affirmative defense in Connecticut

459 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1914–2026 49 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (43)

Case	Followed	Cited
Patterson v. New Yorkgreen scotus · 1977 · cited in 14 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1979–2026 2 sentences 2021Ed. 2d 281 (1977) for the proposition that ‘‘due process does not mandate that the state prove that an accessory to a crime intend that every aggravating element be committed by the principal.’’ In Patterson, the United States Supreme Court declined to declare a New York statute unconsti- tutional.18 The New York statute provides that a defen- dant charged with murder can prove as ‘‘an affirmative defense . . . that the defendant acted under the influ- ence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation—which, if proved by a preponderance of the evidence, would r 2021The issue before the court was ‘‘the constitutionality under the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment’s [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of burdening the defendant in a New York [s]tate murder trial with proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance as defined by New York law.’’ Id., 198 .	4	14
State v. Colemangreen conn · 1987 · cited in 9 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1992–2024 2 sentences 2024In State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631 , 639–40, 508 A.2d 1376 (1986), we established that the statute of limitations in a criminal case is ‘‘generally considered ‘an affirmative defense . . . .’ ’’ State v. Ward, 306 Conn. 698 , 706, 52 A.3d 591 (2012), quoting State v. Coleman, 202 Conn. 86 , 90–91, 519 A.2d 1201 (1987); see General Statutes § 53a-12; see also State v. Swebilius, 325 Conn. 793, 804 , 159 A.3d 1099 (2017) (adopting burden shifting framework). 2024In State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631 , 639–40, 508 A.2d 1376 (1986), we established that the statute of limitations in a criminal case is ‘‘generally considered ‘an affirmative defense . . . .’ ’’ State v. Ward, 306 Conn. 698 , 706, 52 A.3d 591 (2012), quoting State v. Coleman, 202 Conn. 86 , 90–91, 519 A.2d 1201 (1987); see General Statutes § 53a-12; see also State v. Swebilius, 325 Conn. 793, 804 , 159 A.3d 1099 (2017) (adopting burden shifting framework).	4	9
Adesokan v. Bloomfieldgreen conn · 2023 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024	4	4
State v. Littlejohngreen conn · 1986 · cited in 16 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1987–2026 2 sentences 2026See, e.g., Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 222 , 982 A.2d 1053 (2009) (“[c]ollateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that may be waived if not properly pleaded”); Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, 289 Conn. 465, 488 , 958 A.2d 1195 (2008) (“the defendants waived the special defense of federal preemption by failing to plead it”); State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631, 640 , 508 A.2d 1376 (1986) (“[the] better reasoned approach is not to treat the statute of limita- tions as jurisdictional and hence nonwaivable but as an affirmative defense and hence waivable”); Oakland Heights Mobile Pa 2026See, e.g., Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 222 , 982 A.2d 1053 (2009) (“[c]ollateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that may be waived if not properly pleaded”); Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, 289 Conn. 465, 488 , 958 A.2d 1195 (2008) (“the defendants waived the special defense of federal preemption by failing to plead it”); State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631, 640 , 508 A.2d 1376 (1986) (“[the] better reasoned approach is not to treat the statute of limita- tions as jurisdictional and hence nonwaivable but as an affirmative defense and hence waivable”); Oakland Heights Mobile Pa	3	16
State v. Preyergreen conn · 1985 · cited in 10 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1986–2009 2 sentences 2009The defendant acknowledges that he did not raise an objection before the trial court, and, accordingly, seeks to prevail on this unpreserved claim under either State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 5 or the plain error doctrine. 6 35 The state responds that the defendant’s claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Golding because, as this court has stated, “an instructional omission with respect to an affirmative defense such as legal insanity does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 7 Slate v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605, 632 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997); 36 a 2009The defendant acknowledges that he did not raise an objection before the trial court, and, accordingly, seeks to prevail on this unpreserved claim under either State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 5 or the plain error doctrine. 6 35 The state responds that the defendant’s claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Golding because, as this court has stated, “an instructional omission with respect to an affirmative defense such as legal insanity does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 7 Slate v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605, 632 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997); 36 a	3	10
Monczport v. Csongradigreen conn · 1925 · cited in 7 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1987–2018 2 sentences 2018"Privilege is an affirmative defense in a defamation action and must, therefore, be specifically pleaded by the defendant." Miles v. Perry , supra, 11 Conn. App. at 594 n.8, 529 A.2d 199 ; see also Monczport v. Csongradi , 102 Conn. 448 , 450-51, 129 A. 41 (1925) ; Haight v. Cornell , 15 Conn. 74 , 82 (1842). 2018"Privilege is an affirmative defense in a defamation action and must, therefore, be specifically pleaded by the defendant." Miles v. Perry , supra, 11 Conn. App. at 594 n.8, 529 A.2d 199 ; see also Monczport v. Csongradi , 102 Conn. 448 , 450-51, 129 A. 41 (1925) ; Haight v. Cornell , 15 Conn. 74 , 82 (1842).	3	7
Carnese v. Middletongreen connappct · 1992 · cited in 7 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1994–2014 2 sentences 2011See, e.g., Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 222 , 982 A.2d 1053 (2009) (“[collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that may be waived if not properly pleaded”); Sydoriak v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 90 Conn. App. 649, 657 , 879 A.2d 494 (2005) (collateral estoppel claim deemed waived due to failure to plead it as special defense); Carnese v. Middleton, 27 Conn. App. 530, 537 , 608 A.2d 700 (1992) (“[cjollateral estoppel, like res judicata, must be specifically pleaded by a defendant as an affirmative defense”); cf. Practice Book § 10-50 (“res judicata must be specially pleaded” 2011See, e.g., Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 222 , 982 A.2d 1053 (2009) (“[collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that may be waived if not properly pleaded”); Sydoriak v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 90 Conn. App. 649, 657 , 879 A.2d 494 (2005) (collateral estoppel claim deemed waived due to failure to plead it as special defense); Carnese v. Middleton, 27 Conn. App. 530, 537 , 608 A.2d 700 (1992) (“[cjollateral estoppel, like res judicata, must be specifically pleaded by a defendant as an affirmative defense”); cf. Practice Book § 10-50 (“res judicata must be specially pleaded”	3	7
Wilcox v. Webster Insurance, Inc.green conn · 2009 · cited in 5 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2010–2026 2 sentences 2026See, e.g., Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 222 , 982 A.2d 1053 (2009) (“[c]ollateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that may be waived if not properly pleaded”); Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, 289 Conn. 465, 488 , 958 A.2d 1195 (2008) (“the defendants waived the special defense of federal preemption by failing to plead it”); State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631, 640 , 508 A.2d 1376 (1986) (“[the] better reasoned approach is not to treat the statute of limita- tions as jurisdictional and hence nonwaivable but as an affirmative defense and hence waivable”); Oakland Heights Mobile Pa 2026See, e.g., Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 222 , 982 A.2d 1053 (2009) (“[c]ollateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that may be waived if not properly pleaded”); Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, 289 Conn. 465, 488 , 958 A.2d 1195 (2008) (“the defendants waived the special defense of federal preemption by failing to plead it”); State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631, 640 , 508 A.2d 1376 (1986) (“[the] better reasoned approach is not to treat the statute of limita- tions as jurisdictional and hence nonwaivable but as an affirmative defense and hence waivable”); Oakland Heights Mobile Pa	3	5
Alteri v. Laytongreen connsuperct · 1979 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1998–2002	3	4
Faragher v. City of Boca Ratongreen scotus · 1998 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2019–2024	3	3
Miles v. Perrygreen connappct · 1987 · cited in 15 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1992–2018 2 sentences 2018Although a conditional or qualified privilege is an affirmative defense in a defamation action and must be specially pleaded; Miles v. Perry , 11 Conn. App. 584 , 594 n.8, 529 A.2d 199 (1987) ; the litigation privilege implicates a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. 2018Although a conditional or qualified privilege is an affirmative defense in a defamation action and must be specially pleaded; Miles v. Perry , 11 Conn. App. 584 , 594 n.8, 529 A.2d 199 (1987) ; the litigation privilege implicates a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.	2	15
State v. Aligreen conn · 1995 · cited in 8 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1999–2021 2 sentences 2021In State v. Ali, 233 Conn. 403 , 660 A.2d 337 (1995), we explained that ‘‘satisfie[d]’’ is the appropriate term to describe the state’s meeting such obligation under § 54-193 (b) and that ‘‘[o]nly § 54-193 (c) specifically concerns the tolling of the statute of limitations.’’ Id., 413 n.8. 7 Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and Crawford had failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the warrant was not served with due diligence, this court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Crawford’s motion to dismiss. 2021In State v. Ali, 233 Conn. 403 , 660 A.2d 337 (1995), we explained that ‘‘satisfie[d]’’ is the appropriate term to describe the state’s meeting such obligation under § 54-193 (b) and that ‘‘[o]nly § 54-193 (c) specifically concerns the tolling of the statute of limitations.’’ Id., 413 n.8. 7 Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and Crawford had failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the warrant was not served with due diligence, this court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Crawford’s motion to dismiss.	2	8
State v. Foreshawgreen conn · 1990 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1997–2009 2 sentences 2009The defendant acknowledges that he did not raise an objection before the trial court, and, accordingly, seeks to prevail on this unpreserved claim under either State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 5 or the plain error doctrine. 6 35 The state responds that the defendant’s claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Golding because, as this court has stated, “an instructional omission with respect to an affirmative defense such as legal insanity does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 7 Slate v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605, 632 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997); 36 a 2009The defendant acknowledges that he did not raise an objection before the trial court, and, accordingly, seeks to prevail on this unpreserved claim under either State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 5 or the plain error doctrine. 6 35 The state responds that the defendant’s claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Golding because, as this court has stated, “an instructional omission with respect to an affirmative defense such as legal insanity does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 7 Slate v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605, 632 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997); 36 a	2	6
State v. Raygreen conn · 2009 · cited in 5 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2011–2020	2	5
State v. Hartgreen conn · 1992 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1999–2018	2	4
Sydoriak v. Zoning Board of Appealsgreen connappct · 2005 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2009–2014	2	4
State v. Hawthornegreen conn · 1978 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1983–2012	2	4
New England Savings Bank v. Bedford Realty Corp.green conn · 1998 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2001–2023	2	3
State v. Pattersongreen conn · 1994 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1995–2019	2	3
Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc.green conn · 1982 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1996–2005	2	3
State v. Elliottgreen conn · 1979 · cited in 18 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1980–2025 2 sentences 2018In State v. Elliott , 177 Conn. 1 , 7, 411 A.2d 3 (1979), this court observed that the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, as set forth in § 53a-54a (a), "is a considerably expanded version of the common-law defense of heat of passion or sudden provocation." We explained: "It is evident from a reading of § 53a-54a (a) that the defense does not require a provoking or triggering event; or that the homicidal act occur immediately after the cause or causes of the defendant's extreme emotional disturbance; or that the defendant have lost all ability to reason.... 2018In State v. Elliott , 177 Conn. 1 , 7, 411 A.2d 3 (1979), this court observed that the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, as set forth in § 53a-54a (a), "is a considerably expanded version of the common-law defense of heat of passion or sudden provocation." We explained: "It is evident from a reading of § 53a-54a (a) that the defense does not require a provoking or triggering event; or that the homicidal act occur immediately after the cause or causes of the defendant's extreme emotional disturbance; or that the defendant have lost all ability to reason....	1	18
Miranda v. Arizonagreen scotus · 1966 · cited in 12 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1987–2003 2 sentences 1995Section 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “murder. (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prose cution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s 1995Section 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “murder. (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prose cution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s	1	12
State v. Crawfordgreen conn · 1987 · cited in 11 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1992–2019 2 sentences 2017In Crawford , we simply held that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense in Connecticut, such that a defendant is required to present some evidence "concerning the reason for the delay in the execution of the warrant ...." State v. Crawford , supra, 202 Conn. at 451 , 521 A.2d 1034 . 2017In Crawford , we simply held that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense in Connecticut, such that a defendant is required to present some evidence "concerning the reason for the delay in the execution of the warrant ...." State v. Crawford , supra, 202 Conn. at 451 , 521 A.2d 1034 .	1	11
State v. Persongreen conn · 1996 · cited in 10 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1997–2025 2 sentences 2025Accordingly, we must determine whether the prose- cutors’ comments misstated the requirements of the extreme emotional disturbance defense and whether any misstatement constituted prosecutorial impropri- ety that deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. ‘‘Section 53a-54a (a), in defining the crime of murder, excepts, as an affirmative defense, a homi- cide committed by a defendant who acts ‘under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the rea- sonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a 2025Accordingly, we must determine whether the prose- cutors’ comments misstated the requirements of the extreme emotional disturbance defense and whether any misstatement constituted prosecutorial impropri- ety that deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. ‘‘Section 53a-54a (a), in defining the crime of murder, excepts, as an affirmative defense, a homi- cide committed by a defendant who acts ‘under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the rea- sonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a	1	10
State v. Raguseogreen conn · 1993 · cited in 9 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1993–2009 2 sentences 2009Cf. State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 122 , 622 A.2d 519 (1993) (“the ultimate determination of the presence or absence of [the affirmative defense of] extreme emotional disturbance [is] one of fact for the trier, aided by the expert testimony of both sides, but left to its own factual determinations” [internal quotation marks omitted]). 2009Cf. State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 122 , 622 A.2d 519 (1993) (“the ultimate determination of the presence or absence of [the affirmative defense of] extreme emotional disturbance [is] one of fact for the trier, aided by the expert testimony of both sides, but left to its own factual determinations” [internal quotation marks omitted]).	1	9
State v. Zdanisgreen conn · 1980 · cited in 8 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1982–2021 2 sentences 2021Paramount among these is that, because insanity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that, as a result of his psychotic condition at the time of the offense, he ‘‘lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect . . . to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-13 (a); see also General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) (‘‘[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a prep 2021Paramount among these is that, because insanity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that, as a result of his psychotic condition at the time of the offense, he ‘‘lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect . . . to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-13 (a); see also General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) (‘‘[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a prep	1	8
State v. Cassinogreen conn · 1982 · cited in 8 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1982–2011 2 sentences 1985The burden of proof applicable to the claimed defense is recited in § 53a-12 (a) of the General Statutes, which provides: ‘(a) When a defense other than an affirmative defense, is raised at a trial, the state shall have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Emphasis added.)” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Cassino, 188 Conn. 237, 241 , 449 A.2d 154 (1982). “ ‘A defendant must, however, assert a recognized legal defense before such a charge will become obligatory.’ State v. Rosado, [ 178 Conn. 704, 707 , 425 A.2d 108 (1979)]. 1985The burden of proof applicable to the claimed defense is recited in § 53a-12 (a) of the General Statutes, which provides: ‘(a) When a defense other than an affirmative defense, is raised at a trial, the state shall have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Emphasis added.)” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Cassino, 188 Conn. 237, 241 , 449 A.2d 154 (1982). “ ‘A defendant must, however, assert a recognized legal defense before such a charge will become obligatory.’ State v. Rosado, [ 178 Conn. 704, 707 , 425 A.2d 108 (1979)].	1	8
State v. Forrestgreen conn · 1990 · cited in 7 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1990–2025 2 sentences 2025The defendant must establish two elements to prove the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, namely, that (1) he ‘‘committed the offense under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance,’’ Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 12 ,0 0 Conn. 46 State v. Henderson and (2) ‘‘there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for [his] extreme emotional disturbance.’’ State v. For- rest, 216 Conn. 139, 148 , 578 A.2d 1066 (1990); see also State v. Person, supra, 351 . 2025The defendant must establish two elements to prove the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, namely, that (1) he ‘‘committed the offense under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance,’’ Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 12 ,0 0 Conn. 46 State v. Henderson and (2) ‘‘there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for [his] extreme emotional disturbance.’’ State v. For- rest, 216 Conn. 139, 148 , 578 A.2d 1066 (1990); see also State v. Person, supra, 351 .	1	7
State v. Joynergreen conn · 1993 · cited in 7 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1995–2025 2 sentences 1997General Statutes § 53a-13 (a) provides: “In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time he committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his con duct within the requirements of the law.” This affirmative defense statute differs from § 53a-54a (b) in that it “shifts to the defendant the burden of establishing his or her mental status only with respect to the affirmative defense of insanity. 4 The statute does not 1997General Statutes § 53a-13 (a) provides: “In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time he committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his con duct within the requirements of the law.” This affirmative defense statute differs from § 53a-54a (b) in that it “shifts to the defendant the burden of establishing his or her mental status only with respect to the affirmative defense of insanity. 4 The statute does not	1	7
Marshall v. District of Columbiagreen scotus · 1981 · cited in 7 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1984–2021 2 sentences 2021Paramount among these is that, because insanity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that, as a result of his psychotic condition at the time of the offense, he ‘‘lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect . . . to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-13 (a); see also General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) (‘‘[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a prep 1995Griffith further testified that the majority of the information that he used in his evaluation came from seven and one-half hours of interviews with the defendant. 5 Some of the information relayed to Griffith by the defendant was inconsistent with testimony produced at trial from other witnesses, and some of the testimony revealed facts that were not known by Griffith. 6 Section 53a-54a provides that “it shall be an affirmative defense [to a charge of murder] that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reas	1	7
Johnson v. Overberggreen scotus · 1981 · cited in 7 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1984–2021 2 sentences 2021Paramount among these is that, because insanity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that, as a result of his psychotic condition at the time of the offense, he ‘‘lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect . . . to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-13 (a); see also General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) (‘‘[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a prep 1995Griffith further testified that the majority of the information that he used in his evaluation came from seven and one-half hours of interviews with the defendant. 5 Some of the information relayed to Griffith by the defendant was inconsistent with testimony produced at trial from other witnesses, and some of the testimony revealed facts that were not known by Griffith. 6 Section 53a-54a provides that “it shall be an affirmative defense [to a charge of murder] that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reas	1	7
State v. Ortizgreen conn · 1991 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1991–1999 2 sentences 1994General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) provides: “When a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The defendant was hospitalized at Whiting from March 2, 1989, until August 1, 1989. “[T]he determination of the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse for the emotional disturbance must be measured from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.” State v. Steiger, supra, 218 Conn. 385 ; see 1994General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) provides: “When a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The defendant was hospitalized at Whiting from March 2, 1989, until August 1, 1989. “[T]he determination of the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse for the emotional disturbance must be measured from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.” State v. Steiger, supra, 218 Conn. 385 ; see	1	6
Hill v. Lockhartgreen scotus · 1985 · cited in 5 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1999–2017	1	5
State v. Rouleaugreen conn · 1987 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1992–2015	1	4
State v. Wilsongreen conn · 1997 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1998–2015	1	4
State v. Figueroagreen conn · 1995 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1996–2011	1	4
State v. Suggsgreen conn · 1989 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1990–2009	1	4
Zachs v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen connappct · 2021 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2024–2026	1	3
State v. Bellegreen conn · 1990 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1993–2025	1	3
State v. Steigergreen conn · 1991 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1993–2019	1	3

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

Case	Negative	Cited
Carnese v. Middletongreen connappct · 1992 · cited in 7 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1994–2014 2 sentences 2011See, e.g., Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 222 , 982 A.2d 1053 (2009) (“[collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that may be waived if not properly pleaded”); Sydoriak v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 90 Conn. App. 649, 657 , 879 A.2d 494 (2005) (collateral estoppel claim deemed waived due to failure to plead it as special defense); Carnese v. Middleton, 27 Conn. App. 530, 537 , 608 A.2d 700 (1992) (“[cjollateral estoppel, like res judicata, must be specifically pleaded by a defendant as an affirmative defense”); cf. Practice Book § 10-50 (“res judicata must be specially pleaded” 2011See, e.g., Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 222 , 982 A.2d 1053 (2009) (“[collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that may be waived if not properly pleaded”); Sydoriak v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 90 Conn. App. 649, 657 , 879 A.2d 494 (2005) (collateral estoppel claim deemed waived due to failure to plead it as special defense); Carnese v. Middleton, 27 Conn. App. 530, 537 , 608 A.2d 700 (1992) (“[cjollateral estoppel, like res judicata, must be specifically pleaded by a defendant as an affirmative defense”); cf. Practice Book § 10-50 (“res judicata must be specially pleaded”	1	7

Also cited on this issue (37)

Case	Cited	Years
State v. Asherman green conn · 1984 2 sentences 2000General Statutes § 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “Murder, (a) . . . [I]n any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be . . . .” Extreme emotional disturbance is “a mitigating circumstance which will reduce the crime of murder to mans 2000General Statutes § 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “Murder, (a) . . . [I]n any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be . . . .” Extreme emotional disturbance is “a mitigating circumstance which will reduce the crime of murder to mans	12	1986–2000
Basham v. Kentucky green scotus · 1985 2 sentences 2000General Statutes § 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “Murder, (a) . . . [I]n any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be . . . .” Extreme emotional disturbance is “a mitigating circumstance which will reduce the crime of murder to mans 1998Section 53a-54a (a) provides in pertinent part that “it shall be an affirmative defense [to the crime of murder] that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be . . . .” We have held that “[e]xtreme emo tional disturbance ‘is a mitigating circumstance which will reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter.’ ” Stat	12	1986–2000
Asherman v. Connecticut green scotus · 1985 2 sentences 2000General Statutes § 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “Murder, (a) . . . [I]n any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be . . . .” Extreme emotional disturbance is “a mitigating circumstance which will reduce the crime of murder to mans 1998Section 53a-54a (a) provides in pertinent part that “it shall be an affirmative defense [to the crime of murder] that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be . . . .” We have held that “[e]xtreme emo tional disturbance ‘is a mitigating circumstance which will reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter.’ ” Stat	12	1986–2000
James v. Cohen green scotus · 1985 2 sentences 2000General Statutes § 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “Murder, (a) . . . [I]n any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be . . . .” Extreme emotional disturbance is “a mitigating circumstance which will reduce the crime of murder to mans 1998Section 53a-54a (a) provides in pertinent part that “it shall be an affirmative defense [to the crime of murder] that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be . . . .” We have held that “[e]xtreme emo tional disturbance ‘is a mitigating circumstance which will reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter.’ ” Stat	11	1987–2000
Copas v. Commissioner of Correction green conn · 1995 2 sentences 2016To act intentionally, the defendant must have had the conscious objective to cause the death of the victim." (Citation omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aviles, 107 Conn.App. 209 , 217, 944 A.2d 994 , cert. denied, 287 Conn. 922 , 951 A.2d 570 (2008). "[T]he inability to control one's conduct within the requirements of the law that is not induced by voluntary intoxication is an affirmative defense [to murder pursuant to § 53a-13 ]." Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, 234 Conn. 139 , 162, 662 A.2d 718 (1995). 2016To act intentionally, the defendant must have had the conscious objective to cause the death of the victim." (Citation omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aviles, 107 Conn.App. 209 , 217, 944 A.2d 994 , cert. denied, 287 Conn. 922 , 951 A.2d 570 (2008). "[T]he inability to control one's conduct within the requirements of the law that is not induced by voluntary intoxication is an affirmative defense [to murder pursuant to § 53a-13 ]." Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, 234 Conn. 139 , 162, 662 A.2d 718 (1995).	10	1998–2016
State v. Evans green conn · 1973 2 sentences 2009In the absence of a timely request or exception, failure to charge on an affirmative defense is reviewable as an exceptional circumstance within the doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973), only when the defendant can demonstrate that he ‘has clearly been deprived of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial,’ or under Practice Book § [60-5] as plain error. 2009In the absence of a timely request or exception, failure to charge on an affirmative defense is reviewable as an exceptional circumstance within the doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973), only when the defendant can demonstrate that he ‘has clearly been deprived of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial,’ or under Practice Book § [60-5] as plain error.	10	1983–2009
Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction green conn · 2008 2 sentences 2017"When a respondent seeks to raise an affirmative defense of procedural default, the rules of practice require that he or she must file a return to the habeas petition 'alleg[ing] any facts in support of any claim of procedural default ... or any other claim that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.' Practice Book § 23-30(b). 'If the return alleges any defense or claim that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, and such allegations are not put in dispute by the petition, the petitioner shall file a reply.' Practice Book § 23-31(a). 'The reply shall allege any facts and assert any cause 2017"When a respondent seeks to raise an affirmative defense of procedural default, the rules of practice require that he or she must file a return to the habeas petition 'alleg[ing] any facts in support of any claim of procedural default ... or any other claim that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.' Practice Book § 23-30(b). 'If the return alleges any defense or claim that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, and such allegations are not put in dispute by the petition, the petitioner shall file a reply.' Practice Book § 23-31(a). 'The reply shall allege any facts and assert any cause	6	2009–2017
Henry v. Commissioner of Correction green connappct · 2000 2 sentences 2001Similarly, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the prejudice inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henry v. Commissioner of Correction, 60 Conn. App. 313, 318 , 759 A.2d 118 (2000); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S. Ct. 366 , 88 L. 2001Similarly, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the prejudice inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henry v. Commissioner of Correction, 60 Conn. App. 313, 318 , 759 A.2d 118 (2000); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S. Ct. 366 , 88 L.	6	2000–2001
Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction green conn · 2009	5	2015–2022
State v. Woodtke green connappct · 2011	5	2015–2019
Holloway v. Commissioner of Correction green conn · 2002	4	2004–2020
State v. Ortiz green conn · 2002	4	2004–2020
State v. Ortiz green connappct · 2002	4	2004–2020
Mullaney v. Wilbur green scotus · 1975	4	1976–2018
State v. Golding green conn · 1989	4	1992–2009
State v. Whistnant green conn · 1980	4	1983–2002
State v. Arroyo green conn · 1980	4	1989–1999
Bumpus v. Gunter green scotus · 1981	4	1984–1996
Leland v. Oregon green scotus · 1952	4	1976–1994
Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc. green scotus · 1980	3	1991–2025
Casassa v. New York green scotus · 1980	3	1991–2025
Allen v. Alabama green scotus · 1980	3	1991–2025
People v. Casassa green ny · 1980	3	1991–2025
State v. Coughlin green conn · 2001	3	2015–2024
In re Mariah S. green conn · 2001	3	2015–2024
State v. Harrison green connappct · 1994	3	2001–2024
State v. Coughlin green connappct · 2000	3	2015–2024
ST. PAUL TRAVELERS COMPANIES, INC. v. Kuehl green conn · 2011	3	2015–2024
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth green scotus · 1998	3	2001–2019
State v. Small green conn · 1997	3	2002–2017
State v. D'ANTUONO green conn · 1982	3	1987–2017
State v. Fair green conn · 1985	3	1991–2003
Edwards v. Wainwright green scotus · 1986	3	1991–2003
Gadd v. News-Press Publishing Co. green scotus · 1986	3	1991–2003
Hamm v. DeKalb County green scotus · 1986	3	1991–2003
Bradford v. Herzig green connappct · 1994	3	1997–1998
North Carolina v. Alford green scotus · 1970	3	1992–1994

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a (122) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199 (91) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-12 (64) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-134 (45) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-13 (42) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54c (39) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-48 (37) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-55 (36) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-3 (35) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-49 (35) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-70 (35) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-21 (30)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 8269 (1902–2026) IL 3182 (1893–2026) NY 3133 (1870–2026) OH 2190 (1904–2026) CA 2170 (1869–2026) FL 1297 (1907–2026) MO 1169 (1890–2025) NC 1063 (1899–2026) PA 1005 (1907–2026) WA 876 (1892–2026) TN 861 (1928–2026) GA 848 (1911–2026) LA 814 (1923–2026) MI 796 (1906–2026) IN 666 (1893–2026) CO 624 (1891–2026) AL 569 (1846–2026) NJ 492 (1934–2026) CT 459 (1914–2026) OR 441 (1882–2026) VA 356 (1922–2026) MS 331 (1906–2026) IA 331 (1895–2026) OK 325 (1911–2026) AZ 323 (1945–2026) MA 305 (1913–2026) ME 282 (1951–2026) UT 273 (1887–2026) SC 269 (1901–2026) AR 262 (1919–2026) MD 260 (1904–2026) NE 254 (1892–2026) WI 230 (1875–2026) NM 229 (1917–2025) MN 221 (1907–2026) KS 213 (1889–2026) MT 212 (1897–2026) KY 198 (1928–2026) ID 197 (1908–2026) DC 183 (1938–2026) DE 182 (1961–2026) ND 166 (1907–2026) RI 144 (1948–2026) VT 139 (1923–2026) HI 136 (1911–2026) NV 131 (1922–2025) WY 127 (1923–2026) WV 114 (1913–2026) AK 114 (1967–2025) SD 108 (1894–2026) NH 92 (1943–2025) VI 45 (1979–2026) MP 7 (1996–2025) PR 6 (1926–2013) GU 4 (2021–2022)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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