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29 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1983–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Weemsgreen2 sentences2024When considering whether a court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to stay, " ' [t]hree issues must be addressed to determine if a stay in ... civil ... proceedings based on Fifth Amendment concerns in a pending criminal action is warranted: (1) whether the civil proceeding and the criminal proceeding are parallel, see Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 1998); (2) whether the moving party's Fifth Amendment protection against self- incrimination will be threatened if the civil proceeding is not stayed, see Ex parte Windom, 763 So. 2d 946, 950 (Ala. 2000); and (3) whether th 2024When considering whether a court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to stay, " ' [t]hree issues must be addressed to determine if a stay in ... civil ... proceedings based on Fifth Amendment concerns in a pending criminal action is warranted: (1) whether the civil proceeding and the criminal proceeding are parallel, see Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 1998); (2) whether the moving party's Fifth Amendment protection against self- incrimination will be threatened if the civil proceeding is not stayed, see Ex parte Windom, 763 So. 2d 946, 950 (Ala. 2000); and (3) whether th | 4 | 4 |
Ex Parte Ebbersgreen2 sentences2024When considering whether a court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to stay, " ' [t]hree issues must be addressed to determine if a stay in ... civil ... proceedings based on Fifth Amendment concerns in a pending criminal action is warranted: (1) whether the civil proceeding and the criminal proceeding are parallel, see Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 1998); (2) whether the moving party's Fifth Amendment protection against self- incrimination will be threatened if the civil proceeding is not stayed, see Ex parte Windom, 763 So. 2d 946, 950 (Ala. 2000); and (3) whether th 2024When considering whether a court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to stay, " ' [t]hree issues must be addressed to determine if a stay in ... civil ... proceedings based on Fifth Amendment concerns in a pending criminal action is warranted: (1) whether the civil proceeding and the criminal proceeding are parallel, see Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 1998); (2) whether the moving party's Fifth Amendment protection against self- incrimination will be threatened if the civil proceeding is not stayed, see Ex parte Windom, 763 So. 2d 946, 950 (Ala. 2000); and (3) whether th | 4 | 4 |
Ex Parte Windomgreen2 sentences2024When considering whether a court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to stay, " ' [t]hree issues must be addressed to determine if a stay in ... civil ... proceedings based on Fifth Amendment concerns in a pending criminal action is warranted: (1) whether the civil proceeding and the criminal proceeding are parallel, see Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 1998); (2) whether the moving party's Fifth Amendment protection against self- incrimination will be threatened if the civil proceeding is not stayed, see Ex parte Windom, 763 So. 2d 946, 950 (Ala. 2000); and (3) whether th 2024When considering whether a court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to stay, " ' [t]hree issues must be addressed to determine if a stay in ... civil ... proceedings based on Fifth Amendment concerns in a pending criminal action is warranted: (1) whether the civil proceeding and the criminal proceeding are parallel, see Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 1998); (2) whether the moving party's Fifth Amendment protection against self- incrimination will be threatened if the civil proceeding is not stayed, see Ex parte Windom, 763 So. 2d 946, 950 (Ala. 2000); and (3) whether th | 4 | 4 |
Ex Parte Coastal Training Institutegreen2 sentences2024Instead, despite the fact that the mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination-of-parental-rights judgments, DHR focuses its brief on the application of the ore tenus rule and argues that the juvenile court's factual findings in those judgments are supported by clear and convincing evidence. 4 CL-2024-0546, CL-2024-0547, CL-2024-0548, CL-2024-0549, and CL- 2024-0550 Ex parte Coastal Training Inst., 583 So. 2d 979, 980-81 (Ala. 1991). 2024Instead, despite the fact that the mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination-of-parental-rights judgments, DHR focuses its brief on the application of the ore tenus rule and argues that the juvenile court's factual findings in those judgments are supported by clear and convincing evidence. 4 CL-2024-0546, CL-2024-0547, CL-2024-0548, CL-2024-0549, and CL- 2024-0550 Ex parte Coastal Training Inst., 583 So. 2d 979, 980-81 (Ala. 1991). | 4 | 4 |
McMurphy v. East Bay Clothiersgreen2 sentences2008Analysis Although on appeal the mother does not challenge the jurisdiction of the circuit court, "[j]urisdictional matters are of such importance that a court may take notice of them ex mero motu." McMurphy v. East Bay Clothiers, 892 So.2d 395, 397 (Ala.Civ.App.2004). 2008Analysis Although on appeal the mother does not challenge the jurisdiction of the circuit court, “[jjurisdictional matters are of such importance that a court may take notice of them ex mero motu.” McMur-phy v. East Bay Clothiers, 892 So.2d 395, 397 (Ala.Civ.App.2004). | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte McLendongreen2 sentences2015On October 3, 2014, the mother filed a timely notice of appeal seeking this court’s review of five issues — whether the circuit court erred by failing to require the father to meet the custody-modification burden set forth in Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863 (Ala.1984), by failing to properly apply the provisions of the Act, by failing to properly interpret the education clause, by awarding the mother standard visitation, and by failing to subtract the cost of the child’s health-care insurance that was paid by Kip. 2010See McLendon, supra. In his 2006 petition seeking a custody modification, the father asserted that the mother was in violation of a provision of a previous court order prohibiting the mother from cohabitating with a member of the opposite sex. | 1 | 8 |
Young v. Stategreen2 sentences1983Weatherford, supra. We note also our recent statement in Young v. State, 416 So.2d 1109, 1111 (Ala. Cr.App.1982), holding as follows: “Where the rule for the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom is invoked, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to allow any one of the witnesses to remain in the courtroom during the examination of the others and the exercise of this discretion is not reviewable on appeal.” (Citations omitted.) II Appellant asserts the trial court erred in the following ruling, made during the cross-examination of the victim’s mother by defense counsel: “MR. 1983Weatherford, supra. We note also our recent statement in Young v. State , 416 So.2d 1109 , 1111 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), holding as follows: "Where the rule for the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom is invoked, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to allow any one of the witnesses to remain in the courtroom during the examination of the others and the exercise of this discretion is not reviewable on appeal." (Citations omitted.) II Appellant asserts the trial court erred in the following ruling, made during the cross-examination of the victim's mother by defense counsel: "MR | 1 | 2 |
Ex Parte Turnergreen1 sentence2023See Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 134-35 (Ala. 2002). 2 CL-2023-0017 and CL-2023-0018 against the mother; that petition, which does not appear in the materials before this court, was assigned case number DR-19-900863.01 ("the .01 action"). | 1 | 1 |
White Sands Group, LLC v. PRS II, LLCgreen1 sentence2014See White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So.2d 1042, 1058 (Ala.2008) ("Rule 28(a)(10)[, Ala. R. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Rileygreen1 sentence2012See Ex parte Riley, 464 So.2d 92, 94 (Ala.1985). | 1 | 1 |
McCarthy v. Popwellgreen1 sentence2012In McCarthy v. Popwell, 915 So.2d 56, 59 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), a plurality of this court reasoned that, because a stepparent has no legal obligation to support a child of his or her spouse’s former marriage, the income of a noncustodial parent’s new spouse could not be considered part of the financial resources of the parents of the child in determining whether to award postminority educational support; however, McCarthy does not stand for the proposition that a trial court cannot consider a parent’s economic arrangement with a new spouse in assessing that parent’s independent ability to contrib | 1 | 1 |
Blevins v. Hillwood Office Center Owners' Ass'ngreen1 sentence2011Owners’ Ass’n, 51 So.3d 317, 321-23 (Ala.2010) (Because plaintiff lacked standing, complaint failed to invoke trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and action was due to be dismissed in toto, including defendant’s counterclaims.). | 1 | 1 |
Amb v. Rbbgreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., A.M.B. v. 4 So.3d 468 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (affirming a custody judgment based on a finding of unfitness, but reversing that part of the judgment that failed to set forth a specific schedule of visitation for the mother). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Owensgreen2 sentences2011See Ex parte Owens, 65 So.3d 953, 956 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (Mother’s rule nisi petition did not invoke jurisdiction of trial court because she failed to properly register foreign support order pursuant to the UIFSA.). 2011Ex parte Owens, 65 So.3d at 956-57 (Mother’s rule nisi petition was a nullity because of her failure to properly register foreign support order pursuant to the UIFSA, and, therefore, her subsequent attempt to comply with the UIFSA was likewise a nullity.); Blevins v. Hillwood Office Ctr. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Melofgreen1 sentence2003The alleged biological father cites several Alabama cases on equal protection; however, those cases predate Ex parte Melof, 735 So.2d 1172, 1186 (Ala.1999), in which the Alabama Supreme Court held that the Alabama Constitution does not contain an express equal-protection provision. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Rawls
green
2 sentences2024When considering whether a court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to stay, " ' [t]hree issues must be addressed to determine if a stay in ... civil ... proceedings based on Fifth Amendment concerns in a pending criminal action is warranted: (1) whether the civil proceeding and the criminal proceeding are parallel, see Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 1998); (2) whether the moving party's Fifth Amendment protection against self- incrimination will be threatened if the civil proceeding is not stayed, see Ex parte Windom, 763 So. 2d 946, 950 (Ala. 2000); and (3) whether th 2024When considering whether a court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to stay, " ' [t]hree issues must be addressed to determine if a stay in ... civil ... proceedings based on Fifth Amendment concerns in a pending criminal action is warranted: (1) whether the civil proceeding and the criminal proceeding are parallel, see Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 1998); (2) whether the moving party's Fifth Amendment protection against self- incrimination will be threatened if the civil proceeding is not stayed, see Ex parte Windom, 763 So. 2d 946, 950 (Ala. 2000); and (3) whether th | 4 | 2024–2024 |
R.M. v. Elmore Cty. Dept. of Resources, 2091106 (ala.civ.app. 7-15-2011)
green
2 sentences2024When considering whether a court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to stay, " ' [t]hree issues must be addressed to determine if a stay in ... civil ... proceedings based on Fifth Amendment concerns in a pending criminal action is warranted: (1) whether the civil proceeding and the criminal proceeding are parallel, see Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 1998); (2) whether the moving party's Fifth Amendment protection against self- incrimination will be threatened if the civil proceeding is not stayed, see Ex parte Windom, 763 So. 2d 946, 950 (Ala. 2000); and (3) whether th 2024When considering whether a court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to stay, " ' [t]hree issues must be addressed to determine if a stay in ... civil ... proceedings based on Fifth Amendment concerns in a pending criminal action is warranted: (1) whether the civil proceeding and the criminal proceeding are parallel, see Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 1998); (2) whether the moving party's Fifth Amendment protection against self- incrimination will be threatened if the civil proceeding is not stayed, see Ex parte Windom, 763 So. 2d 946, 950 (Ala. 2000); and (3) whether th | 4 | 2024–2024 |
Ex Parte Brewington
green
1 sentence2015Rather, we conclude that the mother stated a claim for relief under Ex parte Brewington, 445 So.2d 294 (Ala.1983), in which our supreme court held that a court can order a parent to financially support an adult child when that child cannot support himself or herself because of a continuing mental or physical disability, so long as that disability existed during the minority of the child. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Christopher v. Christopher
green
2 sentences2015Although in Ex parte Christopher, 145 So.3d 60 (Ala.2013), our supreme court ruled that the term “children” does not include adult children for the purposes of postminority educational support, the court indicated that it was not addressing whether that same statutory construction would apply to awards of postminority support for adult disabled children. 145 So.3d at 66 . 2015Although in Ex parte Christopher, 145 So.3d 60 (Ala.2013), our supreme court ruled that the term “children” does not include adult children for the purposes of postminority educational support, the court indicated that it was not addressing whether that same statutory construction would apply to awards of postminority support for adult disabled children. 145 So.3d at 66 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Duke v. Duke
green
1 sentence2014“In Duke v. Duke, 872 So.2d 153 (Ala.Civ.App.2003), this court held that, when a trial court ratifies an agreement to deviate from the Rule 32[, Ala. R. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ex Parte Bayliss
green
2 sentences2012In its judgment, the trial court stated, in pertinent part: “This court has examined the income of the parties, the potential earnings of the parties, distribution of assets by the parties following their divorce, the remarriage of the [mother] and whether this Order shall impose an undue hardship on the parties.” (Emphasis added.) The mother argues that the trial court erred in considering her remarriage to her current husband in ordering her to pay postminority educational support because, she says, “[a]t no time has any appellate court of the State of Alabama made the remarriage of the pare 2012In its judgment, the trial court stated, in pertinent part: “This court has examined the income of the parties, the potential earnings of the parties, distribution of assets by the parties following their divorce, the remarriage of the [mother] and whether this Order shall impose an undue hardship on the parties.” (Emphasis added.) The mother argues that the trial court erred in considering her remarriage to her current husband in ordering her to pay postminority educational support because, she says, “[a]t no time has any appellate court of the State of Alabama made the remarriage of the pare | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Ex Parte Erg
green
1 sentence2011The mother timely appealed, arguing only that the trial court had erred as a matter of law in failing to deny the grandparents’ claim for visitation under the former Act based on our supreme court’s holding in Ex parte E.R.G., supra. The mother does not challenge the factual basis for the award of grandparent visitation. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Smith v. Smith
green
1 sentence2003Section 30-2-51 (b) provides: "(b) The judge, at his or her discretion , may include in the estate of either spouse the present value of any future or current retirement benefits, that a spouse may have a vested interest in or may be receiving on the date the action for divorce is filed, provided that the following conditions are met: "(1) The parties have been married for a period of 10 years during which the retirement was being accumulated. "(2) The court shall not include in the estate the value of any retirement benefits acquired prior to the marriage including any interest or appreciatio | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Ex Parte Beasley
green
1 sentence1993Beasley, supra. In the instant case, the mother does not challenge the finding of dependency. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Hannon v. Duncan
green
1 sentence1992The jury could have determined that the total value of the mother's past nursing care for Amanda, based on $83.50 per day from the date of the injury (January 30, 1986) until the date of the jury's verdict (April 19, 1991) was $159,067.50 4 As to the mother's claim for loss of Amanda's services, in order for the mother to recover for the value of those services, the mother had to prove "not only that a loss occurred but also the reasonable value of the loss of those services 'measured by pecuniary standard.' " Hannon v. Duncan , 594 So.2d 85 , 93 (Ala. 1992), quoting Smith v. Richardson , 277 | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Smith v. Richardson
green
2 sentences1992The jury could have determined that the total value of the mother's past nursing care for Amanda, based on $83.50 per day from the date of the injury (January 30, 1986) until the date of the jury's verdict (April 19, 1991) was $159,067.50 4 As to the mother's claim for loss of Amanda's services, in order for the mother to recover for the value of those services, the mother had to prove "not only that a loss occurred but also the reasonable value of the loss of those services 'measured by pecuniary standard.' " Hannon v. Duncan , 594 So.2d 85 , 93 (Ala. 1992), quoting Smith v. Richardson , 277 1992The jury could have determined that the total value of the mother's past nursing care for Amanda, based on $83.50 per day from the date of the injury (January 30, 1986) until the date of the jury's verdict (April 19, 1991) was $159,067.50 4 As to the mother's claim for loss of Amanda's services, in order for the mother to recover for the value of those services, the mother had to prove "not only that a loss occurred but also the reasonable value of the loss of those services 'measured by pecuniary standard.' " Hannon v. Duncan , 594 So.2d 85 , 93 (Ala. 1992), quoting Smith v. Richardson , 277 | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Weatherford v. State
green
1 sentence1983Weatherford, supra. We note also our recent statement in Young v. State, 416 So.2d 1109, 1111 (Ala. Cr.App.1982), holding as follows: “Where the rule for the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom is invoked, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to allow any one of the witnesses to remain in the courtroom during the examination of the others and the exercise of this discretion is not reviewable on appeal.” (Citations omitted.) II Appellant asserts the trial court erred in the following ruling, made during the cross-examination of the victim’s mother by defense counsel: “MR. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.