finally, we note that ‘[o]n issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, appellate courts must defer to the findings of the trial judge who has had the opportunity to observe the proceedings and the demeanor of the witnesses.’ ” Dranko v. Dranko, 824 A.2d 1215, 1219 (Pa.Super.2003). ¶ 5 The central issue in this case concerns Mother’s objection to Father’s pervasive use of pornography, which the parties concede precipitated the demise of their marriage.

2025See also Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943 (Pa. Super. 2000) (where appellant fails to properly raise or develop issues on appeal, or where brief is wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, this Court can decline to address appellant’s claims on merits).7 Mother, therefore, has abandoned this claim as well.8 See In re Adoption of R.K.Y., 72 A.3d 669 , 679 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2013) (declining to address subsection 2511(b) where appellant did not make argument concerning that subsection). ____________________________________________ 7 We note that Mother’s brief does not comply with Rule

2015See Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943, 944 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“When issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court will not consider the merits thereof.”). - 19 - J-S74030-14 Even if Mother had not waived the issue, we would conclude that Mother’s claim is without merit.

2023See Kulp v. Hrivnak, 765 A.2d 796, 798 (Pa. Super. 2000) (reiterating, “since we lack jurisdiction over an unappealable order it is incumbent on us to determine, sua sponte when necessary, whether the appeal is taken from an appealable order.”).

2022Before we may address Mother’s issue, “we must determine whether the order[] from which Mother appealed [is] appealable, because appealability implicates our jurisdiction.” In the Interest of J.M., 219 A.3d 645, 650 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing In Interest of N.M., 186 A.3d 998, 1006 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting Kulp v. Hrivnak, 765 A.2d 796, 798 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“[Since we] lack jurisdiction over an unappealable order, it is incumbent on us to determine, … whether the appeal is taken from an appealable order.”))).

2021It is well-settled that “we will not toll the well- being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”)). - 12 - The trial court addressed Mother’s issue regarding section 2511(b) in its well-reasoned Opinion.

2015With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008), citing In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa.Super. 2006).

2021See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b); Estate of Haiko v. McGinely, 799 A.2d 155, 161 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“Without a reasoned discussion of the law … our ability to provide appellate review is hampered.

2020“Where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.” In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330 , 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017); see also Estate of Haiko v. McGinley, 799 A.2d 155 (Pa. Super. 2002) (appellant must support each issue raised by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority; without discussion of law in appellate brief, appellant hampers this Court's review and risks waiver; “It is

2020First, the ACLU reiterates that the Section 6381(d) presumption was intended to allow a parent to be held responsible in cases where there is an absence of direct evidence as to the actual perpetrator of the abuse, and that, in the instant case, the presumption does not apply because Stepbrother was identified as the actual perpetrator [J-66-2019] - 19 In response to Mother’s claim that the Superior Court erred in applying the presumption to the instant case, DHS first argues that the Superior Court properly applied the Section 6381(d) presumption because In re L.Z., supra, “compels the conclu

2016Mother’s brief at 6. ____________________________________________ 2 Neither parent appealed from the dependency orders. -3- J-S56001-16 J-S56002-16 We begin by noting that our “standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law.” In re L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015).

2024See Mother’s brief at 16-17 (quoting In re B.N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855-56 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

2015In re Z.P., supra at 1118-19 (internal citations omitted). “[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his…child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his…parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his…potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M. 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super.2004), appeal denied, 872 A.2d 1200 (Pa.2005) (internal citations omitted). -6- J-S01030-15 After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Kathryn

2023See E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d at 461 .

2023Id. - 10 - within the purview of the trial court to determine which statutory factors “are most salient and critical.” E.B., 209 A.3d at 460 .

2021See D.K., supra. Additionally, absent a bald assertion in Mother’s brief, there is no support for her position that the current custody order changed Child’s residence “to a significantly distant location.” Compare id. (examining trial court’s evaluation of Section 5328(a) and Section 5337(h) factors in case where court modified custody; children went from primary custody with Father in Pittsburgh to primary custody with Mother in North Carolina).

2021See D.K., supra. Additionally, absent a bald assertion in Mother’s brief, there is no support for her position that the current custody order changed Child’s residence “to a significantly distant location.” Compare id. (examining trial court’s evaluation of Section 5328(a) and Section 5337(h) factors in case where court modified custody; children went from primary custody with Father in Pittsburgh to primary custody with Mother in North Carolina).