166 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1907–2026 24 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Michlitschgreen2 sentences2011"Strict liability does not necessarily preclude affirmative defenses, but an affirmative defense will rarely apply." State v. Ness, 2009 ND 182, ¶15 , 774 N.W.2d 254 ; see Olson, at ¶11 (noting an affirmative defense of unwitting, innocent, or mistaken conduct may be presented when a defendant is charged with violating a domestic violence protection order under N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-06); State v. Brandner, 551 N.W.2d 284, 287 (N.D.1996) (holding affirmative defense of unwitting or unknowing possession applicable to prosecution for possession of illegal fish-traps); State v. Rasmussen, 524 N.W.2d 2003Where willfulness is not required, a defendant may present an affirmative defense of unwitting, innocent, or mistaken conduct in accordance with decisions such as State v. Holte, 2001 ND 133 , 631 N.W.2d 595 , and State v. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d 175 (N.D.1989). | 6 | 13 |
State v. Rasmussengreen2 sentences2014Vandermeer contends it is a violation of his constitutional due process rights to treat the charge against him as a strict liability crime because J.S. represented that she was seventeen years old. [¶ 18] This Court has permitted, in certain limited instances, affirmative defenses to strict liability crimes when public policy supports the defense, or as “a logical accommodation which recognizes the reasons for both the legislative designation of the crimes as strict liability offenses and the constitutional interests of the accused.” State v. Kleppe, 2011 ND 141, ¶ 15 , 800 N.W.2d 311 ; see al 2011Although rarely, we have permitted an affirmative defense to a strict liability offense when public policy supports the defense or when the defense serves as “a logical accommodation which recognizes the reasons for both the legislative designation of the crimes as strict liability offenses and the constitutional interests of the accused.” Id.; see also State v. Rasmussen, 524 N.W.2d 843, 846 (N.D.1994) (holding an affirmative defense may be applied when life-threatening circumstances compel the offense). | 6 | 8 |
State v. Whitegreen2 sentences2011An affirmative defense is one “explicitly designated by statute.” See State v. White, 390 N.W.2d 43 , 45 n. 1 (N.D.1986) (explaining the distinction between an “affirmative defense” and a “defense”); see also N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-03(3) (“Subsection 1 does not apply to any defense which is explicitly designated an ‘affirmative defense’.”). 2011An affirmative defense is one “explicitly designated by statute.” See State v. White , 390 N.W.2d 43 , 45 n.1 (N.D. 1986) (explaining the distinction between an “affirmative defense” and a “defense”); see also N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-03(3) (“Subsection 1 does not apply to any defense which is explicitly designated an ‘affirmative defense’.”). | 4 | 4 |
McCarter v. Pomeroygreen2 sentences2012See Interest of K.B. , 490 N.W.2d 715 , 717 (N.D. 1992); McCarter v. Pomeroy , 466 N.W.2d 562, 566 (N.D. 1991) (citing 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions § 294 (1987)). 2012See Interest of K.B., 490 N.W.2d 715 , 717 (N.D.1992); McCarter v. Pomeroy, 466 N.W.2d 562, 566 (N.D.1991) (citing 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions § 294 (1987)). | 4 | 4 |
City of Bismarck v. Nassifgreen2 sentences2003N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-03(3); City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789, 796 (N.D.1989). 2003N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-03(3); City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789, 796 (N.D.1989). | 4 | 4 |
Lehman v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Lehman v. State, 2014 ND 103, ¶¶ 3, 7-8 , 847 N.W.2d 119 (holding that the two- year time limit for postconviction relief applications is “akin to” a statute of limitations, that a statute of limitations defense in a civil proceeding is an affirmative defense, and that affirmative defenses are waived if not pleaded); Johnson v. State, 2010 ND 213, ¶ 10 , 790 N.W.2d 741 (holding that res judicata is an express affirmative defense under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(3) to be pleaded by the State). [¶18] The district court erred by dismissing Chase’s application sua sponte on grounds waived by the State. 2024Lehman v. State, 2014 ND 103, ¶¶ 3, 7-8 , 847 N.W.2d 119 (holding that the two- year time limit for postconviction relief applications is “akin to” a statute of limitations, that a statute of limitations defense in a civil proceeding is an affirmative defense, and that affirmative defenses are waived if not pleaded); Johnson v. State, 2010 ND 213, ¶ 10 , 790 N.W.2d 741 (holding that res judicata is an express affirmative defense under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(3) to be pleaded by the State). [¶18] The district court erred by dismissing Chase’s application sua sponte on grounds waived by the State. | 3 | 6 |
In Interest of KBgreen2 sentences2012See Interest of K.B. , 490 N.W.2d 715 , 717 (N.D. 1992); McCarter v. Pomeroy , 466 N.W.2d 562, 566 (N.D. 1991) (citing 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions § 294 (1987)). 2012See Interest of K.B., 490 N.W.2d 715 , 717 (N.D.1992); McCarter v. Pomeroy, 466 N.W.2d 562, 566 (N.D.1991) (citing 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions § 294 (1987)). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Murchisongreen2 sentences2011Similarly, when this Court reviews a challenge to a “ ‘factual conclusion that entrapment did not occur, we do not weigh conflicting evidence, nor do we judge the credibility of witnesses; instead, we look only to the evidence and its reasonable inferences most favorable to the verdict to see if substantial evidence exists to warrant a conviction.’ ” State v. Murchison, 541 N.W.2d 435, 440-41 (N.D.1995) (quoting Nehring, 509 N.W.2d at 44 ); accord State v. Lively, 130 Wash.2d 1 , 921 P.2d 1085, 1043 (1996) (“The appropriate standard of review [for sufficiency of the evidence when a defendant i 2011Similarly, when this Court reviews a challenge to a “‘factual conclusion that entrapment did not occur, we do not weigh conflicting evidence, nor do we judge the credibility of witnesses; instead, we look only to the evidence and its reasonable inferences most favorable to the verdict to see if substantial evidence exists to warrant a conviction.’” State v. Murchison , 541 N.W.2d 435, 440-41 (N.D. 1995) (quoting Nehring , 509 N.W.2d at 44 ); accord State v. Lively , 921 P.2d 1035, 1043 (Wash. 1996) (“The appropriate standard of review [for sufficiency of the evidence when a defendant is requir | 3 | 3 |
State v. Leidholmgreen2 sentences2011See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 814-15 (N.D.1983) (discussing justification and excuse in context of self-defense); see also N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-03 (“[u]nless otherwise expressly provided, a mistaken belief that the facts which constitute an affirmative defense exist is not a defense”). 2011See State v. Leidholm , 334 N.W.2d 811, 814-15 (N.D. 1983) (discussing justification and excuse in context of self-defense); see also N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-03 (“[u]nless otherwise expressly provided, a mistaken belief that the facts which constitute an affirmative defense exist is not a defense”). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Nehringgreen2 sentences2011Similarly, when this Court reviews a challenge to a “ ‘factual conclusion that entrapment did not occur, we do not weigh conflicting evidence, nor do we judge the credibility of witnesses; instead, we look only to the evidence and its reasonable inferences most favorable to the verdict to see if substantial evidence exists to warrant a conviction.’ ” State v. Murchison, 541 N.W.2d 435, 440-41 (N.D.1995) (quoting Nehring, 509 N.W.2d at 44 ); accord State v. Lively, 130 Wash.2d 1 , 921 P.2d 1085, 1043 (1996) (“The appropriate standard of review [for sufficiency of the evidence when a defendant i 2011Similarly, when this Court reviews a challenge to a “‘factual conclusion that entrapment did not occur, we do not weigh conflicting evidence, nor do we judge the credibility of witnesses; instead, we look only to the evidence and its reasonable inferences most favorable to the verdict to see if substantial evidence exists to warrant a conviction.’” State v. Murchison , 541 N.W.2d 435, 440-41 (N.D. 1995) (quoting Nehring , 509 N.W.2d at 44 ); accord State v. Lively , 921 P.2d 1035, 1043 (Wash. 1996) (“The appropriate standard of review [for sufficiency of the evidence when a defendant is requir | 3 | 3 |
City of Bismarck v. Lembkegreen2 sentences2002See State v. Nygaard, 447 N.W.2d 267, 272 (N.D.1989) (finding a negligent belief is not an excuse to a strict liability defense); see also City of Bismarck v. Lembke, 540 N.W.2d 155, 158 (N.D.1995) (finding an unreasonably held belief precludes the affirmative defense of excuse for a strict liability offense). [¶ 7] Absent an offer of proof by Schmidt to support his claimed affirmative defense of innocent mistake of fact, the trial court did not err in denying Schmidt’s motion in limine on the requested jury instruction. 1999In City of Bismarck v. Lembke, 540 N.W.2d 155, 158 (N.D.1995), we further suggested other facts may support justification as an affirmative defense to the strict liability offense of driving under suspension. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Holtegreen2 sentences2011Although rarely, we have permitted an affirmative defense to a strict liability offense when public policy supports the defense or when the defense serves as “a logical accommodation which recognizes the reasons for both the legislative designation of the crimes as strict liability offenses and the constitutional interests of the accused.” Id. ; see also State v. Rasmussen , 524 N.W.2d 843, 846 (N.D. 1994) (holding an affirmative defense may be applied when life-threatening circumstances compel the offense). 2003Where willfulness is not required, a defendant may present an affirmative defense of unwitting, innocent, or mistaken conduct in accordance with decisions such as State v. Holte, 2001 ND 133 , 631 N.W.2d 595 , and State v. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d 175 (N.D.1989). | 2 | 7 |
State v. Rehlinggreen2 sentences2001Section 12.1-01-03(3), N.D.C.C.; see also State v. Rehling, 426 N.W.2d 6, 7 (N.D.1988). 1996State v. Rehling, 426 N.W.2d 6 (N.D.1988). | 2 | 3 |
Shirazi v. United Overseas, Inc.green2 sentences1997Shirazi v. United Overseas, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 651, 654 (N.D.1984). 1997Shirazi v. United Overseas, Inc. , 354 N.W.2d 651, 654 (N.D. 1984). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Kluckgreen2 sentences1992This stance also avoids the embarrassing explanation of how the affirmative defense of entrapment, which we have heretofore held presents a jury question, [State v. Kluck 340 N.W.2d 446 (1983)] is transformed into a "matter of law.” 1989State v. Weisz, 356 N.W. 2d 462, 464 (N.D.1984); State v. Kluck, 340 N.W.2d 446, 447 (N.D.1983). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Wolffgreen2 sentences2024In addition to requesting the jury instructions, when presented with the proposed final jury instructions, Adams was asked by the district court whether he had any objections to the proposed instructions, and his answer was, “No, Your Honor.” [¶24] “Unchallenged jury instructions become the law of the case.” State v. Rogers, 2007 ND 68, ¶ 10 , 730 N.W.2d 859 (quoting State v. Wolff, 512 N.W.2d 670, 675 (N.D. 1994) (Levine, J., specially concurring)). 2024In addition to requesting the jury instructions, when presented with the proposed final jury instructions, Adams was asked by the district court whether he had any objections to the proposed instructions, and his answer was, “No, Your Honor.” [¶24] “Unchallenged jury instructions become the law of the case.” State v. Rogers, 2007 ND 68, ¶ 10 , 730 N.W.2d 859 (quoting State v. Wolff, 512 N.W.2d 670, 675 (N.D. 1994) (Levine, J., specially concurring)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Olandergreen2 sentences2022See State v. Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 20 , 575 N.W.2d 658 (stating self- defense is a defense and not an affirmative defense); N.D.C.C. §§ 12.1-05-03 (self-defense), 12.1-17-08 (consent as a defense). 2022See State v. Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 20 , 575 N.W.2d 658 (stating self- defense is a defense and not an affirmative defense); N.D.C.C. §§ 12.1-05-03 (self-defense), 12.1-17-08 (consent as a defense). | 2 | 2 |
| Freed v. Unruhgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Syvertson v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Anheluk v. Ohlsengreen | 2 | 2 |
| Baldus v. Matterngreen | 2 | 2 |
| First State Bank of Goodrich v. Ostergreen | 2 | 2 |
| Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v. First National Bank & Trust Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Johnsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Weiszgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Commonwealth v. Kendallgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Millergreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Kleppegreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Nygaardgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Hochstetler v. Grabergreen | 1 | 2 |
| Fisher v. Maricopa County Stadium Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wrigley v. Romanickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Froistad v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Overbo, et al. v. Overbogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vogt v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hamilton v. Hamiltongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Estate of Sandegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Carpenter
green
2 sentences1992Zeno relies on State v. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d 16 (N.D.1984) and State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D.1980), which held that §§ 6-08-16 and 6-08-16.2, N.D.C.C., created a classification based on wealth by affording an issuer of an NSF check an opportunity to pay for an affirmative defense of payment, and that the classification based upon wealth constituted a denial of equal protection. 1988We recognized that what was being done was no different than what was provided for in the statutes that we held to be a violation of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution in State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D.1980); and State v. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d 16 (N.D.1984), namely, making payment an affirmative defense so that the crime was one for not paying rather than one for writing a bad check. | 5 | 1984–1992 |
In Re Estate of Thompson
green
2 sentences2024She argues the loans are outside the statute of frauds because Gary Meyer received a direct personal benefit and failed to raise the affirmative defense. [¶42] “The existence of an oral contract is a question of fact,” which is “reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.” In re Estate of Thompson, 2008 ND 144, ¶ 10 , 752 N.W.2d 624 . 2024She argues the loans are outside the statute of frauds because Gary Meyer received a direct personal benefit and failed to raise the affirmative defense. [¶42] “The existence of an oral contract is a question of fact,” which is “reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.” In re Estate of Thompson, 2008 ND 144, ¶ 10 , 752 N.W.2d 624 . | 4 | 2024–2024 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences2025Johnson v. State, 2010 ND 213, ¶ 10 , 790 N.W.2d 741 ; cf. Atkins v. State, 2021 ND 83, ¶ 17 , 959 N.W.2d 588 (affirming dismissal issued on res judicata grounds but deciding the court should have referred to a statute authorizing summary dismissal “rather than the affirmative defense statute”). 2024Lehman v. State, 2014 ND 103, ¶¶ 3, 7-8 , 847 N.W.2d 119 (holding that the two- year time limit for postconviction relief applications is “akin to” a statute of limitations, that a statute of limitations defense in a civil proceeding is an affirmative defense, and that affirmative defenses are waived if not pleaded); Johnson v. State, 2010 ND 213, ¶ 10 , 790 N.W.2d 741 (holding that res judicata is an express affirmative defense under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(3) to be pleaded by the State). [¶18] The district court erred by dismissing Chase’s application sua sponte on grounds waived by the State. | 3 | 2021–2025 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences2025Johnson v. State, 2010 ND 213, ¶ 10 , 790 N.W.2d 741 ; cf. Atkins v. State, 2021 ND 83, ¶ 17 , 959 N.W.2d 588 (affirming dismissal issued on res judicata grounds but deciding the court should have referred to a statute authorizing summary dismissal “rather than the affirmative defense statute”). 2024Lehman v. State, 2014 ND 103, ¶¶ 3, 7-8 , 847 N.W.2d 119 (holding that the two- year time limit for postconviction relief applications is “akin to” a statute of limitations, that a statute of limitations defense in a civil proceeding is an affirmative defense, and that affirmative defenses are waived if not pleaded); Johnson v. State, 2010 ND 213, ¶ 10 , 790 N.W.2d 741 (holding that res judicata is an express affirmative defense under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(3) to be pleaded by the State). [¶18] The district court erred by dismissing Chase’s application sua sponte on grounds waived by the State. | 3 | 2021–2025 |
State v. Atkins
green
2 sentences2019Atkins , 2016 ND 13 , ¶ 9, 873 N.W.2d 676 . 2019Atkins , 2016 ND 13 , ¶ 9, 873 N.W.2d 676 . | 3 | 2019–2019 |
Stenehjem, ex rel. v. National Audubon Society, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019State v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, Inc. , 2014 ND 71 , ¶ 12, 844 N.W.2d 892 , this Court discussed the equitable defense of laches: A "stale claim" may be barred by the equitable defense of laches. 2019State v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, Inc. , 2014 ND 71 , ¶ 12, 844 N.W.2d 892 , this Court discussed the equitable defense of laches: A "stale claim" may be barred by the equitable defense of laches. | 3 | 2017–2019 |
State v. Ness
green
2 sentences2011State v. Ness, 2009 ND 182, ¶ 13 , 774 N.W.2d 254 (internal citations omitted). [¶ 14] Section 12.1-20-01(3), N.D.C.C., provides: “When criminality depends on the victim being a minor fifteen years of age or older, the actor is guilty of an offense only if the actor is at least three years older than the minor.” Boespflug incorrectly categorized this provision in his proposed instruction as an affirmative defense. 2011State v. Ness, 2009 ND 182, ¶ 13 , 774 N.W.2d 254 (internal citations omitted). [¶ 14] Section 12.1-20-01(3), N.D.C.C., provides: “When criminality depends on the victim being a minor fifteen years of age or older, the actor is guilty of an offense only if the actor is at least three years older than the minor.” Boespflug incorrectly categorized this provision in his proposed instruction as an affirmative defense. | 3 | 2011–2011 |
Iglehart v. Iglehart
green
2 sentences2004“The existence of a duty is a question of law, unless it depends on facts that must be determined by the fact-finder.” Iglehart v. Iglehart, 2003 ND 154, ¶ 11 , 670 N.W.2d 343 . [¶ 29] Our Court has held that assumption of the risk is no longer an affirmative defense, but is one part of the analysis of determining comparative fault. 2004“The existence of a duty is a question of law, unless it depends on facts that must be determined by the fact-finder.” Iglehart v. Iglehart, 2003 ND 154, ¶ 11 , 670 N.W.2d 343 . [¶ 29] Our Court has held that assumption of the risk is no longer an affirmative defense, but is one part of the analysis of determining comparative fault. | 3 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Morris
green
2 sentences1993The State argues that "K.S. had knowledge of the contraband and she as well as her witness testified that the alcoholic beverages were available to anyone who desired them," and that "K.S. could not and did not avail herself of the affirmative defense ... of unwitting or unknowing possession." Therefore, the State says, "she is strictly liable for the offense of minor in possession of an alcoholic beverage." The State cites our decision in State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48 (N.D.1983), to apply the concept of "constructive possession," *606 and in State v. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d 175 (N.D.1989), to 1993The State argues that “K.S. had knowledge of the contraband and she as well as her witness testified that the alcoholic beverages were available to anyone who desired them,” and that “K.S. could not and did not avail herself of the affirmative defense ... of unwitting or unknowing possession.” Therefore, the State says, “she is strictly liable for the offense of minor in possession of an alcoholic beverage.” The State cites our decision in State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48 (N.D.1983), to apply the concept of “constructive possession,” and in State v. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d 175 (N.D.1989), to cont | 3 | 1989–1993 |
State v. Fischer
green
2 sentences1992Zeno relies on State v. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d 16 (N.D.1984) and State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D.1980), which held that §§ 6-08-16 and 6-08-16.2, N.D.C.C., created a classification based on wealth by affording an issuer of an NSF check an opportunity to pay for an affirmative defense of payment, and that the classification based upon wealth constituted a denial of equal protection. 1988We recognized that what was being done was no different than what was provided for in the statutes that we held to be a violation of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution in State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D.1980); and State v. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d 16 (N.D.1984), namely, making payment an affirmative defense so that the crime was one for not paying rather than one for writing a bad check. | 3 | 1986–1992 |
Atkins v. State
green
2 sentences2025Johnson v. State, 2010 ND 213, ¶ 10 , 790 N.W.2d 741 ; cf. Atkins v. State, 2021 ND 83, ¶ 17 , 959 N.W.2d 588 (affirming dismissal issued on res judicata grounds but deciding the court should have referred to a statute authorizing summary dismissal “rather than the affirmative defense statute”). 2025Johnson v. State, 2010 ND 213, ¶ 10 , 790 N.W.2d 741 ; cf. Atkins v. State, 2021 ND 83, ¶ 17 , 959 N.W.2d 588 (affirming dismissal issued on res judicata grounds but deciding the court should have referred to a statute authorizing summary dismissal “rather than the affirmative defense statute”). | 2 | 2024–2025 |
State v. Rogers
green
2 sentences2024In addition to requesting the jury instructions, when presented with the proposed final jury instructions, Adams was asked by the district court whether he had any objections to the proposed instructions, and his answer was, “No, Your Honor.” [¶24] “Unchallenged jury instructions become the law of the case.” State v. Rogers, 2007 ND 68, ¶ 10 , 730 N.W.2d 859 (quoting State v. Wolff, 512 N.W.2d 670, 675 (N.D. 1994) (Levine, J., specially concurring)). 2024In addition to requesting the jury instructions, when presented with the proposed final jury instructions, Adams was asked by the district court whether he had any objections to the proposed instructions, and his answer was, “No, Your Honor.” [¶24] “Unchallenged jury instructions become the law of the case.” State v. Rogers, 2007 ND 68, ¶ 10 , 730 N.W.2d 859 (quoting State v. Wolff, 512 N.W.2d 670, 675 (N.D. 1994) (Levine, J., specially concurring)). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Smestad v. Harris
green
2 sentences2024The City and Ohnstad Twichell assert the Court should interpret “invalid” in N.D.C.C. § 6-09.4-22(2) to also mean “voidable.” [¶14] In Smestad, we further stated, “Consistent with the requirement that the statute of frauds be specifically pled as an affirmative defense, the statute of frauds affects only the remedy on the contract, and to the extent a promisor waives the protection, the contract is enforceable against the promisor.” 2011 ND 91 , ¶ 11. 2024The City and Ohnstad Twichell assert the Court should interpret “invalid” in N.D.C.C. § 6-09.4-22(2) to also mean “voidable.” [¶14] In Smestad, we further stated, “Consistent with the requirement that the statute of frauds be specifically pled as an affirmative defense, the statute of frauds affects only the remedy on the contract, and to the extent a promisor waives the protection, the contract is enforceable against the promisor.” 2011 ND 91 , ¶ 11. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
| Johnson v. Mark green | 2 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Montgomery neutral | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| Johnson v. State green | 2 | 2014–2016 |
| State v. Kleppe green | 2 | 2011–2014 |
| Kuntz v. Kuntz green | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Hammeren green | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Johnson green | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Corman green | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Hammeren green | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| Huber v. Oliver County green | 2 | 2004–2009 |
| Bh v. Kd green | 2 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Brown green | 2 | 1989–1994 |
| Rugby Milling Co. v. Logosz green | 2 | 1988–1989 |
| Frank v. Daimler-Benz, AG, Stuttgart green | 2 | 1978–1984 |
| Bagg v. Otter Tail Power Co. neutral | 2 | 1950–1955 |
| Williamson v. State green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Great W. Cas. Co. v. Butler Mach. Co. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Chase v. State neutral | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Atkins green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Great West Casualty Company v. Butler Machinery Company neutral | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Comes v. State green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| MDU v. Behm neutral | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Moe v. State green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Fried v. Lonski neutral | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Brey v. Tvedt green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| City of Fargo v. Nikle neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| D.E. v. K.F. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.