affirmative defense (Tennessee) · Go Syfert
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affirmative defense in Tennessee

861 Tennessee opinions name it 5 courts 1928–2026 79 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (74)

CaseFollowedCited
McCarley v. West Quality Food Servicegreen
tenn · 1998 · cited in 143 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1998–2013
2 sentences

2013As the moving party, Jackson Bowling bears the burden “to prove the affirmative of its defense . . . .” Id.

2011When a defendant files a motion for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense, the defendant must “conclusively establish [the] affirmative defense.” McMahan v. Sevier County, No. E2005-02028-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1946650 , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2007) (quoting McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588 ).

126143
Robinson v. Omergreen
tenn · 1997 · cited in 87 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1998–2012
2 sentences

2012In addition, “courts must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Giggers, 277 S.W.3d at 364 (citing Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997)).

2007See McCarley v. West Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998); Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997).

8187
Cherry v. Williamsgreen
tennctapp · 2000 · cited in 54 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1996–2020
2 sentences

2020Cardiac Anesthesia Servs., PLLC v. Jones, 385 S.W.3d 530, 539 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Cherry v. Williams, 36 S.W.3d 78, 83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)); see also Sherrill v. Souder, 325 S.W.3d 584, 596 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted) (“[T]he failure to comply with a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. . . .”).

2013Lastly, Ms. Aleo asserts that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied to this case to prevent the running of the statute of limitations because Attorney Weyant “misled her from the outset in 2008 all the way through June 2010, preventing her from recognizing her injury which he promised to ‘fix’ and ‘make it right.’” In Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis our Supreme Court discussed equitable estoppel, stating: In the context of a defense predicated on a statute of limitations, the doctrine of equitable estoppel tolls the running of the statute of limitations when th

5354
Sands v. Stategreen
tenn · 1995 · cited in 54 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1996–2025
2 sentences

2022“Although the State bears the burden of raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, its failure to do so does not necessarily result in a waiver” so long as “‘the opposing party is given fair notice of the defense and an opportunity to rebut it.’” Wilson v. State, 367 S.W.3d 229, 234 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995)).

2022“Although the State bears the burden of raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, its failure to do so does not necessarily result in a waiver” so long as “‘the opposing party is given fair notice of the defense and an opportunity to rebut it.’” Wilson v. State, 367 S.W.3d 229, 234 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995)).

4854
Ricky Harris v. Stategreen
tenn · 2003 · cited in 63 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2004–2018
2 sentences

2017“Although coram nobis claims are also governed by a one-year statute of limitations, the State bears the burden of raising the bar of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.” Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 592-93 (Tenn. 2003).

2017“Although coram nobis claims are also governed by a one-year statute of limitations, the State bears the burden of raising the bar of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.” Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 592-93 (Tenn. 2003).

4563
State v. Nixgreen
tenn · 2001 · cited in 34 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2025
2 sentences

2025The Tennessee Supreme Court has clarified that “the one- year statutory period is an element of the right to file a post-conviction petition and that it is not an affirmative defense that must be asserted by the State.” State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tenn. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Reid ex rel.

2024Our supreme court has recognized that “the one-year statutory period is an element of the right to file a post- conviction petition and that it is not an affirmative defense that must be asserted by the State.” State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tenn. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Reid ex rel.

3334
Byrd v. Hallgreen
tenn · 1993 · cited in 119 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1994–2015
2 sentences

2015As for the second example, the Court stated that ―the moving party could conclusively establish an affirmative defense that defeats the nonmoving party‘s claim, i.e., a defendant would be entitled to summary judgment if he demonstrated that the nonmoving party cannot establish an essential element of his case.‖ Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).

2015As for the second example, the Court'stated that “the moving party could conclusively establish an affirmative defense that defeats the nonmoving partyls claim, i.e., a defendant would be entitled to summary judgment if he demonstrated that the non-moving party cannot establish an essential element of his case.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 , 106 S,Ct. 2548 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).

19119
Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co.red
tenn · 2008 · cited in 45 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2009–2021
2 sentences

2019P. 8.03, according to the “most commonly understood definition” of an affirmative defense in a pleading of “[a] matter asserted by defendant which, assuming the complaint to be true, constitutes a defense to it,” see Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tenn. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 60 (6th ed. 1990)).

2019As our Supreme Court further noted in Hannan, “an affirmative defense is ‘a traditional way for the defendant to defeat the plaintiff’s claim by carrying its own burden of proof.’” Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 7 n.3 (quoting Judy M.

1545
Ricky HARRIS v. STATE of Tennesseered
tenn · 2010 · cited in 31 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2010–2024
2 sentences

2024A judgment of conviction becomes final “thirty days after its entry in the trial court if no post-trial motions are filed or upon entry of an order disposing of a timely filed, post-trial motion.” Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 144 (Tenn. 2010). “[T]he statute of limitations . . . is not an affirmative defense that must be specifically raised by the State in error coram nobis cases; -6- instead, the . . . petition must show on its face that it is timely filed.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828 .

2024A judgment becomes final “thirty days after its entry in the trial court if no post-trial motions are filed or upon entry of an order disposing of a timely filed, post-trial motion.” Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 144 (Tenn. 2010). “[T]he statute of limitations . . . is not an affirmative defense that must be specifically raised by the State in error coram nobis cases; instead, the . . . petition must show on its face that it is timely filed.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 829 .

1531
Staples v. CBL & Associates, Inc.green
tenn · 2000 · cited in 26 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1999–2012
2 sentences

2012Instead, the moving party must “either affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or conclusively establish an affirmative defense.” Id. (quoting Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000)).

2011Rather, the moving party must “either affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or conclusively establish an affirmative defense.” Id. (quoting Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000)).

1426
Anthony v. Tidwellgreen
tenn · 1977 · cited in 14 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1993–2025
2 sentences

2025Even so, dismissal is an appropriate remedy when “an affirmative defense clearly and unequivocally appears on the face of the complaint.” Anthony v. Tidwell, 560 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Tenn. 1977); see Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 403 (Tenn. 1995) (affirming dismissal because “[t]he plaintiff’s allegations d[id] not support application of a ‘special-duty’ of care”).

2022See Anthony v. Tidwell, 560 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Tenn. 1977) (explaining that a complaint may be dismissed based on an affirmative defense if the defense “clearly and unequivocally appears on the face of the complaint”).

1314
Tommy Nunley v. State of Tennesseegreen
· 2018 · cited in 24 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2018–2025
2 sentences

2025Payne, 493 S.W.3d at 484 ; Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 670 . “[T]he statute of limitations set forth in [Tennessee Code Annotated s]ection 27-7-103 is not an affirmative defense that must be specifically raised by the State in error coram nobis cases[.]” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828 .

2024A judgment becomes final “thirty days after its entry in the trial court if no post-trial motions are filed or upon entry of an order disposing of a timely filed, post-trial motion.” Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 144 (Tenn. 2010). “[T]he statute of limitations . . . is not an affirmative defense that must be specifically raised by the State in error coram nobis cases; instead, the . . . petition must show on its face that it is timely filed.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 829 .

1224
State v. Culpgreen
tenncrimapp · 1994 · cited in 12 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1998–2022
2 sentences

2022The defense of necessity should be charged if supported by the facts produced at trial; however, because it is not an affirmative defense, “the defendant need not prove [necessity] by a preponderance of the evidence.” Davenport, 973 S.W.2d at 287 (citing State v. Culp, 900 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Tenn. Crim.

2020Because duress is a general rather than an affirmative defense, a criminal defendant need not establish the elements of duress by a preponderance of the evidence in order to merit a jury instruction.” State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 816-17 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d at 355 ; State v. Culp, 900 S.W.2d 707, 709-10 (Tenn. Crim.

1212
Jeanette Rea Jackson v. Bradley Smithgreen
tenn · 2012 · cited in 15 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2014–2025
2 sentences

2025The plaintiff’s allegations must “show that an affirmative defense exists and that this defense legally defeats the claim for relief.” Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 492 (Tenn. 2012).

2025A Rule 12.02(6) motion may “be used as a vehicle to assert an affirmative defense” only when the allegations in the complaint “show that an affirmative defense exists and that this defense legally defeats the claim for relief.” Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491-92 (Tenn. 2012).

1115
Eddie C. Pratcher, Jr. v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitalsgreen
tenn · 2013 · cited in 11 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2014–2026
2 sentences

2025See Pratcher v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hosps., 407 S.W.3d 727, 739 (Tenn. 2013) (recognizing that an affirmative defense is waived “if not timely raised”); Admin.

2024Resp., 535 S.W.3d 481 , 497 n.9 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting Pratcher v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hosps., 407 S.W.3d 727, 735 (Tenn. 2013)); Moore Freight Servs., Inc. v. Mize, No. E2021-00590-COA-R9-CV, 2022 WL 325595 , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2022) no perm. app. filed (classifying “the doctrine of first material breach of contract” as an affirmative defense).

1111
Carr v. Borchersgreen
tennctapp · 1991 · cited in 11 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1999–2023
2 sentences

2023“When defendants move for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense such as the statute of limitations, they must establish the elements of the affirmative defense before the burden shifts to the nonmovant.” Id. (citing Carr v. Borchers, 815 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Campbell v. Grand Trunk Western R.R.

2020See Harlan v. Hardaway, 796 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (“The non- performance of a condition precedent is an affirmative defense[.]”); see also Acute Care Holdings, LLC v. Houston Cty., No. M2018-01534-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2337434 , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2019) (citing Carr v. Borchers, 815 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)) (placing the burden on the defendant to show the affirmative defense of failure of a condition precedent).

1111
Givens v. Mullikin Ex Rel. McElwaneygreen
tenn · 2002 · cited in 10 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2012–2021
2 sentences

2017"In other words, the plaintiff's own allegations in the complaint must show that an affirmative defense exists and that this defense legally defeats the claim for relief." Id. at 492 (citations omitted).

2012Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383, 404 (Tenn.2002) (quoting Anthony v. Tidwell, 560 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Tenn.1977)). 7 In other words, the plaintiffs own allegations in the complaint must show that an affirmative defense exists and that this defense legally defeats the claim for relief.

1010
Cyrus Deville Wilson v. State of Tennesseegreen
tenn · 2012 · cited in 9 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2012–2022
2 sentences

2022“Although the State bears the burden of raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, its failure to do so does not necessarily result in a waiver” so long as “‘the opposing party is given fair notice of the defense and an opportunity to rebut it.’” Wilson v. State, 367 S.W.3d 229, 234 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995)).

2022“Although the State bears the burden of raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, its failure to do so does not necessarily result in a waiver” so long as “‘the opposing party is given fair notice of the defense and an opportunity to rebut it.’” Wilson v. State, 367 S.W.3d 229, 234 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995)).

99
Myers v. Stategreen
tenn · 1947 · cited in 8 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2006–2016
2 sentences

2016See also Myers v. State, 185 Tenn. 264 , 206 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tenn. 1947) (holding that a defendant is entitled to an affirmative instruction on self-defense if raised by the evidence).

2016See also Myers v. State, 185 Tenn. 264 , 206 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tenn. 1947) (holding that a defendant is entitled to an affirmative instruction on self-defense if raised by the evidence).

88
McIntyre v. Balentinegreen
tenn · 1992 · cited in 21 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1996–2024
2 sentences

2022Cities, 12 S.W.3d 785, 787-88 (Tenn. 2000) (“[F]airness and efficiency require that defendants called upon to answer allegations in negligence be permitted to allege, as an affirmative defense, that a nonparty caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought[.]” (quoting McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992)) (emphasis added). -9- As the nonmoving party, Plaintiff was required in response to Defendant’s motion to “‘do more than simply show that there [was] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts’” and “demonstrate the existence of specific fac

2020The lesser of the award adjusted for the plaintiff’s fault or the statutory cap amount becomes the amount to apportion among the “multiple defendants . . . found liable.” Of course, even when only one defendant is named, the defendant may “allege, as an affirmative defense, that a nonparty caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought,” and if negligence is proven, the jury may “assign this nonparty the percentage of the total negligence for which he is responsible.” McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 58 .

721
George v. Alexandergreen
tenn · 1996 · cited in 10 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1998–2025
2 sentences

2014“An affirmative defense pleads a matter that is not within the plaintiff’s prima facie case.” George v. Alexander, 931 S.W.2d 517, 527 (Tenn. 1996) (citing 2A James W.

2012On appeal, the Supreme Court was presented with the following issue, “whether a defendant in a negligence case must, pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, plead comparative fault as an affirmative defense if the defendant wishes to introduce evidence that a person other than itself caused the plaintiffs injury.” Id. at 518 .

710
George v. Building Materials Corp. of Americagreen
tenn · 2001 · cited in 9 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2004–2020
2 sentences

2013Rather, relying on George v. Building Materials Corp. of Am., 44 S.W.3d 481, 487 (Tenn.2001), it has decided that the trial court reached the correct result because Consultants’s delay in asserting this affirmative defense was “undue.” This is a close call.

2013Rather, relying on George v. Building Materials Corp. of Am., 44 S.W.3d 481, 487 (Tenn. 2001), it has decided that the trial court reached the correct result because Consultants’s delay in asserting this affirmative defense was “undue.” This is a close call.

79
Allied Sound, Inc. v. Neelygreen
tennctapp · 1995 · cited in 9 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1997–2015
2 sentences

2015P. 56.04). “ ‘Generally speaking, a defendant moving for summary judgment may avail itself of one of two avenues: it may negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or it may establish an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, that defeats the claim.’” Doyle v. Town of Oakland, No. W2013-02078-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 3734971 , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2014) (quoting Allied Sound, Inc. v. Neely, 909 S.W.2d 815, 820 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)).

2014“Generally speaking, a defendant moving for summary judgment may avail itself of one of two avenues: it may negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or it may establish an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, that defeats the claim.” Allied Sound, Inc. v. Neely, 909 S.W.2d 815, 820 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

79
Ragsdale v. Hillgreen
tennctapp · 1954 · cited in 7 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2012–2021
77
Thompson, Breeding, Dunn, Creswell & Sparks v. Bowlingreen
tennctapp · 1987 · cited in 7 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1996–2024
2 sentences

2024See Thompson, Breeding, Dunn, Creswell & Sparks v. Bowlin, 765 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (“An affirmative defense is one that wholly or partly avoids the cause of action asserted by the preceding pleading by new allegations that admit part or all of the cause of action, but avoids liability because of a legally sufficient excuse, justification, or other matter negating the alleged breach or wrong.” (quoting LAWRENCE A. PIVNICK, TENNESSEE CIRCUIT COURT PRACTICE § 12:4 (2nd Ed. 1986))).

2015P. 8.03 (―In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmative facts in short and plain terms relied upon to constitute . . . fraud[.]‖); Thompson, Breeding, Dunn, Creswell & Sparks v. Bowlin, 765 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (―In his answer to the complaint, [the defendant] failed to raise any affirmative defenses; therefore, he waived them.‖); see also The Bradley Factor, Inc. v. Holmes, 2004 WL 343966 , at *2 (declining to address defendant‘s fraud in the inducement defense to a claim for breach of contract where the defendant failed to raise fraud as an affirma

67
Allgood v. GATEWAY HEALTH SYSTEMSgreen
tennctapp · 2009 · cited in 7 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2013–2020
67
State v. Simsgreen
tenn · 2001 · cited in 6 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2006–2016
66
Association of Owners of Regency Park Condominiums v. Thomassongreen
tennctapp · 1994 · cited in 6 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2000–2010
56
Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. v. State of Tennesseegreen
tenn · 2013 · cited in 5 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2018–2025
55
Chase v. City of Memphisgreen
tenn · 1998 · cited in 5 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2004–2025
55
Perez v. McConkeygreen
tenn · 1994 · cited in 5 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2000–2016
55
State v. Flakegreen
tenn · 2002 · cited in 13 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2003–2025
2 sentences

2024The State has no obligation to “rebut defense proof of insanity with substantial evidence,” and “[t]he statute places the burden of establishing this affirmative defense squarely on the defendant.” Flake, 88 S.W.3d at 554 ; see T.C.A. § 39-11-501(c) (2014).

2016App. Nov. 21, 2014) (citing State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540, 554 (Tenn. 2002)). -16- (a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of the defendant‟s acts.

413
Blair v. West Town Mallgreen
tenn · 2004 · cited in 9 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2004–2010
2 sentences

2010See Blair v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761 (Tenn.2004).

2010See Blair v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761 (Tenn.2004).

49
Sherrill v. Soudergreen
tenn · 2010 · cited in 5 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2016–2025
45
In Re Audrey S.green
tennctapp · 2005 · cited in 5 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2020–2024
45
ADT Security Services, Inc. v. Johnsongreen
tennctapp · 2009 · cited in 4 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2017–2026
44
Citimortgage, Inc. v. Angeline Renee Drakegreen
tennctapp · 2013 · cited in 4 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2014–2020
44
State v. Shropshiregreen
tenncrimapp · 1993 · cited in 4 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1997–2019
44
C & W ASSET ACQUISITION, LLC, as Assignee of Chrysler First Financial Services Corporation v. Donald H. OGGSgreen
tennctapp · 2007 · cited in 4 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2009–2017
44
State v. Phippsgreen
tenncrimapp · 1994 · cited in 4 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2006–2016
44

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
Ricky HARRIS v. STATE of Tennesseered
tenn · 2010 · cited in 31 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2010–2024
2 sentences

2024A judgment of conviction becomes final “thirty days after its entry in the trial court if no post-trial motions are filed or upon entry of an order disposing of a timely filed, post-trial motion.” Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 144 (Tenn. 2010). “[T]he statute of limitations . . . is not an affirmative defense that must be specifically raised by the State in error coram nobis cases; -6- instead, the . . . petition must show on its face that it is timely filed.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828 .

2024A judgment becomes final “thirty days after its entry in the trial court if no post-trial motions are filed or upon entry of an order disposing of a timely filed, post-trial motion.” Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 144 (Tenn. 2010). “[T]he statute of limitations . . . is not an affirmative defense that must be specifically raised by the State in error coram nobis cases; instead, the . . . petition must show on its face that it is timely filed.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 829 .

131

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co. green
tenn · 1996
61997–2009
Troy Mitchell v. Fayetteville Public Utilities green
tenn · 2012
42016–2025
Austin v. City of Memphis green
tennctapp · 1984
32021–2021
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission green
scotus · 2012
32012–2017
White v. Revco Discount Drug Centers, Inc. green
tenn · 2000
32001–2009
Lewis v. Casenburg green
tenn · 1928
31929–1935

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105 (132) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-103 (116) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 (45) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (41)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 8269 (1902–2026) IL 3182 (1893–2026) NY 3133 (1870–2026) OH 2190 (1904–2026) CA 2170 (1869–2026) FL 1297 (1907–2026) MO 1169 (1890–2025) NC 1063 (1899–2026) PA 1005 (1907–2026) WA 876 (1892–2026) TN 861 (1928–2026) GA 848 (1911–2026) LA 814 (1923–2026) MI 796 (1906–2026) IN 666 (1893–2026) CO 624 (1891–2026) AL 569 (1846–2026) NJ 492 (1934–2026) CT 459 (1914–2026) OR 441 (1882–2026) VA 356 (1922–2026) MS 331 (1906–2026) IA 331 (1895–2026) OK 325 (1911–2026) AZ 323 (1945–2026) MA 305 (1913–2026) ME 282 (1951–2026) UT 273 (1887–2026) SC 269 (1901–2026) AR 262 (1919–2026) MD 260 (1904–2026) NE 254 (1892–2026) WI 230 (1875–2026) NM 229 (1917–2025) MN 221 (1907–2026) KS 213 (1889–2026) MT 212 (1897–2026) KY 198 (1928–2026) ID 197 (1908–2026) DC 183 (1938–2026) DE 182 (1961–2026) ND 166 (1907–2026) RI 144 (1948–2026) VT 139 (1923–2026) HI 136 (1911–2026) NV 131 (1922–2025) WY 127 (1923–2026) WV 114 (1913–2026) AK 114 (1967–2025) SD 108 (1894–2026) NH 92 (1943–2025) VI 45 (1979–2026) MP 7 (1996–2025) PR 6 (1926–2013) GU 4 (2021–2022)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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