325 Oklahoma opinions name it 4 courts 1911–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shaffer v. Jefferygreen2 sentences2013Shoffer explained a right to arbitrate arises from a written contract and is treated as an affirmative defense and that right (to compel arbitration) may also be waived; thus, that right "does not fit within the category of a traditional challenge to a district court's subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at ¶7, 915 P.2d at 913 . 2010See, e.g., Shaffer v. Jeffery, 1996 OK 47, ¶ 7 , 915 P.2d 910, 913 ("The affirmative defense of an agreement to arbitrate is not the same thing as lack of subject matter jurisdiction."). | 5 | 9 |
Furr v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2021However, having waited until the morning of trial--and more than ten months after the deadline for dispositive motions--we find that Merrell waived any argument it may have had based on federal preemption. 3 Furr v. Thomas , 1991 OK 93 , ¶ 23 817 P.2d 1268, 1272 ("The failure to plead an affirmative defense operates as a waiver of that defense."). 2021However, having waited until the morning of trial--and more than ten months after the deadline for dispositive motions--we find that Merrell waived any argument it may have had based on federal preemption. 3 Furr v. Thomas , 1991 OK 93 , ¶ 23 817 P.2d 1268, 1272 ("The failure to plead an affirmative defense operates as a waiver of that defense."). | 4 | 5 |
Pryse Monument Co. v. District Court of Kay Countygreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Sommer v. Sommer, 1997 OK 123 , 947 P.2d 512, 522 (Opala, J., dissenting); Pryse Monument Company v. District Court of Kay County, 1979 OK 71 , 595 P.2d 435, 437-38 (when a case is terminated as time-barred, the disposition is "on the merits" because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense). 2008See, e.g., Sommer v. Sommer, 1997 OK 123 , 947 P.2d 512, 522 (Opala, J., dissenting); Pryse Monument Company v. District Court of Kay County, 1979 OK 71 , 595 P.2d 435, 437-38 (when a case is terminated as time-barred, the disposition is "on the merits" because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense). | 4 | 4 |
Akin v. Missouri Pacific Railroadgreen2 sentences2020See also FDIC v. Tidwell , 1991 OK 119 , 820 P.2d 1338, 1341 (adjudication of a cause of action includes adjudication of a legally cognizable defense to the cause of action). 37 McGee v. Alexander , 2001 OK 78 , ¶ 23, 37 P.3d 800, 806 (the absence of any one element used to define a cause of action is enough to defeat this action); Akin v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. , 1998 OK 102 , ¶ 9, 977 P.2d 1040, 1044 (a defendant must show either the absence of at least one essential element to plaintiff's cause of action, or the presence of all elements necessary to an affirmative defense to the ca 2020See also FDIC v. Tidwell , 1991 OK 119 , 820 P.2d 1338, 1341 (adjudication of a cause of action includes adjudication of a legally cognizable defense to the cause of action). 37 McGee v. Alexander , 2001 OK 78 , ¶ 23, 37 P.3d 800, 806 (the absence of any one element used to define a cause of action is enough to defeat this action); Akin v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. , 1998 OK 102 , ¶ 9, 977 P.2d 1040, 1044 (a defendant must show either the absence of at least one essential element to plaintiff's cause of action, or the presence of all elements necessary to an affirmative defense to the ca | 3 | 14 |
Daugherty v. Farmers Cooperative Ass'ngreen2 sentences1996When a defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense, “he must show that there is no substantial controversy as to facts that are material to the affirmative defense, and that the facts and inferences that may be reasonably drawn- from them are in his favor.” Daugherty v. Farmers Cooperative Association, 689 P.2d 947, 949 (Okla.1984). 1995When a “defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense he must show that there is no substantial controversy as to facts that are material to the affirmative defense, and that the facts and inferences that may be reasonably drawn from them are in his favor.” Daugherty v. Farmers Cooperative Assoc., 689 P.2d 947, 949 (Okl.1984). | 3 | 4 |
Schulte v. Starrittgreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Schulte v. Starritt, 1940 OK 479 , 110 P.2d 611, 612 ("If the defense, whether specifically pleaded, or asserted under a general denial, does not merely negative the title and right of possession of plaintiff, but seeks to avoid it by proof of a new and distinct proposition or state of facts, such defense is affirmative in its nature."). [38] Securities and Exchange Commission v. Elliott, 953 F.2d at 1572 , citing, Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160 , 56 S.Ct. 696, 698 , 80 L.Ed. 1114 (1936). [39] Securities and Exchange Commission v. Elliott, 953 F.2d at 15 2010See, e.g., Schulte v. Starritt, 1940 OK 749 , 110 P.2d 611, 612 ("If the defense, whether specifically pleaded, or asserted under a general denial, does not merely negative the title and right of possession of plaintiff, but seeks to avoid it by proof of a new and distinct proposition or state of facts, such defense is affirmative in its nature."). [38] Securities and Exchange Commission v. Elliott, 953 F.2d at 1572 , citing, Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160 , 56 S.Ct. 696, 698 , 80 L.Ed. 1114 (1936). [39] Securities and Exchange Commission v. Elliott, 953 F.2d at 15 | 3 | 3 |
Martin v. Chapel, Wilkinson, Riggs, and Abneygreen2 sentences1999To prevail, they were required to “show that there is no substantial controversy as to the facts that are material to the affirmative defense and that the facts and inferences that may reasonably be drawn from them are in [their] favor.” Martin v. Chapel, Wilkinson, Riggs, and Abney, 1981 OK 134, ¶ 7 , 637 P.2d 81, 84 (footnote omitted). 1999To prevail, they were required to “show that there is no substantial controversy as to the facts that are material to the affirmative defense and that the facts and inferences that may reasonably be drawn from them are in [their] favor.” Martin v. Chapel, Wilkinson, Riggs, and Abney, 1981 OK 134, ¶ 7 , 637 P.2d 81, 84 (footnote omitted). | 2 | 5 |
West v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., West v. State, 1990 OK CR 61, ¶ 6 , 798 P.2d 1083 (“Self-defense is an affirmative defense which must be raised by die defendant....”) (citation omitted); Id. ¶ 7 ("Self-defense is not available to a person who is the aggressor or who enters into mutual combat.’’) (citation omitted). 15 . 2016See, e.g., West v. State, 1990 OK CR 61, ¶ 6 , 798 P.2d 1083 (“Self-defense is an affirmative defense which must be raised by die defendant....”) (citation omitted); Id. ¶ 7 ("Self-defense is not available to a person who is the aggressor or who enters into mutual combat.’’) (citation omitted). 15 . | 2 | 4 |
Long v. DeGeergreen2 sentences2011See Shaffer v. Jeffery, 1996 OK 47, ¶ 6 , 915 P.2d 910, 913 . *907 115 "[Clourts generally look with favor upon arbitration provisions as a shorteut to substantial justice with a minimum of court interference." Long v. DeGeer, 1987 OK 104, ¶ 5 , 753 P.2d 1327, 1328 . 2011See Shaffer v. Jeffery, 1996 OK 47, ¶ 6 , 915 P.2d 910, 913 . *907 115 "[Clourts generally look with favor upon arbitration provisions as a shorteut to substantial justice with a minimum of court interference." Long v. DeGeer, 1987 OK 104, ¶ 5 , 753 P.2d 1327, 1328 . | 2 | 3 |
| McHam v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| McGee v. Alexandergreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Haughtgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Sparegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Commonwealth v. Dorseygreen | 2 | 2 |
| Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commissiongreen | 2 | 2 |
| Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminarygreen | 2 | 2 |
| Wipf v. Hutterville Hutterian Brethren, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Digital Design Group, Inc. v. Information Builders, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Johnson v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentistsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Lowden v. Northwestern National Bank & Trust Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| cluster 576211green | 2 | 2 |
| In the Matter of Robert Dale Johnson, Bankrupt. Bruce Goldstein, Successor to S. David Rubenstein, Receiver in Bankruptcy v. McLean Bankgreen | 2 | 2 |
| In the Matter of the Bohack Corporation, Debtor-In-Possession. The Bohack Corporation v. Borden, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| White v. Tullahassee Realty Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| Morewitz v. West of England Ship Owners Mutual Protection & Indemnity Ass'n (Luxembourg)green | 2 | 2 |
| Valega v. City of Oklahoma Citygreen | 2 | 2 |
| Red Eagle v. Freegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Loffland Bros. Co. v. Overstreetgreen | 2 | 2 |
Runyon v. Reidgreen2 sentences2003Japan, 1981 OK 42, ¶ 11 , 627 P.2d 439, 441 ; Runyon v. Reid, 1973 OK 25, ¶¶ 12-13 , 510 P.2d 943, 946 . ¶ 32 On the other hand, when the defendant, as here also, relies upon an affirmative defense, then the defendant, as the party with the burden of proof, must meet the same standards as a plaintiff movant. 2003Japan, 1981 OK 42, ¶ 11 , 627 P.2d 439, 441 ; Runyon v. Reid, 1973 OK 25, ¶¶ 12-13 , 510 P.2d 943, 946 . ¶ 32 On the other hand, when the defendant, as here also, relies upon an affirmative defense, then the defendant, as the party with the burden of proof, must meet the same standards as a plaintiff movant. | 1 | 6 |
Special Indemnity Fund v. Choategreen2 sentences2002Special Indemnity Fund v. Choate, 1993 OK 15 , 847 P.2d 796 . 2002Special Indemnity Fund v. Choate, 1993 OK 15 , 847 P.2d 796 . | 1 | 4 |
Moneypenney v. Dawsongreen2 sentences2011O.R. at 749-750 Generally, a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which a defendant must plead and prove, Moneypenney v. Dawson, 2006 OK 53, ¶ 2 , 141 P.3d 549, 551 , and a determination on a limitations issue is a determination on the merits, State ex rel. 2011O.R. at 749-750 Generally, a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which a defendant must plead and prove, Moneypenney v. Dawson, 2006 OK 53, ¶ 2 , 141 P.3d 549, 551 , and a determination on a limitations issue is a determination on the merits, State ex rel. | 1 | 3 |
Norman v. Stategreen2 sentences1992Id. ' In the present case, the only evidence of Appellant’s intoxication came from his own statement to the police that he “had been drinking and utilizing drugs from between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. until about 10:30 p.m.” (Tr. 380-381) This is contrasted with Appellant’s detailed confession to the offenses. 1992Id. | 1 | 3 |
| Liberty Bank & Trust Co. of Oklahoma City, N.A. v. Bachrachgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Million v. Milliongreen | 1 | 2 |
| Lockhart v. Loosengreen | 1 | 2 |
| Leach v. Hamilton Trucking Co.green | 1 | 2 |
| Grove v. Morgangreen | 1 | 2 |
| Flick v. Crouchgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nealis v. Baird
green
2 sentences2009T6 Plaintiff responded by arguing the proper court to determine Decedent's heirs was the still pending action in the probate court in McClain County. 1 He further points out Defendant was not a party to the workers' compensation action and thus is precluded from relying on issue preclusion as an affirmative defense, citing Nealis v. Baird, 1999 OK 98 , 996 P.2d 438 . 17 In Nealis, the defendants contended that by the verdict in their favor in the plaintiffs' personal injury action, the jury absolved them of any negligence in connection with the plaintiffs prenatal care. 2009T6 Plaintiff responded by arguing the proper court to determine Decedent's heirs was the still pending action in the probate court in McClain County. 1 He further points out Defendant was not a party to the workers' compensation action and thus is precluded from relying on issue preclusion as an affirmative defense, citing Nealis v. Baird, 1999 OK 98 , 996 P.2d 438 . 17 In Nealis, the defendants contended that by the verdict in their favor in the plaintiffs' personal injury action, the jury absolved them of any negligence in connection with the plaintiffs prenatal care. | 4 | 2002–2014 |
Turpen v. State
neutral
2 sentences1970Crossett v. State, 96 Okl.Cr. 209 , 252 P.2d 150 ; Turpen v. State, 89 Okl.Cr. 6 , 204 P.2d 298 . 1970Crossett v. State, 96 Okl.Cr. 209 , 252 P.2d 150 ; Turpen v. State, 89 Okl.Cr. 6 , 204 P.2d 298 . | 4 | 1952–1970 |
Ex Parte Scherer
neutral
2 sentences1928L. section 127, page 115, we find this statement: “Under the code system of pleadings, payment is new matter constituting a defense, ánd must be pleaded by the defendant, and it cannot be proven under a general denial, either in bar or mitigation of recovery.” This court has concisely stated this rule in the case of Standard Fashion Co. v. Joels, 60 Okla. 195 , 159 Pac. 846 , as follows : “Payment is an affirmative defense, and to be available, must be expressly pleaded. 1918In 30 Cyc. 1253 (B) it is said: “Nonpayment need not be alleged in the complaint.” In Standard Fashion Co. v. Joels, 60 Okla. 195 , 159 Pac. 846 , it is held: “Payment is an affirmative defense, and, to be available, must be expressly pleaded. | 4 | 1918–1939 |
Standard Fashion Co. v. Joels
neutral
2 sentences1928L. section 127, page 115, we find this statement: “Under the code system of pleadings, payment is new matter constituting a defense, ánd must be pleaded by the defendant, and it cannot be proven under a general denial, either in bar or mitigation of recovery.” This court has concisely stated this rule in the case of Standard Fashion Co. v. Joels, 60 Okla. 195 , 159 Pac. 846 , as follows : “Payment is an affirmative defense, and to be available, must be expressly pleaded. 1918In 30 Cyc. 1253 (B) it is said: “Nonpayment need not be alleged in the complaint.” In Standard Fashion Co. v. Joels, 60 Okla. 195 , 159 Pac. 846 , it is held: “Payment is an affirmative defense, and, to be available, must be expressly pleaded. | 4 | 1918–1939 |
Upham Shoe Co. v. Pollard
neutral
2 sentences1935The defense of payment is not admissible under a general denial where proper objections are made to the introduction of testimony tend-' ing to establish such defense of payment.” Also, the case of Upham Shoe Co. v. Pollard, 111 Okla. 228 , 239 P. 244 , held: “Payment is an affirmative defense, and to be available must be expressly pleaded. 1935The defense of payment is not admissible under a general denial where proper objections are made to the introduction of testimony tend-' ing to establish such defense of payment.” Also, the case of Upham Shoe Co. v. Pollard, 111 Okla. 228 , 239 P. 244 , held: “Payment is an affirmative defense, and to be available must be expressly pleaded. | 4 | 1927–1936 |
Bickerstaff v. State
green
2 sentences2013See Cooper v. State, 1991 OK CR 26, 113 , 806 P.2d 1136, 1139 ; Mornes v. State, 1988 OK CR 78, ¶ 13 , 755 P.2d 91, 95 ; Bickerstaff v. State, 1983 OK CR 116, ¶ 10 , 669 P.2d 778, 780 . . 1984The sentences he received in each were designated to run concurrent with one another. 3 .In Bickerstaff v. State, 669 P.2d 778 (Okl.Cr.1983), we held that the issue of whether a defendant’s prior felony convictions arose out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of events, closely related in time and location under Section 51(B) constitutes an affirmative defense which must be raised by the defendant at trial. | 3 | 1984–2013 |
Crawford v. State
green
2 sentences2000Crawford v. State, 1992 OK CR 62, ¶ 53 , 840 P.2d 627, 638 . ¶ 20 Here, Appellant was able to give a detailed account of the events of the night in question. 1998"If voluntary intoxication is to be relied upon as an affirmative defense, the defendant must introduce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to his ability to form the requisite criminal intent." Id. | 3 | 1998–2000 |
Smith v. Oklahoma City
green
2 sentences1977In Copenhaver , later cited with approval in Smith v. Oklahoma City, Okl.Cr., 513 P.2d 1327 (1973), we stated: “. . .In all future cases where there is a plea of guilty, the procedure above set forth should be followed; provided, however, that prior to accepting a plea of guilty, the defendant should be informed of the nature and consequences of such plea, of his right to court-appointed counsel, if indigent, and his right to a jury trial, and the record should reflect an affirmative waiver of all of these rights prior to the acceptance of a plea.” [footnote omitted] Citing Boykin , defendant 1975In Copenhaver, supra, later cited with approval in Smith v. Oklahoma City, Okl.Cr., 513 P.2d 1327 (1973), this Court stated: “ ‘In all future cases where there is a plea of guilty, the procedure above set forth should be followed; provided, however, that prior to accepting a plea of guilty, the defendant should be informed of the nature and consequences of such plea 1, “ ‘i- In this connection the judge should advise the defendant of the minimum and maximum punishment provided by law for the crime of which the accused stands charged. of his right to court-appointed counsel, if indigent, and hi | 3 | 1975–1979 |
Winton v. Myers
green
2 sentences1918Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 587, the general rule sustained by all the authorities is as follows: “The general rule is well settled that payment is an affirmative defense, and will not, in the first) instance, be presumed, but, after the antecedent existence of'the indebtedness has. been proved by the creditor, the burden of proving its discharge by payment isi upon th debtor or person alleging the payment.” In the case of Winton et al. v. Myers, 8 Okla. 421 , 58 Pac. 634 , it is said: “Payment is always a matter of defense, and as a general rule, must be specifically pleaded and proven by him who c 1918Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 587, the general rule sustained by all the authorities is as follows: “The general rule is well settled that payment is an affirmative defense, and will not, in the first) instance, be presumed, but, after the antecedent existence of'the indebtedness has. been proved by the creditor, the burden of proving its discharge by payment isi upon th debtor or person alleging the payment.” In the case of Winton et al. v. Myers, 8 Okla. 421 , 58 Pac. 634 , it is said: “Payment is always a matter of defense, and as a general rule, must be specifically pleaded and proven by him who c | 3 | 1918–1976 |
Gasper v. Mayer
green
2 sentences1975Gasper v. Mayer, 171 Okl. 457 , 43 P.2d 467 . 1975Gasper v. Mayer, 171 Okl. 457 , 43 P.2d 467 . | 3 | 1943–1975 |
Straub v. Swaim
green
2 sentences1966In Straub v. Swaim, Okl., 296 P.2d 147 , we said that the Statute of Limitation is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the party asserting or claiming it, and when it is not pleaded it is waived. 1965Equitable Royalty Corp. et al. v. Hullet et al., 206 Okl. 233 , 243 P.2d 986 ; Straub et al. v. Swaim, Okl., 296 P.2d 147 . | 3 | 1962–1966 |
Barnes v. Central State Bank
neutral
2 sentences1957Plaintiffs argue that where under the pleadings the plaintiff is entitled to recover unless a certain affirmative defense therein pleaded is sustained, and no evidence is produced reasonably tending to support such a defense, the verdict should be directed in favor of the plaintiff, and cite in support thereof, Motor Mortgage Co. v. Hamilton, 175 Okl. 563 , 54 P.2d 153 ; Ivey v. Stewart, Okl., 295 P.2d 1056 , and Barnes v. Central State Bank, 207 Okl. 399 , 250 P.2d 21 . 1957Plaintiffs argue that where under the pleadings the plaintiff is entitled to recover unless a certain affirmative defense therein pleaded is sustained, and no evidence is produced reasonably tending to support such a defense, the verdict should be directed in favor of the plaintiff, and cite in support thereof, Motor Mortgage Co. v. Hamilton, 175 Okl. 563 , 54 P.2d 153 ; Ivey v. Stewart, Okl., 295 P.2d 1056 , and Barnes v. Central State Bank, 207 Okl. 399 , 250 P.2d 21 . | 3 | 1956–1958 |
Shunkamolah v. Potter Delco
neutral
2 sentences1953Shunkamolah v. Potter Delco, 131 Okla. 272 , 268 P. 270 . 1953Shunkamolah v. Potter Delco, 131 Okla. 272 , 268 P. 270 . | 3 | 1930–1953 |
Adams Oil & Gas Co. v. Hudson
green
2 sentences1927Bruce et al. v. Overton et al., 54 Okla. 350 , 154 Pac. 340 ; Adams Oil & Gas Co. v. Hudson, 55 Okla. 386 , 155 Pac. 220 ; Tucker v. Leonard et al., 76 Okla. 16 , 183 Pac. 907 ; Mobley v. Rhoades et al., 77 Okla. 64 , 186 Pac. 230 ; McIntosh v. Holtgrave et al., 79 Okla. 63 , 191 Pac. 739 .” In Bruce v. Overton, supra, it was held: “A person seeking protection as an innocent purchaser of real estate without notice of an outstanding title must both allege and prove facts constituting him such innocent purchaser, and, unless he does so, that issue is not raised.” In the body of the opinion it is 1927Bruce et al. v. Overton et al., 54 Okla. 350 , 154 Pac. 340 ; Adams Oil & Gas Co. v. Hudson, 55 Okla. 386 , 155 Pac. 220 ; Tucker v. Leonard et al., 76 Okla. 16 , 183 Pac. 907 ; Mobley v. Rhoades et al., 77 Okla. 64 , 186 Pac. 230 ; McIntosh v. Holtgrave et al., 79 Okla. 63 , 191 Pac. 739 .” In Bruce v. Overton, supra, it was held: “A person seeking protection as an innocent purchaser of real estate without notice of an outstanding title must both allege and prove facts constituting him such innocent purchaser, and, unless he does so, that issue is not raised.” In the body of the opinion it is | 3 | 1927–1945 |
Palmer-Gregory Chiropractic College v. Hart
neutral
2 sentences1936Harrah & Co. v. First National Bank of Tonkawa, 26 Okla. 620 , 110 P. 725 : “Where under the pleadings the plaintiff is entitled to recover unless a certain affirmative defense therein pleaded is sustained, no evidence being produced reasonably tending to support such defense, a verdict should be directed in favor of the plaintiff.” The defendants having admitted the execution of the notes in question and having failed to introduce any competent evidence in support of their affirmative defenses of breach of warranty and failure of consideration, and the evidence of the defendants having wholly 1923Bank of Tonka wa, 20 Okla. 620 , 110 Pac. 725 ; Fitzpatrick v. Nations, 30 Okla. 207 , 94 Pac. 1020 ; Cockrell v. Schmidt, 20 Okla. 207 , 94 Pac. 521 . | 3 | 1917–1936 |
Equitable Surety Co. v. Sapp
neutral
2 sentences1936This court, in the case of Equitable Surety Co. v. Sapp, 77 Okla. 221 , 187 P. 917 , states the rule in relation to an affirmative defense: “Where a defendant sets up an affirmative defense, and the plaintiff denies the existence of said fact, the burden of proof is upon the defendant to prove said allegations of his answer.” Tancred et al. v. Holuby et al., 124 Okla. 97 , 254 P. 75 . 1936This court, in the case of Equitable Surety Co. v. Sapp, 77 Okla. 221 , 187 P. 917 , states the rule in relation to an affirmative defense: “Where a defendant sets up an affirmative defense, and the plaintiff denies the existence of said fact, the burden of proof is upon the defendant to prove said allegations of his answer.” Tancred et al. v. Holuby et al., 124 Okla. 97 , 254 P. 75 . | 3 | 1927–1936 |
Bruce Et Ux. v. Overton
green
2 sentences1927Bruce et al. v. Overton et al., 54 Okla. 350 , 154 Pac. 340 ; Adams Oil & Gas Co. v. Hudson, 55 Okla. 386 , 155 Pac. 220 ; Tucker v. Leonard et al., 76 Okla. 16 , 183 Pac. 907 ; Mobley v. Rhoades et al., 77 Okla. 64 , 186 Pac. 230 ; McIntosh v. Holtgrave et al., 79 Okla. 63 , 191 Pac. 739 .” In Bruce v. Overton, supra, it was held: “A person seeking protection as an innocent purchaser of real estate without notice of an outstanding title must both allege and prove facts constituting him such innocent purchaser, and, unless he does so, that issue is not raised.” In the body of the opinion it is 1927Bruce et al. v. Overton et al., 54 Okla. 350 , 154 Pac. 340 ; Adams Oil & Gas Co. v. Hudson, 55 Okla. 386 , 155 Pac. 220 ; Tucker v. Leonard et al., 76 Okla. 16 , 183 Pac. 907 ; Mobley v. Rhoades et al., 77 Okla. 64 , 186 Pac. 230 ; McIntosh v. Holtgrave et al., 79 Okla. 63 , 191 Pac. 739 .” In Bruce v. Overton, supra, it was held: “A person seeking protection as an innocent purchaser of real estate without notice of an outstanding title must both allege and prove facts constituting him such innocent purchaser, and, unless he does so, that issue is not raised.” In the body of the opinion it is | 3 | 1919–1927 |
| Akins v. Altus Newspapers, Inc. green | 2 | 2017–2026 |
| DOE v. THE FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH U.S.A. OF TULSA green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Getty Oil Co. green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| Lafalier v. LEAD-IMPACTED COMMUNITIES green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| Davis v. State green | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Dockery green | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| Parrish v. Ilina green | 2 | 2017–2017 |
| Neil Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Wingrod Investment Corp. green | 2 | 1997–2015 |
| Bank of America, NA v. Kabba green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Manley v. Brown green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Cities Service Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp. green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Hathaway v. MEDICAL RESEARCH & TECH. AUTH. green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Harlow v. Fitzgerald green | 2 | 1994–2012 |
| Harper-Turner Oil Company v. Bridge green | 2 | 2009–2012 |
| State Ex Rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Busch green | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| In Re Williams green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| Johnson v. Noble green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| Widick v. Phillips Petroleum Co. neutral | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. green | 2 | 2007–2008 |
| Frey v. Independence Fire & Casualty Co. green | 2 | 1999–2007 |
| Bench v. State neutral | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Stephens v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. green | 2 | 2003–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.