affirmative defense in Idaho

2025See Gibson, 166 Idaho at 438–39, 461 P.3d at 720–21; Patterson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 316 , 256 P.3d 718, 724 (2011); Fuhriman v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 804 , 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007); Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 455 , 649 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1982). “[A] party does not waive an affirmative defense for failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is raised before trial and the opposing party has time to respond in briefing and oral argument.” Patterson, 151 Idaho at 316 , 256 P.3d at 724 .

2025See Gibson, 166 Idaho at 438–39, 461 P.3d at 720–21; Patterson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 316 , 256 P.3d 718, 724 (2011); Fuhriman v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 804 , 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007); Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 455 , 649 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1982). “[A] party does not waive an affirmative defense for failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is raised before trial and the opposing party has time to respond in briefing and oral argument.” Patterson, 151 Idaho at 316 , 256 P.3d at 724 .

2025See Gibson, 166 Idaho at 438–39, 461 P.3d at 720–21; Patterson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 316 , 256 P.3d 718, 724 (2011); Fuhriman v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 804 , 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007); Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 455 , 649 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1982). “[A] party does not waive an affirmative defense for failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is raised before trial and the opposing party has time to respond in briefing and oral argument.” Patterson, 151 Idaho at 316 , 256 P.3d at 724 .

2025See Gibson, 166 Idaho at 438–39, 461 P.3d at 720–21; Patterson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 316 , 256 P.3d 718, 724 (2011); Fuhriman v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 804 , 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007); Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 455 , 649 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1982). “[A] party does not waive an affirmative defense for failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is raised before trial and the opposing party has time to respond in briefing and oral argument.” Patterson, 151 Idaho at 316 , 256 P.3d at 724 .

2025“Res judicata is an affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 122 , 157 P.3d 613, 616 (2007)).

2025“Res judicata is an affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 122 , 157 P.3d 613, 616 (2007)).

2025See Gibson, 166 Idaho at 438–39, 461 P.3d at 720–21; Patterson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 316 , 256 P.3d 718, 724 (2011); Fuhriman v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 804 , 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007); Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 455 , 649 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1982). “[A] party does not waive an affirmative defense for failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is raised before trial and the opposing party has time to respond in briefing and oral argument.” Patterson, 151 Idaho at 316 , 256 P.3d at 724 .

2025See Gibson, 166 Idaho at 438–39, 461 P.3d at 720–21; Patterson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 316 , 256 P.3d 718, 724 (2011); Fuhriman v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 804 , 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007); Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 455 , 649 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1982). “[A] party does not waive an affirmative defense for failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is raised before trial and the opposing party has time to respond in briefing and oral argument.” Patterson, 151 Idaho at 316 , 256 P.3d at 724 .

2011See also State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942 , 188 P.3d 867, 884 (2008) (requiring a defendant to bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense does not violate due process) (citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235-36 , 107 S.Ct. 1098, 1102-03 , 94 L.Ed.2d 267, 275-76 (1987); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42, 56 , 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2017, 2023-24 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361, 376 (1996)).

2011See also State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942 , 188 P.3d 867, 884 (2008) (requiring a defendant to bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense does not violate due process) (citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235-36 , 107 S.Ct. 1098, 1102-03 , 94 L.Ed.2d 267, 275-76 (1987); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42, 56 , 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2017, 2023-24 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361, 376 (1996)).

2024The defendant knew of the affirmative defense and was given time to present argument in opposition to the defense.” (citation omitted)); Fuhriman v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 804 , 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007); Krinitt, 162 Idaho at 430 , 398 P.3d at 162 ; Cf. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172 , 178–79, 75 P.3d 733 , 739–40 (2003).

2024The defendant knew of the affirmative defense and was given time to present argument in opposition to the defense.” (citation omitted)); Fuhriman v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 804 , 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007); Krinitt, 162 Idaho at 430 , 398 P.3d at 162 ; Cf. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172 , 178–79, 75 P.3d 733 , 739–40 (2003).

2024See Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, 120 Idaho 169, 174 , 814 P.2d 429, 434 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Bluestone, 103 Idaho at 455 , 649 P.2d at 1211 ; cf. Bryan & Co. v. Kieckbusch, 94 Idaho 116, 119 , 482 P.2d 91, 94 (1971) (party waived an affirmative defense because it was raised for the first time in an affidavit filed in support of a motion in opposition to summary judgment).

2024See Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, 120 Idaho 169, 174 , 814 P.2d 429, 434 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Bluestone, 103 Idaho at 455 , 649 P.2d at 1211 ; cf. Bryan & Co. v. Kieckbusch, 94 Idaho 116, 119 , 482 P.2d 91, 94 (1971) (party waived an affirmative defense because it was raised for the first time in an affidavit filed in support of a motion in opposition to summary judgment).

2022Moreover, “[a]s an affirmative defense, the burden is on [the party asserting the defense] to prove the elements of quasi-estoppel by a preponderance of the evidence.” Thomas, 137 Idaho at 358 , 48 P.3d at 1247 .

2022Moreover, “[a]s an affirmative defense, the burden is on [the party asserting the defense] to prove the elements of quasi-estoppel by a preponderance of the evidence.” Thomas, 137 Idaho at 358 , 48 P.3d at 1247 .

2020Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1)(Q) provides that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which must be “affirmatively state[d]” in a party’s answer. “[T]he time bar of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that may be waived if it is not pleaded by the defendant.” Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110 , 15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000) (internal citation omitted).

2020Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1)(Q) provides that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which must be “affirmatively state[d]” in a party’s answer. “[T]he time bar of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that may be waived if it is not pleaded by the defendant.” Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110 , 15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000) (internal citation omitted).

2025Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

2017Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370-71 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 210-11 (1985).

2022This discussion, however, is dicta and was not the basis for this Court’s holding. 8 Id. at 305–06, 527 P.2d at 1263–64 (emphasis added); see also Dumas v. Ropp, 98 Idaho 61 , 558 P.2d 632 (1977) (Bakes, J., concurring) (“One wonders how the pleading philosophy behind those simple statements of a claim for relief . . . could ever be interpreted to require the plaintiff to negate the defense of statute of limitations in his complaint.”) Mindful of such authority, SLI attempts to distinguish this case in three ways: (1) since the facts alleged in Fulfer’s complaint prove SLI is a statutory emplo

2022This discussion, however, is dicta and was not the basis for this Court’s holding. 8 Id. at 305–06, 527 P.2d at 1263–64 (emphasis added); see also Dumas v. Ropp, 98 Idaho 61 , 558 P.2d 632 (1977) (Bakes, J., concurring) (“One wonders how the pleading philosophy behind those simple statements of a claim for relief . . . could ever be interpreted to require the plaintiff to negate the defense of statute of limitations in his complaint.”) Mindful of such authority, SLI attempts to distinguish this case in three ways: (1) since the facts alleged in Fulfer’s complaint prove SLI is a statutory emplo

2025See Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 770 , 215 P.3d 485, 490 (2009) (“[A] defendant bears the burden of proof at trial concerning an affirmative defense.”).

2025See Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 770 , 215 P.3d 485, 490 (2009) (“[A] defendant bears the burden of proof at trial concerning an affirmative defense.”).

2024“A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative defense appears on the face of the complaint itself.” Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611 , 533 P.2d 730, 732 (1975) (citations omitted).

2024“A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative defense appears on the face of the complaint itself.” Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611 , 533 P.2d 730, 732 (1975) (citations omitted).

2022This Court has held that “[t]he corollary to the standard governing a district court’s decision on a 12(b)(6) motion is this: a complaint is not subject to dismissal simply because it does not negate an affirmative defense.” Hammer, 162 Idaho at 574–75, 401 P.3d at 152–52. 4 We have further held that “a judge, in determining the sufficiency of a complaint accompanying a petition to intervene, shall not reject the petition on the ground that the complaint appears to allege a claim barred by the statute of limitations.” Duff v. Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 305 , 527 P.2d 1257, 1263 (1974).

2022This Court has held that “[t]he corollary to the standard governing a district court’s decision on a 12(b)(6) motion is this: a complaint is not subject to dismissal simply because it does not negate an affirmative defense.” Hammer, 162 Idaho at 574–75, 401 P.3d at 152–52. 4 We have further held that “a judge, in determining the sufficiency of a complaint accompanying a petition to intervene, shall not reject the petition on the ground that the complaint appears to allege a claim barred by the statute of limitations.” Duff v. Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 305 , 527 P.2d 1257, 1263 (1974).

2021“In determining whether an affirmative defense has been waived, we have held that ‘a party does not waive an affirmative defense for failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is raised before trial and the opposing party has time to respond in briefing and oral argument.’ ” Krinitt v. Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game, 162 Idaho 425 , 429–30, 398 P.3d 158 , 162–63 (2017) (quoting Patterson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 316 , 256 P.3d 718, 724 (2011)); see also Dep’t of Env’t Quality v. Gibson, 166 Idaho 424 , 461 P.3d 706 , 721 (2020) (citing on contracts entered

2021“In determining whether an affirmative defense has been waived, we have held that ‘a party does not waive an affirmative defense for failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is raised before trial and the opposing party has time to respond in briefing and oral argument.’ ” Krinitt v. Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game, 162 Idaho 425 , 429–30, 398 P.3d 158 , 162–63 (2017) (quoting Patterson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 316 , 256 P.3d 718, 724 (2011)); see also Dep’t of Env’t Quality v. Gibson, 166 Idaho 424 , 461 P.3d 706 , 721 (2020) (citing on contracts entered

2020While impossibility may be asserted as a defense to a claim of neglect founded upon failure to comply with the requirements of a case plan, Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 161 Idaho 596 , 389 P.3d 141 (2016), it must be asserted as an affirmative defense during the hearing so the trial court has an opportunity to determine whether the lack of compliance is the direct or indirect responsibility of the parent.

2020While impossibility may be asserted as a defense to a claim of neglect founded upon failure to comply with the requirements of a case plan, Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 161 Idaho 596 , 389 P.3d 141 (2016), it must be asserted as an affirmative defense during the hearing so the trial court has an opportunity to determine whether the lack of compliance is the direct or indirect responsibility of the parent.

2026The Walshes respond that the district court “expressly found that CMM simply did nothing to protect [its] own interests.” The duty to mitigate, which is also known as the doctrine of avoidable consequences, is “an affirmative defense that provides for a reduction in damages where a defendant proves that it would have been reasonable for the plaintiff to take steps to avoid the full extent of the damages caused by the defendant’s actionable conduct.” McCormick Int’l USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920, 924 , 277 P.3d 367, 371 (2012) (citation omitted).

2026The Walshes respond that the district court “expressly found that CMM simply did nothing to protect [its] own interests.” The duty to mitigate, which is also known as the doctrine of avoidable consequences, is “an affirmative defense that provides for a reduction in damages where a defendant proves that it would have been reasonable for the plaintiff to take steps to avoid the full extent of the damages caused by the defendant’s actionable conduct.” McCormick Int’l USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920, 924 , 277 P.3d 367, 371 (2012) (citation omitted).

2026“In general, a trial court may not raise an affirmative defense that has not been previously raised by the parties.” Van Orden v. Van Orden, 170 Idaho 597 , 607, 515 P.3d 233, 243 (2022) (citing Med.

2023“An affirmative defense is a ‘defendant’s assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s or prosecution’s claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true.’” Van Orden v. Van Orden, 170 Idaho 597 , 607, 515 P.3d 233, 243 (2022) (quoting Kenworth Sales Co. v. Skinner Trucking, Inc., 165 Idaho 938 , 943, 454 P.3d 580 , 585 (2019)).

2025ANALYSIS The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals describes “sentencing entrapment” as an affirmative defense that is available when “a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser 3 offense, is entrapped in[to] committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment.” United States v. Cortes, 757 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2010)).

2025ANALYSIS The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals describes “sentencing entrapment” as an affirmative defense that is available when “a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser 3 offense, is entrapped in[to] committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment.” United States v. Cortes, 757 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2010)).

2025“We exercise free review over questions regarding the application of procedural rules.” Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529 , 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012).

2025“We exercise free review over questions regarding the application of procedural rules.” Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529 , 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012).

2025See State v. Mantis, 32 Idaho 724 , 727–28, 187 P. 268 , 268–69 (1920) (applying the entrapment defense for the first time in Idaho); People v. Stock, 1 Idaho 218 , 226–27 (1868) (applying the defenses of necessity and self-defense for the first time in Idaho).

2025See State v. Mantis, 32 Idaho 724 , 727–28, 187 P. 268 , 268–69 (1920) (applying the entrapment defense for the first time in Idaho); People v. Stock, 1 Idaho 218 , 226–27 (1868) (applying the defenses of necessity and self-defense for the first time in Idaho).

2025See id. at 1108; United States v. McKeever, 824 F.3d 1113, 1123 (D.C.

2025See id. at 1108; United States v. McKeever, 824 F.3d 1113, 1123 (D.C.

2025ANALYSIS The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals describes “sentencing entrapment” as an affirmative defense that is available when “a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser 3 offense, is entrapped in[to] committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment.” United States v. Cortes, 757 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2010)).

2025The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “sentencing entrapment . . . is a separate affirmative defense to the quantity element of [a] drug charge” so “ ‘sentencing entrapment’ is a bit of a misnomer, since the drug quantity is an element of the offense, not a sentencing enhancement or factor.” Cortes, 757 F.3d at 860–61.

2022This Court has held that “[t]he corollary to the standard governing a district court’s decision on a 12(b)(6) motion is this: a complaint is not subject to dismissal simply because it does not negate an affirmative defense.” Hammer, 162 Idaho at 574–75, 401 P.3d at 152–52. 4 We have further held that “a judge, in determining the sufficiency of a complaint accompanying a petition to intervene, shall not reject the petition on the ground that the complaint appears to allege a claim barred by the statute of limitations.” Duff v. Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 305 , 527 P.2d 1257, 1263 (1974).

2022This Court has held that “[t]he corollary to the standard governing a district court’s decision on a 12(b)(6) motion is this: a complaint is not subject to dismissal simply because it does not negate an affirmative defense.” Hammer, 162 Idaho at 574–75, 401 P.3d at 152–52. 4 We have further held that “a judge, in determining the sufficiency of a complaint accompanying a petition to intervene, shall not reject the petition on the ground that the complaint appears to allege a claim barred by the statute of limitations.” Duff v. Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 305 , 527 P.2d 1257, 1263 (1974).

2025For example, in State v Canelo, 129 Idaho 386 , 924 P.2d 1230 (Ct. App. 1996), this Court concluded that evidence of a prior drug transaction was admissible to rebut the defendant's affirmative defense of entrapment, which he raised in response to a charge of delivery of a controlled substance.

2025For example, in State v Canelo, 129 Idaho 386 , 924 P.2d 1230 (Ct. App. 1996), this Court concluded that evidence of a prior drug transaction was admissible to rebut the defendant's affirmative defense of entrapment, which he raised in response to a charge of delivery of a controlled substance.

2024See Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, 120 Idaho 169, 174 , 814 P.2d 429, 434 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Bluestone, 103 Idaho at 455 , 649 P.2d at 1211 ; cf. Bryan & Co. v. Kieckbusch, 94 Idaho 116, 119 , 482 P.2d 91, 94 (1971) (party waived an affirmative defense because it was raised for the first time in an affidavit filed in support of a motion in opposition to summary judgment).

2024See Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, 120 Idaho 169, 174 , 814 P.2d 429, 434 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Bluestone, 103 Idaho at 455 , 649 P.2d at 1211 ; cf. Bryan & Co. v. Kieckbusch, 94 Idaho 116, 119 , 482 P.2d 91, 94 (1971) (party waived an affirmative defense because it was raised for the first time in an affidavit filed in support of a motion in opposition to summary judgment).

2024The defendant knew of the affirmative defense and was given time to present argument in opposition to the defense.” (citation omitted)); Fuhriman v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 804 , 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007); Krinitt, 162 Idaho at 430 , 398 P.3d at 162 ; Cf. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172 , 178–79, 75 P.3d 733 , 739–40 (2003).

2024The defendant knew of the affirmative defense and was given time to present argument in opposition to the defense.” (citation omitted)); Fuhriman v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 804 , 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007); Krinitt, 162 Idaho at 430 , 398 P.3d at 162 ; Cf. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172 , 178–79, 75 P.3d 733 , 739–40 (2003).