affirmative defense in New Jersey

2026Laches "is an equitable doctrine, operating as an affirmative defense that precludes relief when there is an 'unexplainable and inexcusable delay' in exercising a right, which results in prejudice to another party." Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 417 (2012) (quoting Cnty. of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 105 (1998)).

2025Under New Jersey law, "[l]aches is an equitable doctrine, operating A-1660-21 31 as an affirmative defense that precludes relief when there is an 'unexplainable and inexcusable delay' in exercising a right, which results in prejudice to another party." Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 417-18 (2012) (quoting Cnty. of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 105 (1998)).

2026Laches "is an equitable doctrine, operating as an affirmative defense that precludes relief when there is an 'unexplainable and inexcusable delay' in exercising a right, which results in prejudice to another party." Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 417 (2012) (quoting Cnty. of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 105 (1998)).

2025Under New Jersey law, "[l]aches is an equitable doctrine, operating A-1660-21 31 as an affirmative defense that precludes relief when there is an 'unexplainable and inexcusable delay' in exercising a right, which results in prejudice to another party." Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 417-18 (2012) (quoting Cnty. of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 105 (1998)).

2026The A-3168-24 27 court recognized Pro Cap "did everything in their power to try to get information as to whether or not there might be somebody missing that they needed to notify." Saliently, unclean hands is an affirmative defense, and our courts have found that "[a]n affirmative defense is waived if not pleaded or otherwise timely raised," Brown v. Brown, 208 N.J. Super. 372, 384 (App. Div. 1986).

2018See R. 4:5-4; 4:6-2; 4:6- 7; Brown v. Brown, 208 N.J. Super. 372, 384 (App. Div. 1986) (“It is well settled that an affirmative defense is waived if not pleaded or otherwise timely raised.) (citing R 4:6-7).

2021This is because our Legislature "anticipated that New Jersey courts would apply the well-established law concerning the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in adjudicating damage claims under the [CRA]." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Ramos v. Flowers, 429 N.J.

2021"The affirmative defense of qualified immunity protects government officials from personal liability for discretionary actions taken in the course of their public responsibilities, 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Brown v. State, 230 N.J. 84, 97-98 (2017) (quoting Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 116 (2015)).

2021Dougherty Also Has Qualified Immunity "The affirmative defense of qualified immunity protects government officials from personal liability for discretionary actions taken in the course of their public responsibilities, 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Brown v. State, 230 N.J. 84, 97-98 (2017) (quoting Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 116 (2015)).

2021"The affirmative defense of qualified immunity protects government officials from personal liability for discretionary actions taken in the course of their public responsibilities, 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Brown v. State, 230 N.J. 84, 97-98 (2017) (quoting Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 116 (2015)).

2020Thus, the jury, although not charged with the affirmative defense to felony murder, found against defendant on most, if not all, of the four prongs of the defense. [ 203 N.J. at 78, 90 .] A-1320-17T4 21 It is true the jury acquitted defendant of conspiracy to commit murder, murder, and both weapons offenses; that would support her argument about the first two prongs of the affirmative defense.

2019In pertinent part, the statutory defense provides as follows: (a) Except as provided in [N.J.S.A.] 2C:11-4, criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, . . . and in the course of such crime or immediate flight A-5531-16T4 11 therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not t

2026In the companion cases of Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804-08 (1998), the United States Supreme Court delineated the contours of an employer's affirmative defense under federal Title VII.

2021As noted, in Aguas, 220 N.J. at 523-24 , the Court adopted the affirmative defense A-2648-19 13 to an employer's vicarious liability for a supervisor's sexual harassment articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).

2026"In civil matters, the trial court A-1500-24 25 should give an instruction that appropriately guides the jury on the legal basis of a plaintiff's claim or a defendant's affirmative defense, so long as there is a reasonable factual basis in the evidence to support that claim or defense." Walker v. Costco Wholesale Warehouse, 445 N.J.

2025"In civil matters, the trial court should give an instruction that appropriately guides the jury on the legal basis of a plaintiff's claim or a defendant's affirmative defense, so long as there is a reasonable factual basis in the evidence to support that claim or defense." Walker v. Costco Wholesale Warehouse, 445 N.J.

2020Super. 21, 29 (App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted).] A defendant must present some evidence to support the affirmative defense of necessity, but the burden ultimately rests on the State to "disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 36 .

2020Super. 21, 29 (App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted).] A defendant must present some evidence to support the affirmative defense of necessity, but the burden ultimately rests on the State to "disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 36 .

2024A-2138-22 4 "Charitable immunity is an affirmative defense, as to which, like all affirmative defenses, defendants bear the burden of persuasion." Abdallah v. Occupational Ctr. of Hudson Cnty., Inc., 351 N.J.

2019"Charitable immunity is an affirmative defense, as to which, like all affirmative defenses, defendants bear the burden of persuasion." Abdallah v. Occupational Ctr. of Hudson Cty., Inc., 351 N.J.

2021Moreover, a trial court should only sua sponte issue a charge on an affirmative defense "if all of the elements of the affirmative defense are clearly indicated by the evidence." State v. Daniels, 224 N.J. 168, 177 (2016). [T]he notion that the facts must clearly indicate the appropriateness of the jury instruction is paramount: The trial court does not have the obligation . . . to sift through the entire record in every trial to see if some combination of facts and inferences might rationally sustain a[n unrequested] charge. [State v. Rivera, 205 N.J. 472, 489-90 (2011) (second alteration in

2021However, as the Court has recognized, "[a] different and more complicated calculus pertains when reviewing a trial record for factual support for an affirmative defense that defendant did not request and may have actively opposed." State v. Daniels, 224 N.J. 168, 182 (2016).

2017The qualified immunity doctrine is an affirmative defense that "shields government officials from a suit for civil damages when 'their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 113 (2014) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.

2017The qualified immunity doctrine is an affirmative defense that "shields government officials from a suit for civil damages when 'their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 113 (2014) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.

2026Super. at 85, and requires the trial court to consider: (1) the delay in making the [enforcement] request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking [enforcement] was part of the party's litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the [enforcement] issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought [enforcement] to the date of trial; and (7)

2025Those seven Cole factors are as follows: (1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party's litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of A-1592-24 8 trial; and (7) the resulti

2024Following discovery, the trial court initially denied defendants' motion for summary judgment but on motion for reconsideration, determined the City had established the affirmative defense recognized in Aguas v. State, 220 N.J. 494 (2015) and Dunkley v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters, 437 N.J.

2021A-2648-19 10 The court found plaintiff's hostile environment sex discrimination and retaliation claims under the LAD were barred as a matter of law by the affirmative defense adopted in Aguas because plaintiff "failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective opportunit[ies]" presented by defendant's anti- harassment policy; she did not follow defendant's reporting procedure or cooperate with the investigation; and she "voluntarily separated herself from employment." See 220 N.J. at 523-24 .

2025"Determining whether a party waived a right is a fact-sensitive analysis." Ibid. "[T]he mere institution of legal proceedings or the assertion of an affirmative defense by way of an answer . . . do not . . . constitute a waiver of a right to proceed with arbitration in accordance with the terms of an arbitration agreement." Hudik-Ross, Inc. v. 1530 Palisade Ave.

2024Laches is "invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party." Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 180-81 (2003) (internal citations omitted).

2024These prongs "focus on whether the accomplice undertook a homicidal A-1469-21 20 risk or could have foreseen that the commission of the felony might result in death." State v. Walker, 203 N.J. 73, 84 (2010) (quoting State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 22-23 (1990)).

2019In pertinent part, the statutory defense provides as follows: (a) Except as provided in [N.J.S.A.] 2C:11-4, criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, . . . and in the course of such crime or immediate flight A-5531-16T4 11 therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not t

2026See, e.g., Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc., 139 N.J. 365, 378 (1995) (alteration in original) ("'When an affirmative defense is raised [in a civil case], the defendant normally has the burden of proving it'"); Vill. of Ridgefield Park v. N.Y., Susquehanna and W.

2022Super. 351, 364 (App. Div. 1991) (explaining an affirmative defense is "a matter of avoidance of liability for culpable conduct 11 A-0271-20 for which [a] defendant would have been answerable but for the particular facts of the transactional relationship between the parties"). "[W]hen an affirmative defense is raised [in a civil case], the defendant normally has the burden of proving it." Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 164 N.J. 1 , 4- 5 (2000) (second alteration in original) (quoting Roberts v. Rich Foods, 139 N.J. 365, 378 (1995)).

2019Moreover, there is no presumption of qualified immunity; rather, the immunity is considered "an affirmative defense that the defendant must establish." Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 354 (2000).

2010The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's error is "a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact." [ Pearson, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 815 , 172 L.Ed. 2d at 573 (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 , 124 S.Ct. 1284, 1295 , 157 L.Ed. 2d 1068, 1085 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).] An affirmative defense to be established by the defendant, Schneider, supra, 163 N.J. at 354, 749 A. 2d 336 , qualified immunity is a question of law to be decided by the court.

2025Plan or design immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-6 is an affirmative defense for which "the public entity bears . . . the burden of proof." Birchwood Lakes Colony Club, Inc. v. Borough of Medford Lakes, 90 N.J. 582, 600 (1982).

1987The point on which we focus is that in order for a public entity to avail itself of the immunity (an affirmative defense on which defendant has the burden of proof, see Birchwood, supra, 90 N.J. at 599-600 , the entity must demonstrate more than “that works were constructed under a permit.” Id. at 599 .

2026In the companion cases of Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804-08 (1998), the United States Supreme Court delineated the contours of an employer's affirmative defense under federal Title VII.

2021As noted, in Aguas, 220 N.J. at 523-24 , the Court adopted the affirmative defense A-2648-19 13 to an employer's vicarious liability for a supervisor's sexual harassment articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).

2026Under Fees v. Trow, 105 N.J. 330, 335 (1987), he contends a statute of limitations defense must be "affirmatively raised . . . in a timely manner, or it is deemed waived." He also points to Rule 4:5-4, which provides that a responsive pleading should include the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.

1998R. 4:5-4 provides in part that “[a] responsive pleading shall set forth specifically and separately a statement of facts constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense ____” “[A]n affirmative defense is waived if not pleaded or otherwise timely raised.” In addition, a party’s conduct can estop him/her from relying on an affirmative defense. [Citations omitted.] See also Williams, supra, 132 N.J. at 119 , 623 A.2d 234 (holding statute of limitations defense waived although pleaded but not thereafter asserted until post-trial motion); Fees, supra, 105 N.J. at 335 , 521 A.2d 824 (holding statut

2018In Zaccardi , the Supreme Court held that, under the distinctive circumstances presented, the defendants were equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense because their own conduct had "contributed to the delay ...." Zaccardi , 88 N.J. at 260 , 440 A.2d 1329 .

2018In Zaccardi , the Supreme Court held that, under the distinctive circumstances presented, the defendants were equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense because their own conduct had "contributed to the delay ...." Zaccardi , 88 N.J. at 260 , 440 A.2d 1329 .

2003State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 200 , 478 A.2d 364 (1984) (“any evidence ... either in the State’s or the defendant’s case”).

2003State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 200 , 478 A.2d 364 (1984) (“any evidence ... either in the State’s or the defendant’s case”).

2026While F.K. v. Integrity House, Inc. focuses on charitable immunity as an affirmative defense. 460 N.J.

2024"Charitable immunity is an affirmative defense, as to which . . . defendants bear the burden of persuasion." F.K., 460 N.J.