Mother motion in Missouri

2001Mother contends that at the time of trial, she did not have a chemical dependency that prevented her from providing for her children, but instead, was “succeeding in dealing with such dependency as well as recognizing her underlying mental illness.” Mother’s claim of error appears to be directed to only one of the grounds for termination found by the trial court, Section 211.447.4(3), often referred to as the “failure to rectify.” See In Interest of R_L_K_, 957 S.W.2d 778, 782 (Mo.App.

2001Mother contends that at the time of trial, she did not have a chemical dependency that prevented her from providing for her children, but instead, was "succeeding in dealing with such dependency as well as recognizing her underlying mental illness." Mother's claim of error appears to be directed to only one of the grounds for termination found by the trial court, Section 211.447.4(3), often referred to as the "failure to rectify." See In Interest of R_L_K_, 957 S.W.2d 778, 782 (Mo.App.

2013R.J.K. v. J.K.B., 269 S.W.3d 546, 559 (Mo.App.2008) (quoting Cohen v. Cohen, 73 S.W.3d 39, 52 (Mo.App.2002)).

2008“Any claim of error raised in a point relied on which is not addressed in the appellant’s argument is deemed waived.” Cohen v. Cohen, 73 S.W.3d 39, 52 (Mo.App.2002).

2011The trial court denied Mother's motion to dismiss on the basis that the notice was inadequate and thus did not address the legal significance of Father's late filing of his motion to prohibit the relocation of the child. [3] We agree and affirm the judgment. *619 This Court's review of a trial court's judgment denying or granting a motion to relocate a minor child is governed by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976); therefore, we will affirm the trial court's ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence, is not against the weight of the evidence, and does not erroneously de

1997In our review of Mother’s claim, we are mindful that “[ajppellate courts should exercise the power to set aside a decree or judgment on the ground that it is ‘against the weight of the evidence’ with caution and with a firm belief that the decree or judgment is wrong.” Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d at 32 .

2003Mother’s motion taken with the case for damages due to a frivolous appeal is denied. 3 .Attorneys are reminded when drafting their points relied on to review the dictates of Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679, 685 (Mo. banc 1978) and Rule 84.04(d). 4 .

1998Father filed a motion to dismiss this cross appeal or strike Mother’s brief for failure to comply with Rule 80.04(d) and the dictates of Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. banc 1978).

2014See also Ludvik v. Ludvik, 969 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998) (“[W]e acknowledge the potential for abuse inherent in the triggering of the appointment of a guardian ad litem by a simple allegation, we must follow the mandate of the legislature whose intent it was to protect unrepresented children from abuse and neglect.”).

2014See also Ludvik v. Ludvik, 969 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Mo.App.E.D.1998) (“[W]e acknowledge the potential for abuse inherent in the triggering of the appointment of a guardian ad litem by a simple allegation, we must follow the mandate of the legislature whose intent it was to protect unrepresented children from abuse and neglect.”).

2014In the interest of protecting Child from the potential for abuse or neglect, we will exercise our discretion to review for plain error Mother’s claim regarding the court’s failure to appoint a guardian ad litem, as did the Missouri Supreme Court in Rombach v. Rombach, 867 S.W.2d 500, 502, 504 (Mo. banc 1993).

2014In the interest of protecting Child from the potential for abuse or neglect, we will exercise our discretion to review for plain error Mother’s claim regarding the court’s failure to appoint a guardian ad litem, as did the Missouri Supreme Court in Rombach v. Rombach, 867 S.W.2d 500, 502, 504 (Mo. banc 1993).

2014The trial court was also free to disbelieve Mother’s claim that she was unaware of the abuse being perpetrated on S.C. by Stepfather while she was in the home. “[T]he trier of fact has the right to disbelieve evidence, even when it is not contradicted.” White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 307 (Mo. banc 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2014The trial court was also free to disbelieve Mother's claim that she was unaware of the abuse being perpetrated on S.C. by Stepfather while she was in the home. "[T]he trier of fact has the right to disbelieve evidence, even when it is not contradicted." White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 307 (Mo. banc 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2010Mother argues that “[t]he trial court’s findings and judgments [sic] for increasing [Father’s] child support liability can not be challenged on appeal because [Father] failed to follow the law on evidence, in that Father failed to submit any of his own Form No. 14 (Child Support Worksheet) calculations at trial.” In support of her claim, Mother cites Ibrahim v. Ibrahim, 825 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Mo.App.

2010Mother argues that "[t]he trial court's findings and judgments [sic] for increasing [Father's] child support liability can not be challenged on appeal because [Father] failed to follow the law on evidence, in that Father failed to submit any of his own Form No. 14 (Child Support Worksheet) calculations at trial." In support of her claim, Mother cites Ibrahim v. Ibrahim, 825 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Mo.App.

2007"Arguments raised only in the argument portion of the brief and not included in the point relied on are not preserved for appeal.” Kierst v. D.D.H., 965 S.W.2d 932 , 939 n. 4 (Mo.App. 1998); Rule 84.04; see State v. Douglas, 132 S.W.3d 251 , 258 n. 5 (Mo.App.2004). .

2007"Arguments raised only in the argument portion of the brief and not included in the point relied on are not preserved for appeal." Kierst v. D.D.H., 965 S.W.2d 932 , 939 n. 4 (Mo.App. 1998); Rule 84.04; see State v. Douglas, 132 S.W.3d 251 , 258 n. 5 (Mo.App.2004). [6] Mother goes on to argue that certain findings that the court did make regarding K.M.C.'s best interest are not supported by sufficient evidence.

2007See In re L.M., 212 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Mo. App.2007).

2007See In re L.M., 212 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Mo. App.2007).

2005See, e.g., In the Interest of N.D., 857 S.W.2d at 842 . [5] The Division first raised this issue in its response to Mother's motion to set aside or rescind the dismissal order, stating that the motion "was improperly raised in the TR proceeding, and was fully addressed by this Court in the JV matter."

2003In Interest of N.D., 857 S.W.2d 835, 842 (Mo.App.1993).

2003In Interest of F.A.C., 973 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Mo.App.1998).

2003In Interest of F.A.C., 973 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Mo.App.1998).

2000Finally, “[m]ul-tiple contentions not related to a single issue may not be grouped together in a single point relied on.” In the Interest of A.H., 963 S.W.2d 374, 379 (Mo.App.1998).

2000Finally, "[m]ultiple contentions not related to a single issue may not be grouped together in a single point relied on." In the Interest of A.H., 963 S.W.2d 374, 379 (Mo.App.1998).

1999Mother’s first point maintains that there is not sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that “there was a substantial and continuing change in circumstances which would justify modification of the prior custody award,” but even if there was such evidence, “there was no substantial evidence that a change in the primary custodian would serve the best interests and welfare of the child.” The argument portion of Mother’ brief begins by conceding that “[i]nterference by one parent with the decretal rights of visitation of the other is a changed condition which may justify and requ

1999Mother's first point maintains that there is not sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that "there was a substantial and continuing change in circumstances which would justify modification of the prior custody award," but even if there was such evidence, "there was no substantial evidence that a change in the primary custodian would serve the best interests and welfare of the child." The argument portion of Mother' brief begins by conceding that "[i]nterference by one parent with the decretal rights of visitation of the other is a changed condition which may justify and requ

1999Although this court did address a similar issue in a 1997 case, In Interest of H.R.R., 945 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Mo.App.1997), in which we stated that we would be required to reverse and remand because the trial court failed to make findings on all issues required by the statute at issue,-that portion of the statute, § 211.447.2(3), plainly states that “the court shall consider and make findings on the following....” Id. at 89 (quoting § 211.447.2(3), RSMo Supp.1997).

1999Although this court did address a similar issue in a 1997 case, In Interest of H.R.R., 945 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Mo.App.1997), in which we stated that we would be required to reverse and remand because the trial court failed to make findings on all issues required by the statute at issue, that portion of the statute, § 211.447.2(3), plainly states that "the court shall consider and make findings on the following...." Id. at 89 (quoting § 211.447.2(3), RSMo Supp.1997).

2010See Davis v. Schmidt, 210 S.W.3d 494, 517 (Mo.App.2007) (the hearing on Mother’s motion for appellate attorney fees took place approximately eight months after trial without evidence of Mother’s post-dissolution financial condition).

2009In Davis , which is directly on point, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding wife her anticipated attorney's fees on appeal noting that, "[s]ince the hearing on Mother’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees took place approximately eight months after trial and no evidence of Mother's post-dissolution financial condition was presented by Mother, in making its award, the court could not possibly have considered the post-dissolution financial circumstances of the parties, as required by Missouri law.” Davis, 210 S.W.3d at 517 .

2009As the existence of only one statutory ground for termination is necessary for us to affirm the decision of the trial court, In re M.D.D., Jr., 219 S.W.3d 873, 876 (Mo.App.2007), this Court need only address Mother’s claim that the trial court’s finding of abandonment is against the weight of the evidence.

2009As the existence of only one statutory ground for termination is necessary for us to affirm the decision of the trial court, In re M.D.D., Jr., 219 S.W.3d 873 , *406 876 (Mo.App.2007), this Court need only address Mother's claim that the trial court's finding of abandonment is against the weight of the evidence.

2024Mother’s Point II is denied. 8 Point III In Point III, Mother argues that the finding and basis for the default judgment entered on February 27, 2020 “exceeded the scope of the pleadings.” “We review the trial court’s decision whether to grant a motion to set aside a default judgment for an abuse of discretion.” Jones v. Riley, 560 S.W.3d 540, 544 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (internal citations omitted).

2023See Horn, 325 S.W.3d at 507-08 .

2022Wallace v. Frazier, 546 S.W.3d 624, 628 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (“Points that are not developed in the argument are deemed to be abandoned.”).