affirmative defense in California

2026(Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 794, fn. 8 (Johnson).) Defendants moving for summary judgment on an affirmative defense bear “an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) If the defendant carries this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to make a “prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.) “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of

2026Law governing summary judgment motions Summary judgment is appropriate, and the moving party (typically, the defendant) is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where (1) the defendant carries its initial burden of showing, as pertinent here, the existence of an affirmative defense (which includes ratification), and (2) the plaintiff thereafter fails to show the “existence of a triable issue of material fact” as to that affirmative defense. 4 (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, 853 ; Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618 ;

2026(Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347 .) Under section 835, subdivision (b), a public entity is liable “for injury proximately caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury sustained, and the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition a sufficient time before the injury to have taken preventive 8 measures.” (Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 68 (Cornette).) A public entity may avoid liability for an injury caused by a dangerous conditi

2025Design Immunity A public entity may avoid liability for a dangerous condition of public property by raising the affirmative defense of design immunity. (§ 830.6.) Design immunity has three elements: “(1) a causal relationship between the plan or design and the accident; (2) discretionary approval of the plan or design prior to construction; and (3) substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the plan or design.” (Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 66 (Cornette).) While the third element “must be tried by the court” (id. at p. 66), the elements of causation

2023Saputo Was Not Required to Assert in its Answer to Sutton’s Complaint, an Affirmative Defense Based on Worker’s Compensation Immunity Sutton next argues the judgment must be reversed because Saputo failed to plead Workers’ Compensation Act immunity as an affirmative defense in its answer to the complaint, as required by Doney v. Tambouratgis (1979) 23 Cal.3d 91, 96-97 (Doney).

2020(Compare Doney v. Tambouratgis (1979) 23 Cal.3d 91, 96-97 [coverage by Workers’ Compensation Act an affirmative defense to action for damages]; Ray v. Silverado Constructors (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1130 [Privette/Hooker principles not “a complete defense”] with Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 214 [employee must show hirer affirmatively contributed to injuries]; Regalado v. Callaghan (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 582, 595 [approving CACI No. 1009B, which places burden of proving elements of retained control and affirmative conduct on plaintiff] and Madden v. Summit View, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th

2025Applicable Law “ ‘An information … will not be set aside merely because there has been some irregularity or minor error in procedure in the preliminary examination. [Citation.] But where it appears that, during the course of the preliminary examination, the defendant has been denied a substantial right, the commitment is unlawful within the meaning of 15. section 995, and it must be set aside upon timely motion.’ ” (Jennings v. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 867, 874 .) “It is well established that the defendant at a preliminary examination has the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses

2016Jennings v. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 867 , concerns a motion to set aside an information under Penal Code section 995 after the defendant was denied the right to present an affirmative defense at his preliminary hearing.

2025(Mendoza, at p. 174; see also Barton, at p. 201 [no need to give an instruction when the evidence is “minimal and insubstantial”.) “An instance of imperfect self-defense occurs when a defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he or she is in imminent danger of great bodily injury or death.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 132 ; see also People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1226 (Rangel); Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 581 .) Imperfect self-defense is not considered a true affirmative defense but “is instead a shorthand way of describing one form of voluntary manslaughter

2024A. Applicable Law “‘“In determining whether error has been committed in giving or not giving jury instructions, we must consider the instructions as a whole … [and] assume that the jurors 5 Defendant acknowledged guilt for the other four charges related to drug and weapon possession during closing arguments. 11. are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.” [Citation.]’” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088 .) A trial court has a duty to instruct on a lesser included offense or an affirmative defense “only when there

2023Analysis To recap, a validly adopted AWS is an exception to the overtime rules and an affirmative defense that the employer bears the burden of proving. (§ 510, subd. (a); Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 794-795; Maldonado, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1327.) Wage Order 5 governs AWS’s in the health care industry.

2022The work actually performed by the employee during the course of the workweek must, first and foremost, be examined and the amount of time the employee spends on such work, together with the employer’s realistic expectations and the realistic requirements of the job, shall be considered in determining whether the employee satisfies this requirement. “(g) Such employee must also earn a monthly salary equivalent to no less than two (2) times the state minimum wage for full-time employment. . . .” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11040, subd. 1(A)(2); accord, Combs, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1254 .

2025(People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1116 ; People v. Miceli (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 256, 267 ) Substantial evidence in this context does not mean “any evidence . . . no matter how weak[,]” but rather “ ‘ “evidence 7 from which a jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded” ’ that the specific facts supporting the instruction existed.” (People v. Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 677 ; accord, People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810 , 823- 824.) Since entrapment is an affirmative defense that the defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, (People v. Mowe

2016Code, §§ 11362.7-11362.83.) *668 “The Compassionate Use Act . . . ensures that Californians who obtain and use marijuana for specified medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are not subject to certain criminal sanctions.” (People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 84 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 , 146 P.3d 531 ]; see generally People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326 , 49 P.3d 1067 ].) In the later-enacted Medical Marijuana Program statute, the Legislature addressed issues not addressed in the Compassionate Use Act and gave specified individuals—including a qualified pa

2026(See People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 23 [assuming a violation of a criminal defendant’s right to present a defense is reviewed under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ]; People v. Ahmed (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 136, 138 [applying the Chapman standard in deciding whether the trial court’s failure to instruct on an affirmative defense was prejudicial]; People v. Mulcrevy (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 127, 131 [same].) That is a demanding standard: Reversal is required unless the failure to instruct on entrapment 7 For example,

2026(See People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 23 [assuming a violation of a criminal defendant’s right to present a defense is reviewed under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18]; People v. Ahmed (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 136, 138 [applying the Chapman standard in deciding whether the trial court’s failure to instruct on an affirmative defense was prejudicial]; People v. Mulcrevy (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 127, 131 [same].) That is a demanding standard: Reversal is required unless the failure to instruct on entrapment 7 For example, i

2025Self-Defense Instruction Finally, Sandoval argues the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on self-defense as to the charge of assault with a deadly weapon. “[T]he trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on defenses that the defendant is relying on or that are supported by substantial evidence and are not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” (People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 293 .) “In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction” on an affirmative defense, “the trial court does not determine the credibility of the defens

2024(People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982 .) “Except as to crimes that include lack of necessity (or good cause) as an element, necessity is an affirmative defense . . . . [Citations.] To justify an instruction on the defense of necessity, a defendant must present evidence sufficient to establish that [he or] she violated the law (1) to prevent a significant and imminent evil, (2) with no reasonable 3 legal alternative, (3) without creating a greater danger than the one avoided, (4) with a good faith belief that the criminal act was necessary to prevent the greater harm, (5) with such belief

2026(Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 662, 667 .) The employer “ ‘bears the burden of proving the employee’s exemption as an affirmative defense.’ ” (Kizer v. Tristar Risk Management (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 830, 839 .) 21 When moving for summary judgment (or adjudication) based on “the assertion of an affirmative defense, . . . ‘the defendant has the initial burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense.’ ” (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 289 .) “The defendant must demonstrate that under no hypothesis is th

2025(See ibid.) A defendant seeking summary judgment based upon an affirmative defense “ ‘ “ ‘has the initial burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense.’ ” ’ ” (Severin Mobile Towing, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 292 , 302, quoting Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454 , 467–468 (Consumer Cause).) Summary judgment granted to a defendant who fails to produce substantial evidence supporting every element of the affirmative defense “ ‘would have to be reversed, even if the plaintiff failed to introduce a scint

2026(Brinker Restaurant Co. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004 [(Brinker)].) That a defendant in Allison v. Dignity Health . . . , made a sufficient showing to obtain decertification of a previously certified meal and rest claims does not mean that this Defendant needs to make exactly the same showing to defeat class certification on the first pass, as here.[3] Defendant did protect the right to raise an affirmative defense with its Fifth Affirmative Defense of waiver and estoppel.

2026It is appropriate to place the burden on the employer to plead and prove, as an affirmative defense, that it genuinely relieved employees from duty during meal periods.” (Id. at p. 76, citing & quoting Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1053 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) The Donohue court remanded the matter to allow the parties to present evidence as to whether there were records of short or delayed meal periods for which no premium wages were paid.

2026Considering that our Supreme Court has not determined which test applies to the failure to instruct on an affirmative defense (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 199 ) and that each party believes it should prevail under either test, we apply the more stringent Chapman standard and thus will not reverse if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2025(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 199, fn. 3 [“Defendants are mistaken in their assertion that ‘accident’ is an affirmative defense”]; People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989 , 997–998 [“‘The accident defense amounts to a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his or her actions a crime’”]; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616 , 674–675 [“Generally, the claim that a homicide was committed through misfortune or accident ‘amounts to a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his or her actions a crim

2025This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of penology.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745 .) Burgos reviewed our prior decisions applying Estrada33 and concluded from this survey that “[w]e have adhered to 33 In this review, Burgos explained that we had “applied Estrada’s inference of retroactivity to legislation that created an affirmative defense, contracted a criminal offense, or otherwise lessened punishment in some meaningful manner” (Burgo

2024(See Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1390 ; Wright, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 104 7 Because we found the Chapman standard was met, it was unnecessary to decide whether failure to instruct on the affirmative defense violated the defendant’s due process right to present a defense or was instead state law error only.

2024Thereafter, counsel for the parties exchanged e-mails (which are not included in the appellate record) about the 3 “An agreement to arbitrate is an affirmative defense to claims asserted in a lawsuit.” (Oregel v. PacPizza, LLC (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 342, 355 ; see Guess?, Inc. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 553, 558 , [“At a minimum, the failure to plead arbitration as an affirmative defense is an act inconsistent with the later assertion of a right to arbitrate”].) A defendant may file a petition to compel arbitration in lieu of an answer to the complaint.

2023(Guess?, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at 557-558 [“At a minimum, the failure to plead arbitration as an affirmative defense is an act inconsistent with the later assertion of a right to arbitrate”].) Furthermore, even if Apria had timely sought discovery of the arbitration agreement and promptly asserted arbitration as an affirmative defense, substantial evidence of wavier remains.

2025(Mendoza, at p. 174; see also Barton, at p. 201 [no need to give an instruction when the evidence is “minimal and insubstantial”.) “An instance of imperfect self-defense occurs when a defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he or she is in imminent danger of great bodily injury or death.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 132 ; see also People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1226 (Rangel); Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 581 .) Imperfect self-defense is not considered a true affirmative defense but “is instead a shorthand way of describing one form of voluntary manslaughter

2024(People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 133 .) Because the law is unsettled on which standard of prejudice applies to an erroneous failure to instruct on an affirmative defense (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 199 ), we apply the more rigorous standard, which requires reversal unless 5 the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2026The Evidence Raises Disputed Issues of Material Fact Regarding the Board’s Affirmative Defense Under the CWPA, once an employee demonstrates a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer or supervisor to prove, as an affirmative defense, “by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged in protected disclosures.” (§ 8547.12, subd. (e); see Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 712 [analyzing identical “ ‘same-decision’ ” “affirmative defense” under Labor Code whistleblower stat

2026(Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 662, 667 .) The employer “ ‘bears the burden of proving the employee’s exemption as an affirmative defense.’ ” (Kizer v. Tristar Risk Management (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 830, 839 .) 21 When moving for summary judgment (or adjudication) based on “the assertion of an affirmative defense, . . . ‘the defendant has the initial burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense.’ ” (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 289 .) “The defendant must demonstrate that under no hypothesis is th

2026(Bevill v. Zoura (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 694, 697 .) Overstatement of rent owed is an affirmative defense for which the lessee bears the burden of proof. (360 So Reeves, LLC v. Dutton (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1 , 12 (360 So Reeves).)7 “A municipality may, under its general police powers (Cal. Const., art.

2026(Bevill v. Zoura (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 694, 697 .) Overstatement of rent owed is an affirmative defense for which the lessee bears the burden of proof. (360 So Reeves, LLC v. Dutton (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1 , 12 (360 So Reeves).)7 “A municipality may, under its general police powers (Cal. Const., art.

2026(Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404 , 418.) In any case, immunity is an affirmative defense (see Wang v. Nibbelink (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1, 10 ), and thus will be decided on demurrer only when “the face of the complaint discloses that the action is necessarily barred” (Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 177, 183 ).

2024The parties agree that “ ‘[a] demurrer based on an affirmative defense will be sustained only where the face of the complaint discloses that the action is necessarily barred by the defense.’ ” (Brown v. Crandall (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 ; accord, Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 177, 183 [“A general demurrer will lie where the complaint ‘has included allegations that clearly disclose some defense or bar to recovery’ ”].) They disagree as to whether that standard is met here.

2025(Mendoza, at p. 174; see also Barton, at p. 201 [no need to give an instruction when the evidence is “minimal and insubstantial”.) “An instance of imperfect self-defense occurs when a defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he or she is in imminent danger of great bodily injury or death.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 132 ; see also People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1226 (Rangel); Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 581 .) Imperfect self-defense is not considered a true affirmative defense but “is instead a shorthand way of describing one form of voluntary manslaughter

2025(Mendoza, at p. 174; see also Barton, at p. 201 [no need to give an instruction when the evidence is “minimal and insubstantial”.) “An instance of imperfect self-defense occurs when a defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he or she is in imminent danger of great bodily injury or death.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 132 ; see also People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1226 (Rangel); Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 581 .) Imperfect self-defense is not considered a true affirmative defense but “is instead a shorthand way of describing one form of voluntary manslaughter

2026“An affirmative defense, the statute of limitations exists to promote the diligent assertion of claims, ensure defendants the opportunity to collect evidence while still fresh, and provide repose and protection from dilatory suits once excess time has passed. [Citations.] The duration of the limitations period marks the legislatively selected point at which, for a given claim, these considerations surmount the otherwise compelling interest in adjudicating on their merits valid claims.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191 .) The defendant bears the initial burd

2025Plaintiff contends the County’s demurrer cannot be sustained on a theory of discretionary act immunity where nothing in the SAC indicates the County’s employee made a considered or policy decision.10 A demurrer may be sustained based on an affirmative defense, like discretionary act immunity, “ ‘ “where the face of the complaint discloses that the action is necessarily barred by the defense.” ’ ” (McKenney v. Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 79 ; accord, Heshejin v. Rostami (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 984 , 992; see e.g., Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 983−984 [demurrer prop

2024(Locke v. Mitchell (1936) 7 Cal.2d 599, 602 ; Beroiz v. Wahl, supra, 17. 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 492 .) Although the anti-SLAPP statute “places on the plaintiff the burden of substantiating its claims, a defendant that advances an affirmative defense to such claims properly bears the burden of proof on the defense.” (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 676 .) Thus, “[d]uring the second prong of a court’s anti-SLAPP analysis, a defendant bears the burden of proving a privilege’s applicability.” (Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc.

2021In Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at page 676 , the court held that “although [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16 places on the plaintiff the burden of substantiating its claims, a defendant that advances an affirmative defense to such claims properly bears the burden of proof on the defense.” However, in Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1485 , the court characterized the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) as “‘a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonst

2025(Mendoza, at p. 174; see also Barton, at p. 201 [no need to give an instruction when the evidence is “minimal and insubstantial”.) “An instance of imperfect self-defense occurs when a defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he or she is in imminent danger of great bodily injury or death.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 132 ; see also People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1226 (Rangel); Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 581 .) Imperfect self-defense is not considered a true affirmative defense but “is instead a shorthand way of describing one form of voluntary manslaughter

2023(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 197 [“Lesser included offenses of first degree premeditated murder include second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter”]; Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 154 .) “A killing committed because of an unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense is voluntary manslaughter, not murder.” (People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 129 (Elmore).) “[I]mperfect self-defense is not an affirmative defense, but a description of one type of voluntary manslaughter.” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581 (Manriquez).) A kill

2026(Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347 .) Under section 835, subdivision (b), a public entity is liable “for injury proximately caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury sustained, and the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition a sufficient time before the injury to have taken preventive 8 measures.” (Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 68 (Cornette).) A public entity may avoid liability for an injury caused by a dangerous conditi

2025Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Regents of 11 University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618 .) “‘A defendant may bring a motion [for summary judgment] on the ground the plaintiff cannot prove one of the required elements of the case or there is a complete defense to the action.’” (Campbell, at pp. 1161-1162; see Luebke v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 694 , 702.) To carry its initial burden, the defendant must show that the plaintiff cannot establish “‘at least one element of the cause of action’” (Campbell, at p. 1162) or that “undisputed facts

2025Once it does so, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show an issue of fact concerning at least one element of the defense. [Citation.] If, in anticipation of an affirmative defense, the complaint alleges facts to refute it, the pleadings themselves create ‘a material issue which defendant[ ] would have . . . to refute in order to obtain summary [judgment].’ [Citation.] In the absence of such allegations, the plaintiff can avoid summary judgment only by presenting evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue concerning the affirmative defense.” (Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App

2025Once it does so, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show an issue of fact concerning at least one element of the defense.” (Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858 .) “If, in anticipation of an affirmative defense, the complaint alleges facts to refute it, the pleadings themselves create ‘a material issue which defendant[] would have . . . to refute in order to obtain summary [judgment].’ [Citation.] In the absence of such allegations, the plaintiff can avoid summary judgment only by presenting evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue concerning the affirmative defe

2025Because we conclude that the result is the same under either body of law, we do not resolve the choice of law issue. 22 avoid legal responsibility.” ’ ” (Wolfe v. Walker (Mo.Ct.App. 2025) 713 S.W.3d 536 , 542; see also Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 396 (Norgart).) “If the moving defendant argues that it has a complete defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action, the defendant has the initial burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense.

2021Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “The expiration of the applicable statute of limitations is one such complete defense.” (Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 965 .) “The statute of limitations operates in an action as an affirmative defense.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 396 .) Summary judgment based on an affirmative defense is only proper if the undisputed facts establish the defense.

2021Harmless Error 16 “ ‘ “[M]isdirection of the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated” in [People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ].’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 (Beltran), italics added.) “ ‘[U]nder Watson, a defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the error.’ ” (Beltran, at p. 955.) Our high court has “not yet determined what test of prejudice applies to the fail

2016The Attorney General contends that an error involving failure to instruct on an affirmative defense is an error of state law only and is reviewed under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 .

2025A plaintiff alleging an invasion of privacy in violation of the state constitutional right to privacy must establish: “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic information relating to a juvenile adjudication is prohibited under Government Code section 12952.” We reject these arguments as unsupported by the text of these statutes. 17 Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 , 39–40.) “A defendant may prevail in a state constitutional priv

2023If the undisputed material facts show no reasonable expectation of privacy or an insubstantial impact on privacy interests, the question of invasion may be adjudicated as a matter of law.” (Hill, at p. 40.) Second, any such privacy interest “must be balanced against other important [or countervailing] interests.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 37 ; accord Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 572 .) Thus, even if a plaintiff is able to establish a serious invasion of privacy under the threshold inquiry, the defendant may still prevail by “ ‘proving, as an affirmative defense, that the invasion of priva