211 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Scott v. Glazergreen2 sentences1969Scott v. Glazer, La.App., 164 So.2d 185 ; Sonnier v. Great American Insurance Company, La.App., 134 So.2d 363 ; Lavigne v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. 1969It was well stated by us in Scott v. Glazer, 164 So.2d 185, 187 (1964), as follows: “A litigant relying upon the doctrine of last clear chance has the burden of proving all facts and circumstances essential to its application. | 2 | 6 |
Jackson v. Cookgreen2 sentences1964Although the principle established in Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860 , 181 So. 195 , to the effect a defendant will be held liable under the last clear chance doctrine for failure to discover plaintiff's peril which could or should have been detected upon exercise of reasonable care, is clearly applicable to the case at bar, we note therein an express finding of liability predicated upon defendant's failure to timely observe plaintiff, an intoxicated pedestrian, walking along the highway. 1964Although the principle established in Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860 , 181 So. 195 , to the effect a defendant will be held liable under the last clear chance doctrine for failure to discover plaintiff's peril which could or should have been detected upon exercise of reasonable care, is clearly applicable to the case at bar, we note therein an express finding of liability predicated upon defendant's failure to timely observe plaintiff, an intoxicated pedestrian, walking along the highway. | 1 | 38 |
Rottman v. Beverlygreen2 sentences1963At pages 561-562 of 100 So.2d, I find in the opinion: "Prior to the advent of Rottman v. Beverly, 1935, 183 La. 947 , 165 So. 153 , the state of the law with reference to the doctrine of the last clear chance was that the doctrine would not be extended to those cases where the plaintiff's own negligence was continuing and existed up to and actually contributed to the accident and injury. 1963At pages 561-562 of 100 So.2d, I find in the opinion: "Prior to the advent of Rottman v. Beverly, 1935, 183 La. 947 , 165 So. 153 , the state of the law with reference to the doctrine of the last clear chance was that the doctrine would not be extended to those cases where the plaintiff's own negligence was continuing and existed up to and actually contributed to the accident and injury. | 1 | 34 |
Bergeron v. Department of Highwaysgreen2 sentences1978The decision suggests to this writer that in pedestrian cases, at least, we have placed the contributory negligence of the pedestrian on the shelf whenever the alleged carelessness of the motorist is his failure to make a reasonable adjustment to the emergency situation before him. . . ." 19 La.L.Rev. 334, 340 (1959). [8] Although we find the last clear chance doctrine inapplicable to the instant case we take this opportunity to express our disapproval of a concept first introduced into Louisiana jurisprudence by this court in Bergeron v. Department of Highways, 221 La. 595 , 60 So.2d 4 (1952) 1978The decision suggests to this writer that in pedestrian cases, at least, we have placed the contributory negligence of the pedestrian on the shelf whenever the alleged carelessness of the motorist is his failure to make a reasonable adjustment to the emergency situation before him. . . ." 19 La.L.Rev. 334, 340 (1959). [8] Although we find the last clear chance doctrine inapplicable to the instant case we take this opportunity to express our disapproval of a concept first introduced into Louisiana jurisprudence by this court in Bergeron v. Department of Highways, 221 La. 595 , 60 So.2d 4 (1952) | 1 | 9 |
Iglesias v. Campbellgreen2 sentences1950In Iglesias v. Campbell, La.App., 175 So. 145, 148 (13, 14) it was stated: “It is an inexorable rule of law that the operator of an automobile is held to see that which he should have seen and which, of course, may be seen and observed by human eyesight; and this being true, we can see no sound reason for holding that the operator must actually see the injured person in time to avoid colliding with him in order that the doctrine of the last clear chance may be correctly applied.” Under the facts, there was no reason why Miss Gross should not have seen the old man when he started, to walk acros 1945App. Second Circuit, 175 So. 145 , is another case in which the doctrine of the last clear chance was applied, citing the Rottman case. | 1 | 8 |
Newton v. Pacillogreen2 sentences1964A full discussion of the elements involved in the doctrine of last clear chance, under facts which are appropriate to the consideration of the instant case, is found in the case of Newton v. Pacillo (2nd Circuit, 1959, writs denied), La.App., 111 So.2d 895 . 1963O’Dell v. Hood, La.App., 126 So.2d 373 ; Newton v. Pacillo, La.App., 111 So.2d 895 ; Rottman v. Beverly, 183 La. 947 , 165 So. 153 ; and Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860 , 181 So. 195 . | 1 | 7 |
Glatt v. Hintongreen2 sentences1972The last clear chance doctrine does not apply if the defendant, because of his negligence, has failed to discover plaintiff’s peril in time to avoid the accident, but up to the time of impact plaintiff also had an opportunity to save himself and failed to do so because of his own negligence or continued negligence, Glatt v. Hinton, 205 So.2d 91 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1967), writ refused, 251 La. 861 , 206 So.2d 712 . 1972However, plaintiff claims the benefit of the doctrine of last clear chance, the law pertaining to which is set forth in Glatt v. Hinton, 205 So.2d 91 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1967), as follows: “Our settled jurisprudence is that before the doctrine of last clear chance can be invoked the litigant relying thereon has the burden of establishing by a clear preponderance of the evidence: (1) he was in a position of peril of which he was unaware or from which he was unable to extricate himself; (2) the person against whom the doctrine is invoked actually discovered or, by the exercise of reasonable care, ca | 1 | 6 |
Johnson v. Wilsongreen2 sentences1966Also, in Johnson v. Wilson, 239 La. 390 , 118 So.2d 450 , where both parties were guilty of negligence continuing to the moment of the accident and at the time each discovered or should have discovered the other's peril, it was too late to avoid the accident, the court held the doctrine of last clear chance did not apply. 1966Also, in Johnson v. Wilson, 239 La. 390 , 118 So.2d 450 , where both parties were guilty of negligence continuing to the moment of the accident and at the time each discovered or should have discovered the other's peril, it was too late to avoid the accident, the court held the doctrine of last clear chance did not apply. | 1 | 5 |
McCallum v. Adkersongreen2 sentences1962On the issue of last clear chance, we note the following pertinent language appearing in McCallum v. Adkerson, 126 So.2d 835 : "`* * * we hesitate in cases where the last clear chance doctrine is relied upon to relieve a party of his negligent acts except when opportunity presented the other party to avert the accident is manifest.' Id., at page 344. 1962On the issue of last clear chance, we note the following pertinent language appearing in McCallum v. Adkerson, 126 So.2d 835 : "`* * * we hesitate in cases where the last clear chance doctrine is relied upon to relieve a party of his negligent acts except when opportunity presented the other party to avert the accident is manifest.' Id., at page 344. | 1 | 5 |
Ortego v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.green2 sentences1979Co., 295 So.2d 593, p. 598 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1974). 1977As stated by the Court in Ortego v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 295 So.2d 593 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1974), in order for plaintiffs to successfully invoke the doctrine of last clear chance, the evidence must clearly show: `(1) That plaintiff was in a position of peril of which he was unaware, or from which he was unable to extricate himself; `(2) that the defendant actually discovered or should have discovered, the plaintiff's peril; and `(3) that at the time defendant actually discovered, or should have discovered, plaintiff's peril, defendant had a reasonable opportunity to avoid | 1 | 4 |
Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Companygreen2 sentences1973Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Company, La.App., 179 So.2d 499 , as well as Sales v. Guillory, La.App., 188 So.2d 429 ." Plaintiff has argued that in the event he is found to be negligent, the defendant is also negligent, thereby allowing the doctrine of last clear chance to be applied. 1973In order for us to apply the doctrine of last clear chance the plaintiff must prove clearly that three elements exist: “ * * * (1) Plaintiff must be in a position of peril of which he is unaware, or from which he is unable to extricate himself; (2) the plaintiff must show that defendant actually discovered, or should have discovered, the plaintiff’s peril; (3) at the time that defendant actually discovered or should have discovered plaintiff’s peril, defendant must have a reasonable opportunity to avoid the accident.” See Dixon v. Aetna Casualty Company et al., 256 So.2d 474 , (La.App. 2nd Cir | 1 | 4 |
Ballard v. Piehlergreen2 sentences1974Faulkner v. Malloy, La.App., 203 So.2d 100 (2nd Cir. 1967); Ballard v. Piehler, La.App., 98 So.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1957)." The evidence shows that the railroad tracks in this area form a long, slight curve, such that the presence of an automobile *801 on the crossing becomes apparent at a distance of some 1500 feet away. 1974Faulkner v. Malloy, La.App., 203 So.2d 100 (2nd Cir. 1967); Ballard v. Piehler, La.App., 98 So.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1957)." The evidence shows that the railroad tracks in this area form a long, slight curve, such that the presence of an automobile *801 on the crossing becomes apparent at a distance of some 1500 feet away. | 1 | 3 |
Leake v. Prudhomme Truck Tank Service, Inc.green2 sentences1974See, e. g., Leake v. Prudhomme Truck Tank Service, Inc., 260 La. 1071 , 258 So.2d 358, 366 (1971); Conley v. Continental Insurance Company, 270 So.2d 342, 344 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1972). 1974See, e. g., Leake v. Prudhomme Truck Tank Service, Inc., 260 La. 1071 , 258 So.2d 358, 366 (1971); Conley v. Continental Insurance Company, 270 So.2d 342, 344 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1972). | 1 | 3 |
| Mitchell v. Sigrestgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Price v. Wattsgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Rector v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.green | 1 | 2 |
| Tauzier v. Bondiogreen | 1 | 2 |
| Turner v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McElveen v. Gant
green
2 sentences1966Appellants therefore rely primarily upon the last clear chance doctrine and cite the following authorities to support their position : Bergeron v. Department of Highways, 221 La. 595 , 60 So.2d 4 (1952) ; Belshe v. Gant, 235 La. 17 , 102 So.2d 477 (1958) ; Zachery v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., La.App., 116 So.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1959) ; Broussard v. Thompson, La.App., 128 So.2d 477 (3rd Cir. 1961); Campisi v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, La.App., 152 So.2d 88 (3rd Cir. 1963). 1966Appellants therefore rely primarily upon the last clear chance doctrine and cite the following authorities to support their position : Bergeron v. Department of Highways, 221 La. 595 , 60 So.2d 4 (1952) ; Belshe v. Gant, 235 La. 17 , 102 So.2d 477 (1958) ; Zachery v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., La.App., 116 So.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1959) ; Broussard v. Thompson, La.App., 128 So.2d 477 (3rd Cir. 1961); Campisi v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, La.App., 152 So.2d 88 (3rd Cir. 1963). | 10 | 1959–1966 |
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1962In the case of Maryland Casualty Company v. Allstate Insurance Company (La.App., 2 Cir., 1957), 96 So.2d 340 , the court said that before the doctrine of last clear chance may be applied in any given case, three (3) elements must exist: plaintiff must be in a position of peril of which he is unaware or unable to extricate himself; defendant must be in a position where he actually discovered, or should have discovered, the plaintiff's peril; and, defendant should have discovered the plaintiff's peril at such time as he could have, by the exercise of reasonable care, avoided the accident. 1961In the last cited case we observed: "* * * we hesitate in cases where the last clear chance doctrine is relied upon to relieve a party of his negligent acts except when opportunity presented the other party to avert the accident is manifest." Id., at page 344. | 8 | 1961–1967 |
Rottman v. Beverly
green
2 sentences1961"Up to the time the Court of Appeal decided the Rottman Case, 162 So. 73 , the jurisprudence relating to the last clear chance doctrine was confusing. 1960In Jackson v. Cook, supra, we find the following: “Up to the time the Court of Appeal decided the Rottman case, 162 So. 73 , the jurisprudence relating to the last clear chance doctrine was confusing. | 8 | 1938–1961 |
Clark v. Shannon
neutral
2 sentences1984“It is too well established to require citation of authority that the doctrine of last clear chance is applied only in instances where the facts indicate the reasonable possibility of the avoidance of an accident, despite the contributory negligence of the other driver.” Clark v. Shannon, 120 So.2d 307 , (La.App. 2nd Cir.1960), at 309. 1963"The facts in this case are similar to those in Clark v. Shannon, La.App.1960, 120 So.2d 307, 308 , where the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, in holding that the doctrine of last clear chance was not applicable, said: "`Nor can we find from our examination of the record any facts which would support the application of the doctrine of last clear chance. | 5 | 1960–1984 |
Jones v. Dozier
green
2 sentences1971Plaintiff having failed to prove facts essential to the doctrine of last clear chance, he cannot successfully invoke that doctrine, Lawrence v. Core, 132 So.2d 82 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1961); Franicevich v. Lirette, 241 La. 466 , 129 So.2d 740 (1961); Pate v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 147 So.2d 766 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1962); Campisi v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 152 So.2d 88 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1963); Evans v. Johnson, 236 So.2d 285 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1970); Coleman v. Mason, 174 So.2d 655 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1965); Jones v. Dozier, 160 So.2d 395 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1964); Kwo 1965In Jones v. Dozier, La.App., 160 So.2d 395 , we stated the rule as follows: “The jurisprudence of this state is well established to the effect that to warrant application of the doctrine of last clear chance, plaintiff must discharge the burden of establishing three basic factors by a clear preponderance of the evidence. | 5 | 1965–1971 |
Lavigne v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1971In the case of Lavigne v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, La.App., 125 So.2d 430 , the court said: “For the successful invocation of the doctrine of last clear chance, the existence or presence of three essential elements must be established: First, that the other person was in a position of peril of which he was unaware or from which he was unable to extricate himself; second, that the person against whom such doctrine is charged actually discovered or was in a position where he should have and could have discovered such other person’s peril; and, third, that at the time the 1962Co., La.App., 125 So.2d 430 , stated: “For the successful invocation of the doctrine of last clear chance, the existence or presence of three essential elements must be established: First, that the other person was in a position of peril of which he was unaware or from which he was unable to extricate himself; second, that the person against whom such doctrine is charged actually discovered or was in a position where he should have and could have discovered such other person’s peril; and, third, that at the time the person charged with responsibility could have, with the exercise of reasonable | 5 | 1961–1971 |
Breaux v. Meyers
neutral
2 sentences1964In Breaux v. Meyers (La.App., 3 Cir., 1961), 132 So.2d 77, this Court held that three elements are necessary to recover under the doctrine of last clear chance, namely: “ 1 “ * * * (a) plaintiff in a position of peril of which he was unaware of unable to extricate himself; (b) defendant in a position where he actually discovered, or shotdd have discovered, the plaintiff’s peril; (c) at such time that the defendant could have by the exercise of reasonable care, avoided the accident. * * * ” The record is to the effect that plaintiff was attempting to help Touchet; that Touchet had no reason to 1963In Breaux v. Meyers (La.App., 3 Cir., 1961), 132 So.2d 77 , this Court held that three elements are necessary to recover under the doctrine of last clear chance, namely: " * * * (a) plaintiif in a position of peril of which he was unaware or unable to extricate himself; (b) defendant in a position where he actually discovered, or should have discovered, the plaintiff’s peril; (c) at such time that the defendant could have by the exercise of reasonable care, avoided the accident. * * * ” ’ ” After examining the record, this Court is of the opinion that plaintiif, as a prudent person, if he was | 5 | 1963–1967 |
Baumgartner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences1982And since, in such case, a plaintiff's contributory negligence will not bar his recovery, the last clear chance doctrine, used to avoid the harsh effects of the contributory negligence defense, is not at issue." ( 356 So.2d 400, 406 ). 1980Co., 356 So.2d 400 (La. 1978), the court stated: The last clear chance doctrine was created to escape the harsh effects of the contributory negligence defense which operates, in its strict application, as an absolute bar to a plaintiff's recovery. | 4 | 1980–1984 |
Russo v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.
green
2 sentences1962Co., 189 La. 1042 , 181 So. 485 ; Newton v. Pacillo, La.App., 111 So.2d 895 ; Moore v. Shreveport Transit Co., La.App., 115 So.2d 218 . 1962Co., 189 La. 1042 , 181 So. 485 ; Newton v. Pacillo, La.App., 111 So.2d 895 ; Moore v. Shreveport Transit Co., La.App., 115 So.2d 218 . | 4 | 1939–1962 |
Hutcheson v. Misenheimer
green
2 sentences1961The Supreme Court in Bergeron v. Department of Highways, supra, quoted with approval the following language from Hutcheson v. Misenheimer, 169 Va. 511 , 194 S.E. 665 , 667: "The doctrine of the last clear chance is one involving nice distinctions, often of a technical nature, and courts should be wary in extending its application." [ 221 La. 595 , 60 So.2d 8 .] In Maryland Casualty Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, La.App. 2 Cir., 96 So.2d 340, 344 , which involved facts similar to those presented here, the Court, after quoting the above language from the Bergeron and Hutcheson cases, sai 1961The Supreme Court in Bergeron v. Department of Highways, supra, quoted with approval the following language from Hutcheson v. Misenheimer, 169 Va. 511 , 194 S.E. 665 , 667: "The doctrine of the last clear chance is one involving nice distinctions, often of a technical nature, and courts should be wary in extending its application." [ 221 La. 595 , 60 So.2d 8 .] In Maryland Casualty Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, La.App. 2 Cir., 96 So.2d 340, 344 , which involved facts similar to those presented here, the Court, after quoting the above language from the Bergeron and Hutcheson cases, sai | 4 | 1957–1961 |
Sales v. Guillory
neutral
2 sentences1973Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Company, La.App., 179 So.2d 499 , as well as Sales v. Guillory, La.App., 188 So.2d 429 ." Plaintiff has argued that in the event he is found to be negligent, the defendant is also negligent, thereby allowing the doctrine of last clear chance to be applied. 1967The latest expression of the law relative to the doctrine of last clear chance is set forth in the recent case of Sales v. Guillory, 188 So.2d 429 (La.App.1966), in which it is stated as follows: "Our jurisprudence is now established that in order to apply the humanitarian doctrine of last clear chance, plaintiff must prove clearly three elements exist: (1) plaintiff must be in a position of peril of which he is unaware, or from which he is unable to extricate himself; (2) plaintiff must show that defendant actually discovered, or should have discovered plaintiff’s peril; (3) at the time that | 3 | 1967–1973 |
Franicevich v. Lirette
green
2 sentences1971Plaintiff having failed to prove facts essential to the doctrine of last clear chance, he cannot successfully invoke that doctrine, Lawrence v. Core, 132 So.2d 82 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1961); Franicevich v. Lirette, 241 La. 466 , 129 So.2d 740 (1961); Pate v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 147 So.2d 766 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1962); Campisi v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 152 So.2d 88 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1963); Evans v. Johnson, 236 So.2d 285 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1970); Coleman v. Mason, 174 So.2d 655 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1965); Jones v. Dozier, 160 So.2d 395 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1964); Kwo 1971Plaintiff having failed to prove facts essential to the doctrine of last clear chance, he cannot successfully invoke that doctrine, Lawrence v. Core, 132 So.2d 82 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1961); Franicevich v. Lirette, 241 La. 466 , 129 So.2d 740 (1961); Pate v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 147 So.2d 766 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1962); Campisi v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 152 So.2d 88 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1963); Evans v. Johnson, 236 So.2d 285 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1970); Coleman v. Mason, 174 So.2d 655 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1965); Jones v. Dozier, 160 So.2d 395 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1964); Kwo | 3 | 1962–1971 |
Campisi v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York
green
2 sentences1971Plaintiff having failed to prove facts essential to the doctrine of last clear chance, he cannot successfully invoke that doctrine, Lawrence v. Core, 132 So.2d 82 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1961); Franicevich v. Lirette, 241 La. 466 , 129 So.2d 740 (1961); Pate v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 147 So.2d 766 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1962); Campisi v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 152 So.2d 88 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1963); Evans v. Johnson, 236 So.2d 285 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1970); Coleman v. Mason, 174 So.2d 655 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1965); Jones v. Dozier, 160 So.2d 395 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1964); Kwo 1966Appellants therefore rely primarily upon the last clear chance doctrine and cite the following authorities to support their position : Bergeron v. Department of Highways, 221 La. 595 , 60 So.2d 4 (1952) ; Belshe v. Gant, 235 La. 17 , 102 So.2d 477 (1958) ; Zachery v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., La.App., 116 So.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1959) ; Broussard v. Thompson, La.App., 128 So.2d 477 (3rd Cir. 1961); Campisi v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, La.App., 152 So.2d 88 (3rd Cir. 1963). | 3 | 1964–1971 |
Whitner v. Scott
neutral
2 sentences1970Mc-Callum v. Adkerson, La.App., 126 So.2d 835 ; Whitner v. Scott, La.App., 116 So. 2d 180 .” We believe the plaintiff was in a position of peril of which he was unaware. 1966McCallum v. Adkerson, La.App., 126 So.2d 835 ; Whitner v. Scott, La.App., 116 So.2d 180 ." The driver of an automobile has the right to assume that a pedestrian will exercise reasonable care for his own protection and will not leave a position of safety and proceed into the path of an oncoming vehicle. | 3 | 1963–1970 |
Accardo v. Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co.
neutral
2 sentences1970This Court in Accardo v. Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company, 151 So.2d 116 , said: “It is the settled jurisprudence of this state that for the doctrine of last clear chance to apply, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the following factors by a clear preponderance of evidence, namely: (1) that plaintiff was in a position of peril of which he was unaware or from which he was unable to extricate himself; (2) that defendant was in a position to discover plaintiff’s peril; and (3) that when defendant discovered plaintiff’s peril he had reasonable opportunity to avoid the accident. 1966In Accardo v. Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company, La.App. 1 Cir., 151 So.2d 116, 121 , we set out the following rules as to the doctrine of Last Clear Chance: "It is the settled jurisprudence of this state that for the doctrine of last clear chance to apply, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the following factors by a clear preponderance of evidence, namely: (1) that plaintiff was in a position of peril of which he was unaware or from which he was unable to extricate himself; (2) that defendant was in a position to discover plaintiff's peril; and (3) that when defendant discovered | 3 | 1966–1970 |
Nugent v. Milburn
neutral
2 sentences1962McCarthy v. Blair, La.App., 122 So.2d 837 ; Nugent v. Milburn, La.App., 47 So.2d 377 ; Morris v. Weaver, La.App., 81 So.2d 19 . 1954Neither was keeping a proper lookout nor making proper observations under the facts and circumstances, and the accident could have been avoided by the exercise of due diligence by either party as was stated in Nugent v. Milburn, La.App., 47 So.2d 377 , 379: “Inasmuch as the negligence of both parties is found in their respective failure to maintain a lookout, the facts do not justify the application of the last clear chance doctrine as against either.” See also Coleman v. Smith, La.App., 63 So.2d 171 . | 3 | 1954–1962 |
Moore v. Shreveport Transit Company
green
2 sentences1962Co., 189 La. 1042 , 181 So. 485 ; Newton v. Pacillo, La.App., 111 So.2d 895 ; Moore v. Shreveport Transit Co., La.App., 115 So.2d 218 . 1961Lavigne v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., La.App., 125 So. 2d 430 ; Moore v. Shreveport Transit Co., La.App., 115 So.2d 218 . | 3 | 1960–1962 |
| Burvant v. Wolfe green | 3 | 1924–1932 |
| Gibson v. STATE EX REL. DEPT. OF TRANSP. & DEV. green | 2 | 2009–2024 |
| Patin v. State Farm Ins. Co. green | 2 | 1982–1987 |
| Gonzales v. Xerox Corp. green | 2 | 1980–1983 |
| Widcamp v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. green | 2 | 1980–1981 |
| Glatt v. Hinton green | 2 | 1972–1977 |
| Williamson v. Aetna Insurance Co. neutral | 2 | 1968–1977 |
| Epperly v. Kerrigan neutral | 2 | 1974–1975 |
| Faulkner v. Malloy neutral | 2 | 1970–1974 |
| Richard v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. green | 2 | 1970–1973 |
| Gauthreaux v. Edrington green | 2 | 1971–1973 |
| Jones v. FIREMEN'S INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY green | 2 | 1972–1972 |
| Howard v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York neutral | 2 | 1969–1969 |
| Evans v. Thorpe green | 2 | 1967–1968 |
| Boullion v. Bonin neutral | 2 | 1960–1967 |
| Bailey v. Reggie neutral | 2 | 1959–1967 |
| McCarthy v. Blair neutral | 2 | 1962–1967 |
| Gisclair v. Security Insurance Co. green | 2 | 1966–1966 |
| Zachery v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance neutral | 2 | 1961–1966 |
| Broussard v. Thompson neutral | 2 | 1961–1966 |
| McClanahan v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co. neutral | 2 | 1934–1964 |
| Shield v. F. Johnson & Son Co. green | 2 | 1932–1960 |
| Hollabaugh-Seale Funeral Home, Inc. v. Standard Acc. Ins. green | 2 | 1957–1959 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.