Mother claim in California

2025(T.W., at p. 1161.) “ ‘ “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 .) A.S. described the circumstances of the sexual assault by the tenant and Mother’s instruction not to tell anyone.

2021(Ibid.; In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 .) The court felt it could not ensure O.G.’s safety without assurances that Mother’s brief sobriety will last. 12 Mother’s daily drug use, her failure to benefit from a prior drug treatment program and her eagerness to use methamphetamine merely because it is accessible all point to the propriety of removal.

2026(See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283; see, e.g., In re M.C. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 137 , 150-151 [“‘Because the juvenile court assumes jurisdiction of the child, not the parents, jurisdiction may exist based on the conduct of one parent only.’”]; In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 328-329 [appeal from a jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (b), was nonjusticiable where the mother did not challenge a finding under section 300, subdivision (j)].) Second, while this appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over Isabella.

2025(See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283; see, e.g., In re M.C. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 137 , 150-151 [“‘Because the juvenile court assumes jurisdiction of the child, not the parents, jurisdiction may exist based on the conduct of one parent only.’”]; In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 328-329 [appeal from a jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (b), was nonjusticiable where the mother did not challenge a finding under section 300, subdivision (j)].) Second, as discussed, while this appeal was pending the juvenile court terminated its dependency jurisdiction over Amani.

2025(In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491 , overruled in part by In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266 , 283 (D.P.).) Because dependency jurisdiction attaches to the child, not the parents, “a jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both.” (In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397 .) Mother’s challenge to the initial jurisdictional findings is effectively moot.

2024(See In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [mootness]; In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 [nonjusticiability].) 7 where the mother did not challenge a finding under section 300, subdivision (j)]; In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979 [“Because jurisdiction was proper on other grounds, mother cannot expect a more favorable result, and we need not consider her appeal.”].) Kaseem argues his challenge to the jurisdiction findings based on his marijuana use is justiciable because those findings served as the basis for the court’s orders requiring him to undergo drug testing a

2025Mother’s challenge to the b-2 count is moot “[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 , quoted by In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266 , 276 (D.P.).) “[R]elief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ ” (D.P., at p. 277.) An appeal may be rendered moot where “jurisdictional findings have been made as to both parents but only one parent brings a challenge.” (Id. at p. 283.

2024(See In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [mootness]; In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 [nonjusticiability].) 7 where the mother did not challenge a finding under section 300, subdivision (j)]; In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979 [“Because jurisdiction was proper on other grounds, mother cannot expect a more favorable result, and we need not consider her appeal.”].) Kaseem argues his challenge to the jurisdiction findings based on his marijuana use is justiciable because those findings served as the basis for the court’s orders requiring him to undergo drug testing a

2023(See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048 (Cryer) [father sought downward modification of child support based on change in circumstances due to initiation of dependency proceedings]; In re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1235 [father sought reduction of monthly child support on ground that mother’s changed circumstances warranted a downward adjustment]; In re Marriage of Stephenson (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 71, 74 [ex-husband sought order reducing spousal support because of a change in circumstances arising from his election to take early retirement].)

2023(See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048 (Cryer) [father sought downward modification of child support based on change in circumstances due to initiation of dependency proceedings]; In re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1235 [father sought reduction of monthly child support on ground that mother’s changed circumstances warranted a downward adjustment]; In re Marriage of Stephenson (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 71, 74 [ex-husband sought order reducing spousal support because of a change in circumstances arising from his election to take early retirement].)

2023(See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048 (Cryer) [father sought downward modification of child support based on change in circumstances due to initiation of dependency proceedings]; In re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1235 [father sought reduction of monthly child support on ground that mother’s changed circumstances warranted a downward adjustment]; In re Marriage of Stephenson (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 71, 74 [ex-husband sought order reducing spousal support because of a change in circumstances arising from his election to take early retirement].)

2023(See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048 (Cryer) [father sought downward modification of child support based on change in circumstances due to initiation of dependency proceedings]; In re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1235 [father sought reduction of monthly child support on ground that mother’s changed circumstances warranted a downward adjustment]; In re Marriage of Stephenson (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 71, 74 [ex-husband sought order reducing spousal support because of a change in circumstances arising from his election to take early retirement].)

2023(See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048 (Cryer) [father sought downward modification of child support based on change in circumstances due to initiation of dependency proceedings]; In re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1235 [father sought reduction of monthly child support on ground that mother’s changed circumstances warranted a downward adjustment]; In re Marriage of Stephenson (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 71, 74 [ex-husband sought order reducing spousal support because of a change in circumstances arising from his election to take early retirement].)

2023(See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048 (Cryer) [father sought downward modification of child support based on change in circumstances due to initiation of dependency proceedings]; In re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1235 [father sought reduction of monthly child support on ground that mother’s changed circumstances warranted a downward adjustment]; In re Marriage of Stephenson (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 71, 74 [ex-husband sought order reducing spousal support because of a change in circumstances arising from his election to take early retirement].)

2023(See Look v. Penovatz (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 61, 65, fn. 6 [“Under section 3901, subdivision (a)(1), a parent’s child support obligation terminates by operation of law once the child is 18 and no longer a full-time high school student.”].) Father was not seeking a downward adjustment as was the case in most of the cases cited in Mother’s brief.

2023(See Look v. Penovatz (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 61, 65, fn. 6 [“Under section 3901, subdivision (a)(1), a parent’s child support obligation terminates by operation of law once the child is 18 and no longer a full-time high school student.”].) Father was not seeking a downward adjustment as was the case in most of the cases cited in Mother’s brief.

2019Accordingly, we will grant Mother's motion to receive additional evidence on appeal under the Elise K. exception to the rule handed down in Zeth S. In light of the parties' stipulation that "subsequent events" after the .26 hearing in this case have "undermined the juvenile court's finding that [Minor] was likely to be adopted," and their stipulation to reversal on that ground, we conclude that this is one of those "rare and compelling case[s]" ( Zeth S. , supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 399 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 , 73 P.3d 541 ) "where postjudgment evidence stands to completely undermine the legal unde

2019Accordingly, we will grant Mother's motion to receive additional evidence on appeal under the Elise K. exception to the rule handed down in Zeth S. In light of the parties' stipulation that "subsequent events" after the .26 hearing in this case have "undermined the juvenile court's finding that [Minor] was likely to be adopted," and their stipulation to reversal on that ground, we conclude that this is one of those "rare and compelling case[s]" ( Zeth S. , supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 399 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 , 73 P.3d 541 ) "where postjudgment evidence stands to completely undermine the legal unde

2024(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953 , 962.) Even if not forfeited, Mother’s claim lacks merit.

2021And, contrary to her argument on appeal that FCS mediation was an “[i]nadequate [b]asis,” she argued below that it would provide “important information that will be necessary to craft the exit orders for th[e] case.” (Italics added.) Under these circumstances, we conclude Mother’s claim regarding the juvenile court’s use of FCS mediation is precluded by the doctrines of forfeiture and invited error. “[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of this rule is to encourage p

2022(In re Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 228 .) The same principle applies to Mother’s claim that there existed “no risk at all” to the children.

2021On a substantial evidence review, the order “will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228 .) 16 DISPOSITION We dismiss as moot Mother’s challenge to the orders finding jurisdiction over Joshua and Jonathan.

2024The court ordered visitation for Mother and Father and 5 terminated jurisdiction over K.C. with Kin-GAP funding in place.5 Mother timely appealed.6 DISCUSSION A. ICWA and Cal-ICWA Inquiry and Notice Requirements ICWA and Cal-ICWA require in dependency proceedings that where the court knows or has reason to know an Indian child is involved, notice must be given to the relevant tribes. ( 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (a); § 224.3, subd. (a); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 5 ; In re Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 309 , 317 (Rylei S.); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(c)(1).) The notice requirement is at t

2022(See § 224.2, subd. (a); Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 9 [agency and court have an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” whether a child “is or may be an Indian child”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5) [agency has duty “on an ongoing basis” to report “a detailed 7 description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status”].) The Agency also concedes that there were available extended family members, including maternal aunt and maternal grandmother, with whom it should have conducted ICWA inquirie

2019Accordingly, we will grant Mother’s motion to receive additional evidence on appeal under the Elise K. exception to the rule handed down in Zeth S. In light of the parties’ stipulation that “subsequent events” after the .26 hearing in this case have “undermined the juvenile court’s finding that [Minor] was likely to be adopted,” and their stipulation to reversal on that ground, we conclude that this is one of those “rare and 7 Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at page 1062 , footnote 6; In re Jayson T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 75, 85 , disapproved on other grounds in Zeth S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p

2019Accordingly, we will grant Mother’s motion to receive additional evidence on appeal under the Elise K. exception to the rule handed down in Zeth S. In light of the parties’ stipulation that “subsequent events” after the .26 hearing in this case have “undermined the juvenile court’s finding that [Minor] was likely to be adopted,” and their stipulation to reversal on that ground, we conclude that this is one of those “rare and 7 Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at page 1062 , footnote 6; In re Jayson T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 75, 85 , disapproved on other grounds in Zeth S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p

2014“Under these circumstances, mother cannot argue she had prejudicially inadequate notice of the allegations against her.” (In re John M., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1123–1124, citing In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617 , 627–628 [because the mother did not claim prejudicially inadequate notice, the only issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings].) Moreover, as we conclude below, there was sufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings. 2.

2005Accordingly, Mother's challenge of the court's jurisdictional findings is reviewable on appeal from the dispositional orders. ( Ibid.; In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 624 , 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 46 ["[A]ny challenge to the jurisdictional findings would have to be raised in an appeal from the dispositional order."]; In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 196 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 .) [9] As noted ante, Mother and Father had changed Savannah's diaper before they went to the store the first time.

2026(See, e.g., In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143 , 1161–1163; In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 208 .) For one thing, because we have reversed the termination of parental rights on statutory error, allowing Mother’s challenge to the setting of the permanency planning hearing does not “subvert the predominant interests of the child and the state in finality and reasonable expedition.” (Meranda P., at p. 1156.) Moreover, while the statute precludes challenges to the setting of a section 366.26 hearing except through a timely filed extraordinary writ (Z.G., supra, E083710; see § 36

2024(In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1160 [“Because the mother’s appeal from the termination order does not present any issue concerning the validity of the juvenile court’s findings of adoptability and lack of detriment made at the .26 hearing, we will affirm the order terminating the mother’s parental rights.”].) And, absent a viable challenge to the order terminating parental rights, Mother’s challenge to the denial of her section 388 petition becomes moot because “[n]o effective relief may be afforded mother even were we to find her appeal of the denial of the section 388 petition

2025(See, e.g., In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767 , 777, fn. 5 [“a claim that the evidence is insufficient to support a disposition order in a dependency matter generally is not forfeited even if not raised below”]; In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 623 [“ ‘Generally, points not urged in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal. [Citation.] The contention that a judgment is not supported by substantial evidence, however, is an obvious exception to the rule’ ”].) Moreover, even if Mother’s appeal were moot, appellate courts have “inherent discretion to decide certain challenges to juve

2016(In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1317 ; In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 623 .) 14 were considering adoption” was “a far cry . . . from the clear and convincing evidence required to establish the likelihood of adoption.” (Id. at p. 1065.) In the present case, unlike Amelia S., there is no evidence that anyone has ever identified J.G. as a “special needs child” or a “hard to place child.”7 In In re Tamneisha S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 798 , also cited by Mother, the social services agency was unable, after a 10-month search, to find an adoptive home for the child.

2025As respondent argues, “This is not a case where the parent was deprived of due process[;] rather Mother had notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the specific facts of the allegations.” In sum, we decline to consider Mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s finding under section 300(a) because, “[a]s long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate.” (In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979 .) B.

2024(See In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [mootness]; In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 [nonjusticiability].) 7 where the mother did not challenge a finding under section 300, subdivision (j)]; In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979 [“Because jurisdiction was proper on other grounds, mother cannot expect a more favorable result, and we need not consider her appeal.”].) Kaseem argues his challenge to the jurisdiction findings based on his marijuana use is justiciable because those findings served as the basis for the court’s orders requiring him to undergo drug testing a

2023(See In re Christopher C., supra, at p. 83.) “‘“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. ‘In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidenc

2021Although a detective reportedly had doubts about the veracity of Mother’s claim, we construe the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s rulings (In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633 ), and “do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or resolve evidentiary conflicts” (In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 135 ).

2023(See In re Christopher C., supra, at p. 83.) As such, we will only address Mother’s claim regarding the court’s finding under section 300, subdivision (e), since it is related to her other claim that there was no basis for denying her services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5).

2013We need not address Mother’s challenge to the subdivision (g) findings, because “ ‘the juvenile court’s jurisdiction may rest on a single ground.’ ” (In re Christopher C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73, 83 ; see also D.M. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1127 .) B.

2022(See, e.g., In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [affirming finding of jurisdiction over minor because the father did not challenge all bases for jurisdiction, but “not[ing]” the court’s view on the challenged finding “[f]or [the] Father’s benefit”].) Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) authorizes a juvenile court to assume dependency jurisdiction over a child when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or prot

2014“When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence.” (In Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 .) The mother responds, however, that there is a sharp distinction in the degree of risk to the minor in the section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b) orders.

2022Such briefing is manifestly deficient.”]; Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 [a “party who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding must set forth, discuss, and analyze all the evidence on that point, both favorable and unfavorable”].) Here, Mother’s brief violated the foregoing principle because it did not summarize the evidence, favorable and unfavorable, relevant to whether the scratch on Son’s neck was caused by Father or, alternatively, was caused by a toy thrown at Son by his younger brother.

2014Like in Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229 , at page 1246, Mother's brief is "devoid of 9 (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881 ; Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 409-410; Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 218 .) Both Mother's briefing and record on appeal are "manifestly deficient." (In re Marriage of Fink, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 887 .) Like the court in Fink, "we summarily reject [Mother's] arguments based upon a lack of substantial evidence.

2022(Id. at 1492 [“For jurisdictional purposes, it is irrelevant which parent created [the] circumstances” triggering jurisdiction]; accord In re Briana 6 V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 308 [“‘[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both’”].) Although Mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings is accordingly nonjusticiable, we nevertheless opt to briefly describe, for Mother’s benefit, why at least one of the dependency allegations made against her was supported by substantial evidence.

2021As we have held to the contrary, and as a court has broad discretion to fashion a disposition order that is not limited to the content of 13 sustained jurisdiction findings (see, e.g., In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311 ), the argument fails.