Mother motion in Oklahoma

2009They also cite In the Matter of the Adoption of C.D.O., 2002 OK CIV APP 9 , 39 P.3d 828 .

2009They also cite In the Matter of the Adoption of C.D.O., 2002 OK CIV APP 9 , 39 P.3d 828 .

2004Mother appeals. ¶ 8 State sought termination of Mother’s parental rights under 10 O.S. § 7006-1.1(A)(5), which provides: Pursuant to the provisions of the Oklahoma Children’s Code, ... a court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child in the following situations; provided, however, the paramount consideration in proceedings concerning termination of parental rights shall be the health, safety or welfare and best interests of the child: [[Image here]] ¶ 9 A finding that: a. the child has been adjudicated to be deprived, and b. such condition is caused by or contributed to by acts or omiss

2004Mother appeals. ¶ 8 State sought termination of Mother's parental rights under 10 O.S. § 7006-1.1(A)(5), which provides: Pursuant to the provisions of the Oklahoma Children's Code,... a court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child in the following situations; provided, however, the paramount consideration in proceedings concerning termination of parental rights shall be the health, safety or welfare and best interests of the child: .... ¶ 9 A finding that: a. the child has been adjudicated to be deprived, and b. such condition is caused by or contributed to by acts or omissions of the

2004Mother appeals. ¶ 8 State sought termination of Mother’s parental rights under 10 O.S. § 7006-1.1(A)(5), which provides: Pursuant to the provisions of the Oklahoma Children’s Code, ... a court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child in the following situations; provided, however, the paramount consideration in proceedings concerning termination of parental rights shall be the health, safety or welfare and best interests of the child: [[Image here]] ¶ 9 A finding that: a. the child has been adjudicated to be deprived, and b. such condition is caused by or contributed to by acts or omiss

2004Mother appeals. ¶ 8 State sought termination of Mother's parental rights under 10 O.S. § 7006-1.1(A)(5), which provides: Pursuant to the provisions of the Oklahoma Children's Code,... a court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child in the following situations; provided, however, the paramount consideration in proceedings concerning termination of parental rights shall be the health, safety or welfare and best interests of the child: .... ¶ 9 A finding that: a. the child has been adjudicated to be deprived, and b. such condition is caused by or contributed to by acts or omissions of the

2004Mother appeals. ¶ 8 State sought termination of Mother's parental rights under 10 O.S. § 7006-1.1(A)(5), which provides: Pursuant to the provisions of the Oklahoma Children's Code,... a court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child in the following situations; provided, however, the paramount consideration in proceedings concerning termination of parental rights shall be the health, safety or welfare and best interests of the child: .... ¶ 9 A finding that: a. the child has been adjudicated to be deprived, and b. such condition is caused by or contributed to by acts or omissions of the

2004Mother appeals. ¶ 8 State sought termination of Mother's parental rights under 10 O.S. § 7006-1.1(A)(5), which provides: Pursuant to the provisions of the Oklahoma Children's Code,... a court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child in the following situations; provided, however, the paramount consideration in proceedings concerning termination of parental rights shall be the health, safety or welfare and best interests of the child: .... ¶ 9 A finding that: a. the child has been adjudicated to be deprived, and b. such condition is caused by or contributed to by acts or omissions of the

2000Termination of parental rights would be in the best interests of the child. ¶ 7 In reviewing Mother's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the foregoing, we are guided by the following standard of review: "In a termination proceeding tried to a jury, the verdict of the jury is conclusive as to all disputed facts, and where there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict, [an appellate court] will not disturb the judgment based on that verdict." In re K.L.H., 1993 OK CIV APP 127, ¶ 22 , 858 P.2d 1296 , 1299 (citing In re T.R.W., 1985 OK 99, ¶ 13 ,

2000Termination of parental rights would be in the best interests of the child. 17 In reviewing Mother's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the foregoing, we are guided by the following standard of review: "In a termination proceeding tried to a jury, the verdict of the jury is conclusive as to all disputed facts, and where there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict, [an appellate court] will not disturb the judgment based on that verdict." In re KLH, 1993 OK CIV APP 127, ¶ 22 , 858 P.2d 1296, 1299 (citing In re T.R.W., 1985 OK 99, ¶ 13 , 722 P

2000Termination of parental rights would be in the best interests of the child. ¶ 7 In reviewing Mother's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the foregoing, we are guided by the following standard of review: "In a termination proceeding tried to a jury, the verdict of the jury is conclusive as to all disputed facts, and where there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict, [an appellate court] will not disturb the judgment based on that verdict." In re K.L.H., 1993 OK CIV APP 127, ¶ 22 , 858 P.2d 1296 , 1299 (citing In re T.R.W., 1985 OK 99, ¶ 13 ,

2000Termination of parental rights would be in the best interests of the child. ¶ 7 In reviewing Mother's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the foregoing, we are guided by the following standard of review: "In a termination proceeding tried to a jury, the verdict of the jury is conclusive as to all disputed facts, and where there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict, [an appellate court] will not disturb the judgment based on that verdict." In re K.L.H., 1993 OK CIV APP 127, ¶ 22 , 858 P.2d 1296 , 1299 (citing In re T.R.W., 1985 OK 99, ¶ 13 ,

2025Webb Enters., Inc., 2000 OK 78 13 P.3d 480 Id. ¶7 Here, the record reflects the district court erred in finding the service by publication was sufficient and in failing to grant Mother's motion to vacate the default judgment.

2025Webb Enters., Inc., 2000 OK 78 13 P.3d 480 Id. ¶7 Here, the record reflects the district court erred in finding the service by publication was sufficient and in failing to grant Mother's motion to vacate the default judgment.

2023Funnell v. Jones , 1985 OK 73, ¶ 4 , 737 P.2d 105, 107 . 25 "The guardian ad litem's obligation remains the same as that of the trial court: the child's best interests, even though the child's wishes may be otherwise.

2023Funnell v. Jones , 1985 OK 73, ¶ 4 , 737 P.2d 105, 107 . 25 "The guardian ad litem's obligation remains the same as that of the trial court: the child's best interests, even though the child's wishes may be otherwise.

2023Accordingly, this appeal shall proceed. . . ." 8 This issue is also set forth in Mother's motion for new trial. 9 The Oklahoma Comments to § 2005.2 state, in part, that "[t]he purpose of the requirements in paragraph (C) for motions to withdraw is to provide the client with notice of counsel's withdrawal so that the client may either retain other counsel or proceed with the case pro se ." 10 Notably, in Crussell , the default judgment was entered on June 28, 1977, and the defendant was able to retain counsel within approximately two weeks, which counsel filed the motion to vacate on July 14. 1

2023Accordingly, this appeal shall proceed. . . ." 8 This issue is also set forth in Mother's motion for new trial. 9 The Oklahoma Comments to § 2005.2 state, in part, that "[t]he purpose of the requirements in paragraph (C) for motions to withdraw is to provide the client with notice of counsel's withdrawal so that the client may either retain other counsel or proceed with the case pro se ." 10 Notably, in Crussell , the default judgment was entered on June 28, 1977, and the defendant was able to retain counsel within approximately two weeks, which counsel filed the motion to vacate on July 14. 1

2023The court then set out the statute and stated in full on this issue: We join the district court and another division of this Court, see Paul v. Williamson , 2014 OK CIV APP 31, ¶ 8 , 322 P.3d 1070 , in interpreting this statute to cut off completely any ability of a putative father to seek a paternity adjudication more than two years after an AOP is signed, i.e., § 7700-609(B) is a statute of repose as opposed to a statute of limitations.

2023The court then set out the statute and stated in full on this issue: We join the district court and another division of this Court, see Paul v. Williamson , 2014 OK CIV APP 31, ¶ 8, 322 P.3d 1070, in interpreting this statute to cut off completely any ability of a putative father to seek a paternity adjudication more than two years after an AOP is signed, i.e., § 7700-609(B) is a statute of repose as opposed to a statute of limitations.

2021The injection of irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible evidence is ordinarily not grounds to reverse a jury verdict unless that error was prejudicial." James v. Midkiff , 1994 OK CIV APP 165 , ¶ 6, 888 P.2d 5 (citing 12 O.S. § 78; and Karriman v. Orthopedic Clinic , 1973 OK 141 , 516 P.2d 534 ).

2021The injection of irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible evidence is ordinarily not grounds to reverse a jury verdict unless that error was prejudicial." James v. Midkiff , 1994 OK CIV APP 165 , ¶ 6, 888 P.2d 5 (citing 12 O.S. § 78; and Karriman v. Orthopedic Clinic , 1973 OK 141 , 516 P.2d 534 ).

2020See 43 O.S. § 551-207(A); s ee also Holt , 1981 OK 39 , ¶¶ 17-18, 626 P.2d at 1340 (two questions must be asked: (1) has there been compliance with the jurisdictional provisions [in this case the UCCJA] and (2) whether jurisdiction should be exercised); In re R.L.S. , 1994 OK CIV APP 102 , ¶¶ 40-41, 879 P.2d 1258 , 1268 (an Oklahoma trial court can decline and yield its jurisdiction in certain circumstances). ¶33 Because the Oklahoma trial court erroneously concluded that it could not make an initial determination of child custody under the UCCJEA, the Oklahoma trial court never reached

2020See 43 O.S. § 551-207(A); s ee also Holt , 1981 OK 39 , ¶¶ 17-18, 626 P.2d at 1340 (two questions must be asked: (1) has there been compliance with the jurisdictional provisions [in this case the UCCJA] and (2) whether jurisdiction should be exercised); In re R.L.S. , 1994 OK CIV APP 102 , ¶¶ 40-41, 879 P.2d 1258 , 1268 (an Oklahoma trial court can decline and yield its jurisdiction in certain circumstances). ¶33 Because the Oklahoma trial court erroneously concluded that it could not make an initial determination of child custody under the UCCJEA, the Oklahoma trial court never reached

2019Rowe v. Rowe , 2009 OK 6, ¶ 3 , 218 P.3d 887 .

2019Rowe v. Rowe , 2009 OK 6, ¶ 3 , 218 P.3d 887 .

2018In re Lowther , 266 B.R. 753, 758-59 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001), aff'd , 321 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2002). 10 Father did argue below to the effect that the absence of any analysis of the Burk factors in Mother's motion, by itself, constituted error.

2018In re Lowther , 266 B.R. 753, 758-59 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001), aff'd , 321 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2002). 10 Father did argue below to the effect that the absence of any analysis of the Burk factors in Mother's motion, by itself, constituted error.

2013Father is not represented by counsel and did not file an entry of appearance or answer brief in this appeal despite direction by the Supreme Court to do so on or before May 25, 2012. "'Where there is an unexcused failure to file an answer brief, this Court is under no duty to search the record for some theory to sustain the trial court judgment; and where the brief in chief is reasonably supportive of the allegations of error, this Court will ordinarily reverse the appealed judgment with appropriate directions." Cooper v. Cooper, 1980 OK 128, ¶ 6 , 616 P.2d 1154, 1156 ; Oklahoma Supreme Court

2013Father is not represented by counsel and did not file an entry of appearance or answer brief in this appeal despite direction by the Supreme Court to do so on or before May 25, 2012. "'Where there is an unexcused failure to file an answer brief, this Court is under no duty to search the record for some theory to sustain the trial court judgment; and where the brief in chief is reasonably supportive of the allegations of error, this Court will ordinarily reverse the appealed judgment with appropriate directions." Cooper v. Cooper, 1980 OK 128, ¶ 6 , 616 P.2d 1154, 1156 ; Oklahoma Supreme Court

2012Father correctly cites the controlling authority: In matrimonial cases, attorney fee awards do not "depend on one's status as prevailing party in the case, [and] must be granted only to that litigant who qualifies for the benefit through the process of a judicial balancing of the equities." Thielenhaus v. Thielenhaus, 1995 OK 5 , ¶ 19, 890 P.2d 925, 935 .

2010Price v. Price, 1970 OK 116, ¶ 8 , 471 P.2d 894, 895-96 .

2010We find Mother's challenge well-taken for two reasons. 17 First, section 120.3(C)(8) does not permit a parenting coordinator to "make any modification to any order, judgment or decree." A parenting coordinator may only "allow the parties to make minor temporary departures from a parenting plan if authorized by the court to do so." Id.