reservation clause in Maryland

1992In Schaidt v. Blaul, 66 Md. 141, 145 , 6 A. 669 (1886), the Court was concerned in part with the difference between an exception in a deed and a reservation in a deed: A reservation is a clause ... whereby the ... grantor, etc., doth reserve some new thing to himself out of that which he granted before____[a]n exception which is ever of part of the thing granted____ Quoting Sheppard’s Touchstone, 80.

1992In Schaidt v. Blaul, 66 Md. 141, 145 , 6 A. 669 (1886), the Court was concerned in part with the difference between an exception in a deed and a reservation in a deed: A reservation is a clause ... whereby the ... grantor, etc., doth reserve some new thing to himself out of that which he granted before____[a]n exception which is ever of part of the thing granted____ Quoting Sheppard’s Touchstone, 80.

2002Appellees counter that “there was no language in the reservation clause of the Special Warranty Deed to suggest a life estate or other limited estate”; therefore, the trial court properly concluded that appellees’ reservation was an interest in fee simple. *262 Case v. Marshall, 159 Md. 588 , 152 A. 261 (1930), cited by appellees, stands for the proposition that words of limitation or inheritance are not essential to create an estate in fee simple: [W]here a contrary intention is not clearly shown, both deeds and assignments, as well as wills, though without words of limitation or perpetuity,

2002Appellees counter that “there was no language in the reservation clause of the Special Warranty Deed to suggest a life estate or other limited estate”; therefore, the trial court properly concluded that appellees’ reservation was an interest in fee simple. *262 Case v. Marshall, 159 Md. 588 , 152 A. 261 (1930), cited by appellees, stands for the proposition that words of limitation or inheritance are not essential to create an estate in fee simple: [W]here a contrary intention is not clearly shown, both deeds and assignments, as well as wills, though without words of limitation or perpetuity,

1999The Court of Appeals adopted a reasonableness rule with respect to the disapproval of plans in Kirkley v. Seipelt, 212 Md. 127 , 128 A.2d 430 (1957); and we reconciled an inconsistency in a reservation clause by reading into the reservation clause a requirement of reasonableness in Markey v. Wolf, 92 Md.App. 137 , 607 A.2d 82 (1992).

1999The Court of Appeals adopted a reasonableness rule with respect to the disapproval of plans in Kirkley v. Seipelt, 212 Md. 127 , 128 A.2d 430 (1957); and we reconciled an inconsistency in a reservation clause by reading into the reservation clause a requirement of reasonableness in Markey v. Wolf, 92 Md.App. 137 , 607 A.2d 82 (1992).

1999The Court of Appeals adopted a reasonableness rule with respect to the disapproval of plans in Kirkley v. Seipelt, 212 Md. 127 , 128 A.2d 430 (1957); and we reconciled an inconsistency in a reservation clause by reading into the reservation clause a requirement of reasonableness in Markey v. Wolf, 92 Md.App. 137 , 607 A.2d 82 (1992).

1999The Court of Appeals adopted a reasonableness rule with respect to the disapproval of plans in Kirkley v. Seipelt, 212 Md. 127 , 128 A.2d 430 (1957); and we reconciled an inconsistency in a reservation clause by reading into the reservation clause a requirement of reasonableness in Markey v. Wolf, 92 Md.App. 137 , 607 A.2d 82 (1992).

1996After distinguishing a dedication, “the conveyance of ... land ... to the public,” from a reservation, a restriction on “the right ... to use the land for anything but the restrictive purpose,” 301 Md. at 270 , 482 A.2d 908 , the Court of Appeals discussed whether the statute there at issue furthered the end that was proffered as justification for the statute in the first place, i.e., *16 the first step analysis of the appropriateness of the statute. 13 The Court, describing the reservation requirement as an exaction, noted: We bear in mind in this case the “fine line” distinction observed by

1996After distinguishing a dedication, “the conveyance of ... land ... to the public,” from a reservation, a restriction on “the right ... to use the land for anything but the restrictive purpose,” 301 Md. at 270 , 482 A.2d 908 , the Court of Appeals discussed whether the statute there at issue furthered the end that was proffered as justification for the statute in the first place, i.e., *16 the first step analysis of the appropriateness of the statute. 13 The Court, describing the reservation requirement as an exaction, noted: We bear in mind in this case the “fine line” distinction observed by

1996After distinguishing a dedication, “the conveyance of ... land ... to the public,” from a reservation, a restriction on “the right ... to use the land for anything but the restrictive purpose,” 301 Md. at 270 , 482 A.2d 908 , the Court of Appeals discussed whether the statute there at issue furthered the end that was proffered as justification for the statute in the first place, i.e., *16 the first step analysis of the appropriateness of the statute. 13 The Court, describing the reservation requirement as an exaction, noted: We bear in mind in this case the “fine line” distinction observed by

1996After distinguishing a dedication, “the conveyance of ... land ... to the public,” from a reservation, a restriction on “the right ... to use the land for anything but the restrictive purpose,” 301 Md. at 270 , 482 A.2d 908 , the Court of Appeals discussed whether the statute there at issue furthered the end that was proffered as justification for the statute in the first place, i.e., *16 the first step analysis of the appropriateness of the statute. 13 The Court, describing the reservation requirement as an exaction, noted: We bear in mind in this case the “fine line” distinction observed by

1992That Court *162 reconciled the inconsistency by “reading into the reservation clause a requirement of reasonableness____” 13 Id. at 666 .

1992And see Carrigan & Boland, Inc. v. Worrock, 402 So.2d 514, 517 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981); Golian v. Polhironakis, 390 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980); Loch Haven Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Nelle, 389 So.2d 697, 698-99 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980), affd 413 So.2d 28 (Fla.1982) (adopting “the more modern judicial attitude” that such a reservation is only one of the factors to be considered in resolving whether a grantor intended to create a uniform or common scheme of development); Bay Island Towers, Inc. v. Bay Island-Siesta Ass’n, 316 So.2d 574, 575-76 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975); Rodrigue v. LaFlamme

1992And see Carrigan & Boland, Inc. v. Worrock, 402 So.2d 514, 517 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981); Golian v. Polhironakis, 390 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980); Loch Haven Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Nelle, 389 So.2d 697, 698-99 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980), affd 413 So.2d 28 (Fla.1982) (adopting “the more modern judicial attitude” that such a reservation is only one of the factors to be considered in resolving whether a grantor intended to create a uniform or common scheme of development); Bay Island Towers, Inc. v. Bay Island-Siesta Ass’n, 316 So.2d 574, 575-76 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975); Rodrigue v. LaFlamme

1992And see Carrigan & Boland, Inc. v. Worrock, 402 So.2d 514, 517 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981); Golian v. Polhironakis, 390 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980); Loch Haven Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Nelle, 389 So.2d 697, 698-99 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980), affd 413 So.2d 28 (Fla.1982) (adopting “the more modern judicial attitude” that such a reservation is only one of the factors to be considered in resolving whether a grantor intended to create a uniform or common scheme of development); Bay Island Towers, Inc. v. Bay Island-Siesta Ass’n, 316 So.2d 574, 575-76 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975); Rodrigue v. LaFlamme

1992In Matthews v. Kernewood, Inc., 184 Md. 297, 299-306 , 40 A.2d 522 (1945), land was conveyed to a development corporation under an original intention that the lots would be unusually large.

1992In Matthews v. Kernewood, Inc., 184 Md. 297, 299-306 , 40 A.2d 522 (1945), land was conveyed to a development corporation under an original intention that the lots would be unusually large.

1907In Schaidt v. Blaul, 66 Md. 141 and Herbert v. Pue, 72 Md. 307 , the distinction between a reservation and an exception is pointed out.