Mother motion in Indiana

2020See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879 .

2020See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879 .

2016See T.L. v. J.L., 950 N.E.2d 779, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

2014See T.L., 950 N.E.2d at 789 .

2018In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. 2 We need not address Mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child’s well-being because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written such that, to properly effectuate the termination of parental rights, the juvenile court need only find that one of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.

2018In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. 5 We need not address Mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Children’s well-being because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written such that, to properly effectuate the termination of parental rights, the juvenile court need only find that one of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.

2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-DR-2983| July 14, 2020 Page 8 of 17 observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002).

2016More specifically, Mother contends that the trial court erroneously awarded sole physical and legal custody of C.R. to Father. [53] Turning first to Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s modification of physical custody of C.R., we note that “[w]e review custody modifications for abuse of discretion, with a ‘preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.’” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002) (quoting In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178, 178 (Ind. 1993)).

2018A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

2018A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

2017In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208. [10] Mother’s challenge on appeal is very narrow.

2017In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208. [8] Mother’s challenge on appeal is very narrow.

2012Father cites McClure v. Cooper, 893 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) in support of his contention.

2012Father cites McClure v. Cooper, 893 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) in support of his contention.

2011Brief of Appellant at 4. "[W]e have long recognized that our Legislature intended *1190 to extend special protection to existing grandparent/grandchild ties in providing for post-adoptive visitation." Baker v. Lee, 901 N.E.2d 1107, 1109 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009) (citing Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015, 1017-18 (Ind.Ct.App.1989)).

2011Brief of Appellant at 4. “[W]e have long recognized that our Legislature in tended to extend special protection to existing grandparent/grandchild ties in providing for post-adoptive visitation.” Baker v. Lee, 901 N.E.2d 1107, 1109 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009) (citing Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015, 1017-18 (Ind.Ct.App.1989)).

2011Brief of Appellant at 4. "[W]e have long recognized that our Legislature intended *1190 to extend special protection to existing grandparent/grandchild ties in providing for post-adoptive visitation." Baker v. Lee, 901 N.E.2d 1107, 1109 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009) (citing Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015, 1017-18 (Ind.Ct.App.1989)).

2011Brief of Appellant at 4. “[W]e have long recognized that our Legislature in tended to extend special protection to existing grandparent/grandchild ties in providing for post-adoptive visitation.” Baker v. Lee, 901 N.E.2d 1107, 1109 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009) (citing Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015, 1017-18 (Ind.Ct.App.1989)).

2010Clear error exists where the record does not offer facts or inferences to support the trial court's findings or conclusions [thereon]." Grabowski v. Waters, 901 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (citation omitted), trams. denied.

2010Clear error exists where the record does not offer facts or inferences to support the trial court's findings or conclusions [thereon]." Grabowski v. Waters, 901 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (citation omitted), trans. denied.

2009In re Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.B. and *498 S.B., 896 N.E.2d 1, 15-16 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008).

2009In re Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.B. & S.B., 896 N.E.2d 1, 15-16 (Ind.Ct.App.2008).

2004Given the strong policy considerations where child custody is at issue, the complete lack of evidence regarding the child's best interests in this case, and the lack of any provision for child support or visitation, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mother's motion for relief from judgment. 3 See I.K.E.W., 724 N.E.2d at 250 ; see also, e.g., Stewart v. Hicks, 182 Ind.App. 308 , 395 N.E.2d 308 (1979) (reversing trial court's denial of 60(B)(8) motion for relief from judgment to allow defaulted defendant opportunity to dispute amount of damages in contract dispute

2004Given the strong policy considerations where child custody is at issue, the complete lack of evidence regarding the child's best interests in this case, and the lack of any provision for child support or visitation, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mother's motion for relief from judgment. 3 See I.K.E.W., 724 N.E.2d at 250 ; see also, e.g., Stewart v. Hicks, 182 Ind.App. 308 , 395 N.E.2d 308 (1979) (reversing trial court's denial of 60(B)(8) motion for relief from judgment to allow defaulted defendant opportunity to dispute amount of damages in contract dispute

2018Hubbard v. Hubbard, 690 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (internal case citations omitted). [8] In Hubbard, as in the case before us, the mother’s motion at issue had been filed after the trial court entered a final order after a hearing arising from a motion to modify custody.

2016We decline to favor form over substance and, despite its caption, Mother’s motion in the instant case should have been treated as a- motion to correct error.” Id.

2015Court recognized, “‘The concern for finality in custody matters reinforces this doctrine.’” Id. (quoting Baxendale, 878 N.E.2d at 1257-58 ). [33] Initially, we note that Mother’s brief states that she and Child “live in Evansville” and “are seeking to relocate to Avon, Ohio.” Appellant’s Br. at 3.

2012Mother’s Br. at 16. 9 An initial child custody order is determined “in accordance with the best interests of the child.” Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1254 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Ind. Code 9 Before addressing Mother’s issue on appeal, we pause to note that “[w]e ask for two basic things from appellate practitioners in this state: compliance with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure and adherence to fundamental standards of professionalism.” Steve Silveus Ins., Inc. v. Goshert, 873 N.E.2d 165, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

2026Exclusion of Polygraph Results [25] Mother next claims that the trial court erred by excluding from evidence the results of Stepfather’s polygraph examination, which allegedly supported Mother’s claim that A.B.’s molestation accusations were false. [26] Polygraph evidence “is generally disfavored” and “generally inadmissible without a valid stipulation between the parties.” Rynerson v. City of Franklin, 669 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Ind. 1996); J.R.T. v. State, 783 N.E.2d 300, 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

2026See, e.g., M.L.B., 983 N.E.2d at 584 (noting that a “child’s relationship with his grandparents is important, and can deserve protection under the Grandparent Visitation Act”); Sightes v. Barker, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2003 | April 30, 2026 Page 16 of 21 684 N.E.2d 224, 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing the benefits to both children and grandparents), trans. denied.

2026Exclusion of Polygraph Results [25] Mother next claims that the trial court erred by excluding from evidence the results of Stepfather’s polygraph examination, which allegedly supported Mother’s claim that A.B.’s molestation accusations were false. [26] Polygraph evidence “is generally disfavored” and “generally inadmissible without a valid stipulation between the parties.” Rynerson v. City of Franklin, 669 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Ind. 1996); J.R.T. v. State, 783 N.E.2d 300, 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

2026See, e.g., M.L.B., 983 N.E.2d at 584 (noting that a “child’s relationship with his grandparents is important, and can deserve protection under the Grandparent Visitation Act”); Sightes v. Barker, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2003 | April 30, 2026 Page 16 of 21 684 N.E.2d 224, 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing the benefits to both children and grandparents), trans. denied.

2026And the Standard of Review section of Mother’s brief accurately defined clear error as occurring when “the record facts do not support the findings[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 7 (quoting In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017)).

2026In Wolfe v. Wolfe, 793 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied, a party argued on appeal that the trial court failed to follow the proper procedure in granting a motion for change of judge.

2025See, e.g., Gomez v. Gomez, 887 N.E.2d 977, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. sign consents for the grandmother to adopt the child.

2024See, e.g., J.B. v. State, 55 N.E.3d 831, 832-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (addressing whether juvenile court could reduce a restitution order to a civil judgment, despite juvenile court’s revocation of its own order during the appeal proceedings, because no published appellate opinion had yet addressed the issue, which could recur). [30] Turning toward the merits of Mother’s claim, we note the State does not challenge her argument.