affirmative defense in Nevada

2022Accordingly, respondent timely asserted "tendee as an affirmative defense, see Dredge Corp., 80 Nev. at 102 , 389 P.2d at 396 , and the district court correctly determined the assertion of that defense was not time-barred, cf. Holcomb Condos.

2022Accordingly, respondent timely asserted "tendee as an affirmative defense, see Dredge Corp., 80 Nev. at 102 , 389 P.2d at 396 , and the district court correctly determined the assertion of that defense was not time-barred, cf. Holcomb Condos.

2025Co., 96 Nev. 857, 860 , 619 P.2d 1219, 1221 (1980) ("Failure to timely assert an affirmative defense may operate as a waiver . . . .").

2025Co., 96 Nev. 857, 860 , 619 P.2d 1219, 1221 (1980) ("Failure to timely assert an affirmative defense may operate as a waiver . . . .").

2021See Dredge Corp. v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 80 Nev. 99, 102, 389 P.2d 394, 396 (1964) (Limitations do not run against defenses."); see also City of Saint Paul, Alaska v. Evans, 344 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2003) (examining "the interplay between statutes of limitations and defensee and concluding 4A1though we need not reach the issue, the law-of-the-case doctrine likely foreclosed such a requirement in this case.

2021See Dredge Corp. v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 80 Nev. 99, 102 , 389 P.2d 394, 396 (1964) (Limitations do not run against defenses."); see also City of Saint Paul, Alaska v. Evans, 344 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2003) (examining "the interplay between statutes of limitations and defensee and concluding that such limitations do not apply to defenses because "[w]ithout this exception, potential plaintiffs could simply wait until all available defenses are time barred and then pounce on the helpless defendant").

2019Nevertheless, we have held "that an affirmative defense can be considered (if not pleaded) if fairness so dictates and prejudice will not follow." Ivory Ranch, Inc., v. Quinn River Ranch, Inc., 101 Nev. 471 , 473, 705 P.2d 673 , 675 (1985).

2019Nevertheless, we have held "that an affirmative defense can be considered (if not pleaded) if fairness so dictates and prejudice will not follow." Ivory Ranch, Inc., v. Quinn River Ranch, Inc., 101 Nev. 471 , 473, 705 P.2d 673 , 675 (1985).

2020Sys. v. Sutton, 120 Nev. 972, 987 , 103 P.3d 8, 18 (2004) (An affirmative defense not pleaded in the answer is waived.") 3 to standing de novo), and disagree.

2020Sys. v. Sutton, 120 Nev. 972, 987 , 103 P.3d 8, 18 (2004) (An affirmative defense not pleaded in the answer is waived.") 3 to standing de novo), and disagree.

2018But the private- analogue doctrine is a creature of statutory interpretation, see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-42 (1950) (construing the Federal Tort Claims Act to require a private analogue), and Nevada's appellate courts have not imposed a private-analogue requirement on NRS 41.031, Instead, Nevada's jurisprudence in this area proceeds from the principle that the State has waived sovereign immunity and looks directly to whether discretionary-act immunity applies.

2018But the private- analogue doctrine is a creature of statutory interpretation, see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-42 (1950) (construing the Federal Tort Claims Act to require a private analogue), and Nevada's appellate courts have not imposed a private-analogue requirement on NRS 41.031, Instead, Nevada's jurisprudence in this area proceeds from the principle that the State has waived sovereign immunity and looks directly to whether discretionary-act immunity applies.

2016Corp., 93 Nev. 580, 585, 571 P.2d 397, 400 (1977) (implying—in the context of a tort action where a stolen vehicle was operated negligently resulting in damages to a third party—that theft is foreseeable).

2016Corp., 93 Nev. 580, 585, 571 P.2d 397, 400 (1977) (implying—in the context of a tort action where a stolen vehicle was operated negligently resulting in damages to a third party—that theft is foreseeable).

2020State Bank v. Jamison Family P'ship, 106 Nev. 792, 798-99 , 801 P.2d 1377, 1381-82 (1990) (reasoning that a party could raise an affirmative defense despite the statute of limitations based on equitable considerations).

2020State Bank v. Jamison Family P'ship, 106 Nev. 792, 798-99 , 801 P.2d 1377, 1381-82 (1990) (reasoning that a party could raise an affirmative defense despite the statute of limitations based on equitable considerations).

2020Accordingly, appellants were entitled to a judgment that respondent took title to the property subject to the deed of trust, as they presented evidence demonstrating Fannie Mae's ownership of the secured loan similar to the 2 Respondent refers to appellants invocation of the Federal Foreclosure Bar as an "unpled claim." To the extent respondent is suggesting that appellants needed to invoke the Federal Foreclosure Bar in the form of a counterclaim instead of as an affirmative defense, we are not persuaded. 2 evidence this court deemed sufficient in Daisy Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 135 Ne

2019Op. 30, 445 P.3d 846, 849 (2019).2 Appellant also contends that the district court should not have considered respondent's Federal Foreclosure Bar argument because respondent did not assert it as an affirmative defense.

2018Dist. v. Richardson Constr., Inc., 123 Nev. 382, 393 , 168 P.3d 87, 94 (2007) 'Because it is not well-developed, we express no opinion regarding Nationstar's argument that the Federal Foreclosure Bar cannot be waived based on the failure to timely assert it as an affirmative defense under NRCP 8(c).

2018Dist. v. Richardson Constr., Inc., 123 Nev. 382, 393 , 168 P.3d 87, 94 (2007) 'Because it is not well-developed, we express no opinion regarding Nationstar's argument that the Federal Foreclosure Bar cannot be waived based on the failure to timely assert it as an affirmative defense under NRCP 8(c).

1998Chisholm v. Redfield, 75 Nev. 502, 508 , 347 P.2d 523, 526 (1959).

1998Chisholm v. Redfield, 75 Nev. 502, 508 , 347 P.2d 523, 526 (1959).

2022See MacDonald v. Krause, 77 Nev. 312, 318 , 362 P.2d 724, 727 (1961) (stating that a court sitting in equity may “afford complete equitable relief in one action” for claims of unjust enrichment); see also Grouse Creek Ranches v. Budget Fin.

2022See MacDonald v. Krause, 77 Nev. 312, 318 , 362 P.2d 724, 727 (1961) (stating that a court sitting in equity may “afford complete equitable relief in one action” for claims of unjust enrichment); see also Grouse Creek Ranches v. Budget Fin.

2021See Elliot v. Resnick, 114 Nev. 25, 30, 952 P.2d 961, 964-65, (1998) (concluding that an affirmative defense was tried by consent where the issue was raised early and there was no objection to the issue or evidence relevant thereto).

2021See Elliot v. Resnick, 114 Nev. 25, 30, 952 P.2d 961, 964-65, (1998) (concluding that an affirmative defense was tried by consent where the issue was raised early and there was no objection to the issue or evidence relevant thereto).

2020See id. at 274, 255 P.3d at 229-30. 11 By presenting this affirmative defense, Kinion and Elfriede met their burden as the parties moving for summary judgment, but did so without addressing the elements of and factual basis for Spencer's defamation counterclaim.

2020See id. at 274, 255 P.3d at 229-30. 11 By presenting this affirmative defense, Kinion and Elfriede met their burden as the parties moving for summary judgment, but did so without addressing the elements of and factual basis for Spencer's defamation counterclaim.

2019SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A APO. if it raises "new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiffs . . . claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Fifth Third Bank v. CSX Corp., 415 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2005) (Federal preemption is an affirmative defense . . . .").

2018Officer v. CSX Corp., 415 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Federal preemption is an affirmative defense , . . .").

2019Court, 130 Nev. 949 , 954, 338 P.3d 1250, 1253 (2014) ("The voluntary payment doctrine is an affirmative defense . ."); Idaho Res., Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran Gold Co., 110 Nev. 459, 461 , 874 P.2d 742, 743 (1994) ("If an affirmative defense is not properly asserted, or tried by consent, it is waived."). 6 Because respondent waived its voluntary-payment-doctrine defense, the district 4Appellant's due process and retroactivity arguments fail in light of this court's opinions in Saticoy Bay LLC Series 350 Durango 104 v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, 133 Nev. 28 , 388 P.3d 970 (2017), and K&P Homes v.

2019Court, 130 Nev. 949 , 954, 338 P.3d 1250, 1253 (2014) ("The voluntary payment doctrine is an affirmative defense . ."); Idaho Res., Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran Gold Co., 110 Nev. 459, 461 , 874 P.2d 742, 743 (1994) ("If an affirmative defense is not properly asserted, or tried by consent, it is waived."). 6 Because respondent waived its voluntary-payment-doctrine defense, the district 4Appellant's due process and retroactivity arguments fail in light of this court's opinions in Saticoy Bay LLC Series 350 Durango 104 v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, 133 Nev. 28 , 388 P.3d 970 (2017), and K&P Homes v.

2017As we have explained, the one-action rule "does not provide a complete affirmative defense to a separate personal action on the debt, wherever commenced," because the one-action rule "does not excuse the underlying debt." Bonicamp v. Vazquez, 120 Nev. 377, 382-83, 91 P.3d 584, 587 (2004).

2017As we have explained, the one-action rule "does not provide a complete affirmative defense to a separate personal action on the debt, wherever commenced," because the one-action rule "does not excuse the underlying debt." Bonicamp v. Vazquez, 120 Nev. 377, 382-83, 91 P.3d 584, 587 (2004).

2016Id. at 129-30 , 178 P.3d at 152-53 (footnote omitted).

2016Id. at 129-30, 178 P.3d at 152-53 (footnote omitted).

2016On appeal, CSA contends that (1) a prescriptive easement claim cannot be raised as an affirmative defense, (2) the Bryants never had a valid prescriptive easement, and (3) the district court's award of attorney fees was inappropriate . 1 Standard of review "This court reviews a district court order granting a motion for summary judgment de novo." Stalk ix Mushkin, 125 Nev. 21, 24 , 199 P.3d 838, 840 (2009).

2016On appeal, CSA contends that (1) a prescriptive easement claim cannot be raised as an affirmative defense, (2) the Bryants never had a valid prescriptive easement, and (3) the district court's award of attorney fees was inappropriate . 1 Standard of review "This court reviews a district court order granting a motion for summary judgment de novo." Stalk ix Mushkin, 125 Nev. 21, 24 , 199 P.3d 838, 840 (2009).

2015Interpreting NRS 205.130 requires this court to first look to the "statute's plain meaning." State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. , 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011). "[W]hen a statute 'is clear on its face, a court can not go beyond the statute in determining legislative intent." Id. (quoting Robert E. v. Justice Court of Reno Twp., 99 Nev. 443, 445 , 664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983)).

2015Interpreting NRS 205.130 requires this court to first look to the "statute's plain meaning." State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. , 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011). "[W]hen a statute 'is clear on its face, a court can not go beyond the statute in determining legislative intent." Id. (quoting Robert E. v. Justice Court of Reno Twp., 99 Nev. 443, 445 , 664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983)).

2019See NRCP 8(c) (listing payment as an affirmative defense); *159 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 95 Nev. 202 , 206 n.2, 591 P.2d 1137 , 1140 n.2 (1979) ("Since the averments of an affirmative defense are taken as denied or avoided, each element of the defense must be affirmatively proved.

2019See NRCP 8(c) (listing payment as an affirmative defense); *159 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 95 Nev. 202 , 206 n.2, 591 P.2d 1137 , 1140 n.2 (1979) ("Since the averments of an affirmative defense are taken as denied or avoided, each element of the defense must be affirmatively proved.

2016Law Inst. 1981) explains that "[in order for a supervening event to discharge a duty under this Section, the non-occurrence of that event must have been a basic assumption on which both parties made the contract." (Internal quotations omitted.) Although Mojave raised impossibility or impracticability as an affirmative defense in its answer, it did not present any evidence at all at trial that paying Cashman was impossible or impracticable or that Carvalho's failure to tender proper payment to Cashman was "unforeseen." See Nebaco, 87 Nev. at 57, 482 P.2d at 307; see also Elliott v. Mallory Elec

2016Law Inst. 1981) explains that "[in order for a supervening event to discharge a duty under this Section, the non-occurrence of that event must have been a basic assumption on which both parties made the contract." (Internal quotations omitted.) Although Mojave raised impossibility or impracticability as an affirmative defense in its answer, it did not present any evidence at all at trial that paying Cashman was impossible or impracticable or that Carvalho's failure to tender proper payment to Cashman was "unforeseen." See Nebaco, 87 Nev. at 57, 482 P.2d at 307; see also Elliott v. Mallory Elec

2023See Int'l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v, Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 381-82 (1986); see also Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Ins.

2023Following the conclusion of a trial in state court on Davis’ wrongful termination claims, the union argued for the first time in a post-trial motion that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Davis’ claims due to federal preemption under the NLRA. 476 U.S. at 385 .

1984Insanity is an affirmative defense which the accused, who is presumed sane, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. 95 Nev. at 26 , 588 P.2d at 1030 ; accord, Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205-07 (1977).

1984Insanity is an affirmative defense which the accused, who is presumed sane, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. 95 Nev. at 26 , 588 P.2d at 1030 ; accord, Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205-07 (1977).

2017Wholesale Lumber, 92 Nev. at 30, 544 P.2d at 1208)).

2017Wholesale Lumber, 92 Nev. at 30, 544 P.2d at 1208)).

2015See Zent, 376 P.2d at 863 ; Poyet, 492 P.2d at 1152 ; Jacobson, 227 N.W. at 782 .

2015See Zent, 376 P.2d at 863; Poyet, 492 P.2d at 1152; Jacobson, 227 N.W. at 782.