affirmative defense in Kansas

2026See State v. Seba, 305 Kan. 185 , 208, 380 P.3d 209 (2016) ("Imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter . . . is a lesser included offense of first-degree intentional murder."); State v. Haygood, 308 Kan. 1387 , 1404, 430 P.3d 11 (2018) (self-defense instruction legally appropriate as an affirmative defense to first-degree premeditated murder).

2020As I explained in State v. Haygood, 308 Kan. 1387 , 1410, 430 P.3d 11 (2018) (Rosen, J., concurring), the language in this statute requires that the court act as a gatekeeper when offering instructions by "mak[ing] some assessment of the strength of the evidence on which" an affirmative defense assertion stands.

2021To support the waiver argument, the Bank cites to two cases that found waiver of the affirmative defense of estoppel where the defendant failed to raise it in the responsive pleading: Turon State Bank v. Bozarth, 235 Kan. 786 , Syl. ¶ 1, 684 P.2d 419 (1984) (finding estoppel argument waived unless pled in responsive pleading, but holding that estoppel was pled because appropriate facts for estoppel argument were included in pretrial documents), and Coffman v. State, 31 Kan.

2017An affirmative defense "cannot be raised by the court, and consideration of such defenses constitutes error." Coffman v. State, 31 Kan.

1937In the case of Jevons v. Railroad Co., 70 Kan. 491 , 78 Pac. 817 , it was held that— “Oral evidence in support of an affirmative defense, even if not contradicted, will not authorize a trial court peremptorily to direct a verdict for >the defendant.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) In the case of Cobe v. Coughlin, 83 Kan. 522 , 112 Pac. 115 , it was held that— “A court or jury is not required to believe a witness or accept his statements as conclusive merely because there is no direct evidence contradicting his statements.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) In Howell v. Harper, 86 Kan. 396 , 121 Pac. 362 , it was said: “It does not ne

1937In the case of Jevons v. Railroad Co., 70 Kan. 491 , 78 Pac. 817 , it was held that— “Oral evidence in support of an affirmative defense, even if not contradicted, will not authorize a trial court peremptorily to direct a verdict for >the defendant.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) In the case of Cobe v. Coughlin, 83 Kan. 522 , 112 Pac. 115 , it was held that— “A court or jury is not required to believe a witness or accept his statements as conclusive merely because there is no direct evidence contradicting his statements.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) In Howell v. Harper, 86 Kan. 396 , 121 Pac. 362 , it was said: “It does not ne

1937In the case of Jevons v. Railroad Co., 70 Kan. 491 , 78 Pac. 817 , it was held that— “Oral evidence in support of an affirmative defense, even if not contradicted, will not authorize a trial court peremptorily to direct a verdict for >the defendant.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) In the case of Cobe v. Coughlin, 83 Kan. 522 , 112 Pac. 115 , it was held that— “A court or jury is not required to believe a witness or accept his statements as conclusive merely because there is no direct evidence contradicting his statements.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) In Howell v. Harper, 86 Kan. 396 , 121 Pac. 362 , it was said: “It does not ne

1937In the case of Jevons v. Railroad Co., 70 Kan. 491 , 78 Pac. 817 , it was held that— “Oral evidence in support of an affirmative defense, even if not contradicted, will not authorize a trial court peremptorily to direct a verdict for >the defendant.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) In the case of Cobe v. Coughlin, 83 Kan. 522 , 112 Pac. 115 , it was held that— “A court or jury is not required to believe a witness or accept his statements as conclusive merely because there is no direct evidence contradicting his statements.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) In Howell v. Harper, 86 Kan. 396 , 121 Pac. 362 , it was said: “It does not ne

2026K.S.A. 60-208(c); Estate of Belden v. Brown County, 46 Kan.

2021"A defendant failing to assert an affirmative defense waives it." In re Estate of Beldon v. Brown County, 46 Kan.

1990In Hecht v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 208 Kan. 84 , the court held: “Summary judgment may be proper on the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations where there is no dispute or genuine issue as to the time when the statute commenced to run. [Citations omitted.] But where the evidence is in dispute as to when substantial injury first appears or when it becomes reasonably ascertainable, the issue is for determination by the trier of fact.” 208 Kan. at 93 .

1990In Hecht v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 208 Kan. 84 , the court held: “Summary judgment may be proper on the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations where there is no dispute or genuine issue as to the time when the statute commenced to run. [Citations omitted.] But where the evidence is in dispute as to when substantial injury first appears or when it becomes reasonably ascertainable, the issue is for determination by the trier of fact.” 208 Kan. at 93 .

2022Nevertheless, the Crabtree court held that the jury instruction omission was not clearly erroneous in that case because of the nature of the evidence and the nature of the affirmative defense. 248 Kan. at 41 . 13 Then, in State v. Sperry, 267 Kan. 287, 294-95 , 978 P.2d 933 (1999), our Supreme Court relied on Crabtree to find that omitting the burden of proof instruction was not clear error.

2022Nevertheless, the Crabtree court held that the jury instruction omission was not clearly erroneous in that case because of the nature of the evidence and the nature of the affirmative defense. 248 Kan. at 41 . 13 Then, in State v. Sperry, 267 Kan. 287, 294-95 , 978 P.2d 933 (1999), our Supreme Court relied on Crabtree to find that omitting the burden of proof instruction was not clear error.

1994“Where the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations is asserted, summary judgment may be proper where there is no dispute or genuine issue as to the time when the statute commenced to run.” Gilger v. Lee Constr., Inc., 249 Kan. 307, 311 , 820 P.2d 390 (1991).

1994“Where the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations is asserted, summary judgment may be proper where there is no dispute or genuine issue as to the time when the statute commenced to run.” Gilger v. Lee Constr., Inc., 249 Kan. 307, 311 , 820 P.2d 390 (1991).

2021App. 2d 247, 262 , 261 P.3d 943 (2011); Diversified Financial Planners, Inc. v. Maderak, 248 Kan. 946 , Syl. ¶ 4, 811 P.2d 1237 (1991).

2019If a party fails to properly assert an affirmative defense before the district court, it waives the defense on appeal. 248 Kan. at 948 .

2011See Turon State Bank v. Bozarth, 235 Kan. 786, 788 , 684 P.2d 419 (1984) (affirmative defenses must be set forth in a responsive pleading or they are deemed waived); Washington Avenue Investments, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 213 Kan. 269, 269-70 , 515 P.2d 744 (1973).

2011See Turon State Bank v. Bozarth, 235 Kan. 786, 788 , 684 P.2d 419 (1984) (affirmative defenses must be set forth in a responsive pleading or they are deemed waived); Washington Avenue Investments, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 213 Kan. 269, 269-70 , 515 P.2d 744 (1973).

1995State v. Davis, 236 Kan. 538, 542 , 694 P.2d 418 (1985).

1989“However, evidence merely tending to refute or deny one of the elements of the crime does not necessarily constitute an affirmative defense entitled to separate instruction.” 236 Kan. at 542 .

2026Our state's appellate courts have routinely held that the "bar of a statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional bar—it is an affirmative defense that can be waived if not pled by the defendant." State v. Gleason, 315 Kan. 222 , Syl. ¶ 6, 505 P.3d 753 (2022); see Baker v. State, 57 Kan.

2026Our state's appellate courts have routinely held that the "bar of a statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional bar—it is an affirmative defense that can be waived if not pled by the defendant." State v. Gleason, 315 Kan. 222 , Syl. ¶ 6, 505 P.3d 753 (2022); see Baker v. State, 57 Kan.

2025K.S.A. 21-5108(c); State v. Buck-Schrag, 312 Kan. 540 , 553, 477 P.3d 1013 (2020).

2022The State, relying on State v. Buck-Schrag, 312 Kan. 540 , 477 P.3d 1013 (2020), asserts the instructions as a whole accurately stated the law.

2024See, e.g., State v. Cooperwood, 282 Kan. 572, 580-82 , 147 P.3d 125 (2006) (affirming the holding in State v. Crabtree, 248 Kan. 33, 40 , 805 P.2d 1 [1991], after reviewing much of the above precedent, to find the district court did not commit clear error when it failed to provide the instruction on the State's burden when the defendant raises an affirmative self-defense claim); State v. Sperry, 267 Kan. 287, 294-95 , 978 P.2d 933 (1999), disapproved of on 18 other grounds by State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 344-45 , 204 P.3d 585 (2009) (finding the instructions as a whole covered the subject of t

2024See, e.g., State v. Cooperwood, 282 Kan. 572, 580-82 , 147 P.3d 125 (2006) (affirming the holding in State v. Crabtree, 248 Kan. 33, 40 , 805 P.2d 1 [1991], after reviewing much of the above precedent, to find the district court did not commit clear error when it failed to provide the instruction on the State's burden when the defendant raises an affirmative self-defense claim); State v. Sperry, 267 Kan. 287, 294-95 , 978 P.2d 933 (1999), disapproved of on 18 other grounds by State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 344-45 , 204 P.3d 585 (2009) (finding the instructions as a whole covered the subject of t

2021For example, the Kansas Supreme Court has long held that double jeopardy is "an affirmative defense that a defendant in a criminal action waives by failing to raise it in a timely manner." Jackson v. State, 204 Kan. 823 , Syl. ¶ 6, 465 P.2d 927 (1970).

2021For example, the Kansas Supreme Court has long held that double jeopardy is "an affirmative defense that a defendant in a criminal action waives by failing to raise it in a timely manner." Jackson v. State, 204 Kan. 823 , Syl. ¶ 6, 465 P.2d 927 (1970).