last clear chance doctrine in Maryland

1976And, if the unfavored driver is a plaintiff, his suit is defeated unless the doctrine of last clear chance rescues his claim.” And in Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426 , 330 A. 2d 196 (1974), the Court said, at 431: “* * * when the unfavored driver sues, the 'boulevard rule’ barring his recovery applies to an accident which occurs between an unfavored driver *251 and the favored motorist on the ‘boulevard,’ * * * unless, under appropriate circumstances, the unfavored driver is rescued by the doctrine of last clear chance, Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116 , 8 A. 2d 888 (1939).” Appellants concede t

1976If suit is brought by the unfavored driver, he may recover if the circumstances permit the application of the doctrine of last clear chance, Greenfeld v. Hook, supra, 177 Md. at 133 .

1990The remaining issue involves the applicability to the case sub judice of “last clear chance.” Because the last clear chance doctrine presupposes the presence in the case of both primary negligence and contributory negligence, MacKenzie v. Reesey, 235 Md. 381, 387 , 201 A.2d 848 (1964); Smiley v. Atkinson, 12 Md.App. 543, 552-53 , 280 A.2d 277 (1971), our resolution of the contributory negligence issue necessarily is dispositive: this is not a case in which a last clear chance instruction should, or could, have been given.

1990The remaining issue involves the applicability to the case sub judice of “last clear chance.” Because the last clear chance doctrine presupposes the presence in the case of both primary negligence and contributory negligence, MacKenzie v. Reesey, 235 Md. 381, 387 , 201 A.2d 848 (1964); Smiley v. Atkinson, 12 Md.App. 543, 552-53 , 280 A.2d 277 (1971), our resolution of the contributory negligence issue necessarily is dispositive: this is not a case in which a last clear chance instruction should, or could, have been given.

1952As pointed out, the doctrine of last clear chance is well set out by Judge Offutt in the case of Legum v. State, 167 Md. 339 , at page 355, 173 A. 565, 572 , where it is said: “The basis of the doctrine of last clear chance is that the actor either has actual knowledge, or is under some legal duty which charges *475 him with knowledge, (a) that if he persists in a course which he is pursuing it will result in injury to another, (b) which the other cannot, because of ignorance or disability, be reasonably expected to avoid, (c) when the actor either has or is chargeable with that knowledge in t

1952As pointed out, the doctrine of last clear chance is well set out by Judge Offutt in the case of Legum v. State, 167 Md. 339 , at page 355, 173 A. 565, 572 , where it is said: “The basis of the doctrine of last clear chance is that the actor either has actual knowledge, or is under some legal duty which charges *475 him with knowledge, (a) that if he persists in a course which he is pursuing it will result in injury to another, (b) which the other cannot, because of ignorance or disability, be reasonably expected to avoid, (c) when the actor either has or is chargeable with that knowledge in t

2001In Simmons , Judge; Harrell for this Court said: The last clear chance doctrine “presupposes a perilous situation created or existing through both a defendant’s negligence and plaintiffs contributory negligence and assumes that there was a time after such negligence has occurred when the defendant could, and the plaintiff could not, by the use of the means available, avert the accident.” Johnson v. Dortch, 27 Md.App. 605, 614 , 342 A.2d 326 , cert. denied, 276 Md. 745 (1975) (examining last clear chance . doctrine in a boulevard law case).

2001In Simmons , Judge; Harrell for this Court said: The last clear chance doctrine “presupposes a perilous situation created or existing through both a defendant’s negligence and plaintiffs contributory negligence and assumes that there was a time after such negligence has occurred when the defendant could, and the plaintiff could not, by the use of the means available, avert the accident.” Johnson v. Dortch, 27 Md.App. 605, 614 , 342 A.2d 326 , cert. denied, 276 Md. 745 (1975) (examining last clear chance . doctrine in a boulevard law case).

1995Following the court’s actual instructions to the jury, appellants’ counsel noted his objection to the court’s refusal to instruct on the doctrine of last clear chance, citing a recent Court of Special Appeals decision in Myers v. Alessi, 80 Md.App. 124 , 560 A.2d 59 , cert. denied, 317 Md. 640 , 566 A.2d 101 (1989).

1995Following the court’s actual instructions to the jury, appellants’ counsel noted his objection to the court’s refusal to instruct on the doctrine of last clear chance, citing a recent Court of Special Appeals decision in Myers v. Alessi, 80 Md.App. 124 , 560 A.2d 59 , cert. denied, 317 Md. 640 , 566 A.2d 101 (1989).

1975This large group of previous cases makes clear that when the unfavored driver sues, the ‘boulevard rule’ barring his recovery applies to an accident which occurs between, an unfavored driver and the favored motorist . on the ‘boulevard,’ either in the intersection or at a point, though technically outside the intersection, so close to it that the unfavored entering driver interferes with the favored driver’s right-of-way into or through the intersection, Grue et al. v. Collins, 237 Md. 150, 157 , 205 A. 2d 260 (1964), unless, under appropriate circumstances, the unfavored driver is rescued by

1975This large group of previous cases makes clear that when the unfavored driver sues, the ‘boulevard rule’ barring his recovery applies to an accident which occurs between, an unfavored driver and the favored motorist . on the ‘boulevard,’ either in the intersection or at a point, though technically outside the intersection, so close to it that the unfavored entering driver interferes with the favored driver’s right-of-way into or through the intersection, Grue et al. v. Collins, 237 Md. 150, 157 , 205 A. 2d 260 (1964), unless, under appropriate circumstances, the unfavored driver is rescued by

1969In such a situation one does not have time to think what is the best thing to do; the emergency occurs so quickly that it would be unjust to apply the ' rule which governs in the ordinary case.’ In Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 44 , we said: ‘Time and a reasonable opportunity to avoid an imminent danger is an essential element here, as it is under the doctrine of last clear chance.’ Similar arguments as to a wrong choice in an emergency, were advanced, without success, in Coastal Tank Lines v. Carroll, 205 Md. 137 , Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500 and Burhans v. Burhans, 159 Md

1969In such a situation one does not have time to think what is the best thing to do; the emergency occurs so quickly that it would be unjust to apply the ' rule which governs in the ordinary case.’ In Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 44 , we said: ‘Time and a reasonable opportunity to avoid an imminent danger is an essential element here, as it is under the doctrine of last clear chance.’ Similar arguments as to a wrong choice in an emergency, were advanced, without success, in Coastal Tank Lines v. Carroll, 205 Md. 137 , Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500 and Burhans v. Burhans, 159 Md

2009In some contributory negligence situations, however, the doctrine of last clear chance can apply to allow recovery. [T]he doctrine of last clear chance permits a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover damages from a negligent defendant if each of the following elements is satisfied: (i) the defendant is negligent; (ii) the plaintiff is contributorily negligent; and (iii) the plaintiff makes “a showing of something new or sequential, which affords the defendant a fresh opportunity (of which he fails to avail himself) to avert the consequences of his original negligence.” Burdette v. Rock

2009In some contributory negligence situations, however, the doctrine of last clear chance can apply to allow recovery. [T]he doctrine of last clear chance permits a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover damages from a negligent defendant if each of the following elements is satisfied: (i) the defendant is negligent; (ii) the plaintiff is contributorily negligent; and (iii) the plaintiff makes “a showing of something new or sequential, which affords the defendant a fresh opportunity (of which he fails to avail himself) to avert the consequences of his original negligence.” Burdette v. Rock

1990The remaining issue involves the applicability to the case sub judice of “last clear chance.” Because the last clear chance doctrine presupposes the presence in the case of both primary negligence and contributory negligence, MacKenzie v. Reesey, 235 Md. 381, 387 , 201 A.2d 848 (1964); Smiley v. Atkinson, 12 Md.App. 543, 552-53 , 280 A.2d 277 (1971), our resolution of the contributory negligence issue necessarily is dispositive: this is not a case in which a last clear chance instruction should, or could, have been given.

1990The remaining issue involves the applicability to the case sub judice of “last clear chance.” Because the last clear chance doctrine presupposes the presence in the case of both primary negligence and contributory negligence, MacKenzie v. Reesey, 235 Md. 381, 387 , 201 A.2d 848 (1964); Smiley v. Atkinson, 12 Md.App. 543, 552-53 , 280 A.2d 277 (1971), our resolution of the contributory negligence issue necessarily is dispositive: this is not a case in which a last clear chance instruction should, or could, have been given.

1969In such a situation one does not have time to think what is the best thing to do; the emergency occurs so quickly that it would be unjust to apply the ' rule which governs in the ordinary case.’ In Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 44 , we said: ‘Time and a reasonable opportunity to avoid an imminent danger is an essential element here, as it is under the doctrine of last clear chance.’ Similar arguments as to a wrong choice in an emergency, were advanced, without success, in Coastal Tank Lines v. Carroll, 205 Md. 137 , Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500 and Burhans v. Burhans, 159 Md

1958In such a situation one does not have time to think what is the best thing to do; the emergency occurs so quickly that it would be unjust to apply the rule which governs in the ordinary case.” In Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 44 , we said: “Time and a reasonable opportunity to avoid an imminent danger is an essential element here, as it is under the doctrine of last clear chance.” Similar arguments as to a wrong choice in an emergency, were advanced, without success, in Coastal Tank Lines v. Carroll, 205 Md. 137 , Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500 and Burhans v. Burhans, 159 Md.

1969In such a situation one does not have time to think what is the best thing to do; the emergency occurs so quickly that it would be unjust to apply the ' rule which governs in the ordinary case.’ In Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 44 , we said: ‘Time and a reasonable opportunity to avoid an imminent danger is an essential element here, as it is under the doctrine of last clear chance.’ Similar arguments as to a wrong choice in an emergency, were advanced, without success, in Coastal Tank Lines v. Carroll, 205 Md. 137 , Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500 and Burhans v. Burhans, 159 Md

1958In such a situation one does not have time to think what is the best thing to do; the emergency occurs so quickly that it would be unjust to apply the rule which governs in the ordinary case.” In Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 44 , we said: “Time and a reasonable opportunity to avoid an imminent danger is an essential element here, as it is under the doctrine of last clear chance.” Similar arguments as to a wrong choice in an emergency, were advanced, without success, in Coastal Tank Lines v. Carroll, 205 Md. 137 , Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500 and Burhans v. Burhans, 159 Md.

1969In such a situation one does not have time to think what is the best thing to do; the emergency occurs so quickly that it would be unjust to apply the ' rule which governs in the ordinary case.’ In Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 44 , we said: ‘Time and a reasonable opportunity to avoid an imminent danger is an essential element here, as it is under the doctrine of last clear chance.’ Similar arguments as to a wrong choice in an emergency, were advanced, without success, in Coastal Tank Lines v. Carroll, 205 Md. 137 , Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500 and Burhans v. Burhans, 159 Md

1958In such a situation one does not have time to think what is the best thing to do; the emergency occurs so quickly that it would be unjust to apply the rule which governs in the ordinary case.” In Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 44 , we said: “Time and a reasonable opportunity to avoid an imminent danger is an essential element here, as it is under the doctrine of last clear chance.” Similar arguments as to a wrong choice in an emergency, were advanced, without success, in Coastal Tank Lines v. Carroll, 205 Md. 137 , Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500 and Burhans v. Burhans, 159 Md.

1968It was said in West v. Belle Isle Cab Co., 203 Md. 244, 252 , 100 A. 2d 17 : “Further, if, as the testimony indicates, she suddenly stepped from between the parked cars, she was guilty of contributory negligence which was concurrent with the negligence of the driver, if negligence there was, and under those circumstances, the doctrine of last clear chance would not be applicable.” It was said in reference to the doctrine of last clear chance in Martin v. Sweeney, 207 Md. 543, 552 , 114 A. 2d 825 , quoting from United Rys. v. Sherwood Bros., 161 Md. 304 , 157 A. 280 , and from O’Keefe v. Baltim

1968It was said in West v. Belle Isle Cab Co., 203 Md. 244, 252 , 100 A. 2d 17 : “Further, if, as the testimony indicates, she suddenly stepped from between the parked cars, she was guilty of contributory negligence which was concurrent with the negligence of the driver, if negligence there was, and under those circumstances, the doctrine of last clear chance would not be applicable.” It was said in reference to the doctrine of last clear chance in Martin v. Sweeney, 207 Md. 543, 552 , 114 A. 2d 825 , quoting from United Rys. v. Sherwood Bros., 161 Md. 304 , 157 A. 280 , and from O’Keefe v. Baltim

1953This Court there said 157 Md. at page 633 , 147 A. at page 533 : “From these facts we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the plaintiff by his own negligence contributed to the accident resulting in the injuries and loss of which he complains.” The Court there held that the doctrine of last clear chance did not apply.

1953This Court there said 157 Md. at page 633 , 147 A. at page 533 : “From these facts we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the plaintiff by his own negligence contributed to the accident resulting in the injuries and loss of which he complains.” The Court there held that the doctrine of last clear chance did not apply.

2013See, e.g., Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1050 ; Hoffman, 280 So.2d at 438 ; Alvis, 52 Ill.Dec. 23 , 421 N.E.2d at 898 .

2013Despite general scholarly agreement with this principle, see, e.g., Digges & Klein, supra, at 276; Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 464 ("The real explanation [for the doctrine of last clear chance] would seem to be a fundamental dislike for the harshness of the contributory negligence defense.”), the Harrison court stated that "[n]othing in [the adopting case] lends any direct support to this hypothesis.” 295 Md. at 450-51 , 456 A.2d at 898 . .

2013Despite general scholarly agreement with this principle, see, e.g., Digges & Klein, supra, at 276; Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 464 ("The real explanation [for the doctrine of last clear chance] would seem to be a fundamental dislike for the harshness of the contributory negligence defense.”), the Harrison court stated that "[n]othing in [the adopting case] lends any direct support to this hypothesis.” 295 Md. at 450-51 , 456 A.2d at 898 . .

2013See, e.g., Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1050 ; Hoffman, 280 So.2d at 438 ; Alvis, 52 Ill.Dec. 23 , 421 N.E.2d at 898 .

2009In some contributory negligence situations, however, the doctrine of last clear chance can apply to allow recovery. [T]he doctrine of last clear chance permits a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover damages from a negligent defendant if each of the following elements is satisfied: (i) the defendant is negligent; (ii) the plaintiff is contributorily negligent; and (iii) the plaintiff makes “a showing of something new or sequential, which affords the defendant a fresh opportunity (of which he fails to avail himself) to avert the consequences of his original negligence.” Burdette v. Rock

2009In some contributory negligence situations, however, the doctrine of last clear chance can apply to allow recovery. [T]he doctrine of last clear chance permits a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover damages from a negligent defendant if each of the following elements is satisfied: (i) the defendant is negligent; (ii) the plaintiff is contributorily negligent; and (iii) the plaintiff makes “a showing of something new or sequential, which affords the defendant a fresh opportunity (of which he fails to avail himself) to avert the consequences of his original negligence.” Burdette v. Rock

2005As between the favored driver and the unfavored driver, such a jury issue is presented only “if the circumstances permit the application of the doctrine of last clear chance,” or the evidence is such as to permit, but not require, the jury to find “that the favored driver’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.” Dennard, 335 Md. at 319 , 643 A.2d 422 (internal citations omitted).

2005As between the favored driver and the unfavored driver, such a jury issue is presented only “if the circumstances permit the application of the doctrine of last clear chance,” or the evidence is such as to permit, but not require, the jury to find “that the favored driver’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.” Dennard, 335 Md. at 319 , 643 A.2d 422 (internal citations omitted).

2004Co. v. Leasure, 193 Md. 523, 534 , 69 A.2d 248 (1949). *358 Our research revealed more than four dozen reported Maryland cases discussing the last clear chance doctrine.

2004Co. v. Leasure, 193 Md. 523, 534 , 69 A.2d 248 (1949). *358 Our research revealed more than four dozen reported Maryland cases discussing the last clear chance doctrine.

2004Cohen v. Rubin, 55 Md.App. 83, 92 , 460 A.2d 1046 (1983)(citing MacKenzie v. Reesey, 235 Md. 381 , 201 A.2d 848 (1964)). *359 Ill On appeal, appellant concedes Clyburn’s negligence.

2004Cohen v. Rubin, 55 Md.App. 83, 92 , 460 A.2d 1046 (1983)(citing MacKenzie v. Reesey, 235 Md. 381 , 201 A.2d 848 (1964)). *359 Ill On appeal, appellant concedes Clyburn’s negligence.

2004Id.